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INTRODUCTION 
Wa-sâr minhum zulm zâyid shay' yukammil al-wasf 
fa-irtafa' al-matar min al-zulm 
And they imposed a reign of injustice which was beyond 
description; even the rains stopped because of the injustice done 
During much of the late 18th and early 19th centuries most parts of the 
Syrian provinces of the Ottoman empire witnessed oppressive and, at 
times, violent rule. It was not for the first time that the area witnessed un-
charitable government. The forces of order in traditional society har-
boured the antipodes of justice and benevolence: injustice and brutality. 
Both rulers and subjects were generally well-aware of this contradiction 
ruling society. This awareness is manifest in the literary and documen-
tary sources. Chroniclers complain about a wide range of unjust measures 
imposed by the agents of the state; superiors warn their inferiors to re-
frain from such acts; court historians concede that inequitable measures 
had become part of the system and even had to become part of it because 
their inclusion was considered an undesirable but inevitable stage in the 
life-cycle of empires. 
The main contradiction ruling traditional states like the Ottoman em-
pire concerns the recurrent disparity between the needs of the state and 
the inadequacy of the resources of the territories over which it ruled. 
Notwithstanding the achievements of the Ottomans in organizing a com-
plex administration which encompassed vast and diverse territories, the 
capabilities of a pre-industrial state like the Ottoman were limited. In 
these states coercion constituted a vital policy instrument since other 
methods of persuasion often failed. Although coercion was not by defini-
tion unjust, it could easily be regarded as such by the subjects of the state, 
who suffered from violent acts causing damage, loss and grief. The mere 
threat of harmful action, or symbolic punitive exercises, sufficed to keep 
the awareness of the potential damage alive. The preservation of the 
state depended to a considerable extent on the application of force. It 
was an indispensable tool to press the material claims of the state on the 
population. However, the exploitation of the resources of its territories 
could not be pursued with success when the state lost its legitimacy. The 
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Ottoman court historian Mustafa Naima considered it the ideal that the 
subjects felt both dread of and affection for the sultan. Evidently, coer-
cion was deemed to be complementary to legitimacy and not necessarily 
inconsistent with legitimate power as long as it was the privilege of the 
state. 
The functioning of the Ottoman administration in the Syrian interior, 
and in particular in the district of Hama, is the concern of this study. The 
district of Hama was attached to the province of Damascus, which 
covered most of inland Syria. The period under discussion is 1785-1841. 
The main context in which provincial administration evolves, was, of 
course, the state. The Ottoman concept of the state, devlet (Arabic 
dawla), was not an impersonal abstraction. It denoted the dynastic rule of 
each individual head of the House of Osman, the sultan, and by extension 
the institutions created to protect his rule and to administer the territo-
ries under his rule, the dynastic patrimony. Those who protected the rule 
of the sultan and administered the territories enjoyed a number of privi-
leges, but they were considered the sultan's slaves. The ruling class, then, 
constituted a servile elite. This ruling class was referred to as askeri, the 
military, but included the bureaucrats as well. They were the Ottomans. 
The subject classes, the reaya or flocks, were free, but entrusted by God 
to the care of the sultan. 
The authority of the sultan was absolute. No formal limitations on his 
power existed, but the inclusion of the divine law, the shar', in Ottoman 
ideology did put some restraints on the sultan's power. The association of 
the sultanic authority with religious law was derived from the pre-Islamic 
Persian tradition in which royal authority and religious order had been 
made mutually dependent. In the Ottoman concept of government the 
Islamic law constituted the foundation of the state, but this law could not 
be upheld without sultanic support. Well into the 19th century two com-
plementary principles of government dominated Ottoman political think-
ing: the Circle of Equity and the Bounds. Apart from the association of 
royal authority with religious law, the first doctrine maintains that the sur-
vival of the state depends on the prosperity of the subjects, in particular 
the peasantry. They pay the taxes which enable the sultan to maintain the 
military and the bureaucratic apparatus. The prosperity of the subjects 
depends on justice and it is the function of the sultan to render justice. In 
the view of Ernest Gellner this "simple and elegant political theory...sums 
up, lucidly and adequately, the general condition of agrarian society". 
The second doctrine holds that the separation between the askeri and the 
reaya is fundamental for the proper functioning of the state, basically be-
cause the askeri did not pay taxes. 
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In the political context justice meant the protection of the subject 
classes against abuse of the power which was delegated by the sultan to 
his servants, the askeri. Above all, the subject classes had to be protected 
against their illegal financial demands. This notion was certainly linked 
to the consideration that the subjects should be left with sufficient means 
to continue their economic activities, but more importantly it was aimed 
at the maintenance of the personal and absolute power of the sultan, who 
was the sole individual in the empire having an inalienable right to the re-
venue. The ideal, or myth, of justice and benovelence facilitated the disci-
plining of the members of the askeri class. 
The delegation of power constituted a major dilemma in an autocratic 
state like the Ottoman empire. Considerable powers were delegated to 
those who served in the provinces. The ability to control the office-
holders in the provinces was limited, in particular because local power 
groups had been increasingly engaged in provincial administration in the 
course of the 17th and 18th centuries. In other words, local elements had 
gained access to the askeri class. As a result the separation between the 
askeri and reaya classes had not only become blurred, but the enlarge-
ment of the askeri class posed a danger to the functioning of the state and 
the well-being of the reaya, or rather to their productive qualities, be-
cause the financial pressure on the subjects increased. Moreover, the 
danger existed that the agents of the state were able to acquire an inde-
pendent power base in the province. Locally recruited nominees already 
had a power base and were liable to strengthen their position. Non-local 
nominees regularly succeeded in creating a power base in the province. 
The outcome was the fragmentation of power, which could result in the 
disintegration of the state. 
The main responsibilities of the provincial office-holders were the col-
lection of revenue and the protection of production. Given the recurrent 
inadequacy of the provincial resources competition for revenue was in-
tense, not only between the local power groups, but also between them 
and the central authority. The central state had adopted a position 
towards the extraction of revenue which posed a moral dilemma. It did 
not necessarily object to unjust measures in the process of collecting re-
venue provided that its own material demands were fulfilled. After all, 
"most governments preferred material to moral satisfaction."1 In this re-
spect the government can be defined as "an institution which prevents in-
justice other than such as it commits itself." However, in order to 
preserve its moral hold on the population the central authority imposed, 
or more often threatened to impose, sanctions on those who perpetrated 
acts of injustice. This latter policy also served as an important instrument 
to contain power groups in the province and to press the central state's fi-
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nancial claims on them. This was not the only method to safeguard the in-
terests of the central state. Various instruments were employed in order 
to contain the power of provincial office-holders, like the rotation of the 
senior offices and the separation of authority. Each of these instruments 
had its limitation and their efficiency depended on circumstance. 
Some of the dilemmas facing the central authority were embedded in the 
provincial administration as well. The senior provincial office-holders de-
pended on the services of the body of officials, officers and tax farmers to 
whom power had to be delegated. Within the confines of provincial rule 
the mechanisms of control were often inadequate. The limitations im-
posed by the central authority on the office-holders in the province could 
seriously restrict their abilities and force them, more often than not, to 
use more informal, as well as illegal or unauthorized methods to 
strengthen their control. The containment policies of the central state 
could also produce or stimulate political fragmentation in the province, in 
particular when senior office-holders were recruited from competing 
local power groups. 
With regard to the Syrian provinces of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli 
the period 1785-1841 can be divided into three phases. Firstly, 1785-1812, 
a period characterized by intense competition between provincial and 
local factions. Secondly, 1812-1832, a period in which factionalism ac-
quired a more narrow and petty local nature. The third period, 1832-41, 
differs markedly in this respect; local factionalism was by and large 
suppressed. This was not the logical outcome of developments of the ear-
lier periods. In 1831 the reformist governor of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali 
Pasha, rebelled against the sultan and by July of 1832 he had occupied all 
of Syria. For nearly a decade Syria witnessed an unprecedented degree of 
centralization and direct rule. Muhammad 'Ali Pasha is generally re-
garded as the first, at least would-be, modern ruler in the Eastern Medi-
terranean; the first to formulate new answers to old problems, including 
the problem of the delegation of power and the deficiency of the re-
sources. For this reason the decade of Egyptian rule is included in the 
discussion of the mechanisms of provincial and local rule. The emphasis, 
however, is on the first two periods. 
The principal questions concern the main elements of the Circle of 
Equity in which 1) the relations of power and 2) the relations of exploita-
tion are linked to 3) legitimacy. It was the belief of the Ottoman imperial 
elite that this doctrine could solve the two major dilemmas of the tradi-
tional state: the delegation of power and the inadequacy of the resources. 
It could not, but it shall be demonstrated that the Circle of Equity re-
flected, indeed, the condition of (the state in) pre-modern Syrian society. 
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Three sets of interrelated features of provincial and local rule shall be ex-
amined in the light of these two dilemmas: 
1. Composition, recruitment and career patterns of the provincial and 
local office-holders. 
2. Function and limitations of the various actors on the provincial and 
local levels; their mutual relations and their relation with the central 
authority. 
3. Methods of exploitation of the resources and the attitudes towards the 
most important group of producers, the peasantry. 
In order to be able to examine provincial and local rule it is first neces-
sary to introduce Hamawî society in the context of the Syrian interior, 
which was exposed to strong tribal pressure (Chapter One). Next, the 
more general regional context will be presented, especially the emer-
gence of three strong local power groups: firstly, the one headed by the 
'Azm family which dominated the Syrian provinces for much of the 18th 
century and had its rural base in the Hama area; secondly, the military 
household of Jazzâr Pasha of the coastal town of Acre which became the 
dominant group in Syria in the closing decades of the 18th century; 
thirdly, the military household of Muhammad 'All Pasha of Egypt in the 
early 19th century which eventually competed for power with the imperial 
household and annexed the Syrian provinces to its realm in 1831-2 (Chap-
ter Two). Then follows a description of local administration, in particular 
of the various institutions and the people who participated in the adminis-
tration (Chapter Three). This portrayal of the local government is fol-
lowed by an analysis of the extreme factionalism during the period 
1785-1812 and the subsidence of the violence and contention in the pe-
riod 1812-1832 (Chapter Four). Given that the exploitation of the re-
sources of the area played an important part in the competition between 
the local factions and also defined the relations between local and central 
authority, the next two chapters deal with the fiscal and financial contexts 
of provincial administration until 1832. After a detailed description of the 
tax system (Chapter Five) an interpretation of the policies provincial fi-
nance is given (Chapter Six). Finally, the short period of Egyptian rule 
over Syria will be discussed, in particular the recruitment of local-office-
holders and the financial and economic policies (Chapter Seven). 
Sources 
This study is primarily based on the sijillât al-mahkama al-shar'iyya, the 
registers of the Religious Court, of the district of Нагла and on a number 
of local chronicles. Since the main concern of this study is the local con­
text of the administration, preference has been given to these local 
sources. 
The registers of the Religious Court 
The registers of the Religious Court of Hama (SMH) are kept in the 
Markaz al-Wathâ'iq al-Târîkhiyya, the Centre for Historical Documenta-
tion, in Damascus. They contain four broad categories of documents: 
1. Copies of judicial deeds, hujjas, issued by the court in which a summary 
of a law suit is given including the sentence. 
2. Copies of notarized deeds, referred to as hujjas as well, concerning a 
variety of transactions and contracts, but most importantly inheritances, 
purchases of real estate, loans, partnerships, divorces, as well as the es-
tablishment, administration and lease of religious and family foundations 
(waqf) 
3. Copies of a variety of buyuruldus, edicts, emanating from the the pro-
vincial governor (wait), or his council (dîwân), as well as from the impe-
rial dîwân. 
4. Tax tabulations and surveys. 
Obviously the latter two categories are of great importance to this study. 
For the period under review, 1785-1841, the Hama registers appear to be 
unique for the Syrian provinces in that they contain a large amount of 
these documents, especially letters of appointment, replies to petitions, 
tax tabulations and surveys, and orders related to war efforts and re-
volts.1 The large majority of the documents is in Arabic. Turkish edicts 
are often accompanied by an Arabic translation. The shar'î material 
proper, the hujjas of the first two categories, deal with many aspects of 
private and public life. Most of them deal with property rights and 
economic relations between individuals or between individuals and a 
number of villagers, craftsmen or tribesmen. Matters of family law consti-
tute another large part of the hujjas which are preserved in the sijills. 
Only a small number of lutjjas concern matters of faith and moral be-
haviour. 
The registers of the Religious Court of Hama impose some limitations 
on the research. Until they were transferred to the Markaz al-Wathâ'iq al-
Târîkhiyya in Damascus, the Hama registers were kept in very poor con-
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ditions in the museum of Hama. Mildew has affected the volumes badly 
to the extent that many pages have partly mouldered. Careless binding 
has made matters worse, because many lines start, or end, in the spine of 
the volume. The Centre of Historical Documentation lacks funding to re-
pair the often fragile documents. However, the reading of the documents 
now gives one the sense of pioneering normally reserved for archaeolo-
gists. 
The use of the court registers 
Apart from their physical shortcomings the court registers impose a num-
ber of other limitations on the research. Unfortunately, it has become a 
habit among students of the history of the Syrian provinces to praise the 
merits of the court registers while remaining silent about the pitfalls or 
playing these down. So far no critical assessment has been made, prob-
ably because the use of the registers by researchers only gained momen-
tum during the last fifteen years. It is true that the court registers 
contain a wealth of information and constitute the main source for the so-
cial and economic history of the towns and their hinterlands in the area. 
Other local sources include chronicles, biographical works (focussing on 
'ulama'), family papers, and archives of religious institutions, mainly 
Christian. The distribution over locality and time of most sources is un-
even. Hama, for instance is well covered by its court registers, but hardly 
any record of the religious court of its twin town Horns has survived. 
Lebanon, while poorly served by the registers, is well covered by chron-
icles, as well as monastic and patriarchal archival material. 
Given the hesitation on the part of most students of Syrian history to 
disclose the shortcomings of the registers of the Religious Court as a his-
torical source, and my own experience with this source being confined to 
late 18th and 19th century Hama, I will only present some critical remarks 
which deserve further consideration in the future. 
From the nature of the institution to which the registers belong, the 
mahkama shar'iyya, it follows that the coverage of the registers is con-
fined to certain areas of public and private life. The jurisdiction of the 
court was extensive, but nonetheless limited. For instance, hardly any 
criminal cases were brought before the court in the 18th and 19th centur-
ies. The inclusion of non-shar'î material like letters of appointment and 
tax tabulations in the period under regard often depended upon specific 
circumstances in given years and is, consequently, distributed unevenly 
over the period. 
The registers are incomplete. Even in extensive series like that of the 
Hama court some years or months are lacking. The information given in 
numerous hujjas, in particular in the summaries of law suits, is often mini-
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mal. Much of what should have been most interesting information is 
omitted. Thus in the case of two litigants arguing or quarrelling before 
the court, the hujja often simply states that an argument or quarrel 
developed by using phrases like wa-sûra nizâ', or even qâl wa-qtl which 
translates to "blah-blah". Moreover, in most valuable documents, like 
those on inheritances, possessions like real estate are often excluded. It is 
also evident that other transactions were not or rarely recorded, such as 
the sale of the usufructuary rights of waqf properties. The question of 
how comprehensive the registers are, remains, as yet, open to specula-
tion.19 
Many documents relate to the "ideal" and do not necessarily reflect 
actual practice. For instance, a hujja tells us how an inheritance should be 
divided and an edict on a certain tax may only tell us how much should be 
collected. This problem can be partly solved by information collected 
from other documents which tells us that someone failed to conform to 
the prescriptions of the hujja or the edict. At times shar'î law imposes its 
ideals on society in neglect of common practice, for instance in the case 
of charging interest, or converts certain informal practices into formal 
shar'î vocabulary. Some lawsuits were mere rituals. There is little doubt 
that hujjas played an important role in solving disputes and in protecting 
the rights of individuals or groups, because so many people made use of 
the services of the court, not only townspeople but villagers and tribes-
men as well. However, little is known about the completion of disputes 
and the same goes for alternative methods of dispute settlement. 
Notwithstanding the remarks made above, the value of the registers of 
the Religious Court as a source for the history of the Syrian provinces is 
great. They contain a host of data on a great variety of topics, much of 
which is not to be found in any other source. 
Chronicles 
An important additional source for the study of local history are the con-
temporary and near contemporary literary sources, in particular the 
chronicles. The most important chronicles for the history of the province 
of Damascus and the district of Hama are: 
1. Lubnânjî 'ahd al-umarâ' al-Shihâbiyyîn, which is the title of the edition 
(1933) by A. Rustum and F. al-Bustânî of the last two parts of the 
voluminous manuscript by the Lebanese amir Haydar Ahmad Shihâb 
(1761-1835). The original title of the manuscript appears to have been 
Ghurar al-hisân fi dhikr abnâ' al-zamân. The history of the Shihâb 
family, and with it that of Jabal Lubnân, forms the centerpiece of this 
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manuscript, but it contains much information on events in the province of 
Damascus. 
2. Târîkh liawâdith al-Shâm wa-Lubnân, also known as Târîkh Mikhail al-
Dimashqi, which was first edited by L. Ma'lûf and published in al-Mashriq 
in 1912. In 1982 an edition by A. Gh. Sabânû was published in Damascus. 
The author of the manuscript is referred to by its copyist as Mikhâ'îl al-
Dimashqî, but this copyist may have been the author himself who was un-
willing to reveal his identity. The manuscript is made up of three parts 
and was completed in 1843. In particular the first part is of interest for 
this study since it deals with the governors of Damascus during the 1782-
1841 period. 
3. Târîkh Hasan Aghâ al-'Abd, edited by Y J . Nu'aysa and published in 
1979. The manuscript and its edition have received little attention so far. 
The original manuscript was part of the vast manuscript collection of the 
Zâhiriyya library in Damascus, but only a xerox copy has survived. The 
Damascene Hasan Aghâ al-'Abd is the author of the untitled and in-
complete manuscript. The part edited and published covers events in the 
province of Damascus during the 1772-1826 period. The little information 
we have about the author is derived from the manuscript itself and from a 
few scattered references to him in some other chronicles, amongst them 
Shihâb's Lubnân. Hasan Aghâ was an official and was, amongst others, 
involved in the repair of the fortresses along the road to the Hijâz. In the 
early 1820s he acted as governor of the Biqâ' district (Века valley). 
4. Târîkh Hints, yawmiyyât, by the religious sheikh Muhammad al-Makki 
ibn al-Sayyid ibn al-Hâjj Makkî ibn Khânqâh, a native of Homs. The un-
titled manuscript, kept in the library of the American University of 
Beirut, was edited by 'U.N. al-'Umar and published in Damascus in 1987. 
Although covering an earlier period (1688-1722), this work is of great in-
terest because it is one of the few chronicles which have survived from 
places in Syria other than Damascus, Lebanon and Aleppo for the Ot-
toman period prior to the second half of the 19th century. In the context 
of this study this chronicle sheds some new light on the circumstances in 
the Homs and Hama areas at the time of emergence of the 'Azm family 
(see Chapter Two). 
Some other edited manuscripts have been used as well, but much less 
frequently than those mentioned above. Information from two unedited 
manuscripts (Hiqab and Sâyikh's Muqtarab) has been used as well, but 
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only in one or two places. For these edited and unedited manuscripts see 
the bibliography. 
The travel accounts, written predominantly by European travellers, are 
numerous but only a few offer valuable information on the Syrian interior 
during the period under regard. The main exception to this rule are the 
works of John Lewis Burckhardt {Notes and Travels). He spent several 
years in Syria, Arabia and Egypt, where he died, and was one of the few 
travellers who spoke Arabic fluently. He showed more courage than the 
average tourist by leaving the beaten tracks and in particular his work on 
the tribes is unique for the period. 
Note on transliteration 
Since this study is based on Arabic documentary and literary sources the 
large majority of names, phrases and technical terms are transliterated 
according to the convention for Arabic used in the International loumal 
of Middle East Studies. Turkish administrative terms which are derived 
from Arabic have also been given this transliteration. For other Turkish 
terms the modern standard Turkish spelling has been employed. Only the 
tendency to change the final consonants d and b into t and ρ has not been 
followed. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE HAMA PLAIN AND THE TRIBES 
1.1 Between the mountain and the desert 
In 1785 the district of Hama covered a portion of the vast inland plains of 
Bilâd al-Shâm; Syria. To the west the Hama plain is contained by the 
coastal chain, al-Jibâl al-Nusayriyya, the Nusayrî Mountains as they were 
called then. To the east lies the Bâdiyat al-Shâm, the Syrian Desert. The 
word bâdiya denoted wasteland rather than scarcely vegetated arid land: 
the Bâdiyat al-Shâm comprised extensive tracts of steppe and pasture. 
The town of Hama was situated in the transitional zone between culti-
vated and uncultivated land. In earlier times this desert line ran further 
to the east; a considerable part of the bâdiya of Hama had been farmland. 
It was dotted with khirab (sing, khirba), the, often ancient, ruins of 
deserted villages. In principle, the average rainfall would have permitted 
the cultivation of wheat and some other crops, as far as 60 or 70 kilome-
ters to the east of the town. Settled farming had, however, been super-
seded by pastoralism. The process of village desertion can be traced back 
to the later Middle Ages. The bâdiya had reached the outskirts of the 
town of Hama in the early sixteenth century, when the region was con-
quered by the Ottomans. Under Ottoman rule the settled farming com-
munities appear to have been relatively stable until the late seventeenth 
century. From then on the bâdiya claimed farmland in particular in the 
northern part of the district and in the area to the south of the town (see 
map 2). 
The foothills of the Nusayrî Mountains offered a totally different pic-
ture. They received about twice as much rainfall as the town of Hama and 
during summer the water from smaller and larger springs exceeded the 
local needs. The slopes and hills to the south were covered with mulberry 
orchards and vineyards, amidst patches of brushwood. Further to the 
north cultivation was less intensive; some oak forest had survived near 
Misyâf, but the hills of the Jabal Kalbiyya were largely denuded of trees 
except for some mulberry plantations. Still, the relative abundance of 
water allowed for greenery during summer when the heat had scorched 
the spring vegetation in the remainder of the district. 
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Squeezed in between the mountain and the desert line lay a nearly 
treeless but fertile plain. Only some plane-trees marked the location of 
wells. Dry-farming dominated on the plain; only on the banks of the river 
'Âsî garden culture was possible. The 'Âsî describes a wide curve through 
the Hama area and the river owed its name—which means the Re-
bellious—to its unique flow in the wider region; contrary to the other 
rivers it flows from the south to the north. To the west of the river is the 
stony plain of the Wa'r, crossed by rivulets which only had water in the 
winter and early spring. This was the core agricultural area. The villagers 
depended on the growing of cereals, especially on the winter crops of 
wheat and barley. Here the yields were relatively high and the Wa'r 
belonged to the most important cereal producing areas of Syria. 
North of the river, in the A'la area, the landscape becomes more hilly. 
Here settled farming communities and migratory herdsmen coexisted, but 
not always on friendly terms. The 'Asî river proceeds to the sparsely in-
habited Ghâb valley, a cleft between the Nusayri Chain and the A'la and 
Zâwiya hills. In the valley the water was soaked into long-stretched 
marshlands. The abundance of water and fish attracted people; in sum-
mer tribesmen descended from the then dry and hot Zâwiya hills to the 
margins of marshlands to water their flocks. In summer this was above all 
the domain of the mosquitos and fishermen descended from the steep 
mountains on the other side in winter only to avoid the summer fever. 
1.2 Sedentary and migratory groups 
The sedentary population of the district was distributed over one single 
town, Hama, and roughly 250 villages. Many of the villages, especially in 
the western hills, were small and comprised a handful of households only. 
Moreover, not all settlements were continuously inhabited. Mazarí' (sing. 
mazra'a) or semi-permanent settlements were a common feature of the 
Hama countryside. Peasants from a nearby village or town would spend 
most of spring on the mazra'a to keep an eye on the standing crop. Some 
places were interchangeably referred to as village (qarya) and mazra'a, an 
illustration of the uncertain state of settled farming. About 10% of the vil-
lages suffered from desertion to the extent that they were totally 
evacuated for shorter or longer periods in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries. 
Both the rural and urban population adhered predominantly to Sunnî 
Islam, following the Hanafî and Shâfi'î rites. However, apart from the 
bâdiya, only one area, the A'la, was exclusively Sunnî. In the Wa'r Sunnî 
Islam gave way to the Nusayriyya, a movement which had acquired a 
sectarian nature outside the mainstream Shfa. In the adjacent mountains 
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carrying their name, Jibâl al-Nusayriyya, these sectarians constituted the 
vast majority. They were divided over numerous larger and smaller kin-
ship groups called 'ashâyir, tribes, as well as over several Nusayrî rites. 
One of the strongest Nusayrî kinship groups, the Matâwira, was centered 
in the Jabal Kalbiyya and, like most of the Nusayris living in or near the 
Hama district, they followed the Kalâzî rite, also known as Qibliyya. Their 
main local rivals belonged to the Rashâwina who adhered to the Shamâlî 
rite of the Nusayriyya. 
In and around Misyâf the small Ismâ'îlî community constituted a rem-
nant of the famed mountain state of the Assassins, as they were known in 
Europe since the time of the crusades. The Ismâ'flîs of Misyâf entertained 
strong relations with their coreligionists of Qadmûs, another fortress-vil-
lage situated in the adjacent district of Latakia. Like the Nusayris, the 
Ismâ'flîs were divided over religious factions and the inhabitants of 
Misyâf and Qadmûs predominantly adhered to the Suwaydânî rite. 
Nusayris and Ismâ'flîs alike were normally considered apostates by the 
Sunnî Muslim establishment, but the latter by and large had come to 
terms with the pertinacity of these "corrupted" faiths. Of course it was in-
conceivable to fully acknowledge the existence of these deviant Islamic 
traditions and public opinion was at times hostile, especially to the 
Nusayrî tribes of the higher mountain which held a reputation of being 
bandits.12 
Christians, mainly Greek Orthodox, formed a small minority in the 
town of Hama. In the countryside they populated two of the largest vil-
lages, Kafr Buhum and Mharda, and several smaller ones to the south of 
the town, as well as in the southwestern and northwestern margins of the 
district. A tiny number of Suryân, Syrian Orthodox, lived in Hama and 
Mharda. The old Jewish community had by 1800 almost ceased to exist 
due to migration and conversion. 
Religion mattered in traditional Syrian society. It figured as a common 
way to distinguish between one group and the other. Apart from religion 
some communities were defined by ethnic origins or a clearly divergent 
mode of life. The former included the Turcomans, who inhabited a band 
of villages to the south of Hama and the Hazûr area, a cluster of small vil-
lages in the western hills. Many of them hardly spoke Arabic, but they 
shared the faith of the majority; Sunnî Islam. Kurds constituted another, 
but very small, ethnic minority. Some of the Kurds were migratory pas-
toralists, as had been most of the Turcomans in the past. 
The one large group which distinguished itself from the others by their 
transhumance and economic activities were the 'arab, the Arabic speak-
ing nomadic pastoralists. In the view of the sedentary and certainly the 
urban Syrians the migratory 'arab formed the antipode of the hadar, the 
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civilized world of the townsmen and villagers. As to the 'arab, they them-
selves felt equally distinct, especially from the peasants whose work they 
despised. The antagonism between the sedentary and migratory popula-
tions emanates from their disparate attitudes towards economical re-
sources. Sedentary communities, including a rural town like Hama, 
depended on considerable investments in both time and money for the 
maintenance of the arable fields, gardens and orchards, and of smaller or 
larger irrigations works. The processing of the crops, transport and 
market facilities required additional high investments. The world of the 
sedentary was reproduced by the human hand. Nomadic pastoralism re-
quired little investment and the nomads hardly interfered with the habitat 
of the territories which they frequented with their animals. The world of 
the nomads, however, was more fragile, depending as they did on the 
scarce resources of the bâdiya. The bâdiya consisted largely of marginal 
land and water resources were scattered. The rains were unevenly dis-
tributed over both time and locality. The nomads, therefore, depended 
strongly on intelligence and on the mobility of their, socially strong, 
group. 5 
The popular antithesis between the hadar and the 'arab could not hide 
their mutual dependence. The economic reciprocity between the bâdiya 
and the transitional zone was strong. A high demand existed for the pro-
duce of the 'arab (animals for transport, meat, wool, skin, dairy products 
and alkali ashes) as well as for their services, like herding, transport and 
protection. The 'arab largely produced for the sedentary population and 
exchanged their products and services for foodstuffs, notably wheat, 
clothing, weaponry and household utilities. 
The long history of close, but at times unfriendly, relations between the 
settled, largely farming population and migratory pastoralists had shaped 
local culture. Hama was a small town which depended primarily on trade 
with the tribes and villages. The town had strong rural traits. Its inhabi-
tants, Muslims and Christians alike, were conservative and inward 
oriented. Quite a number of them were of recent rural derivation. The 
Hamawî dress was sober and plain as was the food. This Hamawî style, 
and its own particular accent, was not confined to the town itself, but 
characterized many of the villages of the plain as well. 
In the western parts of the district Hamawî tradition gave way to the 
Jabalí, the tradition of the mountain. The two differed in dress, food, ac-
cent and prayer. The long dress for men was supplanted by trousers and 
the animal fat, which accompanied many dishes, by olive oil. The dissimi-
larity between the culture of the interior plain and that of the Mediter-
ranean mountain manifested itself on many levels. Geography and 
climate dictated obvious differences in agricultural and pastoralist activi-
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ties. The transition from cereal production and sheep rearing to orchard 
and terrace culture coincided with a transition from a dominantly Sunnî 
to a predominantly Nusayrî environment. As a rule, one could tell from 
the mere dress and accent whether someone belonged to the community 
of the faithful or not. 
The Hama plain, then, was sandwiched between two remarkably dis-
tinct local cultures. On the eastern extreme 'arab pastoralists of the 
bâdiya, on the western extreme Nusayrî mountain dwellers. Both ex-
tremes had in common that they were tribally organized and considered 
uncivilized by many of those who lived in between. This bias was partly 
based on fear. Hama was the seat of government and the strength of the 
government very much determined the liberties taken by tribes on either 
side, but especially by the 'arab. Within living memory order had col-
lapsed more than once and the area had suffered greatly from banditry 
and tribal raids. By the late eighteenth century a total collapse seemed 
imminent again. However, as will be shown later, the government itself 
contributed strongly to crises of sedentary society. 
1.3 Mawâlîdomination in the 16th and 17th centuries 
Hama was often mentioned in one breath with Homs and Ma'arra. These 
three towns, of which Hama was the largest, occupied a strategic position 
in Syria, since they connected the south, al-Shâm proper, with the vast 
northern plain of Aleppo. The main inland road, the Sultanic Road, 
passed through the towns and some of their villages. In the past Hama 
had never been integrated into either one of the provinces of the interior; 
al-Shâm and Aleppo. During early Ottoman rule it was attached first to 
Damascus, then to Aleppo, but it eventually became part of the coastal 
province of Tripoli, created in 1570. The remoteness of Hama from the 
two large cities of the interior, Aleppo and Damascus, may have defined 
this administrative bond, but the history of the Hama area remained part 
of that of the Syrian interior. 
From the regional political configuration in the early Ottoman period 
followed a northern rather than western or southern orientation of Hama. 
The 'arab Mawâlî tribes constituted a dominant provincial force. The 
Mawâlî formed a heterogeneous formation, which comprised both sheep 
rearing pastoralists and horse and camel breeding nomads. They con-
trolled an area stretching from the bâdiya of Hama and Homs in the west 
to the oasis of Palmyra in the east and the Euphrates area in the north. 
One of their principal strongholds were the ruins of Salamiyya situated in 
a marshy valley some 40 kilometers to the southeast of Hama. The 
Mawâlî domination of the desert and the adjacent areas dated back to the 
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thirteenth century and their leading sheikh was traditionally titled amîr al-
bâdiya, the Lord of the Desert. Prior to 1574 the Ottomans had shown 
considerable reluctance in acknowledging the privileged status of the 
Mawâlî and campaigned several times against them in order to gain their 
full submission. They failed to do so and in 1574 the Ottoman authorities 
formally adopted the traditional policy of co-optation. 
The need to maintain tranquility along the major roads connecting 
Anatolia with Iraq, Syria and the Ottoman dominions beyond, as well as 
the protection of the cultivated areas bordering on the bâdiya played a 
crucial role in the administration of the region. The maintenance of secu-
rity along the lines of communications through the bâdiya and borderland 
had always been problematic. The Ottomans, like their predecessors, 
basically followed two different, but complementary sets of policies. On 
the one hand they encouraged the tribes to adopt a loyal attitude towards 
the state by giving them a stake in the orderly conduct of administration 
and trade. The dominant tribal factions were granted privileges, like the 
right to levy toll, and offered lucrative contracts for the provision of 
camels and horses and for the protection of caravans, convoys or even 
cultivated areas. Their sheikhs were treated with honour and received 
yearly payments. In return for these favours they policed the bâdiya and 
the cultivated borderlands and, at times, provided auxiliaries to support 
Ottoman military efforts. 
On the other hand the maintenance of order was not, of course, en-
tirely left to the tribal sheikhs and their para-military forces. In their ef-
forts to come to an understanding with the powers of the bâdiya the 
authorities continued to use coercive methods as well. Along the major 
roads of communication imperial troops, the so called muhâfîzs, were sta-
tioned in fortified villages or traffic facilities, like caravansaries (khan) 
and waterreservoirs. Local para-military forces from areas bordering on 
the bâdiya were engaged in the protection of traffic and sedentary life in 
addition to the salaried soldiers. A more radical method to restrain the 
'arab tribes was the transfer of Turcoman tribes from Anatolia and their 
settlement and employment as police force in strategic locations. 
The functions of the various military or para-military groups included 
the restriction of tribal movements near or in the transitional zone, in-
cluding those of the Mawâlî tribes. Deeper in the bâdiya the Ottomans 
had not been able to maintain garrisons or trading facilities and this defi-
ciency constituted the principal source of the power and prosperity of the 
Mawâlî, for the overland trade along the Silk Road leading from northern 
Iran to the important commercial centre of Aleppo, as well as the Bagh-
dad-Damascus trade passed through Mawâlî country. 
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The arrangement between the Ottoman authorities and the Mawâlî 
chieftains was reasonably effective and certainly long-lived. The Mawâlî 
were occasionally involved in revolts or suspected of supporting un-
friendly parties, but considering the, at times, confused political situation 
in the Syrian provinces their endurance alone made them viable partners. 
In the early 17th century, when the Ottoman central authorities faced 
numerous revolts, the so-called Celali, Syria witnessed the emergence of 
several rebellious groups, most notably the Kurdish Junbulât clan of the 
Aleppo area. The Mawâlî chieftains appear to have kept a low profile 
during this period of upheaval, albeit that an internal struggle for power 
occasionally resulted in a violation of the agreement with the authori-
ties.21 
From the mid-17th century onward the record of the Mawâlî as the 
police force of the bâdiya became poorer and by the close of the century 
the old order of the bâdiya had collapsed. The precise causes of the ero-
sion of Mawâlî power are unknown, but it is most likely to have been con-
nected to changing patterns of tribal migrations and possibly to changing 
patterns in overland trade. 
1.4 Tribal shifts of the late 17th and 18th centuries 
The bâdiya was divided into a number of tribal territories in which usually 
one tribal group dominated over others who were often its clients. 
Changes in the migratory patterns of the 'arab tribes of the deserts of 
Northern Arabia, Syria and Iraq went largely unnoticed as long as they 
did not result in tribal conflict. The gradual displacement of the dâyira, 
the annual cycle of migration of a given tribal group, would eventually be 
followed by conflict or agreement over the redistribution of the resources 
of a section of the bâdiya. In the course of the 17th century, or possibly 
earlier, sections of several tribes from northern Arabia expanded their 
migratory range to the north. These tribal shifts may have been generated 
by climatic changes or population pressure—the causes are simply un-
known—, but in any case the "nomadic" consideration that the herds 
needed the best possible grazing is most likely to have motivated the ex-
pansion. Tribesmen would normally not restrain their herds unless force 
or agreement compelled them to do so. Undoubtedly, years of drought, 
but also of severe cold, did play a role in the tribal shifts. However, not 
only years of privation induced tribes to look for alternative pastures. 
Prosperity could also force a tribe to occupy additional pastures for their 
growing herds. Evidently, tribal groups from northern Arabia found no 
insurmountable resistance in the bâdiya of Syria and Iraq. By 1700 the 
Euphrates area was incorporated into the migratory cycle of some 'Anaza 
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and Shammar tribes. The pastures and water resources of the north 
compared favourably with those of Arabia. Access to permanent rivers 
like the Euphrates and later the 'Âsî was certainly a great asset for any 
tribe. 
The prospects of good grazing in the areas which had been dominated 
by the Mawâlî clans eventually generated more massive tribal shifts. The 
large tribes of the 'Anaza confederation of northern Arabia would nearly 
all change their migratory cycle. The inclusion of the Syrian bâdiya into 
their migratory range coincided with a decime of agriculture in the transi-
tional zone. The land under cultivation contracted and in several areas 
pastoralism increasingly competed with agriculture and sometimes re-
placed it. It is doubtful whether the tribal shifts constituted one of the 
original causes of the crisis of settled farming in the Syrian interior. 
Tribesmen were attracted to the transitional zone partly because land was 
going out of cultivation due to failing investments in agriculture and its 
protection. Moreover, a portion of the peasant population turned to pas-
toralism and associated themselves with tribal groups. However, once 
the tribal pressure in the bâdiya increased and the position of the Mawâlî 
as the dominant force was violently questioned by newly arrived tribes, 
tribal warfare affected agriculture in the transitional zone, especially be-
cause the Mawâlî were gradually pushed out of the heart of the bâdiya to 
its sown and even beyond. Thus, the bâdiya expanded; agricultural land 
was increasingly used for pasturage. In this sense bâdiya "...is an 
economic rather than a geographical expression." 
It is uncertain to which extent the arrival of 'Anaza groups accounted 
for the first period of tribal unrest in the late 17th and early 18th century 
when Hama and other areas were severely affected. Sedentary groups 
participated in the widespread banditry and pillaging which plagued the 
area, amongst them local and provincial troops, the Danâdisha of the 
'Akkâr region, a large clan claiming Yamanî ancestry and bands of 
Nusayns who descended from their mountains. The situation in Syria was 
not dissimilar to the Celali crisis of the early 17th century, except that the 
new crisis was more prolonged and that the Mawâlî fully participated and 
did not even hesitate to ransack the marketplaces of Hama and Horns. 
The other tribal group which took part in the disturbances were Tur-
coman tribes, some of which had been despatched recently to the area. 
The 'Anaza had, not as yet, expanded their range to the Hama area. 
The disturbances and tribal pressure subsided in the course of the 
1720s, but intensified in the second half of the 18th century. The tribal 
shifts acquired a more massive dimension, at times, took the form of 
tribal drifts and profoundly changed the tribal map of the entire Fertile 
Crescent. The acceleration of the northward expansion of the 'Anaza was 
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partly the result of natural calamities. The great drought of 1756 followed 
by extreme cold in winter caused many tribes to look beyond their tradi-
tional pastures and may well have caused the acceleration of the tribal 
shift. By that time it must have been common knowledge in northern 
Arabia that the prospects in Syria were favourable. It became a feasible 
option to drive the herds to the Syrian pastures in times of dearth. The 
sedentary population had been less aware of the shining patterns of mi-
gration and was shocked by the, in their eyes, sudden arrival of thousands 
of 'Anaza tribesmen near their villages or towns in years of disaster. 
These drifts were the most dramatic phenomenon of a long-stretched 
process. 
Changing political relations between the tribes of northern Arabia 
were another factor which is likely to have contributed to the migratory 
shifts. The formation of the Wahhâbî movement in the Najd in the mid-
18th century apparently led to the political exclusion of several 'Anaza 
and other tribes. This puritan Islamic, Hanbalî, movement is named after 
its ideologue Muhammad ibn 'Abd al-Wahhâb who had engaged the sup-
port of an 'Anaza tribal group lead by the Sa'ûd family. From the late 
1740s onwards this Wahhâbî-Sa'ûdî coalition established its authority 
over the Najd and some adjacent areas. The movement showed a remark-
able hostility against local tradition and, what is more, against the Ot-
toman state. The Wahhâbîs openly challenged the ascendancy of the 
Ottoman sultan over the domains of Islam and, to the great embarrass-
ment of the sultan, eventually occupied the holy cities of Islam, Mecca 
and Medina, for some years in the early 19th century. 
It is open to speculation whether there was a direct relation between 
the migration of several 'Anaza tribes and the rise of the Wahhâbî desert 
state. There are no indications that the three largest 'Anaza tribes, the 
Ruwâla, Fad'ân and 'Amârât (which migrated to Iraq) had been forced to 
leave their traditional pastures. The tribes may have felt increasingly un-
comfortable with the strict rule of the Wahhâbîs and, at least partly, 
moved north in order to preserve their independence. Some of these 
tribes were already in the process of expanding to the north and the rise 
of the Wahhâbî desert state may just have quickened the expansion. 
The first 'Anaza tribe to arrive in the bâdiya of Hama was the Hasana. 
They made their presence felt in the course of the 1770s when they regu-
larly clashed with the Mawâlî. The Mawâlî lost part of their traditional 
pastures and were driven with their animals to more marginal pastures or 
to partly cultivated areas, especially to the north of Hama, the A'la and 
Zâwiya hills. In 1786 the Mawâlî revolted and attacked scores of villages 
all over the area including the foothills of the Nusayri Mountains. Untypi-
24 Chapter One 
cally, they not only pillaged but killed a large number of local strongmen 
and village sheikhs. In a counter-offensive provincial troops slaughtered 
the 'arab. The Mawâlî had irrevocably lost their prominent position in 
the bâdiya of Hama and Horns. 
From the mid-1780s onwards the Hasana constituted the strongest 
tribal group in the area to the east of Hama and Horns. Some of the local 
tribes became their clients and the Hasana collected protection money, 
the so called khuwwa, from these tribes, as well as from the villages which 
were situated in or close to their summer pastures, a time-honoured privi-
lege, which, however, was rarely sanctioned by law. The authorities 
conceded to this practice with reluctancy. In times of relative tranquility 
the khuwwa could, indeed, be regarded as a payment in return for polic-
ing services. The payment, however, was not a voluntary act and the de-
gree of reciprocity varied. At times the receiving tribe indeed protected 
their pastoralist and sedentary clients from harassment by other parties 
or even by individuals belonging to the receiving tribe. In times of tribal 
unrest, however, the receiving tribe was often either unable or unwilling 
to provide protection and competing parties could claim their share. If 
that was the case khuwwa came close to extortion. 
1.5 The arrival of large 'Anaza tribes 
The dominion of the Hasana over the bâdiya of Hama was never 
complete and certainly short-lived compared to that of their Mawâlî 
predecessors. During the second decade of the 19th century they were 
confronted with the expansion of the 'Anaza tribe of the Fad'ân and their 
dependents, the Sibâ'. The Fad'ân was one of the two large 'Anaza tribes 
of which sections had extended their migratory range to the Syrian inte-
rior during the second half of 18th century, the other being the Ruwâla. 
The latter were in the process of claiming the bâdiya between Damascus 
and Palmyra as their summer pasture, while the Fad'ân had moved 
further north, to the plain of Aleppo. When Fad'ân tribesmen first ar-
rived in or near the Hama area is unknown and the same is true for the 
Sibâ'. However, in the spring of 1814 they arrived for the first time in 
great numbers from their traditional winter pastures in the Najd. Their 
massive appearance in the area to the east of the 'Así river alarmed the 
locals and the authorities, who believed that the tribes had been expelled 
by the Wahhâbîs. When the authorities ordered the tribes to evacuate the 
area, they refused to obey claiming that they had suffered from a lack of 
grazing land. 
The 'Anaza tribes of the Hasana and Ruwâla, too, considered the ar-
rival of the Fad'ân in the Hama area a major menace to the fragile tribal 
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relations in the wider area. They combined their forces with provincial 
and local troops in an attempt to relieve the area from the new arrivals. 
The effort was largely ineffective. The Fad'an retreated only to return 
later and retaliate against their 'Anaza opponents, especially against the 
Hasana. 
The conflict of 1814 was linked to a division among the 'Anaza tribes. 
The Fad'an was the leading tribe of the Dana' Muslim 'Anaza, which in-
cluded the Sibâ', whereas both the Ruwâla and the Hasana belonged to 
the Dana' Bishr 'Anaza. A divide along kinship Unes was, and still is, a 
common feature of tribal ideology in which good, or bad, qualities corre-
late with Uneage rather than with wealth, occupation, rite or locality. This 
dialectic ideology sanctioned rivalry and hostilities, but largely fails to ex-
plain tribal animosity. In 1814 the Fad'ân and Sibâ' were undoubtedly 
confirmed in their belief that the Hasana and Ruwâla were indeed cursed 
by descent, but only three years later the hostile parties combined their 
forces in an attempt to take control over the bâdiya of Hama. Severe cold 
may have induced them to occupy the pastures of Hama and to appro-
priate the flocks of local tribes in order to satisfy their needs. Such tribal 
coalitions constituted a great menace to tribes which had been excluded. 
In 1817 the local tribes of Hama lost thousands of sheep to the raiders. 
Such tribal coalitions—the small but militant Turki tribe also participated 
in the raids—were short-lived, but in given circumstances even the most 
hostile tribal groups could join forces. 
This pragmatism on the part of the tribes, which in a sense runs con-
trary to the tribal ideology, explains why the authorities, and others, were 
often confused about tribal alliances and hence did not always distinguish 
between the separate tribal groups in their reports. This implies that reli-
able documentation about intertribal relations is scarce. What is cer-
tain, however, is that in the early decades of the 19th century a new tribal 
division of Syria became apparent, a division which would not change 
radically during the next century or so. In the central and southern areas 
the Ruwâla established their domination over the other tribes, as well as 
over some cultivated areas bordering the bâdiya. In the north the Fad'ân 
played a similar role and their clients, the Sibâ', manifested themselves in 
the Hama area. The position of the Sibâ' was relatively insecure due to 
the near vicinity of the area dominated by the Ruwâla. 
The function of the Fad'ân differed from that of their predecessors, 
the Mawâlî. Unlike the Mawâlî the Fad'ân constituted a relatively homo-
geneous group comprising mainly camel and horse breeding nomads who 
travelled over great distances. Their high mobility was one of their assets, 
but it also meant that the tribal groups headed almost in their totality for 
the distant winter pastures in autumn and only returned in late spring, 
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leaving the area to others in the months in between. The Fad'ân, and even 
more so the Ruwâla, constituted a formidable force, but they did not con-
trol the bâdiya as once the much more complex tribal entity of the Mawâlî 
had done. But it was not only the formation of the tribes and their migra-
tory patterns which influenced the nature and degree of their control, but 
also their relation with the local tribes, the sedentary population and, of 
course, with the Ottoman administration. 
1.6 The local tribes 
In the early decades of the 19th century some 25 tribes were formally tied 
to the district of Hama in the sense that they paid their taxes there. These 
tribes were known as the 'ashâyir al-dâyira, the tribes of the local, migra-
tory cycle. The migratory cycles of the local tribes comprised the districts 
of Ma'arra, Hama and Horns, as well as the Palmyra and Hamad desert 
regions. As a rule the local tribes, or rather sections of the tribes, 
pitched their tents in or near the cultivated areas in late spring and 
moved, often in the company of other tribes, eastward in autumn to spend 
the winter in the bâdiya. Some small 'arab units remained in or near the 
cultivated areas all year long. The 'ashâyir al-dâyira comprised both pre-
dominantly sheep and camel rearing tribes, but the distinction between 
the two categories was not always clear-cut, because the first usually 
tended some camels as well, and the latter some sheep and goats. The 
sheep rearers, referred to as ra'iyya or shawâyâ, did not move much 
further than the Jabal, an area some 80 kilometers to the southeast of 
Hama. The others may have taken their herds of camels as far as Palmyra 
and the Hamad. 
Not all local tribes constituted independent units. Over half of the 
tribes were actually subsections of one of the larger tribes. They often, 
but not always, moved jointly during the mashâriq and the maghârib, the 
migration to the east or to the west respectively, but dispersed over the 
winter and summer pastures in smaller encampments. Some larger tribes 
had a number of client tribal units, which were either small tribes or sec-
tions of other tribes. 
During the 16th and 17th centuries most, if not all tribes of the dâyira 
of Hama were either clients to the Mawâlî or subject to the authority of 
this large federation. The Mawâlî comprised a large number of tribes 
ranging from small semi-nomadic pastoralists to predominantly camel 
and horse breeders who followed extended migratory cycles. However, 
none of these tribes appear to have migrated over distances comparable 
to those covered by the tribes of northern Arabia, at least not during Ot-
toman times. The Mawâlî had been locals for centuries in northern Syria. 
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As has been noted before the Mawâlî had lost much of their former 
strength by the late 18th century, but they still constituted the most 
powerful local tribal group. The Mawâlî tribes who frequented the Hama 
area belonged mostly to the Shamâlî, the Northern Mawâlî, which, as a 
result of earlier migratory shifts occupied pastures to the south of the 
Qiblî faction, the Southerns. The core of the Shamâlî was formed by the 
Mashârifa, Banî 'Izz, and the Tûqân. The sheikh, or amir, of the Mash-
ârifa acted as serkerder Ίίώάη Hama, chief of the Hamawî tribes. In this 
capacity he received a yearly payment, the mal muwassata, from the local 
government. These payments were made in return for police duties, 
especially the protection of villages against tribal incursions. However, 
the Mawâlî had long since ceased to be a reliable police force and the 
continuation of the payments to their amir until, at least, 1830 appears to 
have been rooted in tradition rather than efficiency. None of the Qiblî 
Mawâlî tribes fell under the authority of the Hama administration, but 
the leading Jamâjima tribe as well as the Khutabâ' were no strangers to 
Hama and the villages of the plain. 
The other larger local tribes included the Banî Khâlid, Nu'aym and 
Bashâkim. The Banî Khâlid derived its name from the Muslim conqueror 
of Syria, Khâlid ibn al-Walîd, and claimed to have descended from tribes 
which campaigned under his command. The leading family of the Banî 
Khâlid, Dandan, had a right to a share of the revenues of the extended 
properties of the Khâlid ibn al-Walîd shrine and mosque in Horns. The 
number of tents of the Banî Khâlid may have exceeded 500 in the early 
19th century, about half of which belonged to the Banî Khâlid proper and 
the remainder to various related tribes. The Nu'aym, which included 
apart from the Nu'aym proper, five or six associated tribes, may have con-
stituted the largest tribe of the area. The Bashâkim formed the largest 
client tribe of the Mawâlî. 
Most tribes mentioned above are known to have frequented the Hama 
area in the early Ottoman period or before. Several tribes which were 
of importance around 1800 had moved from elsewhere to the area during 
the previous half a century or so, notably the Hadîdîn and the Turkî, 
whereas one other important tribe, the Fawâ'ira, was of recent local for-
mation. The Hadîdîn, or rather part of them, had been expulsed by the 
northwards migration of the Fad'ân from their traditional pastures in the 
Aleppo area. Little is certain about the history of the Hadîdîn and the 
Turkî, except that after they had established themselves in the Hama area 
they belonged to the more militant tribes. They were regularly involved 
in tribal clashes, especially after the Fad'ân and Sibâ' had extended their 
migratory range to the Hama area. Both the Turkî and the Hadîdîn enter-
tained unfriendly relations with the Mawâlî. The Fawâ'ira comprised 
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several break-away factions of the Mawâlî and their clients. The 
Fawâ'ira also figured among the more valiant tribes, but, unlike the Turki 
and Hadîdîn, they formally belonged to the 'urban dâyirat Hama, the local 
tribes. 
As a rule the militancy of a tribe correlated with their mobility and the 
more militant tribes, or their leading sections, were predominantly camel 
and horse breeders. Occasionally the Hadâdîn, Fawâ'ira and Mawâlî 
challenged the superiority of the Fad'ân and Sibâ', but conflicts among 
themselves were much more numerous. The reason for the relative high 
frequency of tribal incidents is most probably the establishment of the 
primacy of the 'Anaza and the general insecurity which accompanied that 
process. The migratory cycles and grazing rights of most, if not all tribes 
were affected and new pastures and water rights had to be established 
and defended. The animosity between the Dana' Muslim 'Anaza (Fad'ân 
and Sibâ') and the Dana' Bishr 'Anaza (Ruwâla and Hasana) influenced 
the relations between the local tribes to some extent. The area in which 
the Ruwâla held sway was not far from the bâdiya of Hama. The Ruwâla 
acted as the patron of the one tribe with which most, but not all, local 
tribes were regularly on bad terms, the Hasana. Tension between the 
Mawâlî and the Hasana remained high after their wars over the pastures 
of Hama and Horns in the late 18th century. The Fawâ'ira and the Turki, 
too, entertained hostile relations with the Hasana. The Mawâlî, Turki and 
Fawâ'ira all enjoyed friendly relations with Dana' Muslim 'Anaza. A few 
other tribes, however, were usually on friendly terms with the Hasana, no-
tably the Banî Khâlid and the Hadîdîn and they were closer to the Dana' 
Bishr. It should be kept in mind, however, that numerous conflicts be-
tween the local tribes failed to be congruent with this tribal divide. 
1.7 The tribes and the local economy 
The local tribes were well integrated into the local economy. Especially 
the villagers entertained close relations with the local 'arab and even 
though serious incidents involving 'arab and villagers are reported as late 
as the 1870s, the strong interdependence between the two favoured ad-
justments and reconciliation. Small 'arab encampments were to be found 
all over the Hama district during the season. At harvest time, when the 
villagers were in need of farm hands, many 'arab pitched their tents near 
the villages or occupied vacant houses or nearby caves. After the harvest 
had been gathered in the sheep of the 'arab grazed on the fields in ex-
change for a small fee. Often 'arab tended the sheep, goats and cattle of 
villagers. The 'arab who owned camels played a vital role in transporting 
the crop to Hama or elsewhere. Individual tribesmen lived in villages and 
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were sometimes engaged in farming. In the course of the 19th century the 
number of settled tribesmen would increase sharply, but this process only 
gained momentum during the second half of the century. Prior to that 
time individual or small groups of 'arab only adopted a sedentary way of 
life in times when the prospect of farming was favourable, which was 
hardly the case during the period under regard, and they returned to the 
bâdiya when the economic situation in the villages deteriorated. 
As in all the towns of the Syrian interior a number of 'arab lived in 
Hama, the main market for the produce of the local tribes. Out of the 
forty or so crafts of the town about a quarter depended on supplies by the 
tribes. Meat, wool and skins were traded on the Hama market and the lo-
cally produced abâya, a thick woollen cloak for which Hama was famous, 
may serve to exemplify the close-knit relations between the tribes and the 
town. Well-to-do Hamawîs owned considerable flocks of sheep which 
were taken care of by 'arab, as partners or otherwise, a practice referred 
to as ghunûmiyya. 'Arab and Hamawîs were also frequently partners in 
transport, owning pack animals jointly. Contrary to peasant indebtedness 
the magnitude of 'arab indebtedness to Hamawî moneylenders, or to the 
local treasury, appears to have been small. 
Most conflicts between sedentary and pastoralists concerned petty 
economic and social disputes, which reflected their close interaction. Not 
surprisingly animals, either lost, stolen, sick, astray, or unpaid for, often 
played a role in these small local controversies. Typically, a villager would 
claim compensation for the damage done by a camel on the loose which 
had fed on his crop, or an 'arab would claim compensation from a villager 
who had injured or even killed his camel by throwing stones at it or beat-
ing it in an effort to chase the animal away. All through the 19th century a 
lively trade existed in stolen pack animals. The purchase of a pack animal 
was anything but a secure investment and many lost their newly bought 
donkey, mule, horse or camel to thiefs in the marketplace, to highwaymen 
or to soldiers. Others faced law suits when people claimed the legal 
ownership of the animal before the court. 
The larger conflicts which occurred between villagers and tribesmen 
usually concerned raids on villages in times when public order was feeble 
due to tribal discord, famine, wars or revolts. This remained the case well 
into the second half of the 19th century. In 1860, for example, in the wake 
of the massacre of Christians in Damascus, in which 'arab participated, 
the Christian village of Squlaybiyya in the Hama area was attacked by a 
number of tribes. Violent incidents in more tranquil years were rare 
and usually related to a controversy between individual tribesmen and vil-
lagers. 
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The relations between the 'Anaza and the sedentary were of a differ-
ent nature. Contrary to the local tribes the 'Anaza, with the exception of 
the Hasana, entertained no close economic relations with the villages. 
The 'Anaza marketed their camels, horses, leather, and alkali ashes 
largely in town and depended for their demands of wheat, clothing, 
weaponry and utensils on the urban market. The small community of 
the Sawâkhina, people originating from the oasis of Sukhna to north of 
Palmyra, played an important role in the trade with the 'Anaza tribes. 
Contrary to the relations between local tribesmen and the town, hardly 
any details on the economic relations between the 'Anaza and the town 
are to be found in the court records of Hama. This does not imply, of 
course, that no disputes arose, but rather that when disputes were settled 
this happened outside the court. 
1.8 The 'Anaza tribes and the administration 
The large 'Anaza tribes were generally reluctant to enter into formal rela-
tions with the Ottoman authorities. Their military strength and high mo-
bility enabled them to evade the authorities or even challenge them. 
The large tribes usually did not pay taxes except, maybe, the smaller 
charges resting on the produce they sold on the urban markets, whereas 
the local tribes made considerable contributions to the local treasury. By 
the early 19th century the leading Mawâlî tribes, too, paid their taxes. 
However, the 'Anaza, including the Hasana, received more or less regular 
payments in the form of khuwwa from villages and local tribes. 
The attitude of the authorities towards the 'Anaza tribes also 
frustrated the establishment of more balanced relations between the large 
'Anaza tribes and the sedentary. On the one hand the authorities sought 
to appease the large 'Anaza tribes by entering into negotiations with 
them, by offering them lucrative contracts for the supply of camels and 
horses or simply by paying them off. At times they tried to mobilize their 
support in subduing other tribes or unruly military groups. On the other 
hand they confronted them militarily whenever possible and tried to pro-
voke controversies between rival factions within the tribes. Most impor-
tant, however, was the refusal to grant their leadership an authority 
similar to that of the Mawâlî amirs. No tribal leader of the Fad'ân or Sibâ' 
ever acted as amir al-bâdiya, Lord of the Desert, nor did they perform 
police-tasks on a regular basis as the Mawâlî had done and were still sup-
posed to do. The highest honour that could befall a sheikh of the Fad'ân 
was to be invested by the authorities with the position of "Chief of the 
'Anaza". This title was exclusively honorific and is unlikely to have im-
pressed the powerful Ruwâla. 
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There are several reasons why the authorities often hesitated between 
a policy of reconciliation or confrontation during the first decades of the 
19th century. Firstly, the mood in the imperial centre, Istanbul, had 
changed. The central policy was increasingly directed against the, often 
self-proclaimed, privileges of local and provincial power groups including 
tribal groups. Armed confrontations with the tribes could be motivated by 
this policy, but at times also by the bare need to relieve an area from sud-
den and massive tribal incursions. The main handicap of the provincial 
authorities in the pursuit of the policy of confrontation was the inade-
quacy of the military. A second important reason which helps explain the 
inconsistency of the tribal policies of the time was the insecurity which 
prevailed in the bâdiya. A new tribal division was only becoming apparent 
and a new tribal order was in the make but not yet established. The 
authorities lacked sufficient intelligence on the relations between the 
different tribes or factions within a tribe and could easily offend the one 
tribal group by entering into negotiations with or bestowing some favours 
on the other. 
It was only in the course of the 1830s that 'Anaza tribes were success-
fully contained by military force. In 1832 all of Syria was occupied by the 
armies of the powerful governor of Egypt, the famed Muhammad 'Ali 
Pasha, who had rebelled against his master, the sultan. In the next chap-
ter this conflict will be dealt with in some detail; the tribal policies of the 
Egyptian regime are presented in Chapter Seven. It is of importance to 
note here that the containment of the 'Anaza tribes during the 1830s was 
not the result of indigenous developments in the Syrian interior and as 
soon as the Egyptian troops were withdrawn, the tribal pressure on the 
cultivated areas increased sharply. 

CHAPTER TWO 
THE EMERGENCE OF PROVINCIAL MILITARY HOUSEHOLDS 
Syria had witnessed periods of upheaval during Ottoman rule before, but 
the extent of the disturbances of the late 17th and early 18th centuries was 
unprecedented. The restoration of public order had become the more 
problematic because a traditional instrument for its maintenance, the mil-
itary, failed to adhere to earlier standards. The main military formations 
competed for privilege and economic gain and regularly clashed with 
each other. As a result disturbances spread to the cities as well and espe-
cially Damascus became the scene of intense and violent competition 
among local and imperial janissaries. Popular discontent about local and 
provincial officers and officials was widespread. Their inability to protect 
the sedentary population against the tribes was certainly not the sole 
cause for complaint. The permanence of brutalities, extortion and prof-
iteering had undermined the foundations of local and provincial adminis-
tration. Incompetent and oppressive rule added much to the general 
misery around 1700. In the words of Muhammad al-Makkî, a contem-
porary religious sheikh from Horns: "The people suffer from dearth, in-
convenience and hardship, partly because of the 'arab, partly because of 
the local rulers and high prices." 
2.1 The military and the rise of the 'Azm family 
The effects of the widespread disturbances in the Syrian interior were 
most worrying to the central authorities. Firstly, the hajj, the yearly pilgri-
mage to the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina, had become difficult to 
organize and to protect and this undertaking was at the heart of the re-
ligious prestige of the sultan. Secondly, the contraction of settled farm-
ing in the areas bordering on the Syrian Desert resulted in a decline of 
revenue. The analogous depopulation of villages along the major roads of 
communications, most notably the Sultanic Road, discouraged trade be-
cause these villages normally furnished vital facilities such as lodging and 
provisioning. Confronted with the instability in the Syrian provinces the 
Ottoman authorities sought to check the tribes by restricting their migra-
tory movements and by stimulating or enforcing settlement along the 
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major roads. By offering the more powerful tribes contracts for the pro-
tection of trade and traffic and the provisioning of the pilgrimage, or by 
buying them off, the authorities sought their cooperation in provincial af-
fairs. 
Another strategy to restore order was to encourage the formation of 
promising local and provincial alliances. The area of Ma'arra, Hama and 
Horns played a crucial role in the emergence of a particularly powerful 
alliance headed by members of the 'Azm family. The origin and early 
careers of members of the family have remained obscure. The stronghold 
of the 'Azms was Ma'arra, a small town situated on the Sultanic Road 
within a day's travel north of Hama. It is believed that the first member of 
the family to have a remarkable career, Ismâ'îl Aghâ, was the son of a 
professional soldier, possibly a janissary. The assumption that janissaries 
or other military took advantage of the confused political situation in the 
Syrian provinces around 1700 and took up residence in small and 
troubled places aspiring to a local career , finds support in the account of 
Muhammad al-MakkFs of Horns. In his chronicle, which abounds in 
desperate comments on the state of insecurity in the area, Ismâ'îl Aghâ, 
or Ibn al-'Adm as he was called, suddenly appears in a setting of inces-
sant raids, robberies, brutalities and clashes involving Mawâlî, Turcomans 
and local military. He is first mentioned in connection with the sending of 
wheat and barley to Horns in 1717. This was just after the town of Hama 
had been relieved from 'arab by the cavalry of the aghawât of the fortress 
village of Hasya situated to the south of Horns. The aghawât of Hasya 
constituted the dominant military faction in the Horns area and their 
commanders often served as governors of the district. 
It is evident that aghawât based in unappealing places like Ma'arra and 
Hasya played a major role in the slow pacification of the Horns and 
Hama areas. Most of them were probably muMfizs, janissaries who oc-
cupied fortresses along the major lines of communication. Like Ma'arra, 
Hasya was situated along the Sultanic Road in an area which had suffered 
from village desertion. Such places were extremely vulnerable to tribal at-
tacks, but apparently also served the aghawât as the proper locations in 
which to campaign against the tribes or to enter into negotiations and alli-
ances with tribal factions. 
Prior to the expansion of the influence of the 'Azms the dignitaries 
of Hama and the aghawât of the Horns area met regularly. The latter also 
campaigned on several occasions in the Hama area against the Mawâlî. 
An alliance of some kind between the aghawât of Ma'arra in the north 
and those of Hasya in the south appears to have existed and, if this is so, it 
would help to explain the accomplishments of Ibn al-'Adm of Ma'arra, 
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who was appointed to the governorship of the districts of Ma'arra, Hama 
and Horns in March 1719.й 
Ismâ'îl Aghâ al-'Azm was quick to establish a reputation as a resolute, 
but just and even generous ruler, at least in the eyes of the chronicler. For 
the first and only time Muhammad al-Makkî prayed for the well-being of 
a governor: "May God give him strength and make him stand firm and 
prolong his rule and deliver him and his troops from his enemies, amen, 
amen, amen." Ismâ'îl Aghâ al-'Azm was soon to be promoted to the 
governorship of Tripoli. 
The province of Tripoli occupied a marginal position at the time. In 
the decades prior to the appointment of Ismâ'îl Aghâ in 1721 the wall, 
governor-general, of Tripoli appears to have exercised little authority 
over the Horns and Hama districts. On one occasion the governor of 
Tripoli replied to the dignitaries of Horns, who visited him in order to 
complain about the desperate situation, that he had not taken control of 
Horns and Hama, because he had understood that 'arab had ruined 
them. Not all governors of Tripoli showed such a blatant lack of inter-
est, but the handling of affairs in the area was largely left to the local mili-
tary and to the governors of Damascus and Aleppo. 
The remarkable career of a petty local officer like Ismâ'îl Aghâ al-
'Azm is, of course, not to be attributed solely to local alliances and to his 
personal qualifications however remarkable these may have been. He re-
ceived support from the governor-general of Aleppo, to which Ma'arra 
belonged, and after he had manifested himself as an able officer he re-
ceived further backing. Through the good offices of this governor-
general Ismâ'îl Aghâ gained recognition in the capital. Imperial troops 
were sent to help him subject the insurgent tribes, both Mawâlî and Tur-
coman, and he and his family were granted privileges which ensured them 
sufficient funds. Thus Ismâ'îl Aghâ and his following were able to render 
services the Porte valued most; the protection of trade and traffic, includ-
ing the convoys of pilgrims, the provisioning of the towns, the protection 
of cultivated areas and the settlement of Turcoman tribes. After having 
given proof of his abilities in the Hama-Homs area he became an obvious 
candidate for higher office. When Ismâ'îl Pasha al-'Azm was named 
governor-general of Damascus in 1725 he was entrusted with the pacifica-
tion of the Syrian interior from Ma'arra in the north to the land east of 
the river Jordan in the south. His brother Sulaymân succeeded him in 
Tripoli and a son of his was entrusted with the administration of the dis-
trict of Hama. 
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2.2 'Azm preeminence 
Ismâ'îl Aghâ had laid the foundation of what would be the strongest pro-
vincial family-based power group of the 18th century. His heirs were able 
guardians of his legacy and obtained numerous governorships. The first 
two generations of 'Azm governors exerted a great influence over the af-
fairs of the Syrian provinces of which Damascus was the most prominent. 
A large area was brought under a relatively effective provincial adminis-
tration. Especially their success in the handling of the yearly pilgrimage to 
the holy shrines of Mecca and Medina in their capacity of amir al-hajj 
(commander of the pilgrimage) contributed to their prestige as well as 
their wealth. Given its great religious relevance the pilgrimage constituted 
the centrepiece of provincial administration in the region. Long-distance 
trade, in which the pilgrimage played an important role, was patronized 
by the 'Azm governors. 
Tribal policies of the 'Azms are to be understood in the light of the all-
important pilgrimage. They involved the large tribes of the bâdiya to the 
south of Damascus in the provisioning and protection of the ha]]. Several 
tribes received sizable payments, known as surra or san, in order to facili-
tate the passage of the convoy of pilgrims. Prior to the migration of the 
'Anaza to southern Syria, the Sardiyya and Banî Sakhr tribes received 
these payments. The Sardiyya and Banî Sakhr dominated the bâdiya of 
southern Syria. When the 'Anaza Wuld 'Ali extended their range of mi-
gration to southern Syria they received payments as well, eventually at the 
expense of the Sardiyya.1 
When established as governors the 'Azm family moved its country re-
sort from Ma'arra to Hama. The district of Hama was granted as a 
malikane, a leasehold for life, to the 'Azm governors of Damascus. Nomi-
nally part of the province of Tripoli the Hama district was integrated into 
the province of Damascus. It was not unusual that the malikane of a dis-
trict was given to high officials other than the governor-general of the 
province of which the district was part. A malikane did not always remain 
in the hands of an official for his lifetime. In practice it was often attached 
to certain offices and earmarked for the covering of specific expendi-
tures. The malikane of Hama was increasingly given to the governors of 
Damascus in their capacity as amir al-hajj. Members of the 'Azm family 
nearly monopolized the combined office of governor-general and amir al-
hajj between 1725 and 1757. The mutasallim, district governor, of Hama 
was normally recruited from the family or from their entourage. The fate 
of the Hama district had become entangled in that of the 'Azm family. 
During the rule of the 'Azms tribal pressure on the Hama area 
diminished. The 'Azms had been keen to protect the villages because the 
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local wheat production constituted a vital policy instrument. Their ability 
to provide the urban populations with wheat figured high among their 
qualifications for the office of provincial governor. The area under cul-
tivation in the district of Hama is most likely to have increased during the 
heyday of the 'Azms as a result of the settlement of several Turcoman 
tribes in the fertile, but largely deserted area to the south of the town of 
Hama. Some Turcoman tribes had resisted this policy of forced settle-
ment, but others occupied villages which had not been assigned to them, 
chasing away the original inhabitants. Only by 1740 were these tribesmen 
resettled by As'ad Bey al-'Azm, then governor of Hama. Pococke, who 
visited Hama in the late 1730s, described the town of Hama as flourishing 
because it was the only town in the wider area to which the 'arab came for 
supplies. According to Pococke the tribes had committed themselves to 
refrain from harassing caravans which headed for Hama. 
Some have regarded the coming to prominence of the 'Azm family as a 
manifestation of localism and subsequently as a sign of the waning power 
of the imperial centre, but more recently it has been argued that the 
'Azms were instrumental to the policy makers in Istanbul. Given the un-
certainties surrounding the origin of the family, as well as their early 
careers, it cannot be asserted that they were locals. As will be shown later 
the military were highly mobile. However, they created, with the support 
of superior authorities, a local base, politically and economically. Once 
the family was firmly established in Hama and Damascus, their interests 
became closely connected to these localities. However, it is also evident 
that the family's orientation remained "Ottoman". The 'Azms may have 
believed that they had acquired the right to the governorship of Damas-
cus and the neighbouring provinces of Sidon and Tripoli and they were 
certainly able to accumulate great wealth, but they considered themselves 
part of the Ottoman establishment. They were loyal servants of the Sultan 
and refrained from defying his authority. Their dependence on the impe-
rial centre became especially manifest in cases of a change of personnel 
in the small ruling elite of Istanbul. For instance, the 'Azm governors 
were dismissed and imprisoned collectively in 1730 after a coup d'état in 
Istanbul. They were pardoned and reinstalled in 1731. In 1757 the high fi-
nancial needs of the new sultan, Mustafa, resulted in the execution of the 
most successful of all 'Azm governors, As'ad Pasha, who had served for 
an uninterrupted period of 14 years as governor of Damascus. 
2.3 The shift of provincial power 
In the second half of the 18th century the 'Azms failed to preserve their 
nearly exclusive position as governors of Damascus and the provinces of 
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Tripoli and Sidon. Damascus was losing its traditional dominant position 
in the region to Acre, capital of the province of Sidon. Several develop-
ments contributed to this provincial shift of power in which a small and 
partly ruined port on the Mediterranean was to succeed a large inland 
city as the region's political centre. The 'Azms attempted, but never 
succeeded to curb the power of some local strongmen in parts of 
Palestine and Lebanon. Although the members of the family or their as-
sociates usually occupied the governorship of the coastal provinces, the 
'Azms considered these to be secondary to the Syrian interior. Local 
power groups made use of this relatively indifferent attitude towards the 
periphery. A veteran warlord of the Galilee, Dâhir al-'Umar, even openly 
contested the authority of the 'Azm governors and succeeded in main-
taining a firm hold on northern Palestine, including Acre. Eventually the 
central authorities granted him the governorship of Sidon, but this was 
after the 'Azms had lost their regional prominence. 
The shift in provincial power from the interior to the coastal area was 
a complex process. The rise of Acre is often linked to the expansion of 
the European capitalist economies. The basic idea is that the economies 
of the region became more susceptible to fluctuations on the inter-
national market and that as a result of changing demands and trade pat-
terns some areas, like the hinterland of Acre, witnessed crop 
specialization and became suppliers of raw material for the European in-
dustries. This incorporation of cotton-growing territories into what is 
called the world economy, or the complex of economic relations domi-
nated by the European capitalist economies, facilitated the rise of local 
lords like Dâhir al-'Umar. 
It is questionable whether the increase in cotton production in the hin-
terland of Acre was a decisive factor in the rise of Acre as a political 
centre. It is true that cotton exports facilitated the rise of Dâhir al-'Umar, 
but he was not the man who made Acre the political centre of Syria. It 
was only in the 1770s that a non-local officer, the later Jazzâr Pasha, 
made Acre his stronghold and it was Jazzâr Pasha, not Dâhir al-'Umar, 
who changed the political geography of Syria. Jazzâr Pasha established 
his domination in a period in which trade with Europe fell to an all time 
low. The major effect of the changes in trade and demand patterns on the 
Syrian provinces in the second half of the 18th century was the marginali-
zation of its export-oriented trade. The foreign trade conducted in 
Aleppo, the grand old entrepot of the Silk Road, had been on the decline 
for some time, but decreased dramatically after 1750, the year in which 
the last caravan from Iran entered the town. French trade with the 
coastal areas of Syria had shown a remarkable increase during the mid-
18th century, at the time when Dâhir al-'Umar reached the zenith of his 
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long career, but in the course of the second half of the century a sharp de-
cline of exports shipped from the Syrian ports occurred, including Acre 
and Sidon. Trade had been dominated by French merchants and at the 
close of the century European trade with the coast came to a virtual 
standstill and with it a period of nearly two centuries of relatively inten-
sive commercial contacts between the coast and Europe came to a 
close. European trade with the Ottoman empire had shifted to the 
Aegean provinces. The economy of Damascus appears to have been less 
susceptible to fluctuations in demand and trade patterns, because its 
economy was tied to the pilgrimage. 
Acre figured as the political centre of Syria from the mid-1770s to the 
early 1830s, a period which coincided with a prolonged recession of trade 
with Europe. It was only from the 1830s onwards that trade relations be-
tween the Syrian coast and Europe intensified, mainly as a result of grow-
ing local demand for manufactured goods from Europe. The vessels 
calling at the Syrian ports were often unable to find return cargo, which 
indicates that the production of cash crops, such as cotton, was limited. 
The volume of the Syrian exports did increase from the 1830s onwards, 
but this did not necessarily reflect an increase in local output. Exports of 
cotton and wheat appear to have been largely diverted from the local to 
the European market before the mid-19th century. Moreover, the pur-
chases of Syrian wheat did not always relate to a growing European 
demand for the commodity as such, but to the need for ballast for the re-
turning ships. 
In the discussion on the incorporation into the world economy the 
function of trade with Europe in the local economies is at times pre-
sented in an unbalanced fashion for little attention is paid to local and re-
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gional trade, partly because both are poorly documented. However, 
both in quantity and value trade with Europe compared bleakly with local 
and regional trade. The volume of this trade fluctuated considerably be-
cause it depended to a large extent on the irregular appearance of short-
ages in one area or the other following failing harvest or other 
calamities. 
In the literature on Ottoman Syria no connection has been laid be-
tween the shift in provincial power and the large tribal shifts which oc-
curred in the course of the second half of the 18th century. It is difficult to 
assess the effects of the tribal shifts on the balance of provincial power. 
Conditions in the countryside of Damascus, Aleppo, Hama and other 
towns of the interior had become problematic. Village desertion showed 
a significant increase in most areas of the interior, but tribal pressure was 
not the only cause of the agricultural crisis. The material base of the 
peasantry had been weakened by heavy taxation and they often lacked the 
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means to make the necessary investments in seeds, ploughing animals and 
transport. Also in several areas which did not border on the bâdiya the 
land under cultivation contracted, including some coastal areas like parts 
of Palestine and plain of Latakia. Peasants flocked to the larger cities, 
where it was easier to gain a livelihood. No large investments in time and 
money were needed to find an odd job in the urban fabric. Although the 
cities were the seat of the government, it was easier to evade the demands 
of the authorities in large urban centres like Aleppo or Damascus than in 
the villages. Rephrasing the words of the exceptionally perceptive 
traveller William Brown: the authorities tax that what is most apparent, 
and most difficult to remove, and contrary to property in the countryside 
property in the cities is often veiled from the eyes of the government. 
The agricultural crisis undoubtedly affected the urban economy, but an 
increase in the trade with the tribes may have offered a compensation for 
the decrease in trade with the villages. On the other hand, regional trade 
suffered from insecurity along the trade routes to Baghdad and the Hijâz. 
Although the hajj convoy was attacked and pillaged in 1757, a year of 
tribal drift following severe weather conditions, the governors of Damas-
cus serving in the second half of the 18th century were quick to adapt to 
the changing tribal division in the bâdiya to the south of Damascus. They 
acknowledged the prominent position of the Wuld 'Ali of the 'Anaza 
after these had pushed aside the Sardiyya tribe. Only in the early 19th 
century did the conduct of the pilgrimage become very problematic again. 
The Wahhâbî-Sa'ûdî coalition ventured to annex the Hijâz to their desert 
state in an attempt to disqualify the Ottoman Sultan as the protector of 
the holy cities of Islam. Damascene authorities were incapable of dealing 
with this severe threat to Ottoman prestige. The central authorities came 
to depend increasingly on the services of the governor of Egypt, 
Muhammad 'All Pasha, in their efforts to regain and retain their hold on 
the Hijâz.37 
2.4 Jazzâr Pasha and the province of Damascus 
The emergence of Egypt as a regional power under the governorship of 
Muhammad 'Alî Pasha had serious repercussions on the position of the 
Syrian provinces within the empire. Muhammad 'Ali Pasha was, in a 
sense, the heir of the man who had made Acre the political centre of 
Syria, Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzâr who, significantly, had made his career in 
Egypt. During much of the Ottoman period the political history of Syria 
and that of Egypt had largely followed separate courses, but from the 
early 1770s an, at times strong, interrelation came about. The shift of pro-
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vincial power within the Syrian provinces was, at least partly, connected 
to that changing relationship. 
In the course of the 18th century the imperial centre had great diffi-
culty containing provincial power groups. The Ottomans had irrevocably 
lost the initiative in Europe and suffered heavy defeats at the hands of the 
Russians and their allies. As a result of the confusion in Istanbul follow-
ing the military setbacks power groups in several parts of the empire pro-
liferated, among them the military establishment of Egypt with its strong 
mamlûk element.39 In the early 1770s the then governor of Egypt, 'Ali 
Bey, challenged Ottoman suzerainty and pursued expansionist policies. 
He invaded Palestine in 1771, allying himself with Dâhir al-'Umar and 
even with the Russians. The Egyptian bey even captured the city of 
Damascus, but abandoned this conquest after ten days. The central 
authorities were only able to restore a degree of control over Egypt and 
Palestine by relying upon mamlûk officers who were reluctant to openly 
confront the Sultan. The situation in the coastal areas of southern Syria 
remained unsettled until the late 1770s when a former mamlûk officer of 
'Ali Bey restored order and started to impose his rigid rule, the afore-
mentioned Ahmad Pasha, a Bosnian nicknamed al-Jazzâr, the Butcher, 
for his blatant lack of compassion. 
From 1775 until his death in 1804 Jazzâr Pasha reshaped the political 
landscape of the Syrian provinces Sidon, Damascus and Tripoli. Jazzâr 
Pasha and his mamlûk household followed a policy of exclusion and ap-
propriation. He excluded traditional intermediary groups in the adminis-
tration of the taxes, raised tax rates and imposed extended monopolies on 
trade. Any show of discontent met with coercive action and he even ex-
pelled the small French resident trading community. Jazzâr Pasha in-
vested heavily in the military and turned Acre into the strongest fortified 
town of the Eastern Mediterranean. In the closing years of the 18th cen-
tury Jazzâr Pasha became the hero of the day after Napoleon had oc-
cupied Egypt and invaded Palestine by withstanding the French assault 
on Acre, albeit that the pasha's forces suffered heavy losses. 
At the time when Jazzâr Pasha was in the process of establishing his 
rule firmly in the province of Sidon, the governorship of Damascus was in 
the hands of Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm. During his long rule (1771-2 and 
1773-1783) Damascus witnessed tranquility and relative prosperity, and 
Muhammad Pasha was to be remembered as a just ruler and a charitable 
man. Muhammad Pasha occupied himself with reconstruction works in 
Damascus and, of course, with the pilgrimage. Contrary to most of his 
predecessors he was reluctant to interfere in the affairs of the Lebanon 
and Northern Palestine and thus evaded a confrontation with Jazzâr 
Pasha, although relations between the two pashas were not friendly. 
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After the death of Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm Jazzâr Pasha prepared 
himself for the governorship of Damascus. However, suspicious of his 
self-reliant position the Porte tried to limit the power of Jazzâr Pasha by 
refusing him a permanent hold on the province of Damascus, which was 
still considered the most prestigious governorship of the region. Jazzâr 
Pasha served four times as governor of Damascus, but being well aware 
of the reservations against him in the imperial centre, he continued to res-
ide in his fortified town of Acre. The 'Azm family profited from this con-
tainment policy in the sense that the leading member of the family, 
'Abdallah Pasha, the son of Muhammad Pasha, remained a candidate for 
the governorship of Damascus. 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm served three 
times as governor of Damascus in the late 18th and early 19th centuries, 
but he was the last of the family to be granted this governorship. The pro-
vince of Tripoli disintegrated and became a dependency of Acre. From 
the late 1790s to 1833 Tripoli was intermittently ruled, often to the dismay 
of the Porte, by Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, a protégé of Jazzâr Pasha and his 
heirs.45 
As a result of the containment policy of the Porte the governorship of 
Damascus started to change hands much more frequently after 1783. 
Until 1812 provincial rivals often alternated with each other and as a con-
sequence provincial factionalism thrived. The swift rotation of gover-
nors of Damascus persisted, but from 1812 onwards only non-locals were 
appointed. This was a remarkable change of policy since the governor-
ship of Damascus had been dominated for nearly a century by locals or by 
non-locals who had made their career in the province in the service of the 
'Azms and, from the mid-1780s, by Jazzâr Pasha and his heir Sulaymân 
Pasha. This policy contrasted sharply with the attitude towards the pro-
vince of Sidon which remained in the hands of the heirs of Jazzâr Pasha, 
first Sulaymân Pasha and then 'Abdallah Pasha, both former mamlûks. 
2.5 Early reform and the rise ofMuliammad 'Alt Pasha 
After the military disasters in Europe and the proliferation of power 
groups in the empire during the late 18th century the need to reform 
some of the empire's main institutions became apparent, at least to some 
segments of the ruling Ottoman elite. Naturally, the function of the army 
became a point of dispute after the desperately poor showing on the 
battlefields. Military reforms were initiated by Sultan Selim III, but two 
principal problems obstructed his policy of reform. Firstly, the opposition 
to fundamental changes of the military structures was strong, not only 
within the janissary corps. The second principal problem was the lack of 
adequate funding. Sultan Selim III and his supporters sought to increase 
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the income of the central state by establishing a stricter control over the 
provincial resources and the allocation of the revenue. Even though the 
sultan succeeded in increasing the income of the central treasury, he 
largely depended on traditional measures to do so, like raising tax rates, 
confiscations and debasement of the currency. The more radical military 
reforms came to an end in 1807 when the traditional military, the janissar-
ies, and other conservative forces, especially from the religious estab-
lishment, joined forces against Selim III and had him replaced by his 
cousin Mustafa II. 
The reaction in the imperial centre did not meet with wide-spread ap-
proval in the provinces. A number of provincial governors even inter-
vened against the coup d'état. In several parts of the empire governors 
had built a strong base for their own personal rule and they hoped to 
achieve a more secure status. Governors who served in the European 
provinces had some reason to support military reforms, because they 
were within reach of enemy forces, but they hesitated to support sultan 
Selim III whose reforms were also directed against their self-reliant posi-
tions.48 
It is of interest that a strong drive to alter the provincial administration 
came from some governors who had been successful in exploiting the 
traditional system, for instance Jazzâr Pasha of Acre and Muhammad 'Alî 
Pasha of Egypt. Both were essentially strong supporters of centralization 
in the sense that they sought to monopolize the appropriation of the pro-
vincial surplus. Their main targets were contending provincial factions 
which were cither subjected or eliminated. After Muhammad 'Alî Pasha 
had brutally suppressed the mamlûk factions in 1811 he radically changed 
the provincial administration by abolishing many of the privileges of offi-
cials and officers. In the rural areas tax farming was supplanted by a uni-
fied fiscal regime and a direct link between the provincial state and the 
producers was established. In order to be able to implement the reforms 
and to discipline the population into cooperation the proficiency of the 
bureaucracy and the armed forces had to be improved. The functions and 
attributions of officials and administrative bodies were carefully defined. 
Both the bureaucracy and the army were enlarged to the extent that the 
resources of the provinces were hardly adequate. In particular the invest-
ments in the building of the new nizâm (standing) army constituted a 
heavy drain on the resources. The economic policies of Muhammad 'Alî 
Pasha were largely motivated by the excessive needs of his armies and 
bureaucracy. It was especially in its economic policies that the new Egyp-
tian regime differed from other reformers in the empire. New crops, tech-
niques and industries were introduced on a relatively large scale and to 
the direct benefit of the treasury or the army. Economic growth and mili-
44 Chapter Two 
tary control constituted the basic principles of the administration of 
Muhammad 'All Pasha. 
The efforts of Muhammad 'Alf Pasha, in particular those in the mili-
tary field, made a very strong impression on the sultan of the time, Mah-
mud II and those in his entourage who favoured fundamental reform. 
They were apprehensive of the growing power of the governor of Egypt, 
but until the early 1830s Muhammad 'Ali Pasha did not openly challenge 
the authority of the sultan. On several occasions his military services to 
the sultan were most vital to preserve the prestige of the empire, notably 
in the containment of the Wahhâbî movement in the Hijâz and of the 
Greek revolt. Disputes about a proper compensation for these services, 
and the losses involved, eventually engendered an open confrontation be-
tween the sultan and his powerful servant. In November of 1831 
Muhammad 'Ali Pasha directed his forces into Syria and his troops ad-
vanced far into Anatolia. 
By that time Mahmud II had adopted some of the measures taken ear-
lier by Muhammad 'Ali Pasha in his military reforms — the janissary corps 
was brutally abolished in 1826—and he was making preparations for the 
financial reorganization of the provinces. The occupation of Syria and 
parts of Anatolia by the armies of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha served as a 
strong impetus for the central authorities to formulate new policies, 
partly in order to mobilize foreign support for their cause. After he had 
annexed Syria to his realm the position of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha radi-
cally changed. While his authority was confined to Egypt and the Hijâz he 
had been relatively secure, although he was obsessed by possible intrigues 
against him on the part of the Porte. In late 1831, however, he not only 
challenged the supremacy of the sultan, but also alarmed the European 
powers who feared that Muhammad 'Ali Pasha's moves could lead to a 
swift disintegration of the empire and, subsequently, to the disturbance of 
the balance of power in Europe. When the sultan called in the assistance 
of the Russians to protect Istanbul from a possible Egyptian attack, Great 
Britain started to exert strong pressure on the contending parties to find a 
solution through negotiations. In the treaty of Kütahya of March 1833 the 
Syrian governorships were conceded to Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The Ot-
toman sultan regarded this as a temporary concession to a rebel governor 
and the Egyptian hold on the area remained basically insecure. Conten-
tion between Cairo and Istanbul endured and Sultan Mahmud II was pre-
paring for war for most of the time, feeling reassured by a growing 
concern for the future of the empire on the part of the British govern-
ment. It was left to a new sultan, Abdülmecid (1839-1861), or rather to 
the prominent Ottoman statesman Mustafa Resid Pasha, and to the 
British, to settle the affair with Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. He and his family 
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were offered the permanent governorship of Egypt. The pasha was reluc-
tant to accept this, in his eyes greatly unsatisfactory, offer, but British 
naval forces finally forced the evacuation of the Egyptian army from Syria 
in 1841. 
It is difficult to underestimate the magnitude of the changes which 
Muhammad 'Ali Pasha' regime brought about in Egypt. The pasha may 
have treasured the Ottoman cultural identity of his rule, but in fact Egyp-
tianized the administration, conscripted the Egyptian peasantry in his ar-
mies and favoured the formation of large estates. Thus he laid the 
foundation of a nation state. Nominally, Egypt remained part of the Ot-
toman empire, but it continued to follow a separate course. The effects of 
Muhammad 'Ali Pasha's policies on the Syria provinces and the empire at 
large are less clearly evident, except that they, unintentionally, speeded 
up the process of reform, as well as the incorporation of the empire into 
the new capitalist world order. The Egyptian regime encouraged produc-
tion for export, but its expansionist policies brought it in conflict with the 
dominant capitalist power, Great Britain. The British government traded 
political support for the sultan for a free-trade treaty with the entire Ot-
toman empire. Free-trade had not been a favourite of Muhammad 'Ali 
Pasha, who sought to protect Egypt's state sponsored industries and to 
establish central state control over all the resources of his domain. 
Egyptian policies in Syria, in particular in the district of Hama, will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter Seven. First, however, we must return to 
the period prior to the Egyptian occupation because in this study the dis-
cussion of the episode of Egyptian rule over Syria is primarily meant to 
facilitate the analysis of the mechanisms of traditional local rule. 

CHAPTER THREE 
LOCAL ADMINISTRATION 
THE LATE 18TH AND EARLY 19TH CENTURIES 
3.1 The ayân and local administration 
The 18th century is known as the era of the ascendancy of the ayân in 
provincial and local administration. In its broadest definition the ayân 
comprised the most prominent men of local society and they are often re-
ferred to as notables. During the 18th century the term acquired a more 
precise meaning, namely those among the notable members of local 
society who "...exercised political influence and were accorded official 
status." This restriction is of some importance because it excludes a 
large number of locals who may have been distinguished socially but who 
did not play any role of significance in local administration and politics. 
The nature of the relations with the administration is crucial in defining 
the composition of the ayân. In the Balkans and western Anatolian pro-
vinces people could be formally appointed ayân by gaining access to the 
local dîwân, or council. This practice appears to have been applied in 
Damascus as well. Contrary to the Balkans and western Anatolia no 
dîwâns were established in the district capitals of the Syrian provinces 
prior to the 1830s. In the provincial capitals, however, the dîwân consti-
tuted an important consultative body. 
The term ayân occurs often in Syrian literary sources, but much less 
frequently in official documents. In both the literary and documentary 
sources the term is normally, but not always, used in its broad definition. 
The ambiguity may partly explain the confusion about the composition 
and the function of the ayân in some recent studies. According to the 
strict definition of ayân the Syrian provinces had only a small number of 
ayân and, due to the absence of a dîwân, the district of Hama none. 
However, in the course of the 17th century local elements had already 
gained access to the askeri, the imperial military ruling class. In Damascus 
the recruitment of locals for the janissary force gave rise to formation of 
the yerli, the local janissary corps juxtaposed to and often in competition 
with the imperial janissaries. The latter corps was known locally as qa-
bîqûl or, simply, as qui, and was sometimes referred to as dawlat al-qal'a, 
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the "state of citadel" as opposed to the dawlat Dimashq, the "state of 
Damascus", an alternative designation for their local counterparts. The 
participation of locals in the administration reached its height in the 18th 
century when they occupied leading positions, such as provincial and dis-
trict governorships. Zayd al-amôjid wa-1-ayân, the Cream of the Most 
Glorious and of the A yân, the habitual form of address to the mutasallim, 
who was usually recruited from locally prominent military, fits well into 
this pattern. It is useful to broaden the concept of ayân to a local no-
table class which participated in the government. Wealth may have con-
stituted the prime criterion for inclusion in this class , but this wealth was 
not necessarily inherited wealth, although it often was. The ayân de-
pended to a large degree on income derived from governmental sources 
or from sources to which access was gained through participation in the 
administration. It is, however, of importance to note that the status of 
the ayân did not merely depend on their wealth. The special nature of 
the relationship between ayân and the state was acknowledged by the 
authorities and by local society, or, at least, of part of it. 
The differentiation within the class of ayân depended on the degree of 
their dependence on power delegated to them by the state, on their de-
pendency on local political resources, as well as on their ability to transfer 
their power and wealth to their heirs. The military-administrative class, 
here referred to as the leading aghawât, constituted the dominant seg-
ment of ayân in much of Syria, including Hama. The second clearly dis-
cernible segment of ayân in the Syrian provinces comprises the 
religious-administrative class, the leading Warna'. A third segment, de-
fined by Hourani as the "secular notables" and by Inalcik as "bour-
geoisie", comprising merchants and bankers, played a prominent role in 
the Balkans, but not in the Syrian provinces. Most military and religious 
ayân were, however, deeply involved in trade and finance. It has been ar-
gued that the military, too, were far stronger in the Balkans during the 
late 18th century than their counterparts in Damascus and Aleppo. 
However, in the case of Damascus there are clear indications, as will be 
shown later, that the leading local aghawât constituted the dominant 
political factor during most of the period under regard, including the 
closing years of the 18th century. Nevertheless, local political traditions 
or specific social or economic circumstances influenced the composition 
of the small privileged group of ayân. 
3.2 The military: aghawât and beys 
The aghawât constituted the backbone of the local administration of 
Hama. Here the term aghawât includes the officers of military or para-
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military formations, as well as people from a military background, but 
who occupied non-military administrative positions. The title of aghâ was 
hereditary and did not necessarily refer to a person's occupation. An 
aghâ could be promoted to bey when called to higher office. Occasion-
ally, also the title of bey became hereditary. This was, for example, the 
case with the Hamawî 'Azm family, all male members of which were re-
ferred to as bey in the early 19th century. The ability of the leading 
aghawât to maintain or mobilize armed, often irregular, units constituted 
their main asset. 
The aghawât were involved in administrating the locality predomi-
nantly as police and security officers, tax farmers and collectors. The 
governor of the district, the mutasallim, normally had a military back-
ground. Around 1700 most or, at least, the more influential aghawât oc-
cupied fortress villages, but in the course of the 18th century a change in 
residence occurred. Following the example of the 'Azms they increasingly 
took up residence in the town of Hama. Several households of aghawât, 
however, remained rurally based, the main fortress villages being Hisn al-
Akrâd and Khân Shaykhûn. 
Many aghawât had either strong local roots or had settled in the dis-
trict permanently, but at times the wâlî, the governor-general, appointed 
aghawât from Damascus or elsewhere to serve in the Hama district, 
mostly for shorter periods. The area also served as a place of refuge for 
dissatisfied officers and their following, who were sometimes able to es-
tablish themselves as military households. Military strongmen were gener-
ally referred to as hukkâm (sing, hâkim), which was not a formal title and 
more often than not associated with zulm, a most common word at the 
time for all sorts of acts of injustice and oppression. 
The differentiation within the body of aghawât was pronounced and it 
is difficult to see them as single social formation. The differentiation 
largely followed the magnitude of the wealth and political capital 
generated by office-holding as well as the degree of success in transfer-
ring this professionally generated capital to one's heirs. The more promi-
nent households of aghawât in the Hama area were formed around 
particular families. There was no tradition of mamlûk households. The 
leading aghawât of these families recruited soldiers and officers, atbâ', 
from various areas and, occasionally, acquired an adolescent mamlûk 
who received his training in the family household. In order to preserve or 
bolster the family's position young male members of the family, either 
sons, teenaged brothers, nephews or cousins, were prepared for office. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties they faced on the provincial level from 
the mid-18th century onward, the 'Azm family had remained the leading 
aghawât household of Hama and was to retain that position. No other 
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household compared to theirs in terms of wealth and status. The 'Azms 
were the only Hamawî family which included a number of pashas. The 
mutasallim of the district of Hama was, until the early 1820s, mostly, but 
not always, recruited from the family or from their associates. The 'Azms 
maintained close relations with the Jundî family from Ma'arra, the origi-
nal stronghold of the 'Azm family. The careers of aghawât of the Jundî 
family was closely related to the rise of the 'Azms to provincial promi-
nence. They acquired a strong foothold in the neighbouring district of 
Homs. Three aghawât of the Jundî family acted as mutasallim of Hama 
during the period under discussion, one of them a former commander of 
the fortress village of Tallbîsa. The Jundis ceased to play a role of signifi-
cance in Hama after the 1810s. 
During the first decades of the 19th century some aghawât of the Ji-
jaklî, Barâzî, Turkumânî and Tayfûr families gained prominence locally. 
They had first arrived in the area in the closing decades of the 18th cen-
tury. Little is known about the early careers of these aghawât, but their ar-
rival coincided with the decline of the power of the 'Azms on the 
provincial level, albeit that some of them may have started off as their 
clients. 
The majority of aghawât, especially those residing in villages and those 
in the service of the leading aghawât, lacked a family name, which makes 
it difficult to trace their origin. Apart from the fortress villages rural 
aghawât mainly lived in the Turcoman villages to the south of Hama, and 
in the Turcoman muqâta'a of Hazûr, situated in the foothills of the Jabal 
Nusayriyya, reflecting the originally military function of the settled Tur-
coman tribes. The aghawât of the tribally organized sedentary Turcoman 
were headed by the bey-i büyük. This position may have been similar to 
that of the serkerder of the local 'arab tribes mentioned before. 
Evidently, only few of the aghawât families of Hama could be con-
sidered awlâd al-'arab, of Arab ancestry. This was true for both the rural 
aghawât and their more distinguished urban counterparts. The origin of 
the 'Azms was, and still is, disputed. Some believe that they belonged to 
awlâd al-'arab, but there is some evidence that the first aghâ of this family 
to become wall of the province of Damascus did not speak Arabic. The 
origins of the families are of interest because they shed light on recruit-
ment and career patterns of officers in the Syrian provinces, many of 
whom originated from Anatolia. The 'Azm family may have originated 
from the Konya area, the Jijaklîs were of Turkish origin, whereas both the 
Barâzîs and Tayfurs were Kurds. In two or three generations they were 
normally considered to be locals. Most eventually adopted Arabic as their 
language, but rural aghawât belonging to Turcoman or Kurdish tribes 
often preserved, like their kin, their mother tongue. The adoption of a 
Local administration 51 
family name by Turkish and Kurdish aghawât may be considered a sign of 
integration into the dominantly Arabic local culture as well. The more re-
nowned urban aghawât often married into prominent local families of un-
disputed Arab ancestry. 
The only segment of the awlâd al-'arab with a distinct military tradition 
were the 'arab. Service in one of the military formations often attracted 
tribesmen to the towns, but none of the more prominent aghawât fami-
lies of the town of Hama was of 'arab ancestry. Some sheikhs of the 
Mawâlî, and possibly of a few other tribes, however, were referred to as 
aghâ. These 'arab aghawât may have belonged to retinue of the serkerder, 
the leading Mawâlî sheikh. One of the leading aghawât families of 
Damascus, the Shâmlî family, was of 'arab extraction. Two members of 
this family served as mutasallim of Hama in the late 1820s and early 
1830s.20 Later in the century Hûlû Pasha al-'Âbid, an aghâ of Mawâlî 
origin, made a remarkable career in the province. In the course of the 
second half of the 19th century it also became a policy to bestow on many 
'arab sheikhs, also from the lesser tribes, honorary titles such as bey and 
even pasha. 
The ranks of aghawât were largely closed to non-Muslims. Non-
Muslim, or rather non-Sunnî, private para-military forces did exist in the 
Nusayri Mountains and the Lebanon. Their commanders were local 
strongmen who often acted as tax farmers. In the Nusayri mountains 
these strongmen were referred to as mir in the case of the Ismâ'îlîs and 
muqaddam in the case of the Nusayris. Some Nusayri muqaddams could 
mobilize quite formidable forces and the leading muqaddam of the 
Matâwira, the dominant Nusayri kinship group of Jabal Kalbiyya, claimed 
the title of bey.21 
3.3 The learned: 'ulama'and mu'allims 
The awlâd al-'arab occupied the offices which required religious learning, 
as well as the scribal offices. The Kaylânî family had a near monopoly of 
the major judiciary and religious offices. The family traced its origin to 
'Abd al-Qâdir al-Jîlânî, the celebrated late medieval mystic whose fol-
lowers organized themselves in the Qâdiriyya order. The first Kaylânîs ar-
rived in Hama in the 14th century from Baghdad. This Hamawî family of 
mystics and 'ulama', both Shâfi'î and Hanafî, was highly regarded. The 
qâdî (judge), the chief muftì (jurisconsult), the naqîb al-ashrâf (head of 
the local descendants of the prophet), as well as the shaykh al-sajjâda al-
Qâdiriyya (head of the Qâdiriyya order) was nearly always selected from 
this family. The family headquarters, the Kaylâniyya, built on the bank of 
the 'Así river, contained a mosque, a convent and a prison. Apart from 
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their ancestor 'Abd al-Qâdir some members of the family had also ac-
quired sainthood and their shrines were frequented by locals. 
The other highly esteemed learned family of Hama was the 'Alwânî 
family, descendants of the locally much venerated mystic and scholar 
sheikh 'Alwân ibn 'Atiya (d.1527). Their ancestor occupied the seat of 
muftì, but the 'Alwânîs, mostly adhering to the Shâfi'î rite, were later ex-
cluded from the main offices. They derived their strength mainly from a 
genuine Islamic institution; the waqf, public or private holdings in mort-
main, usually referred to as religious or family foundations. The 'Alwânîs 
were a family of mutawallh, administrators of waqf holdings. The waqf 
properties of the family included shops, land and mills. Like the Kaylânî 
family, the 'Alwânîs were considered ashrâf, descendants of the prophet. 
Apart from Kaylânîs and 'Alwânîs, the Harîrî family may be counted 
among the local 'ulama' families of importance, albeit that some sheikhs 
of this family only established themselves later in the 19th century as lead-
ing Чііата' and started to compete with the Kaylânîs for the major re-
ligious offices. In the early 19th century the sheikhs of the Harîrî family 
administered the awqäf that were attached to the shrines of thejr ances-
tors. Like other cities Hama numbered numerous, often crumbling, 
shrines, mosques and meeting places of various mystical orders and, con-
sequently, many petty sheikhs, not all of whom necessarily belonged to 
sheikhly families. 
The "secular" scribes were largely recruited from the Greek-orthodox 
community of Hama or nearby Horns, among them the Bahn family. 
Like the Warna' they belonged to the traditional literati and they were re-
ferred to as mu'allim. The prominent role Christians played on the 
money-market also figured among their qualifications. Both the office of 
kâtib sancak, the scribe of the district, and the kâtib khazîna, the scribe of 
the treasury, appear to have been secure offices, sometimes held for 
life. The scribe of the treasury was assisted, at least in the early 1830s, 
by the sarrâf, cashier of the treasury. Not all scribal offices were held by 
Christians. The books of the local granary were kept by an aghâ, the an-
bârjî (see below) and the same was true for the postal resthouse, the man-
zilkhâna. 
3.4 The mutasallim and the aghawât 
The main local institutions were the sarâyâ and the mahkama. The 
sarâyâ was not a formal institution as such, but the building in which the 
mutasallim of the sancak, the district governor of Hama held office. The 
powers delegated to the mutasallim were far-reaching. He represented 
the wâlî, the provincial governor, on the district level and was answerable 
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to him. His main tasks consisted of the collection of taxes, the safeguard-
ing of public security and the preservation of the villages. He had to 
contribute to war efforts by sending provisions and to see to the supply of 
food and fodder of troops engaged in regional campaigns. Occasionally 
he himself participated in regional campaigns. 
The retinue of the mutasallim included the tiifenkçi basi, the mirahur 
and the wakîl al-khaq, respectively the commander of the musketeers, the 
Master of the Horse and the superintendent of expenditures. The most 
senior officer in his service, however, appears to have been the garib yigit 
agasi. Garib yigit forces first appear in the late seventeenth century in the 
Arab provinces, but little is known about the composition and activities of 
these cavalry units in these provinces. They seem to have been recruited 
mostly from irregular forces. They were either attached to janissary units 
or to private armies of provincial governors. The remainder of the reti-
nue of the mutasallim consisted of envoys, guards and servants. Apart 
from his private guard the mutasallim, then, had in principle direct con-
trol over a mounted force as well as the musketeers, who acted as the 
urban police force. 
The aghawât mentioned above were entitled to fees, called 'awâyid, 
collected from the population in lieu of a salary. This privilege distin-
guished them from a number of other aghawât. The relation between the 
mutasallim and some of these latter officers like the delibasi and the 
odabasi is unclear. The delibasi commanded the delis, a force which was 
called dalâtiyya in the Syrian provinces. Originally cavalry units in the 
service of provincial governors, by the 18th century they increasingly 
acted as auxiliary troops in the service of any patron who would hire 
them. The mounted delis were usually hired to police the countryside. 
Unemployed delis constituted a major threat to public security in north-
ern Syria. 
The odabasi, commander of the barracks, belonged to the janissaries. 
Janissary forces played an important role in the economy and politics in 
both Damascus and Aleppo, but little is known about their Hamawî coun-
terparts, except that their pay was organized differently from that of other 
local troops. In the countryside janissaries, referred to as muhâflzs 
(watchmen), manned a number of fortresses, each under the command of 
a dizdar. In the late 18th century the number of muhâfizs varied between 
30 and 60 troops per fortress. In the early 19th century some of the 
fortresses were, at least temporarily, abandoned, like Salamiyya, or oc-
cupied by rebels, as was the case with Qal'at al-Mudîq. 
Even though the delibasi and the odabasi were not permitted to collect 
fees, they may have acted in other capacities, for example as qassâms, 
which did entitle them to collect fees. The qassâmiyya constituted the 
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body of aghawât with their troops which was in charge of collecting the 
qism, a proportional tax on agricultural produce, mainly cereals. They re-
sorted directly under the mutasallim and were headed by the qassâm 
aghâ. The wheat and barley were stored in the anbâr, the granary of the 
district which was administered by the αηοάήΐ. The proper collection and 
storage of wheat and barley was a constant matter of concern for the mu­
tasallim and his superior, the wait, because of the high political value of 
the cereals. Barley was essential for the military and transport, whereas 
the ability to supply wheat to Damascus or other cities in times of scarcity 
contributed much to the reputation of any district or provincial governor. 
The stocks of wheat also enabled them to manipulate the market and pro­
vided them with a handsome additional income. As we shall see in Chap­
ter Six, the importance of cereals induced many of those involved in its 
collection, storage, supply and marketing to capitalize on its political and 
commercial potential. 
The number of aghawât is unknown, but it must have been consider-
able. Not only the officials and commanders of the various units were re-
ferred to as aghâ, but their senior aids and adult sons as well. Prominent 
Hamawîs employed aghawât in their households and these men were 
known as atbâ', clients or following. This was not only true for the 'Azms, 
but also for members of the Kaylânî family. Many of the aghawât who 
served in the district are only referred to by their given name, which 
makes it very difficult to trace the career patterns, in particular of the 
middle and lower strata. Of the aghawât households which established 
themselves firmly in the upper layers of the Hamawî administration and 
society in the course of the first three decades of the 19th century only the 
later stages in their career are relatively well-documented. Aghawât of the 
Jijakli and Barâzî families acted as garib yvgit agasi and delibaci respec-
tively. The Jijaklîs were active as tax farmers in the western parts of the 
district, whereas the Barâzîs maintained strong relations with the tribes. 
The Turkumân family of aghawât established itself in the area to the 
north of the district prior to the extension of their range of activities, in-
cluding tax farming, to Hama. The Tayfûr family appears to have made a 
late, but quick career in the 1830s. The hereditary chiefs of the Mawâlî, 
the Khurfân family, as well as of the sedentary Turcoman tribes, the 
Abâza family, belonged to the more prominent aghawât families of the 
district as well. 
The origin and early career of a number of aghawât who failed to 
transmit their power to a next generation is obscure. The increased use of 
family names during the mid-19th century is of great help to reconstruct 
the lineage of several families, but those families or individual aghawât 
who left few traces remain enigmatic. Among them, of course, were non-
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local individuals who had made a career elsewhere before they were ap­
pointed to office in Наша or were contracted by Hamawî authorities. Un-
fortunately, the origin and early career of one of the most important 
aghawât in the Hama district from the mid-1820s onwards, Faraj Aghâ, is 
obscure. 
3.5 The executive and the judiciary 
The mutasallim combined both judiciary and executive functions. As 
hakim al-iirf he decided on most criminal and fiscal cases. In principle, 
however, he could not overrule the judgments of the hakim al-shar' or 
qâdî who presided over the mahkama shar'iyya or majlis al-shar', the re-
ligious court. The Iatter's executive powers were limited and he often de-
pended on the mutasallim for the implementation of his rulings. Contrary 
to the qâdî, the mutasallim was not tied to an extensive and detailed cor-
pus of laws. He largely relied upon his personal judgment of a case and 
hardly ever kept record of his rulings. He had, of course, to comply with 
the directives emanating from the provincial and imperial centres, but 
these were generally stated in very broad terms, except in matters of taxa-
tion and market regulations. 
Notwithstanding the limited powers of the qâdî when compared to 
those of the mutasallim, he exercised a great responsibility. The qâdî con-
sidered a wide range of law suits and his judgment was in principle final. 
The large majority of the cases brought before the qâdî concerned either 
matters of family law or disputes in the spheres of property and com-
merce, such as legal ownership, partnership, loans, sales and lease con-
tracts. The mahkama was more than just a law court. Besides settling 
disputes, the qâdî acted as notary public and auditor of the finances of 
awqâf, religious or family foundations. 
The functioning of the mahkama was not strictly demarcated by re-
ligious law. At times the qâdî violated shar'î principles, particularly when 
one, or two, of the parties adhered to the Nusayrî faith. Nusayris, who 
constituted the second largest confessional community in the district, en-
joyed legal rights, a practice which ran contrary to the shar', which de-
fined them as apostates. Occasionally, the qâdî disallowed a testimony by 
a Nusayrî witness against a Muslim party, but normally a Nusayrî testi-
mony against Muslims was—in blatant contradiction with religious law— 
considered valid. Nonetheless, the reputation of the Muslims of Hama 
as devout, if not strict followers of the holy prescriptions, was reflected by 
the indignation the word fâ'id, interest, aroused in the court. In Aleppo 
courts, for instance, the qâdî took a lenient attitude towards the charging 
of interest, following the normal practice and sultanic law. Except in the 
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case of Nusayrî litigants, formal deviations from the shar' occurred rarely 
in the Hama court. Local custom, 'âda, was of some importance, for ex-
ample in the case of labour regulations. However, many cases were 
settled without reference to legal principles except that both parties had 
come to an understanding, which made a legal ruling. 
The involvement of the Hama court in the general administration is of 
special interest here. Edicts emanating from both the imperial and pro-
vincial dîwân were read out in court and entered into the records. At the 
introduction of a change of regulations or reforms the qâdî was involved 
in their implementation. The involvement of the qâdî confirmed the 
legitimacy of reforms and other actions, because the higher authorities of 
the state were keen not to separate imperial from religious law. In times 
of popular dissatisfaction they used the court as an instrument to empha-
size that they were seriously concerned with the local affairs and poised 
to restore confidence in the 'adi, the rule of justice. 
By denying the mutasallim the exclusive right to deal with taxation, 
public security, market regulations and other matters which were defined 
by imperial rather than religious law, the higher authorities sought to 
counterbalance his power. From time to time the qâdî received orders to 
conduct an investigation into the, mainly financial, dealings of high rank-
ing aghawât, including the mutasallim. The mutasallim of Hama was 
often present or represented during litigations of serious interest, a prac-
tice which reflects the ambition or need of this official to exert some con-
trol over the dealings of the court. 
In principle the qâdî was neither answerable to the mutasallim nor to 
the wâlî, but resorted directly under the imperial dîwân. Complaints 
about his dealings were to be directed to the latter body. In the circum-
stances of the time this was highly unpractical, because the central state 
lacked the means to exert adequate control over local affairs. It had dele-
gated part of its powers to the provincial governors and their dîwâns. The 
dismissal of at least one qâdî of Hama followed a petition addressed to 
the wâlî. Also, few locals would have the means to file complaints 
against the qâdî other than to local officials. Petitioning the provincial, let 
alone the imperial dîwân, could produce an effect only when the petition 
was supported by influential Hamawîs. Given the central position the 
court occupied in Hamawî society, it was difficult to ignore its president, 
the qâdî, and his family, the Kaylânîs. 
3.6 The mahkama and local society 
In large cities such as Damascus and Aleppo the qâdî was nearly always a 
non-local who served for a limited period. His deputy judges often ex-
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erted more political influence because of their prolonged tenure and be-
cause they represented local families and factions. The influence of the 
qâdî was also limited by the iftâ', the jurisconsultancy. Muflís of the 
various Sunriî rites played an important role in the local juridical system 
in the Syrian provinces, both inside and outside the court, The juriscon-
sultancy constituted to some extent an alternative for the qadâ', the 
judgement of a case by the qâdî. People could ask & fatwâ, legal opnion, 
of a muftì on a given issue in order to settle a dispute. The frequency of 
this type of settlement, that is, without the formal involvement of the 
court, is unknown. People often consulted a muftì prior to opening litiga-
tion in the court. Such a litigation was not a mere formality, even though 
the qâdî normally backed the fatwâ. The reason why people frequently re-
ferred the case to the qâdî after they had consulted a muftì was that the 
hujja produced by the court formally settled the case. Contrary to a hujja, 
a fatwâ contained a hypothetical version of the issue in the form of a 
question and the identity of the litigants remained concealed. The ques-
tion was often answered by a simple confirmation or refutation without 
any argumentation. Apart from the identity of the litigants a hujja con-
tained a clear verdict. The function of the muftì was rather casual except 
for the Hanafî muflís appointed by the supreme muftì of the state, the 
shaykh al-islâm. In the Syrian provinces these Hanafî muflís were, as else-
where, recruited from local 'ulama' families and the appointment was, in 
principle, for life. In Damascus the candidates for the office of Hanafî 
muftì, as well as the naqîb, were not selected from one single family. 
During the period under discussion the Murâdî family, which maintained 
close relations with some of the 'Azms, dominated the office of muftì, but 
they faced competition from 'ulama' of the 'Ajlânî, Mahâsinî and Bakrî 
families. The office of Hanafî muftì of Damascus, and other large cities, 
constituted the highest and most prestigious office occupied by a member 
of the local religious elite and the Damascene muftì acted, albeit infor-
mally, as the principal representative of the local community. He often 
voiced the complaints of various interest groups or those of the popula-
tion at large. l 
In the small town of Hama the qâdî was nearly always a local, and like 
the Hanafî muftì, he was recruited from the Kaylânî family. He was as-
sisted and often represented by his aide, the amîn al-fatâwâ. This sub-
ordinate, but still prestigious position was reserved for most of the period 
under discussion for sheikh Muhammad al-Dabbâgh. Given that the 
Kaylânî family also dominated the offices of naqîb al-ashrâf and shaykh 
al-sajjâda they constituted a formidable power. The political function of 
the Hanafî muftì in Hama differed from that of his counterpart in Damas-
cus, because his position vis-a-vis the qâdî, and the administration at 
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large, depended strongly on the relations within the Kaylânî family. The 
muftì was not necessarily the leading member of the family. Muhammad 
Sa'dì Efendi al-Kaylânî, for instance, who served both as muftì and shaykh 
al-sajjâda until his death in 1825, was a man of learning and piety, and ap-
pears not to have been deeply involved in local politics. He was 
succeeded by his son Muhammad Najìb Efendi, who served relatively 
briefly and of whom little is known. The next muftì, Muhammad 'АИ 
Efendi became one of the main actors in local politics. From the late 
1820s until his dismissal in 1845 he headed the family. 
The mahkama, and the iftâ', constituted the local institutionspar excel-
lence. The court functioned as a meeting place for the locally influential 
and was generally open to the public. Members of the 'Azm family, or 
their envoys, as well as of other prominent families like the 'Alwânî and 
Jijaklî, frequented court sessions. They, or their representatives, often 
acted as shuhûd al-hâl, witnesses who assented the handling of a court 
case. The qâdî hardly ever decided on a case without consultation with 
either religious experts, such as the muftì or sheikhs of the 'Alwânî family, 
or with people whose expertise was in a specific field, like the market or 
tax regulations, or who had an intimate knowledge of the quarters, vil-
lages and the tribes. Village sheikhs, for example, were often present at 
court sessions. 
The presence of experts and interested parties compensated for the 
shortage of staff of the qâdî which consisted of a scribe and a couple of 
court ushers only. The mahkama was a place of negotiating and bargain-
ing. It combined the diverse local interests with the principles of religious, 
imperial and local laws and traditions. The qâdî presided over a local in-
stitution where the muslims, the local public, discussed and settled their 
disputes. The qâdî often acted as arbitrator and sanctioned the ne-
gotiated settlement by issuing a hujja. Occasionally people who had ear-
lier brought their case to the notice of the mutasallim in his capacity as 
hakim al-'urf, applied to the qâdî to have the mutasallim's ruling con-
firmed. It is of interest that the mutasallim never acted as shâhid al-hâl 
in the Hama court. When attending a case his presence was stated in the 
opening line of a deed, which expresses his eminence, but also the distinc-
tion between his office and that of the qâdî. 
3.7 The a'yân of Hama 
At the beginning of this chapter a'yân were defined as a local notable 
class which participated in the government and depended to a large ex-
tent on income derived from governmental resources or from sources to 
which access was gained through office-holding. Two families stand out in 
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this respect, the 'Azms, representing the military-administrative class, 
and the Kaylânîs, representing the religious-judiciary class. The 'Alwânî 
family, which rarely held major offices, but which depended to a large ex-
tent on income derived from the administration of waqf properties, may 
be included in this small elite as well. None of the members of the other 
families mentioned so far could be considered local a'yan prior to the 
1820s, with the possible exception of the Mawâlî chiefs of the Khurfân 
family.56 
A clear indication of the distinguished position of the 'Azms, Kaylânîs 
and 'Alwânîs within Hamawî society and their special relation with the 
government is the addition of the prestigious Ottoman suffix zade to their 
surname. With the exception of non-local officials the use of honorific 
titles was restricted to members of these three families, the title of efendi 
being reserved for the learned, the Kaylânîs and 'Alwânîs. All three fami-
lies showed a remarkable ability to transfer their status and wealth to 
their heirs, albeit that the 'Azms failed to preserve their eminent position 
on the provincial level. 
The 'Azm and Kaylânî families were very wealthy, although their 
wealth was not evenly distributed over the various branches of the fami-
lies. In a later chapter some particulars of the finances and properties of 
two members of the 'Azm family are given. Here, an abstract of a waq-
fiyya, charter of a waqf, of 'Abd al-Qâdir Efendi ibn Ibrâhîm Efendi Kay-
lânîzâde, the naqîb for most of the 1820s, may serve as an indication of 
the magnitude of the wealth concentrated in the hands of Hamawî a'yan. 
This document also gives us an idea of what may be called the geography 
of wealth. The newly established waqf comprised the following: 
— a bakery in the Bârûdiyya quarter opposite the house of the heirs of 
Ismâ'îl Aghâ al-Za'îm; 
— a shop in the Sûq al-Tawîl next to the shop belonging to the waqf of 
Banî Malik; 
— a shop in the Hâdir quarter next to the coffee house belonging to the 
waqf of Yâsîn Efendi al-Kaylânî and the shop belonging to the heirs of 
the late Khâlid Efendi al-Kaylânî; 
— an irrigated field (zûr) near the village Qumhâna, held jointly with 
the heirs of the late 'Alî Efendï al-Kaylânî and with the brother of the 
wâqif (founder of the waqf) 'Abdallah Efcndi (all properties mentioned 
below are held jointly with this brother, apart from those in the Horns dis-
trict); 
— an irrigated field near the village of Khattâb, next to the field of 
Ahmad Bey al-'Azm, son of the late 'Abdallah Pasha; 
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— nine shops in the Hâdir quarter, next to the shop belonging to the 
waqfoî the Arba'în Mosque; 
— seven shops in the Hâdir quarter, next to the nine mentioned above; 
— a water mill near the village Murîj al-Durr, on the 'Así river, held 
jointly with the heirs of 'Abd al-Razzâq Efendi al-Kaylânî; 
— a shop in the Sûq al-Shajara quarter, next the shop belonging to the 
shrine of Sheikh 'Alwân, May God sanctify his secret; 
— a shop in the Jawra quarter, next to the shop belonging to the heirs 
of al-Hajj Zayn; 
— an oil press in the street of the coppersmiths, next to the courtyard 
belonging to the waqfoi the late As'ad Pasha al-'Azm; 
— a shop in the sûq, market, of the saddlemakers, next to the square 
belonging to the waqfoi As'ad Pasha al-'Azm; 
— two shops in the sûq of the skinners, next to the shop belonging to 
the waqfoi As'ad Pasha; 
— half of a water mill near the village al-Sadda in the Horns district, 
the other half belonging to the waqfoi the Khâlid ibn al-Walîd Mosque of 
Homs; 
— a khan, including shops and depots, in Homs, next to the coffee 
house owed by Ahmad Bey al-'Azm; 
— four shops built next to the khan mentioned above; 
—three shops in Homs, next to the khan belonging to the waqf of 
As'ad Pasha al-'Azm; 
— four shops in the Bâb 'Umar quarter in Homs, next to the shop and 
the depot belonging to the waqf of As'ad Pasha al-'Azm, and next to the 
shop of the Christian Jurjus Ghandûr; 
— four fields (ard) near Hama; 
Out of the yields, rents, of this waqf some modest charity payments were 
to be made yearly: 80 q. to the great mosque of Medina, 50 q. to the main 
mosque in Hama, the Nûrî, and 72 q. to four reciters of the Koran in 
Hama.58 
Despite the fact that their properties were located next to each other, 
a clear distinction was maintained between umara', commanders, and the 
ïilamâ', the learned. The 'Azms and Kaylânîs may have competed at 
times for influence, but normally respected each other's privileges and 
did not compete for the same offices before the mid-19th century. The re-
liance on power delegated to the military-administrative class, the 'Azms, 
differentiated them from the religious a^ân. The 'Azms depended 
heavily on the military and on provincial coalitions. This implied that the 
'Azms were more vulnerable to changes in the political order of the pro-
vince and the empire at large. This vulnerability will be demonstrated in 
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the next chapter. The religious-judiciary offices were clearly less vulnera-
ble to political shifts on the provincial level. Apart from co-optation by 
the state, the religious a'yân depended much more on local political re-
sources. Their status as learned custodians of the Islamic tradition en· 
dowed them with moral authority and prestige. 
The 'Azm family distinguished itself from the Kaylânîs and 'Alwânîs by 
their tradition of high office-holding. They had acquired cosmopolitan 
traits. Branches of the family had established themselves in Damascus, 
Aleppo and Cairo in the wake of the exceptional political career of the 
family during the 18th century. They married into several influential 
families in these centres of administration and commerce. The 'Azms of 
Damascus were particularly influential and belonged to the leading fami-
lies of the inner-city. 
Notwithstanding their illustrious ancestry the Kaylânîs were more 
parochial. The connection with their namesakes in Baghdad had re-
mained of some importance, as well as the ties with the Gaylânî family of 
Cairo, which like themselves claimed descent from 'Abd al-Qâdir al-
Jîlânî. The establishment of the Damascene branch of the Kaylânî 
family was connected with the rise of the 'Azms to provincial power and 
even though several members of the family held positions of influence in 
that city, they were not regarded as genuine Damascenes, contrary to the 
Damascene 'Azms. They remained first and foremost Hamawîs and 
clients to the Damascene 'Azms. The 'Alwânî family was a genuine local 
family which held a reputation of piety, also beyond Hama. 
In the late 1820s members of the Jijaklî family manifested themselves 
as a'yân when they attached the suffix zade to their name. It is true that 
the family had acquired strong interests in tax farming, but they found it 
difficult to preserve their prominent position after 1841. Some of the 
other aghawât families which had also relatively recently settled in the 
area, most notably Tayfûr and Barâzî, would join the ranks of local a'yân 
in the 1830s and 1840s. By then, however, the function of the a'yân was in 
a process of transformation due to the gradual strengthening of central 
control. 
Unmentioned so far is one group which did exert political influence 
but fails to conform to the qualifications of a'yân, the tujjâr (sing, tâjir), 
merchants. Some of the merchants belonged to the wealthiest among the 
Hamawîs, but in their relation with the government they appear to have 
depended strongly on established "political" families, primarily on the 
Kaylânîs. The tujjâr constituted a local interest group and their interests 
were apparently best served by the main truly local family. An indication 
that the tujjâr were far from constituting a corporate and politically viable 
62 Chapter Three 
group is the frequent omission of the tujjâr as addressees in opening lines 
of the edicts which were read out in the courts. 
CHAPTER FOUR 
POLITICAL INSTABILITY AND FACTIONALISM 
Injustice, zulm, is a key word in the chronicles and court records. Acts of 
zulm encompassed all sorts of abuse of power, like intimidation, exaction, 
outright extortion and profiteering by governors, officers and other offi-
cials. By the late 18th century injustice had long since become a natural 
companion of the provincial administration. The spread of exactions and 
other forms of harassment is generally attributed to changes in the mili-
tary organization of the provinces in the late 16th century, especially to 
the maintenance of private armies by provincial governors and strong-
men. Since then the central authorities had tried to curb the power of 
their servants in the provinces and to mitigate excessive abuse of power in 
provinces by assigning part of the revenue collection in the provinces to 
others than the governor and by introducing the swift rotation of senior 
provincial officials. The measures may have had some temporary effect, 
but failed to suppress the emergence of local elements in the administra-
tion. The ascendancy of the ay an in the administration of the provinces 
often went hand in hand with strong competition and ensuing long and 
devastating feuds. 
4.1 The Acre and interior f actions 
In the case of the province of Damascus the policy of the swift rotation of 
waits was abandoned in the 1720s, albeit not wholeheartedly, when a local 
military element, the 'Azm aghawât, had been allowed greater access to 
revenue sources by granting them tax farms which were not part of the 
province, for instance the district of Hama. They were allowed prolonged 
tenures. This change of policy was motivated by the collapse of order in 
most of the Syrian interior in the late 17th and early 18th century. The 
general lack of security seriously endangered the management of the all 
important hajj. Although the 'Azms were highly successful in the handling 
of the hajj and in curbing tribal unrest, the central authorities showed 
their reluctance to support dynastic governors by replacing As'ad Pasha 
al-'Azm by one of his former officers in 1757. Eventually, a former mam-
lûk of As'ad Pasha was established as wâlî in 1760, after three others had 
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failed to bring the province under control after the 'arab attack on the 
convoy of pilgrims shortly after As'ad Pasha's departure. The new wâlî, 
'Uthmân Pasha al-Kurjî, served for nearly twelve years. His successor was 
again recruited from the 'Azm family, Muhammad Pasha, the last wâlî of 
Damascus who was allowed a long tenure; from 1772 until his death in 
1783. In the three years following his death Damascus witnessed a swift 
rotation of wâlîs, amongst them Ahmad Pasha al-Jazzâr of Acre, his first, 
and shortest tenure in Damascus. 
The policy of the central authorities towards Damascus in the late 18th 
and early 19th century was, as has been noted before, largely motivated 
by the desire to contain Jazzâr Pasha and his mamluk household of Acre. 
The refusal to grant Jazzâr Pasha a permanent hold on Damascus may 
not have migitated the ambitions of the pasha, but he was pinned down in 
his fortified coastal town, where he continued to reside during the years 
he did serve as governor of Damascus. Jazzâr Pasha turned Acre into a 
fortification, not so much to defend this part of the empire against the en-
croachments of foreign hostile parties, but to protect himself against the 
enemy from within. 
The central authorities did not exclude Jazzâr Pasha from what re-
mained the most prestigious governorship in Syria, Damascus. Appease-
ment was part of the containment policy and Jazzâr Pasha was granted 
the governorship of Damascus four times, serving for about nine years in 
total. Three other candidates were used to counterbalance the strongman 
of Acre, at first Ibrahim Deli Pasha, and afterwards 'Abdallah Pasha al-
'Azm and Ibrahim Pasha al-Halabî. These three pashas represented, for 
lack of a better designation, the interior factions which consisted largely 
of the disintegrating 'Azm faction and their associates. After the death of 
Jazzâr Pasha in 1804 his heir Sulaymân Pasha saw himself placed in a 
position similar to that of his former master. In 1806 'Abdallah Pasha al-
'Azm was replaced by his senior aide, Kunj Yûsuf Pasha, as the exponent 
of the interior. By rotating the leaders or exponents of hostile factions— 
the Acre faction on the one hand and the factions of the interior on the 
other — as wâlîs of Damascus the central authorities kindled provincial 
factionalism. As a result acts of severe zulm became routine and, at times, 
extreme violence disturbed the Syrian provinces. In 1812 the central 
authorities ceased to recruit the wâlîs of Damascus from the ranks of the 
by then exhausted rival local parties. 
4.2 The revolts of 1786 
The year 1785 in which the fourth wâlî since the death of Muhammad 
Pasha al-'Azm, Jazzâr Pasha, was appointed to Damascus, marks the 
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beginning of a period of violent provincial factionalism. The following 
year was characterized by violence in Damascus and a rebellion of the 
Mawâlî in the Hama and Horns area, a rebellion which sparked off other 
revolts in the Syrian interior, especially in the northern parts. 
In 1786, after having served for little over a year as wâlî of Damascus, 
Jazzâr Pasha was replaced by Ibrahim Deli Pasha, also known as Ibrahim 
Pasha al-Dalâtî, a Kurd and former governor of Tripoli, who had made a 
career as a professional soldier—hence his name. Ibrahim Deli Pasha had 
a troublesome start in Damascus. Soon after his arrival he was forced to 
flee following a revolt of the janissaries of the citadel and aghawât from 
the Maydân quarter. The wâlî first retreated to a village to the south of 
Damascus, where he was joined by some Damascene dignitaries, among 
them the muftì, Muhammad Khalil Efendi al-Murâdî, who had just re-
turned from Istanbul. The party then left for Hama in order to collect 
troops. Nearly three months later Ibrahim Deli Pasha returned to Damas-
cus after he had received a reply from the Porte to his report on the re-
volt which he had dispatched from Hama. Apparently the central 
authorities had ordered him to take whatever measures necessary to rees-
tablish order in Damascus. He had the Maydân plundered and set to fire 
by the troops and many of its inhabitants were killed. He then besieged 
the citadel and, after the mediation of one of the leading hilamâ' and the 
delibasi, the janissaries surrendered. Some of them were executed, but 
most were expelled or allowed to escape, among them their commander, 
Ahmad Aghâ al-Za'faranji. The delibasi was Mullû Ismâ'îl, a highly in-
fluential officer who was later to play a less conciliatory role in the district 
of Hama. 
The Mawâlî 'arab under the leadership of their amir Muhammad 
Khurfân of the Mashârifa tribe had taken the opportunity to rise in revolt 
after the mobilization of troops from the Hama area to suppress the re-
bellion in Damascus. The grievances of the Mawâlî concerned the grow-
ing strength of the Hasana of the 'Anaza confederation who had taken 
control over part of their pastures. The Mawâlî attacked numerous vil-
lages all over the area, including the foothills of the Nusayri Mountains. 
Contrary to the tradition of trying to avoid bloodshed as much as 
possibly, the Mawâlî killed a large number of people, especially village 
elders and local aghawât. 
After his expulsion Ahmad Aghâ, the commander of the citadel of 
Damascus, had first sought refuge with the Mawâlî, but then proceeded 
to the mutasallim of Hama and may have contributed to the campaigns 
which were launched against the Mawâlî later. The counter-offensive 
against the tribesmen was directed from Aleppo and Hama. The Mawâlî 
were dealt a severe blow; hundreds of their number were killed. At the 
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same time Ottoman troops advanced from Antakia to the areas north of 
Hama to which the revolt had spread as well. The troops caused wide-
spread destruction in the villages of the northern Zâwiya and, what is 
more, carried the plague with them. The epidemic spread and northern 
Syria was hit by an extremely serious plague in the following year. 
The year 1786, then, was catastrophic. The spread of violence revealed 
the collapse of the political structures in the interior as they had 
developed during the 'Azm period. The course of events, however, was 
not totally untypical. The Damascene qabîqûl, the imperial janissaries 
who manned the citadel, as well as the aghawât from the Maydân, the 
stronghold of the yerli or local janissaries, had a history of revolts. Since 
the mid-17th century the containment of the military factions in Damas-
cus had been problematic. Ibrahim Deli Pasha was not the first wait who 
had been forced to retreat following a military revolt. Also the 'Azm waits 
had had some major difficulties in restraining the Damascene military, 
but they had been relatively successful compared to others. The May-
dan quarter had stood up to severe punitive actions before, most recently 
in 1758. The expulsion of military forces from Damascus had occurred 
earlier in the century as well. Only during the prolonged rule of 
Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm (1772/3-1783) had Damascus not witnessed 
open military dissension. 
Whether Jazzâr Pasha's policies during his first term in office in 
Damascus had contributed to the political instability is a difficult ques-
tion. He is most likely to have been upset by his dismissal as wait of 
Damascus in 1786, but there is no indication that he had a hand in the re-
volt against his successor. He was dismissed after Damascenes under 
the leadership of the muftì, Muhammad Khalîl Efendi al-Murâdî, had 
complained to the Porte about his attempts to impose a monopoly on the 
cereal trade. Given the strong reliance of merchants and aghawât of the 
Maydân on the cereal trade, it seems probable that they were among the 
petitioners. During his later terms in office in Damascus Jazzâr Pasha's 
main local allies, however, came from the Maydân, among them some of 
the mutasallims who represented him. 
4.3 The position of the 'Azms in Damascus 
It is of interest that a number of notables joined Ibrahim Deli Pasha 
during the revolt. The 'Azm family entertained strong relations with the 
notable families, primarily religious ayân, of the inner city of Damascus, 
like the learned Murâdî family. Damascene factionalism in the decades to 
come often followed the traditional antagonism between the inner city 
and the Maydân, although none of these two major parts of the city were 
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organized in single, internally coherent factions. Also, the aghawât from 
the northern quarters, let alone the imperial janissaries, were certainly 
not without influence. No faction constituted a solid, united formation. 
Alliances could easily dissolve at a time when the authorities were reluc-
tant to fully support any party. During his terms in office in 1790s and 
especially during his last term in the early years of the 19th century Jazzâr 
Pasha had a number of notables and aghawât executed, while others died 
of neglect in his prisons, among them three Hanafî muftis. The fact that 
the Hanafî muftis constituted a prime target of Jazzâr Pasha's repression 
reflects the central position of this particular office in Damascus. Since 
the qâdî of Damascus was not recruited locally, the chief mufti was the 
most senior religious ayân. The muftis, and others who suffered per-
secution, may have been associated with the 'Azms in one way or another, 
but not all of them should be considered as their clients. It seems certain 
that the Murâdî family was indeed closely connected with the 'Azm 
family at the time, not only through the bonds of marriage. Shortly after 
'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm had been appointed to Damascus for the first 
time in 1795, As'ad Efendi al-Mahâsinî was replaced by 'Abd al-Rahmân 
Efendi al-Murâdî as mufti. Other instances of the near simultaneous 
changes of personnel suggest that the wait was able to influence the ap-
pointment of a mufti. During the last and most repressive years of Jaz-
zâr's rule the position of the mufti became precarious because this 
functionary often voiced the general grievances of the Damascene popu-
lation against Jazzâr Pasha's policies and the brutal conduct of his troops 
and his local aides. The fact that leading religious ayân, as well as lead-
ing military were imprisoned or killed by Jazzâr Pasha does not neces-
sarily imply that these victims of his wrath were allies of the 'Azms and 
belonged to their faction. The ill-fated career of Ahmad Aghâ al-
Za'faranjî may serve as an example of the changing relations between the 
various actors. In 1786 Ahmad Aghâ, then commander of the imperial 
janissaries of the citadel, revolted against the newly appointed Ibrahim 
Deli Pasha. He was expelled from Damascus after the pasha had crushed 
the revolt, but was later employed by the same wait as mutasallim of 
Jerusalem. Jazzâr Pasha appointed him to Hama in the early 1790s, but 
shortly afterwards he was killed by Muhammad Aghâ, Jazzâr Pasha's qây-
immaqâm (deputy governor), possibly on the order of the pasha. 
The leading member of the 'Azm family at the time, 'Abdallah Pasha, 
had started his career under his father Muhammad Pasha and had served 
as governor of Tripoli and commander of Úit jarda when his farther held 
office in Damascus. In 1794 'Abdallah Pasha was promoted to the gover-
norship of Aleppo. When he was first appointed to Damascus in 1795, re-
placing Jazzâr Pasha, the family was popular among the Damascenes who 
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cherished good memories of the tranquil rule of his father, who had es-
tablished a reputation of righteousness and piety. News of 'Abdallah 
Pasha's appointment was received with joy. For the time being no eyes 
were gouged out or noses cut off, to mention two of the penalties for 
minor offenses which had become routine during Jazzâr Pasha's rule. 
'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm failed to fulfill the high expectations and, un-
like his father, he was not to be remembered as a just ruler, but as a rapa-
cious one, although the more violent acts of zulm perpetrated during his 
later years as wait in Damascus were ascribed to his senior aides, in par-
ticular to Darwîsh Aghâ ibn Ja'far Aghâ, rather than to the pasha him-
self. 'Abdallah Pasha lacked the efficiency of his main contenders, as 
well as sufficient support from the central authorities who had decided 
that a quick rotation of the office of wait of Damascus would better serve 
the interests of the state. For a decade the appointment to the governor-
ship of Damascus resembled musical chairs in which, apart from 'Abdal-
lah Pasha al-'Azm and Jazzâr Pasha, a third candidate joined in, Ibrahim 
Pasha al-Halabî, a strongman from Aleppo who had served under 
'Abdallah Pasha in Aleppo and had succeeded him as governor when 
'Abdallah Pasha was transferred to Damascus in 1795. 'Abdallah Pasha 
was to serve four times as wait of Damascus, Ibrahim Pasha three times 
and Jazzâr Pasha another two times (he died while in office in 1804). Jaz-
zâr Pasha owed his third appointment to his military capacities. When the 
French army occupied Egypt the governorship of Damascus was restored 
to him. He was appointed wait of Egypt as well. This latter appointment 
was at the expense of another scion of the 'Azm family, Nusûh Pasha, who 
had been the commander of the troops, which had defended Cairo un-
successfully against the French assault. The appointment of Jazzâr Pasha 
to Egypt was nominal. Egypt had come under French rule. When Jazzâr 
Pasha survived the siege of Acre by Napoleon's troops, he became the 
hero of the day. 
4.4 Violence and factionalism in Hama 
The relations between the 'Azms and Jazzâr Pasha were hostile, not only 
because they were political rivals. A family feud had entered the relation-
ship in the early 1790s. Jazzâr Pasha was accused of assassinating 'Ali Bey 
al-'Azm, a brother of 'Abdallah Pasha. The mutasallim of Jazzâr Pasha 
had confiscated a large number of sheep from 'arab with whom 'Ali Bey 
had contracted a partnership, making him the co-owner of the flocks. 
Consequently, 'Ali Bey demanded the return of the sheep. The mutasal-
lim asked Jazzâr Pasha, who resided in Acre, for advice in the matter. 
'Ali Bey was shortly afterwards poisoned. It was believed that Jazzâr 
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Pasha had ordered his local representative to kill 'Ali Bey secretly. The 
bey's mother decided to travel to Istanbul to bring the matter to notice of 
the sultan, but she died before reaching the capital, some believed of 
grief, others saw the hand of Jazzâr Pasha in her death. 
With the erosion of support for the family in Istanbul after the mid-
18th century the 'Azm family had to fall back on the exploitation of their 
rural and urban properties in the province, which included a number of 
large trading facilities. The demise of the family's power on the provincial 
level had serious repercussions on their position in their once secure 
abode of Hama. The Hama area had already suffered from numerous 
tribal skirmishes before the revolt of the Mawâlî in 1786. The aghawât of 
the area had campaigned on several occasions against the Mawâlî. In the 
mid-1770s the leading member of the Hamawî 'Azms, 'Abd al-Rahmân 
Bey, had been taken captive by the tribesmen, together with 'Abd al-Raz-
zâq al-Jundî. commander of the fortress of Tallbîsa, who was executed by 
the Mawâlî. 
The Hamawî 'Azms appear to have suffered a heavy blow in 1786. 
They may have been involved in the suppression of the janissary rebellion 
of Damascus and undoubtedly contributed to the campaign against the 
Mawâlî insurgents, but they had lost, at least temporarily, the governor-
ship of the district. The Hama area became the scene of competition 
between the local 'Azms and contending aghawât who were often of non-
local origin. These contenders were not necessarily tied to rival provin-
cial factions, but they had the opportunity to ally themselves to these 
factions when such a move appeared convenient to strengthen their posi-
tion. 
During the second term of Jazzâr Pasha in Damascus (1790-5) faction-
alism in Hama increased. In 1794 fighting between the men of the garib 
yvgit agasi and the tiifenkçi basi erupted, in the wake of which fire was 
opened on the Kaylâniyya, the headquarters of the Kaylânî family, the old 
associates of the 'Azms. The appointment of 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm, 
who belonged to the Damascene branch of the family, as wait in 1795 was 
certainly welcomed by his Hamawî relatives. His terms in office were 
short and interrupted, but he did favour his family. 'Abd al-Rahmân Bey 
al-'Azm served as his mutasallim in Hama during his first tenure. When 
Ibrahim Pasha al-Halabî was installed as wâlî of Damascus 'Uthmân 
Aghâ al-Jundî, the son of the aforementioned 'Abd al-Razzâq Aghâ, was 
appointed to Hama. 'Uthmân Aghâ was twice replaced by 'Abdallah 
Aghâ al-Mahmûd, a member of the Dandashlî clan of the Homs area and 
one of the main allies of Jazzâr Pasha, but later 'Uthmân Aghâ served 
both under Jazzâr Pasha and 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm, showing that this 
aghâ had established himself firmly in the area. 
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After the French had been forced to evacuate Palestine Jazzâr Pasha 
ordered 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd to organize festivities in Hama in 
celebration of this God-given victory. The town was decorated with 
colourful banners by the local dyers. The main event was the parade in 
which the guilds were the principal participants, but the military, 
peasants, gypsies and even 'Anaza 'arab had also been mobilized and 
joined the ranks of the paraders. According to the official report on the 
festivities they paraded for more than three hours through the streets of 
Hama, "...without offending, fighting and quarrelling..." and also there 
had been "...no instances of immoral behaviour, deceit, coercion, iniquity 
or destruction." Obviously, such a show of harmony was extremely rare 
and it was certainly not to last. 
The competition between 'Azm and Jazzâr factions culminated in a 
bloody exchange between troops of the two pashas in the streets of Hama 
in 1803. 'Abdallah Pasha had just been replaced by Jazzâr Pasha as 
governor of Damascus. He heard the news of his dismissal while laying 
siege to Tripoli in order to arrest its rebel hakim, Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, a 
client of Jazzâr Pasha, who had sent troops to assist tum. 'Abdallah Pasha 
lifted the siege and directed his troops to Hama to relieve the town from 
the troops of 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd, another of Jazzâr Pasha's as-
sociates, former governor of Hama and then governor of Homs. The aghâ 
had set off for Hama after his patron had received the letter of appoint-
ment. He may have proceeded to Hama in order to retaliate against the 
'Azms for the conduct of 'Abdallah Pasha's troops prior to the siege of 
Tripoli. All along the way from Damascus to Tripoli the pasha's troops 
had plundered villages and the road which connected the interior with 
coastal Tripoli ran through the area where 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd 
and his Dandashlî clan held sway. During the fighting in Hama 'Abdallah 
Aghâ al-Mahmûd was killed, together with many of his and Jazzâr's sol-
diers who had joined the army of the strongman of Homs. The casualties 
among the inhabitants were high as well, but the troops of 'Abdallah 
Pasha al-'Azm had dealt a heavy blow to his enemy. The remainder of 
Jazzâr's troops escaped, but were raided by 'arab. 'Abdallah Pasha 
proceeded with his troops to the near vicinity of Damascus because he re-
fused to accept his dismissal. Out of fear for his troops the inhabitants of 
the outer quarters of Damascus sought refuge in the inner city. However, 
his troops eventually turned against the pasha, because they had not re-
ceived their pay, and because they "refused to fight the dawla", the mili-
tary of Damascus. 
Jazzâr Pasha had no absolute control over his commanders and associ-
ates either. He may not have consented to the conduct of his troops and 
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those of 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd in Наша. A few years earlier, for ex­
ample, he had informed 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd, then mutasallim of 
Hama, that a number of horsemen and soldiers had departed for the 
north without his consent and that they were causing trouble along their 
way. The last year Jazzâr Pasha served as wait of Damascus was charac-
terized by indiscriminate violence, not only in Hama, but in Damascus as 
well. The pasha was old and suffered from failing health. Retired in his 
fortified retreat in Acre he was losing his grip on the situation. His death 
in April of 1804 was greeted with great relief and outbursts of joy in most 
of Syria. Numerous verses were composed to commemorate his death, or 
rather the cruelties he perpetrated during the last decade. In Damascus a 
manhunt on his aides ensued. 
4.5 The years following the death of Jazzâr Pasha 
The division between the interior and the coast continued to play an im-
portant role after the death of Jazzâr Pasha, but the degree of violence 
and repression which accompanied provincial factionalism decreased. 
This was partly due to the more compassionate ways of Jazzâr's heir, Su-
laymân Pasha, one of his former mamlûks. The central authorities were 
determined not to allow Sulaymân Pasha to occupy a position of strength 
comparable to that of his former master. Much of the energy of the 
governors of Damascus during the first seven years after the death of Jaz-
zâr Pasha was spent in trying to curb the power of their counterpart in 
Acre. The status of the province of Tripoli played an important role 
during these years. It had become a dependency of Acre under Jazzâr 
Pasha, who had patronized the dizdar, the commander of the citadel of 
Tripoli, Mustafa Aghâ Barbar. To the dissatisfaction of the Porte this 
aghâ continued to receive support from Acre after Jazzâr Pasha had died. 
Several campaigns were launched against Mustafa Aghâ Barbar by 
Ibrahim Pasha al-Halabi, 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm and his successor in 
Damascus, Kunj Yûsuf Pasha. Even though the aghâ was ousted several 
times, he was always able to regain control over Tripoli and this pattern 
would continue into the 1830s. 
This is also the period in which the 'Azms ceased to play a prominent 
role in provincial politics. In 1806, after he had barely survived a military 
revolt in Damascus, but, more importantly, after the Wahhâbîs had re-
fused the hajj convoy from Damascus entrance to the holy shrines, 
'Abdallah Pasha was transferred to Adana and later to Urfa. His succes-
sor in Damascus was recruited from his own ranks, his former delibasi 
and mutasallim of Damascus, Kunj Yûsuf Pasha, a Kurd who had served 
earlier in the Hama area. The tenure of Kunj Yûsuf Pasha was troubled 
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by Wahhâbî incursions and by a growing opposition from Sulaymân Pasha 
and his allies in Lebanon and Tripoli. In 1810 Kunj Yûsuf fled from 
Damascus and Sulaymân Pasha's troops, reenforced by Druze forces, 
took the city. The Porte had given in to Sulaymân Pasha's claim to the 
governorship of Damascus, expecting from him and his military the ability 
to curb the Wahhâbî encroachments. 
The policies of Sulaymân Pasha compared favourably to those of Jaz-
zâr Pasha. Although he was engaged in an, at times violent, competition 
with Kunj Yûsuf Pasha, he was much less inclined to oppressive action 
and much more to reconciliation with Damascene factions, which had re-
ceived the news of his appointment with some anxiety. When Sulaymân 
Pasha's choice for the office oimutasallim of the city—an aghâ who had 
served under Jazzâr Pasha in Damascus as well—was announced, a revolt 
appeared to be imminent. Sulaymân Pasha gave in to the objections 
against his nominee and replaced him by a leading local aghâ, Darwîsh 
Aghâ ibn Ja'far Aghâ, who had previously served as mutasallim under 
'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm. This concession did not indicate that a strong 
and viable interior faction still existed. On the contrary, with the flight of 
Kunj Yûsuf Pasha to Egypt and the disintegration of his once quite formi-
dable army, no provincial rival of any potency was left and there was no 
direct danger in recruiting able and experienced officers who had been 
attached to the interior factions in the preceding decade. 
Sulaymân Pasha only served for a year and half. The coming man of 
the wider region, the governor of Egypt, Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, had sent 
his forces to the Hijâz to deal with the Wahhâbîs. After initial setbacks 
and at high costs Muhammad 'Ali Pasha's troops regained the holy cities 
for the sultan in 1812 and 1813. Now that the pacification of the Hijâz 
and adjacent areas had become the responsibility of the governor of 
Egypt, the pressure on the governor of Damascus to campaign against the 
Wahhâbî tribesmen was relieved. Together with the final disintegration of 
the interior provincial factions this allowed for a change of policy towards 
the province of Damascus. From early 1812 only non-locals were ap-
pointed to Damascus in order to bring the province under a stricter cen-
tral control. The sultan of the time, Mahmud II, initiated this policy in 
Anatolia and the province of Aleppo as well. In September of 1811 a 
former protégé of Sultan Selim III and officer in his nizâm forces, had 
been appointed as wait of Aleppo. In the Aleppo province the change 
of policy resulted in a series of revolts, but in the province of Damascus it 
produced at least one positive effect. Factionalism acquired a local and 
usually petty nature. The period of intense and violent competition for 
the resources of the Syrian provinces, in particular those of the province 
of Damascus, a period which had started with the emergence of Jazzâr 
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Pasha's military household in the 1780s, had come to an end. The factions 
of the interior, of which Kunj Yûsuf Pasha may be considered the last 
representative, had exhausted their means first. Notwithstanding their 
relative strength the Acre faction also suffered from exhaustion. Sulay-
mân Pasha had inherited a domain which had been exploited well beyond 
the limit by Jazzâr Pasha during the last years of his life. Combined with 
the depression of trade with Europe the extremely oppressive rule of Jaz-
zâr Pasha had resulted in a decrease of economic activity in Acre and its 
hinterland and in the departure of a considerable part of its inhabitants. 
Sulaymân Pasha served as governor of the province of Sidon and Tripoli 
until his death in the late summer 1819 and does not appear to have had 
the ambition to recover the governorship of Damascus after 1812. 
4.6 Depopulation in the Наша district 
By the early years of the 19th century Hama had gained the reputation of 
a place of injustice and agony. According to an early 20th century 
Hamawî sheikh, the conduct of the horsemen was so rude that people re-
constructed their front doors in order to prevent them from entering on 
horseback. This may be a figure of speech, but few places were as 
plagued by violence as Hama was at the time. Shihâb alleges that during 
one month in the year 1218 (1803-4) no less than five mutasallims served 
in Hama consecutively and that they were all brutal, bringing about the 
exodus of the majority of the population to Mount Lebanon and 
Tripoli.44 
The lack of discipline among local officials and troops at times 
alarmed the higher authorities. In 1788, for example, Hamawî aghawât, 
notably the mutasallim and the qassâmiyya, received a stern warning from 
Damascus. They were accused of extorting and terrorizing the peasantry 
and blamed for the general deprivation of the villages. No reference is 
made in the edict to the widespread pillaging of villages by the Mawâlî a 
few years earlier, but it does mention massive desertion of villages over 
the previous years. The aghawât were held responsible by Ibrahim Deli 
Pasha, the wait who had mobilized Hamawî troops to suppress the revolt 
in Damascus in 1786 and to sack the Maydân quarter. 
Such warnings—there were many more to follow—were of little avail. 
The aghawât had to operate under difficult conditions. Competition for 
the yields of the area was intense. The yields of agriculture and animal 
husbandry had dropped due to displacement of villagers and 'arab alike. 
Several tribes were in search of new pastures and attempted to satisfy 
their needs by turning to banditry. Nonetheless, fugitive and unemployed 
aghawât and soldiers were attracted to troubled areas like Hama and the 
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Zâwiya, because the old local order had collapsed. Villagers were ex-
tremely vulnerable in times of instability, when investment in agriculture 
dropped. They were not only visited by local officials who demanded pay-
ments on top of the regular charges, but also by tribesmen who 
demanded khuwwa (protection money) and bands of unemployed or fugi-
tive horsemen. The pressure on the rural population had become acute 
and, subsequently, many left their villages. 
In the closing years of the 18th century tax pressure increased dramati-
cally as a result of the French occupation of Egypt and coastal Palestine. 
Imperial and provincial troops headed south to repel the French invasion 
army. The troops had to be provided with food, fodder and camels and 
the expenses were distributed over the districts. From 1799 until 1803 
many troops passed through the area and usually camped for a day or two 
near Hama. The presence of the troops inspired awe in the population, 
because of their rude conduct. The massive movements of troops accel-
erated the process of village desertion. When in 1800 the officer in charge 
of the provisioning of the troops prepared a list of villages for the dis-
tribution of the expenses, it became evident that about 10 % of the vil-
lages of the Hama plain had very recently been totally evacuated by their 
inhabitants. 
Tribal pressure was one of the causes of village desertion. A number of 
villages bordering to the bâdiya fell in ruins in the late 18th century, par-
ticularly in the area to the south of the town of Hama and in the northern 
part of the district, the A'la, to which the Mawâlî had retreated. Some 
of these villages were reoccupied in the decade following 1804 during 
which provincial factionalism gradually became less violent and tribal 
pressure subsided. Others remained deserted until the 1830s. Those parts 
of the district which were generally less exposed to tribal pressure, like 
the Jabal Kalbiyya, also suffered from village desertion, albeit that villages 
were rarely deserted entirely. Here the financial burden resting upon the 
villagers constituted the main cause of land desertion. The authorities 
were well aware of the financial needs of the peasantry and tax rates were 
occasionally lowered, for example in 1788 by Ibrahim Deli Pasha and in 
1799 even by Jazzâr Pasha. These and some later tax reductions pro-
duced little effect as long as instability prevailed. 
4.7МиШ Ismail, a warlord 
By rotating provincial rivals as walls of Damascus during the period 1785-
1812 the central authorities had created an atmosphere of instability in 
which commanders of regular and auxiliary forces came to play an impor­
tant role. These aghawât had, of course, always been an important factor 
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in provincial administration and politics. Many waits who served in the 
Syrian provinces had started their career as professional soldiers, includ-
ing the first generation of the 'Azm governors, and all but one of the 
governors of Damascus who served between 1785 and 1812. The excep-
tion was 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm, himself the son of a pasha. This is in 
marked contrast with the period 1744-1784 in which the sons of pashas 
had dominated the office. The prominence of the ex-soldiers after 1786 
reflects the violent character provincial rule had assumed. Apart from 
soldiers who made it to provincial governor a broader stratum of influen-
tial aghawât existed. The leading aghawât of the local janissaries of the 
Maydân were part of this group, as well as those of other quarters of 
Damascus, like Darwîsh Aghâ ibn Ja'far Aghâ, and the officers of the im-
perial janissaries, like Ahmad Aghâ al-Za'faranjî. Some rurally based 
aghawât, too, like 'Uthmân Aghâ al-Jundî and 'Abdallah Aghâ al-
Mahmûd, figured prominently. Many of these aghawât were tied to a cer-
tain locality, but others had no strong local ties. This was the case with the 
imperial janissaries and with those who had been recruited as mamlûk or 
as mercenary from outside the Syrian provinces or from nomadic groups. 
This does not imply that all mamlûks and mercenaries lacked local ties. 
In Acre with its strong mamlûk household founded by Jazzâr Pasha part 
of the mamlûks established close relations with the locality, which they 
turned into their stronghold. However, in the case of quite a large num-
ber of the aghawât and their troops ethnicity rather than locality predomi-
nated in their relations and orientation. The population often identified 
them as ethnic groups, as Kurds, Turks, Maghribis or Arnâ'ût, people 
from Albania or the Balkan at large. The Kurds constituted the dominant 
ethnic group within various military formations. 
The governors made extensive use of the services of both local aghawât 
and the more mobile "ethnic aghawât". The mounted delis constituted 
the most important auxiliary force and a number of delibasis occupied 
vital positions. Two of the governors of Damascus during the period 
1785-1812 were former delibasis, whereas other commanders of deli 
troops served as district governors. 
All through this period one particular delibasi, Mullû Ismâ'îl, was 
deeply involved in Syrian politics. Mullû Ismâ'îPs origins are obscure, but 
he is most likely to have been a Kurd. Mullû Ismâ'îl offered his services 
to all governors of Damascus during this period. During the suppression 
of the janissary revolt of 1786 he mediated between Ibrahim Deli Pasha 
and the commander of the citadel. From the early 19th century he 
developed a special relation with the Hama area while serving 'Abdallah 
Pasha al-'Azm. By 1805, when 'Abdallah Pasha was still governor of 
Damascus, Mullû Ismâ'îl had made a fortune and had taken up residence 
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in Hama. He ranked among the most influential officers in the Syrian 
provinces. Many sought his support or took refuge with him, including 
high-ranking non-local officials. 
Naturally, Mullû Ismâ'îl was involved with several strongmen from 
areas adjacent to Hama, like the Nusayrf headman of Sâfîtâ, Saqar al-
Mahfûd, and Mustafa Aghâ Barbar of Tripoli. Few of them could afford 
to be faithful allies in these times and Mullû Ismâ'îl, too, regularly 
changed sides, sometimes abruptly. In 1806, for example, Mustafa Aghâ 
Barbar ransacked the Sâfîtâ area after Mullû Ismâ'îl had withdrawn his 
support from Saqar al-Mahfûd. Later Mullû Ismâ'îl offered his services to 
Kunj Yûsuf Pasha on several occasions. He campaigned with the pasha 
against Mustafa Aghâ Barbar in 1808, as well as against the local rulers of 
the Biqâ' valley, the ShM Harfush clan. Mullû Ismâ'îl also acted as a me-
diator in a number of disputes involving Kunj Yûsuf Pasha and various 
Lebanese parlies. In the Hama area he restored the small town of Misyâf 
to its Ismâ'îlî inhabitants after they had been expelled by the Nusayri 
Rasâlina clan. 
The relation between Mullû Ismâ'îl and Kunj Yûsuf Pasha is of inter-
est. The latter had started his career as a mamlûk in the service of Mullû 
Ismâ'îl, but disengaged himself from his patron. Like his former master 
Kunj Yûsuf entered the service of 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm and had a 
quick career. Mullû Ismâ'îl became, at least nominally, Kunj Yûsuf s in-
ferior when the latter was promoted to wâlî, but the veteran Mullû Ismâ'îl 
followed his own interests. When Kunj Yûsuf Pasha's position in Damas-
cus had become most awkward in 1810 in the face of Wahhâbî incursions 
into southern Syria, local opposition and a military threat on the part of 
Sulaymân Pasha of Acre and his Druze allies, he called upon Mullû 
Ismâ'îl for military assistance. When it became apparent that Mullû 
Ismâ'îl had decided to throw in his lot with Sulaymân Pasha and re-
mained in Hama, Kunj Yûsuf Pasha speeded up his preparations to 
escape to Egypt. Mullû Ismâ'îl was duly rewarded by the new wâlî, Sulay-
mân Pasha, and made mutasallim of both Hama and Horns. 
About a year after his appointment to Hama, Mullû Ismâ'îl fell from 
grace. He left Hama and sought refuge with the Mawâlî. His departure 
was accompanied by, apparently extreme, violence, because news of dis-
turbances in the Hama area shocked the public in Damascus. He then 
established himself as a rebel chief in the fortress village of Qal'at al-
Mudîq, overseeing the entrance of the Ghâb valley. He aligned himself 
with the self-appointed rulers of Jisr al-Shughûr, a small town in the 
northern Ghâb, and of Arîhâ, an even smaller town in the northern 
Zâwiya. The thinly inhabited triangle in between these three places con-
stituted a favoured retreat for insurgent aghawât and 'arab, given its re-
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moteness from Aleppo, capital of the province of which the area was 
part. Mullû Ismâ'îl maintained close relations with several 'arab tribes 
and owed huge flocks of sheep. 
4.8 Vie 'arab, the 'Azms and the death of Mullû Ismâ'îl 
With the retreat of Mullû Ismâ'îl to the fortress village of Qal'at al-Mudîq 
his career had not come to an end. However, during the second decade of 
the 19th century the provincial factionalism on which the warlord had fed 
subsided. The exclusion of the provincial factional leaders from the 
governorship of Damascus brought a higher degree of stability in the Syr-
ian interior. The Hamawî 'Azms reestablished themselves as the leading 
aghawât of the district. For over a decade the mutasallim was again to be 
recruited from their family. 
During the second decade of the century no resurgence of the power 
of the 'Azm family on the provincial level occurred. In the early 1810s two 
of the last pashas of the family settled in Hama, namely the army com-
mander Nasuti Pasha and 'Abdallah Pasha who had been dismissed from 
the governorship of Urfa and was ordered to take up residence in Hama. 
In the same year the head of the Hamawî 'Azms, 'Abd al-Rahmân Bey, 
died and was succeeded by his son Salìm Bey. Little is known about the 
vicissitudes of the Damascene 'Azms during these years, a clear sign that 
the family had indeed ceased to play a role of significance in provincial 
politics. The wâlîs of Damascus at the time took action against several 
Damascene aghawât, among them Maydânîs. Among the most influen-
tial Damascene aghawât of the period after 1812 were Darwîsh Aghâ ibn 
Ja'far and the Maydânî 'Abd al-Ghanî Aghâ al-Shâmlî. An indication that 
political factionalism had indeed subsided to a considerable extent was 
the fact that the office of the mufti became much more secure. During the 
preceding quarter of a century the office had changed hands often, but it 
changed hands only twice between 1813 and 1830, the first time in 1815 
when the muftì 'Ali Efendi al-Murâdî died and was succeeded by his son 
Husayn Efendi, whose prolonged tenure was interrupted for one year by 
Sa'ìd Efendi al-'Ajlânî, the son of the muftì who preceded 'Ali Efendi al-
Murâdî, namely Hamza Efendi al-'Ajlânî. It is of interest that the 
Murâdî family was able to dominate the office (well into the 1840s), while 
their former patrons, the Damascene 'Azms, lost much of their past in-
fluence. 
The Hamawî 'Azms may have strengthened their position, but they 
were certainly not in absolute control. The second decade of the 19th 
century witnessed two major incidents involving 'arab tribes, and Mullû 
Ismâ'îl was a participant in both. In the spring of 1814 a large number of 
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'arab of 'Anaza Fad'ân and Sibâ' arrived from the Najd in the bâdiya of 
Hama. 1 Their arrival caused great alarm and resulted in the formation of 
an exceptional coalition, comprising tribesmen from the Hasana and 
Wuld 'All and army units from Damascus, local troops from Hama, the 
Biqâ' and Tripoli. Also Mullû Ismâ'îl and his men were engaged. The al-
lies built up their forces in the Salamiyya area, to the southeast of Hama. 
A battle followed which is said to have lasted for over two weeks. The 
Damascene troops then retreated to Hama. Mullû Ismâ'îl and the com-
mander of the troops from Tripoli attempted, in vain, to persuade the 
commander of the Damascenes to resume Fighting. In the end only the 
Hasana and Wuld 'Ali continued fighting until the Fad'ân and Sibâ' re-
treated to the north. After this retreat the troops from Damascus and the 
other places returned home. Shortly afterwards the Hasana and Wuld 
'Ali tribesmen, who now had their camps in the area to the west of Hama, 
became the target of retaliation raids of the Fad'ân. 
The second incident in the spring of 1817 involved a completely differ-
ent alliance. A tribal coalition had been forged which included the tribes 
that had clashed with each other three years earlier. For this occasion the 
'Anaza had joined their forces. The local 'arab tribes, or more accurately, 
their flocks formed their main target. It was believed that Mullû Ismâ'îl 
had helped to bring about the coalition, through his close relations with 
the Turkî tribe, a small but militant group. Salîm Bey al-'Azm, the mu-
tasallim of Hama, went to Damascus lo bring the matter to the notice of 
Sâlih Pasha, then wait. While on his return to Hama the 'Anaza launched 
their long-awaited attack on a number of the local tribes and carried off a 
huge number of sheep. Sâlih Pasha issued orders to have Mullû Ismâ'îl 
executed and directed his troops to Hama. The 'Anaza had retreated by 
the time the troops arrived. Mullû Ismâ'îl tried to open negotiations with 
the authorities and eventually was shot dead during a meeting with the 
mutasallim Salîm Bey in the sarâyâ of Hama. Except for his personal 
belongings his properties were confiscated. Sâlih Pasha distributed the 
thousands of sheep which had belonged to the dead warlord over the pro-
vince. His family and followers were ordered to leave Hama for good to-
gether with the following of his associate, the local delibaci Bâkîr Aghâ 
al-Barâzî.73 
Mullû Ismâ'îl left no heir to his political legacy even though some of 
his relatives or kinsmen may have returned to Hama. Bâkîr Aghâ al-
Barâzî was pardoned and allowed to take up residence in Hama again in 
1826 after a group of prominent Hamawîs had petitioned the wait claim-
ing that he had been falsely accused. 
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4.9 The temporary revival of the 'Azms in the early 1820s 
With the elimination of Mullû Ismâ'îl in 1817 the Hama area had been re-
lieved from a warlord who had figured prominently during the decades of 
violent provincial controversies. The leading aghâ of the Hamawî 'Azms, 
Salîm Bey, had secured the continued local preeminence of the family 
with the support of governor of Damascus. According to Shihâb the 
events had left their mark on the bey; the anxiety had made him ill. He 
went to Sidon to recover, but died shortly after he had arrived. The mu-
tasallim of Homs, Muhammad Aghâ al-Jundî, the son of 'Uthmân Aghâ, 
acted temporarily as governor of Hama, but after him three members of 
the 'Azm family were appointed mutasallim consecutively. 
The Hawamî 'Azms had not lost their ambition to pursue provincial 
careers. The refusal of 'Abdallah Pasha, who had succeeded Sulaymân 
Pasha in Acre in 1819, to accept his dismissal in 1821 offered them the 
opportunity to further their interests. Armies were sent from the north to 
assist the governor of Damascus in capturing and executing the rebel 
pasha. Over a hundred horsemen from Hama joined the military effort, 
perhaps under the command of Sulaymân Bey, son of the late Salîm Bey. 
In 1823, after Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt had mediated between 
the Porte and 'Abdallah Pasha, the crisis subsided and 'Abdallah Pasha's 
hold on the province of Sidon was confirmed. Before the pasha revolted 
he had been wait of both Sidon and Tripoli. However, once again, the 
Porte undertook to detach the province of Tripoli from Acre of which it 
had become an often unruly dependency ever since the days of Jazzâr 
Pasha. Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, the veteran hakim, had served as mutasal-
lim of Tripoli under 'Abdallah Pasha. During the rebellion of his patron, 
Mustafa Aghâ Barbar escaped to Egypt and was kindly received by 
Muhammad 'Alî Pasha, who at the time also hosted the influential strong-
man of the Lebanon, Amîr Bashîr al-Shihâb. Mustafa Aghâ Barbar was 
first replaced by his main local adversary, 'Alî Aghâ al-As'ad, a Kurd 
from the 'Akkâr region, the hinterland of Tripoli. 'Alî Aghâ al-As'ad had 
been a candidate of the central authorities for the office in Tripoli for 
some time. He had replaced Mustafa Aghâ Barbar on several occasions 
before. In the past, too, 'Alî Aghâ had depended to a considerable extent 
on the support of the governors of Damascus. In return for this support 
he offered his services to the governors of Damascus. 
The assignment to reestablish Tripoli as a province independent from 
Acre was given to Mustafa Pasha, the former wait of Aleppo, who had 
been transferred to Damascus and had headed the military efforts against 
'Abdallah Pasha of Acre in 1821 and 1822. Although only a few details 
are known about the relationship between the 'Azms and Mustafa Pasha, 
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it is certain that this wait engaged the Hamawî 'Azms in the provincial 
government. First Husayn Aghâ al-Jarkasî, the customs officer of Beirut, 
was appointed to Tripoli and he acted at the same time as qâyimmaqâm, 
deputy governor, of Damascus. He was soon replaced by Sulaymân Bey 
al-'Azm, the aforementioned son of the late Salîm Bey, and then mutasal-
lim of Hama. Sulaymân, now Pasha, was appointed mirmiran, a governor 
of the second class. He also acted as bafbufe al-jarda, commander of the 
troops carrying provisions from Damascus to the returning convoy of pil-
grims. This combination of offices indicates that the wait of Damascus 
and amîr al-hâjj, Mustafa Pasha, was, if not de jure, de facto his superior. 
The appointment of a mirmiran to Tripoli who also served as baçbufe al-
jarda was not unprecedented. * Sulaymân Pasha was quick to engage his 
relatives. He first appointed Ahmad Bey, perhaps the son of 'Abdallah 
Pasha al-'Azm, as his qâyimmaqâm, but soon replaced him with his own 
brother, Husayn Bey. In Hama his cousin Muhammad Bey al-'Azm 
succeeded Sulaymân as mutasallim. 
On the face of it the situation resembled that of a century earlier. The 
'Azms were holding office in Tripoli and Hama. However, it soon became 
evident that the family was far from regaining a leading position in the 
Syrian provinces. While Sulaymân Pasha headed the jarda in 1824, his 
brother Husayn Bey faced a rebellion in Tripoli. The brothers had taken 
drastic measures to gain control over the local population. Many of the 
inhabitants of the town had fled to the mountains in order to escape from 
their oppressive rule. When Husayn Bey destroyed the house of a local 
family who were close to Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, a crowd attacked the bey. 
He escaped to the famous shrine of Sheikh al-Badawî to the north of the 
town. In order to recapture the town Husayn Bey was forced to rely on 
the old network. He contacted Alî Aghâ al-As'ad of 'Akkâr and jointly 
they addressed 'Abdallah Pasha of Acre, asking him to take action 
against Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, who was believed to have a hand in the re-
volt. 'Abdallah Pasha ordered Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, who had returned 
from Egypt and stayed in Beirut at the time, to refrain from inciting the 
inhabitants of Tripoli against the 'Azm brothers and to keep away from 
Tripoli. The sultan had in the meantime ordered the head of Mustafa 
Aghâ Barbar to Istanbul. Mustafa Aghâ, then, had good reason to keep a 
low profile for the time being, notwithstanding the support he received 
from Muhammad 'Alî Pasha of Egypt. Sulaymân Pasha al-'Azm returned 
from the jarda in the summer of 1824. He fell ill and died shortly after-
wards in Tripoli, where he was buried. 
Sulaymân had been the last member of the 'Azm family to become 
pasha. Husayn Bey, the qâyimmaqâm of Tripoli, did not succeed his 
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brother as mirmiran. Instead 'Alî Aghâ al-As'ad was appointed governor 
to Tripoli. Husayn Bey retired to Hama where he died some time later. 
The developments in coastal Syria showed that the containment policy 
of the central authorities—that is, the containment of provincial fac-
tions—had its limitations. The Porte had been forced to confirm 'Abdal-
lah Pasha's position in Acre. The appointment of 'Alî Aghâ, now Pasha, 
al-As'ad, the headman of a local faction to Tripoli, marked the failure to 
disentangle the province from Acre. It is true that 'Ali Pasha al-As'ad was 
not a protégé of 'Abdallah Pasha, but he and his 'Akkâr faction acted in 
the context of coastal factionalism in which 'Abdallah Pasha occupied the 
central position. Eventually, the Porte did not persist in denying the pre-
dominance of the pasha of Acre. In 1827 'Abdallah Pasha again became 
wâlî of both Sidon and Tripoli and Mustafa Aghâ Barbar was restored as 
mutasallim of Tripoli. In the province of Damascus the policy of appoint-
ing non-locals continued to be applied and was even extended to other 
than the most senior positions. 
4.10 Post-'Azm Hanta 
Late 1824 Muhammad Bey al-'Azm, the mutasallim of Hama, also died. 
From then on the mutasallims of the district were no longer recruited 
from the family. His successor was a certain Salîm Aghâ who may have 
served for about a year. The most noted post-'Azm mutasallim of 
Hama was Faraj Aghâ. The origin and early career of Faraj Aghâ are un-
known. He did not belong to one of the leading families of the area and 
may well have been a non-local. He was first appointed mutasallim of 
Hama in May of 1826. His career came into jeopardy two years later 
when he encountered strong local opposition to his rule. The merchants 
of Hama appealed to the wall, accusing Faraj Aghâ of obstruction of 
trade, the imposition of illegal charges on silk and the failure to repay 
forced loans. They also filed complaints against the tiifenkçi basi and 
some other aghawât, who had likewise imposed illegal charges. The mer-
chants received the backing of the naqîb al-ashrâf, 'Abdallah Efendi al-
Kaylânî.87 
The opposition in Hama appears to have been connected with at-
tempts on the part of the authorities to refuse the Kaylânî family their 
traditional hold on the office of qâdî. The first success of the local op-
position had been the reappointment in 1828, at their request, of 'Abd al-
Wahhâb Efendi al-Kaylânî as qâdî, at the expense of a non-local, a 
certain Ahmad Efendi 'Izz al-Dîn who had just been transferred to 
Hama. Ahmad Efendi had been the second non-local occupying the of-
82 Chapter Four 
fice since 1824, when 'Abd al-Wahhâb Efendi al-Kaylânî was first 
succeeded by another outsider. 
Relations in Hama remained tense and in the summer of 1829 the pro-
vincial authorities gave in to the dignitaries and merchants who refused to 
accept the affirmation of Faraj Aghâ as mutasallim. Faraj Aghâ was re-
placed by an experienced functionary, Sulaymân Aghâ, the supervisor of 
the awqâf of the Haramayn, the Two Holy Sanctuaries, of the province. 
He was instructed to take action against the arbâb al-fasâd, the corrupt 
officials. An inquiry into the finances of Faraj Aghâ and some of his offi-
cials showed that their exactions and malversations had amounted to 
nearly 800,000 qirsh (q.), a sum which exceeded the annual payment of 
fixed taxes to the treasury. 
At about the same time that Sulaymân Aghâ replaced Faraj Aghâ, 
'Abd al-Wahhâb al-Kaylânî was dismissed and again a non-local was 
granted the office of qâdî. Within two months, however, 'Abd al-
Wahhâb Efendi was reinstated and when he died later that year, he was 
succeeded by a relative, Sharaf al-Dîn Efendi al-Kaylânî. Sulaymân 
Aghâ acted as an interim mutasallim and was soon to be replaced by 
'Abd al-Ghanî Aghâ al-Shâmlî, the leading aghâ of the Maydân, an ap-
pointment which may have insulted the 'Azms both in Hama and Damas-
cus. No member of the 'Azm family appears to have played a prominent 
role in local politics during the late 1820s. The recovery of the power of 
the 'Azms on the local and, to a certain extent, the provincial level in be-
tween the years 1812 and 1824 had, indeed, been a temporary affair. In 
Hama the Kaylânî family acquired a dominant position among the ay an. 
Notwithstanding his manifest rapacity Faraj Aghâ succeeded 'Abd al-
Ghanî al-Shâmlî after the latter had been in office for only five months. 
This sudden change of policy towards the troubled town of Hama was 
probably connected with the arrival of a new wâlî, Muhammad Ra'ûf 
Pasha. Apparently Faraj Aghâ had already established a name as a 
capable official whose ability to deal with the 'arab tribes was one of his 
qualifications. The opposition to the rule of Faraj Aghâ should not only 
be regarded as an expression of strong local discontent against his finan-
cial demands and the attempts to exclude the Kaylânîs from the office of 
qâdî, but also as an expression of the more general sense of insecurity. 
After 1825, a year of drought, there were signs of growing unrest in 
several parts of Syria. Tribal pressure had increased in the wake of the 
great plague of 1826 and the famine which continued well into the next 
year. The plague had ravaged much of Syria and the death toll had been 
very high, especially in the northern and central parts. To make matters 
even worse locusts devoured much of the standing crop. In the summer of 
1827 'arab tribes, which had suffered greatly from the epidemic, besieged 
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the town of Hama in search of food. Troops from Damascus were sent to 
expel them.94 Evidently, Faraj Aghâ had to operate under difficult condi-
tions. 
4.11 Conditions in the villages 
One tends to expect massive village desertion during this period (1812-
1832), but although the rural society was affected by drought, plague and 
locusts as well as by 'arab incursions, the number of villages which were 
entirely deserted was surprisingly low. 
Table 1 The condition of the villages 
A. Number of inhabited villages and cultivated farms 
B. Number of villages and farms described as "impoverished", 
in arrears or receiving tax exempts 
С Number of recently deserted villages and farms 
D. Number offaddân 
year 
1800 
1818 
1829 
1832 
A 
116 
101 
110 
128 
В 
? 
27 
29 
29 
С 
11 
16 
4 
? 
D 
1,500 
2,208 
2,350 
2,100 
sources: SMH 43, p. 89,5 Rabr* II1215; SMH 43, p. 180-7, 7 Rabí* 11233; 
SMH 49, p. 326-9, 23 RaW 11215; SMH 49, p. 443,29 Rabf 11247; SMH 
49, p. 449, 15 Rajab 1247; SMH 49, p. 468, 20 Sha'bân 1247; SMH 51, p. 
316-7, dated 1257 
Since the cessation of violent provincial factionalism, which had been par-
ticularly intense at the turn of the century, the area under cultivation had 
increased markedly, but the number of inhabited and cultivated places 
showed an increase only towards the very end of the period and this in-
crease may have been due to the separate entry of some farms. Ob-
viously, peasants were less inclined to take up farming in a deserted place 
and the increase of land under cultivation was due to the extension of the 
farmland belonging or adjacent to the larger villages. Among the villages 
which were impoverished and unable to meet the tax demands made on 
them—about 25% of the total number of villages—were most villages of 
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the northern part of the district, the A'la. The A'la bordered on the tri-
angle between Qal'at al-Mudîq, Jisr al-Shughûr and Arîhâ, the refuge of 
rebel officers like Mullû Ismâ'îl and the Mawâlî 'arab. The few villages to 
the west of the Sultanic Road, both to the north and south of Hama, on 
the edge of the bâdiya had even more difficulty to survive. Clearly, 
peasants were very reluctant to take up farming in such exposed places 
and some remained deserted for most of the period, whereas some other 
villages which had been recently deserted in 1800 were only repopulated 
during the 1830s. 
In the central area of the plain, the Wa'r, villages did not exactly flour-
ish, but it was here that more land been brought under the plough. The 
relatively high frequency of land disputes between neighbouring villages 
in this area reflects this expansion. While there was land in abundance 
in the district, land had become scarce in some areas in the Wa'r. But 
also in the Wa'r many villagers had to seek financial support from either 
the government or from the wealthier Hamawîs. It will be remembered 
that one of the tasks of the mutasallim was the preservation of the vil-
lages. In the 1820s numerous villagers received loans from the treasury, 
referred to as quwwa. In 1826 the sheikhs and elders of 35 villages re-
ceived such a loan, which enabled them to purchase ploughing animals 
and other necessities of farming. Again the villages in the A'la and in the 
area west of the Sultanic Road figured prominently, but the Wa'r was also 
represented. In other years such loans were made as well and the 
largest loan registered during the period was granted to the sizable village 
of Talldû in the Wa'r in 1822, 3000 q. The mutasallim also supplied vil-
lages with seed from the anbâr, the state granary. In 1831 Faraj Aghâ dis-
tributed wheat and barley seeds to 35 villages. The amount constituted 
roughly 50% and 40% of the total quantities of wheat and barley, respec-
tively, collected as tax in the previous year. 
It is evident that the conditions for agriculture had improved during 
the first decades of the 19th century, but it remains difficult to assess the 
impact of tax pressure or other financial pressures, political instability, 
tribal pressure and natural calamities and epidemics. It seems safe to as-
sume that with the subsidence of the violent provincial factionalism 
peasants felt reassured. When the area under cultivation began to expand 
is uncertain, but it was most probably after 1804, the year Jazzâr Pasha 
died. After his death provincial factionalism persisted and with it armed 
confrontations between the various factional leaders. However, com-
pared to the extremely oppressive and violent traits of factionalism during 
Jazzâr Pasha's lifetime, the situation in the Syrian provinces improved. 
From 1804 until the arrival the 'Anaza Fad'ân and Sibâ' in 1814 no major 
violent incidents occurred in the Hama area. Whatever harm the 'arab 
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and Mullû Ismâ'îl may have caused between 1811 and 1818, it seems not 
to have seriously affected sedentary Hama in general. The effects of the 
tribal pressure was felt, no doubt, but only profoundly in the northern 
part and eastern fringes of the district. Considering the heavy tax burden 
and the exactions, as well as the drought, the plague and 'arab incursions 
during the 1820s, rural society displayed a remarkable resilience. Of 
course, the suffering of the population finds no expression in table 1. In 
the wake of the devastating plague and famine of 1826 and 1827 many vil-
lagers left their homes in order to escape from the tribes who were 
desperately looking for food. Most of them returned to their villages after 
the crisis had subsided and received some support from the authorities to 
continue their life of hardship. 
4.12 The uncertainties of the late 1820s and early 1830s 
On the political level uncertainty prevailed. The bloody suppression of 
the janissary revolt in Istanbul and the ensuing abolition of the corps in 
June 1826 may have been welcomed by the public, but many aghawât all 
over the empire became anxious about their future. For the time being 
the military reforms of sultan Mahmud II hardly affected the military for-
mations in the province of Damascus. The empire had come under attack 
again in the Balkans, the Hijâz and Iraq. In his efforts to build a new army 
Mahmud II ran out of cash and time. The financial demands made upon 
the provinces increased sharply, causing revolts in Homs, Damascus and 
elsewhere. 
Many eyes in Syria were directed to the south, to Egypt. Muhammad 
'Ali Pasha of Egypt had gained strength and, being the only person in the 
empire commanding a strong military force, the sultan increasingly relied 
on the pasha's services. Muhammad 'Ali Pasha was not compensated for 
his expenses in serving his master and felt increasingly frustrated about 
his position within the imperial order. Already from the early 1820s 
Muhammad 'Ali Pasha had extended his influence over the affairs of 
coastal Syria, in the late 1820s he assumed a more aggressive policy 
towards 'Abdallah Pasha of Acre. This was the prelude to the invasion in 
November 1831. 
On the eve of the Egyptian occupation of Syria by the troops of 
Muhammad 'Ali Pasha the Damascenes successfully resisted the imposi-
tion of a tax on shops and warehouses, referred to as salyan. The then 
wâlî, 'Abd al-Ra'ûf Pasha, was, subsequently, replaced by Salîm Pasha. 
The new governor general had an empire-wide reputation of being ruth-
less. He had played an important role in the brutal suppression of the 
janissaries in Istanbul in 1826. The aghawât of Damascus feared he would 
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take action against them and their forces as well. Upon arrival in Damas-
cus Salîm Pasha announced that he would proceed with the collection of 
the new tax. In what seems to have been a concerted act of religious 
dignitaries, aghawât and other prominent figures the city revolted. In the 
course of the rebellion, which lasted for several weeks, some aghawât of 
the Maydân followed a more radical line than the inner-city notables, 
headed by the Hanafî muftì. When the wait surrendered to rebel forces, 
he was brought to the house of the late Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm, where 
he stayed for some days. The wait was then moved to a house belonging 
to a Kaylânî on the pretext that he and his men would have more space to 
themselves, but it may well be that the 'Azm were reluctant to entertain 
the wâlî given the hostile mood which prevailed in the city. At night the 
house was attacked and set on fire. The wâlî and his retinue perished in 
the flames. Until the occupation of Damascus in June 1832 by the Egyp-
tian forces, the muftì and local aghawât, some Maydânîs figuring promi-
nently amongst them, ruled the city, although a new governor had arrived. 
The population suffered from scarcity of food and exorbitant prices until 
relief supplies of wheat were brought in daily from Hama. 
With the Egyptian occupation of the Syrian provinces the rebellion in 
Damascus came to an end. The rebellious governor of Egypt dwarfed the 
Damascene rebels. For nearly a decade local factionalism ceased to play 
a role of significance in Syrian politics. In Chapter Seven we shall return 
to the Egyptian rule in Syria. Firstly, the fiscal system (Chapter Five) and 
the financial policies (Chapter Six) during the decades prior to the Egyp-
tian occupation are examined. 
CHAPTER FIVE 
TAXATION 
Access to revenue is generally regarded as the fundamental issue under­
lying political competition in the provinces of the Ottoman empire. Not 
unexpectedly, acts of zulm, injustice, are often related to the collection of 
the revenue. The district of Наша was a rich source of revenue; it is likely 
to have yielded more than any other district attached to the province of 
Damascus. This chapter contains a detailed description of the various 
impositions. Chapter Six deals with the collection of the taxes and their 
allocation in the context of the financial policies of the state. 
5.1 The court records and taxation 
Although the records of the Hama court contain a wealth of data con­
cerning the local fiscal regime during the period under regard, there are 
no data for each and every year. The involvement of the court with the fis­
cal regime was largely limited to times of political or economic problems. 
The central or provincial authorities involved the qâdî in the implementa-
tion of measures taken to overcome these problems. Also the enactment 
of fiscal reform was entered into the books of the court. The most 
detailed documents concern tax tabulations and regulations issued after 
the local crisis of 1817 and 1818, when Mullû Ismâ'îl and the 'Anaza 
tribes confronted local tribes, and in 1829 after an influential segment of 
the population of Hama had refused to accept the reappointment of 
Faraj Aghâ as mutasallim. Also for several other years valuable docu-
ments have survived, for example for 1788, when some taxes were re-
duced in order to halt the massive village desertion caused by the Mawâlî 
uprising of 1786 and the ensuing military campaigns, or for 1806, when 
the provincial authorities undertook to adjust some deviations from the 
fiscal regulations in the district. 
Although many other documents contain details on a specific tax, the 
distribution of the data over the years is uneven. The fiscal regime de-
scribed here is the regime which had come about by 1818 and which re-
mained by and large unchanged until the occupation of Syria by the 
troops of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt in 1832. Between 1805 and 
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1818 some Fiscal reforms may have been implemented. There is no refer-
ence to certain taxes prior to 1818, but this absence may be due to the use 
of much more general terms in the older documents. The edicts of 1818 
do not refer to the introduction of any new tax. What may have happened 
is that the way in which the various taxes were administered was altered, 
as well as the method of assessment in the case of some taxes. 
5.2 The variety of impositions 
Numerous impositions existed. Well over fifty different designations 
occur in the Hama records for the period 1785 to 1841. A number of 
these terms denoted taxes in general or a number of related impositions, 
although some of these could also be used with reference to one specific 
tax. Others concern small charges like the various tolls. Moreover, some 
impositions were known by two different names. The wide variety of taxes 
and the relative lack of consistency in the use of fiscal terms correlates to 
the relatively low degree of rationalization within the traditional Ottoman 
administration. Numerous taxes were related to specific expenditures of 
the administration and the authorities had always shown a remarkable in-
ventiveness in the pursuit of their material claims on the population. Al-
though nearly all taxes could be identified, the nature and magnitude of 
some remain obscure. Due to the local variation in the fiscal regime and 
the diversity of the fiscal vocabulary there is some danger in ascribing the 
function of a certain tax in another locality to an imposition of the same 
name which was collected in the Hama district. 
The authorities distinguished between two basic types of impositions: 
regular taxes which were remitted to the treasury and extraordinary im-
positions. The extraordinary impositions, usually called khawârij in the re-
cords, were levied to cover a variety of expenses not covered by the 
treasury. They comprised two main categories: firstly, levies collected for 
the support of local office-holders and secondly, impositions related to 
war efforts, regional campaigns or natural calamities. The first category 
of extraordinary taxes certainly had a regular aspect in the sense that they 
were levied each year and at more or less regular rates. The magnitude of 
the second category of extraordinary charges depended on the occur-
rence of war, revolt and natural disasters and varied sharply. Since the ex-
traordinary impositions comprised two very distinct types of taxes it 
seems proper to distinguish between three main components of the total, 
legal, revenue: 
1. regular taxes which were remitted to the treasury 
2. extraordinary taxes levied to support local office holders 
3. extraordinary taxes related to war efforts, regional campaigns and nat-
ural calamities. 
In the Hama district a clear distinction was made between the taxes 
which had to be remitted to the state's treasury, the khazîna 'âmira, and 
levies collected for the support of office-holders. They were administered 
separately. The additional levies in times of war and revolt were adminis-
tered separately as well. The latter, irregular, levies will be discussed after 
the first two components of the total revenue levied annually. The Hama 
records contain many details on the first component of the revenue, the 
taxes due to the treasury, but considerably less on some of the charges 
which were part of the second component. This relative scarcity of details 
concerning the levies for the support of office-holders may be partly due 
to the nature of our main source—court records—but also arises from 
the ill-defined status of some of these levies and the many abuses which 
accompanied their collection. The taxes which were remitted to the treas-
ury in the province of Damascus were largely earmarked for the financing 
of the ha}]. The paradox in the flow of revenue was that the income of the 
treasury was spent in the province and never reached Istanbul, whereas a 
large share of the levies which were collected to support office-holders 
was transmitted to the sultan and the grandees of the state in Istanbul on 
whose backing appointments in the provinces depended. 
5.3 Taxes remitted to the treasury 
The district of Hama was attached to the governorship of Damascus in 
the 1720s. The wall of Damascus was granted the malikane of the district 
of Hama in his capacity as amir al-hajj, commander of the pilgrimage. 
The income of the treasury from the district was in its entirety allocated 
to cover the expenses of this vital operation and some related religious 
occasions. The taxes which were remitted to the treasury comprised two 
main components: the murattabât Hijâziyya and the amwâl mîriyya. The 
term murattabât Hijâziyya, the Hijâzî impositions, refers to the pilgrimage 
to Mecca and Medina, which are in the Hijâz. The amwâl mîriyya, or miri, 
comprised primarily taxes resting upon the usufruct of state-owned prop-
erties. 
The murattabât Hijâziyya comprised the takâlîf, taxes which were 
levied to cover the expenses of officials who were involved with the hajj. 
The most prominent of these were the dignitaries who had come from 
Istanbul in procession, headed by the surre emini, who was in charge of 
the presents to the rich and poor of Mecca. With the arrival of the pro-
cession in Hama the wâlî of Damascus assumed the responsibility of the 
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ha)]? As his delegate the mutasallim of Hama had to see to the well-being 
and safety of the procession until it had reached Homs. The retinue of the 
surre emini included the müjdeci basi, his chief emissary, and the 
sakabasi, who supervised the supply of water to the pilgrims. Their ex-
penses are listed among the takâtîf. The takâlîf diso accounted for the let-
ters of exchange of the mashâyikh al-hajj, religious dignitaries who 
accompanied the lay people on their way to the holy shrines. Listed as ta-
kâlîf were also the 'îdiyya, bashâyir and salâmiyya, all relating to gifts to 
the sultan and high officials on the occasion of this religious festival. 
Even though the takâlîf comprised impositions which corresponded to 
specific religious exercises, these charges were not prescribed by religious 
law. In fact, the word takâlîf was often used in combination with iirf (ta-
kâlîf iirfiyya), denoting that they were imposed by the sultan. 
The mîrî, payable primarily by those who enjoyed the usufruct of state-
owned properties, was likewise defined by sultanic law. Mîrî designated 
all that belonged to the sultan as the head of the ruling house. The ide-
ology of the state did not allow for formal limitations on the powers of the 
sultan, but in fiscal practice mîrî referred first and foremost to state-
owned arable land, arâdî mîriyya. When collected in kind the mîrî is re-
ferred to as qism, a proportion of the harvest. Most rural agricultural land 
was state-owned and the villagers or others who were entitled to its 
tasarruf, usufruct, were hable to the mîrî. 
However, the mîrî was not necessarily limited to the right of usufruct 
of state-owned properties. In the Hama district the mîrî also rested on the 
rural agricultural land which was held in mortmain, waqf holdings. 
Neither was the mîrî an exclusively rural tax. In practice a variety of im-
positions was included in the mîrî. Most of these concerned fixed charges 
resting upon commercial and economic activities, such as market dues 
(ihtisâb) and slaughterhouse rights (mal qassâbkhâna). Also the tax re-
sting on urban real estate, the i'âna, was listed among the mîrî charges. 
The i'âna financed the manzil, the postal service and resting house. 
Apart from these more substantial charges a number of small taxes was 
usually Usted under the heading oimîrî, varying from the church tax (mal 
kanâyis) to the animal fat tax (samniyya). 
The murattabât Hijâziyya and the mîrî constituted the bulk of the in-
come of the treasury from the Hama district. Other taxes which were re-
mitted to the treasury included the wedding tax, the pasture fees, the goat 
tax, and tolls levied on bridges over the 'Así river. Also the duties on 
imports of livestock, wool, tobacco and silk contributed to the income of 
the treasury. The rates of these rusûmât, as they were called collectively, 
were fixed per head or volume. 
It has been mentioned before that the leading sheikh, the amir, of the 
Mawâlî received a payment from the treasury, the muwassata. This ex-
penditure was distributed over the villages of the districts of Hama, Homs 
and Ma'arra, and belonged to the income of the treasury of Hama. 
5.4 Levies to support office-holders 
The total amount of levies to support office-holders and to make up for 
some expenses of the local government roughly equalled the sum col-
lected as takâlîf and mîrî. A number of the office-holders had the right to 
collect fees, referred to as 'awâyid. The amounts varied according to 
rank and the number of troops and, at least some of them, were payable 
on a monthly basis. The aghawât who were entitled to levy 'awâyid in-
cluded the garib yigit agasi, the tiifenkçi basi, the wakîl al-kharj and the 
qassâmiyya. The latter, who collected the qism, proportional agricultural 
tax, were, at least in the late 18th century, entitled to take a fixed amount 
of both the primary crops, wheat and barley, and the secondary crops, 
like lentils and chick peas. Later no such distinction appears to have 
been made. 
The mutasallim was not entitled to collect 'awâyid. It may be that he 
had the right to collect the fâyid, that is, if he acted in the capacity of 
muhassil, the tax collector, which seems to have been the case in the 
Hama district. Reference to the fâyid is very rare in the Hama records. 
In Palestine and Egypt fâyid could represent a proportional amount 
levied on top of the regular taxes. However, the term was also used as a 
general category covering all sorts of extraordinary taxes. In the Hama 
district the 'ubûdiyya, servitude tax, constituted one of the extraordinary 
levies. It is likely that the mutasallim depended to a considerable extent 
on this tax. The 'ubûdiyya covered a large expenditure of the mutasallim; 
the payment he had to make to the wâlî to express his servitude and to 
procure his appointment. The wait, in his turn, made similar payments to 
the sultan and the grandees of the state. Although only some details on 
the 'ubûdiyya were found in the records, there is little doubt that it consti-
tuted the main imposition collected for the support of office holders. 
The 'ubûdiyya and 'awâyid were tabulated jointly with two other 
charges: the khidma and the 'awna. The khidma was a duty levied to 
cover the expenses of the local treasury department amounting to 2.5 % 
of the aggregate of taxes resting upon a fiscal unit. The nature and mag-
nitude of the 'awna is obscure. 
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5.5 Composite impositions 
The wide variety of taxes originated from the tradition to link them with 
specific expenditures. The traditional inclination of the authorities to tap 
additional revenue sources in order to satisfy their financial needs, also 
explains the high number of impositions. The authorities showed a 
marked reluctance to formally abolish old taxes and replace them with 
more general impositions. A number of taxes were clustered instead in 
order to facilitate their assessment and collection. These composite im-
positions concerned mostly, but not solely, the taxes which were remitted 
to the treasury. There were two major composite impositions: the mal 
muqâta'a and the mâlfaddân. The first defined the fiscal category of the 
muqâta'as, rural and urban tax farms. The second was of importance for 
the tax assessment of the villages of the plain which were distributed over 
four fiscal categories: the hâsil, the maqtu', the Turcoman and the 
qutuniyyât villages. 
5.5.7 The mal muqâta'a and the damm 
The farming of taxes was, of course, widespread, but not all tax farms 
were referred to as muqâta'a. The general word for the farming of taxes 
was iltizâm, whereas the muqâta'as concerned specific fiscal units which 
were farmed out and administered separately. The fiscal treatment of the 
muqâta'as differed from that of other categories. A muqâta'a, then, did 
not refer to each and every village, tribe, quarter or craft organization of 
which the taxes were farmed. 
The important rural muqâta'as comprised several clusters of villages 
and farms in the western periphery of the district. The largest was Hisn 
al-Akrâd, the famous Crac des Chevaliers, the others being Jabal Kal-
biyya, Misyâf and Hazûr. They were usually, but not always, farmed by 
local aghawât or headmen. Only two villages, situated in the western part 
of the district as well, constituted an individual muqâta'a: Kafrûn and 
Ba'rin. The urban muqâta'as included a number of offices which regu-
lated and taxed activities in the field of commerce and industry. The 
ihtisâb, the market inspection and duty office, and the qassâbkhâna, the 
slaughterhouse constituted the two major urban muqâta'as. Other, less 
valued muqâta'as encompassed the lease-holds of the roasting house, the 
weighing house, the small Jewish quarter, a number of shops, a bath and 
some waterwheels, all of these being state-owned. The last category of 
urban muqâta'as concerned the farming of the taxes resting on urban ag-
ricultural land, churches, the administration of the jizya (see below), the 
dye-pits and on some of the smaller craft organizations: the fishermen, 
stringmakers and drummers. 
The mîrî was the main component of the mal muqâta'a. On top of the 
mîrî a sum referred to as damm rested on most muqâta'as. The damm 
was a technical term denoting an amount which was levied in addition to 
an earlier or original tax assessment. An increase of the tax rate following, 
for example, the debasement of the currency would be entered as damm. 
Payments to make up for the difference between calculations based on 
the Islamic hijrt year and the financial year counted as damm as well. Al-
though the damm often included an additional amount of mîrî, it could 
refer to any other tax imposed on top of the mîrî, including the htbûdiyya, 
'awâyid and other charges which were not remitted to the treasury. Some-
times the damm was used to adjust differences in tax treatment. 
The damm rested almost exclusively on the rural and urban muqâta'as 
which, unlike other fiscal categories, were not liable to the takâlîf. The 
proportion of the damm varied substantially from one muqâta'a to 
another, depending largely on the magnitude of the original tax assess-
ment. The mal muqâta'a of the village of Ba'rîn, for example, comprised 
103 q. of mîrî and 1500 q. of damm in both 1818 and 1829. Clearly the 
large amount of damm was to compensate for the very low original mîrî 
assessment. In the case of the muqâta'ât qassâbkhâna on which 13,406 q. 
of mîrî rested, no damm was entered for these years. An earlier amount 
of damm imposed on the qassâbkhâna had become part of the "old" 
mîrî. 
5.5.2 The mâlfaddân and the qism 
The other major composite imposition, the mal faddân, was payable by 
most villages of the Hama plain. It was a tax assessment in proportion to 
the acreage. The mal faddân represented the amount of fixed regular 
taxes resting upon the area of land which could be ploughed by one or 
two yokes of cows or oxen during the season, a faddân. By multiplying 
the number oí faddân of a village by the mal the total amount of regular 
taxes payable by a village was assessed. The villages of the Hama plain 
had been categorized in four groups: the hâsil, maqtû', Turcoman and 
qutuniyyât. The mâlfaddân always included the takâlîf, and in the case of 
the maqtû', Turcoman and qutuniyyât villages the mîrî, too, was part of 
the mal faddân. The word maqtû' denotes "fixed amount" and in 1818 
and 1829 20 villages and farms were grouped under that name. Techni-
cally the 19 Turcoman villages and three qutuniyyât, cotton villages, were 
maqtû' as well, in the sense that they were hable to a fixed amount only, 
but the rate of the mâlfaddân differed from that of the maqtft' villages. 
The mâlfaddân of the largest category, the hâsil, the crop or revenue vil-
lages, consisted of the takâlîf only. On top of the mâlfaddân they paid the 
mîrî in proportion to the crop, the qism or habbat al-hâsil. 
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The division between villages which were liable to a fixed amount only, 
maqtû', and villages which paid a proportion of the crop on top of a fixed 
amount, hâsil, not only predates Ottoman but also Islamic times. In some 
areas of Syria the latter category was still known by its (Arabized) Greek 
name, dîmûs (from δημόσιον) in the 16th century and possibly later. 
The rates of qism varied in the Hama district. In 1788 the rates for most 
of the hâsil villages were set at 2/6 or 2/7 of the harvest, but some paid 
less. Later the rates were reduced to 1/6,1/7 or 1/8 of the crop. The re-
duction of the rates was designed to stimulate peasants to continue farm-
ing. The qism rested on the primary crops of wheat and barley, as well as 
on the secondary crops of dura or sorghum, chickpeas, lentils and the re-
lated kirsinna. The collected cereals and pulses were stored in the anbâr, 
the granary. 
5.6 Other rural tax assessments 
The way regular taxes were assessed in the case of the rural and urban 
muqâta'as and the villages of the plain show a degree of fiscal rationaliza-
tion. The remaining three fiscal categories of the district, which are the 
villages of the Jabal Gharbî, the 'arab tribes and the asnâf or craft organi-
zations of Hama, were treated differently. In the Jabal Gharbî, a small 
area in the west of the district, the takâlîf were assessed separately for 
each village, whereas the miri was fixed upon the Jabal Gharbî as a whole. 
The reverse was true for the 'arab tribes. Here the takâlîf were assessed 
collectively and subsequently divided among the individual tribes. The 
tribes were also liable to the a'dâd ghanam, the sheep tax. This tax re-
sembled the qism in that a proportion of the livestock was taken. Unfor-
tunately, the Hama records contain hardly any details on the a'dâd 
ghanam. The near absence of details on the a'dad ghanam may suggest 
that the collection of the tax did not fall within the authority of the mu-
tasallim of Hama. On top of the takâlîf and the a'dâd ghanam the tribes 
were liable to two small charges, the kislak, pasture fee, and the samniyya, 
animal fat tax. For five out of the 24 tribes these charges were assessed at 
a fixed sum, the others paid per tent or volume respectively. 
5.7 The craft organizations 
At least forty craft organizations existed in Hama. In the tax tabulations 
most were referred to as asnâf (sing, sauf), but others as hirfa (plur. hiraf). 
Collectively, they were known as tawâyif (sing, tâyifa). The craft organiza-
tions resembled the European guilds to a considerable extent, but the 
former generally observed more lenient regulations, often allowed freer 
competition and were more exposed to inteference by the local adminis-
tralion. Most of the asnâf were assessed collectively and were liable to a 
sum called paha-i libsât mashâyikli al-asnâf, an appointment fee of the 
sheikhs who were nominated by the craftsmen. This imposition consti-
tuted nearly half of the total amount of taxes resting upon the craft or-
ganizations. The hiraf may have been organized differently from the 
asnâf. There is no reference to sheikhs in relation to the hiraf. The hiraf 
were subject to takâiïf. The hiraf comprised some major occupational 
groups, like the millers and dyers, as well as the Christian craftsmen. 
The weavers, coppersmiths, the weaponsmiths, the charcoal burners, 
druggists and saddlemakers, to mention only some of the more important 
crafts, were counted among the asnâf. 
The most important occupational groups were the butchers and 
bakers, at least when it came to providing the urban population, including 
the officials and the troops, with food. The importance of these craft or-
ganization was reflected by the appointment of a bas, head, who super-
vised the distribution of meat and bread. The butchers pertained to the 
qassâbkhâna, the slaughterhouse, which was not a single building, but an 
institution comprising nine butcher shops. The qassâbkhâna constituted 
one of the more important urban muqâta'as and the qassâb basi was its 
leaseholder. Apart from the mal muqâta'a, the qassâbkhâna was liable to 
a monthly payment of 900 q. in the late 1820's. The bakers, headed by the 
ekmekçi basi, paid a monthly charge of 200 q. at the same time. 
5.8 The distribution of the burden of taxation 
The distribution of the taxes over the different fiscal categories was un-
even. Some segments of society were treated with comparative leniency, 
whereas others were assessed at amounts which appear to have been dis-
proportional to their number or economic value. Differences in tax treat-
ment originated from various considerations. Economic value and 
viability mattered, as much as the needs of the administration, but tradi-
tion, privilege and religious principles had also shaped the fiscal system. 
The synopsis of the revenue of the district for the financial year 1248 
(1832-3) in table 2 shows that the amount of taxes which was remitted to 
the treasury and the amount of levies collected for the support of office 
holders were balanced. The synopsis also shows that about 85 % of taxes 
which were entered in the books in cash, was paid by the rural popula-
tion.40 
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Table 2: Distribution of impositions for the year 1248 
A: number of villages or tribes (year 1245) 
B: taxes payable to the treasury 
C: levies to support office-holders 
D: total of В and С 
E: percentage of the grand total 
fiscal category А В С D E 
I. Rural 
hâsil villages* 73 169,916 202,367 372,283 24 
JabalGharbî 15 62,212 78,211 140,423 9.1 
Turcoman villages 19 53,434 49,961 103,395 6.7 
maqtû 'villages 20 23,175 28,730 51,905 3.4 
qutu'niyyât villages 3 14,715 12,452 27,167 1.8 
muqâta'as 138,254 372,411 510,665 33 
'crab tribes** 24 49,836 62,012 111,848 7.2 (85.2) 
(14.8%) 
muqâta'as 
crafts 
including the qism* 
140,124 
59,213 
710,879 
46% 
820,879 
49% 
17,379 157,503 
12,470 71,683 
835,993 1,546,872 
54% 
835,993 1,656,872 
5 1 % 
10.2 
4.6 
100% 
100% 
* also liable to the qism ca. 110,000 q. (year 1246)39 
** also liable to the a'dâdghanam, no figures available 
sources: A: SMH 49, p. 326-9,23 Rabí* 11245 
В and C: SMH 51, p. 316-7, n.d. [Ramadan 125η (which includes the 
figures for 1248) 
When the qism, the proportional tax on the agricultural yields, is included 
the relative share of the rural population rises to at least 90 %. Of course 
the amounts of cereals and pulses collected as qism varied with the yields. 
In 1830 the crops collected as qism represented a value of about 110,000 
q., that is according to official prices and not to the market value. The of-
ficial price of wheat, the main crop, had hardly changed since the turn of 
the century, notwithstanding the high rate of inflation. In 1800 the price of 
a tnakkûk of wheat had been fixed at 224 q. and three decades later it had 
been augmented with a mere 26 q. to 240 q., or 30% or less of its value on 
the market. Subsequently, the actual contribution to the treasury by the 
hâsil villages was considerably higher than the synopsis suggests. The dis-
parity between official price and market value was a rich source of hidden 
revenue. 
Given the absence of a reliable indication of the number and the dis-
tribution of the population, any remark made on the relative fiscal burden 
remains speculative. It seems highly unlikely that only about 10% of the 
district's population lived in the town of Hama. According to the first 
somewhat more precise estimate of the district's population which dates 
from 1851,35 to 40% of the population lived in the town of Hama. The 
proportion of the rural population may well be deflated in this estimate, 
but, nonetheless, there is reason to believe that, by contributing about 
90% of the total revenue, the rural population carried a considerably 
higher tax burden than the townspeople. 
Table 3: Comparison of tax distribution over five rural categories 
A. average number oîfaddân per village 
B. mâlfaddân 
C. average amount of taxes perfaddân 
D. average amount of taxes per village 
Jabal Gharbî 
qutuniyyât 
hâsil 
including qism 
Turcoman 
maqtû' 
Sources: see table 1 
A 
— 
21.7 
25.2 
16.4 
14.8 
В 
— 
225 
110 
170 
150 or 225 
100 
С 
— 
417.3 
261.5 
379.7 
331.8 
175.4 
Table 3 shows that the tax treatment of the villages varied considerably. 
The maqtû' villages received a preferential treatment. The rationale be-
hind the lenient rate of 110 q. perfaddân is obscure. The maqtû' villages 
were scattered over the plains and depended, like the hâsil and Tur-
D 
9361.5 
9055.7 
6589.2 
9568.0 
5441.8 
2595.3 
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coman villages on the production of cereals and pulses. In the recent past 
a number of hâsil villages had been illegally entered into the books as 
maqtû'. In 1806 the dîwân of Damascus ordered the mutasallim to restore 
these villages to their original state (liâsil) and subsequently the number 
of maqtû ' villages had dropped from 44 to 14 by 1818. It may be that the 
mainly small maqtû' villages were the remnants of the timars, the old 
cavalry fiefs. 
The hâsil villages carried a much heavier tax burden. The rate of the 
mal faddân resting upon these villages was only relatively low, because 
they were liable to qism as well. The average of 9568 q. per village in-
cludes the value of the qism according to highly conservative official 
prices for the year 1830. Because the qism was levied in proportion to 
the harvest, the fiscal regime of these villages was, to a degree, adapted to 
the uncertainties of dry-farming. It is unknown whether the harvest of 
1830 was below or above average. 
In the case of the Turcoman villages economic conditions were taken 
into consideration. Most Turcoman villages paid a mal faddân of 225 q., 
but the villages situated to the east of the Sultanic Road were liable to a 
lower rate, 150 q. This reduced rate reflected the poor conditions of agri-
culture in areas bordering the bâdiya. 
The three qutuniyyât, or cotton villages, belonged to the more prosper-
ous farming communities of the district. They were situated on the fertile 
banks of the 'Así river in the near vicinity of the town of Hama. A number 
of на "ores, waterwheels, carried water to their gardens and fields. Apart 
from cotton they supplied a variety of fruits and vegetables to the town's 
population. The relative prosperity of these villages may explain the com­
paratively heavy tax burden. 
It is more difficult to find a possible reason why the Jabal Gharbî car-
ried such a heavy tax burden. The villages in question were all small vine-
yard and orchard villages which produced for the local market. The heavy 
syrup, dibs, made out of grapes was a popular sweet, especially when 
mixed with sesame paste. The Hamawî halwâniyya, confectioners, ob-
tained dibs from these villages. 
5.9 Religion and taxation 
The inhabitants of the Jabal Gharbî adhered predominantly to the 
Nusayrî faith and were formally considered apostates. In the early Ot-
toman period the Nusayris were subject to a discriminatory capital tax, 
the dirham al-rijâl. Ño such charge was payable by them in the period 
under discussion, but the tradition that these unbelievers had to pay for 
their corrupt tenets may have influenced the tax assessment of the Jabal 
Gharbî. The Nusayrî faith was not confined to this small area. A number 
of hâsil and maqtû' villages were inhabited by Nusayris, but, more impor-
tantly, they made up the large majority of the population in the rural 
muqâta'as. These muqâta'as formed the single largest source of revenue 
due to a disproportionate amount of levies collected in the support of of-
fice holders. These levies constituted roughly half of the total tax burden 
resting upon most rural categories, but in the case of the rural muqâta'as 
their presence constituted no less than 73%. 
However, it remains unclear whether the Nusayris were discriminated 
by the fiscal authorities on religious grounds. In principle apostates had 
no legal rights and any discriminatory imposition which would have been 
levied from the Nusayris, lacked the backing of religious law. According 
to the shar' they should not be tolerated at all. 
In the case of the Christians and the Jews, who, as dhimmh, enjoyed a 
protected but subordinate status, the levying of a discriminatory poll-tax, 
the jizya, was prescribed by religious law. On top of the jizya they were 
subject to two other discriminatory charges, the mal kanâyis, or church 
fee, and the ghafr dhimmiyyîn, a toll payable to guards who manned 
checkpoints. The latter charges were rooted in tradition rather than re-
ligious law and were at any rate unsubstantial. The jizya payable by two 
large Christian villages had been fixed (maqtû') for the village as a whole, 
a practice which ran contrary to the prescription of religious law, but 
which was not uncommon. The Christians of the town of Hama were 
assessed properly, that is per capita, according to the number of adult 
males. The number of Christians liable to pay the jizya in 1825 amounted 
to 333 divided over the wealthy (33), those having an average income 
(268) and the working poor (32). The jizya of the town of Hama was tabu-
lated jointly with that of Horns, which had a slightly larger Christian com-
munity. The total for the two towns was 14,415 q. Due to the 
devaluation of the Ottoman currency and the increasing financial needs 
of the state the rates of the jizya were regularly reassessed and by the 
early 1830's the rate showed an increase of 100 % compared to 1825. 
The Ottoman sultans paid special attention to the jizya, because of its 
religious relevance. Preferential fiscal treatment could be motivated by 
religious ideals as well. Waqf holdings which were vital for the upkeep of 
mosques and other religious and public facilities, profited considerably 
from tax exemptions and the same was true for a number of religious 
dignitaries who owed land in some villages. However, the person who se-
cured the largest individual tax exemption on the land tax was the mu-
tasallim. 
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5.10 The costs of war and repression 
Apart from taxes which were collected annually a number of impositions 
were levied from time to time, the frequency and magnitude of which de-
pended on circumstance. In times of natural calamities the administration 
imposed additional levies or raised the rate of some of the regular taxes. 
The Syrian provinces suffered periodically from earthquakes, drought, lo-
custs and plagues. The more frequent misfortunes were, however, revolt 
and war. The recurrence of revolts and wars pressed hard upon the popu-
lation. Provincial factionalism was accompanied by smaller and larger 
armed disturbances and revolts, entailing frequent movement of troops. 
Attempts to protect the cultivated areas against 'arab incursions involved 
further military efforts, as did the protection of the convoys of pilgrims. 
At times events caused massive movements of troops. This was the 
case at the turn of the century, when the French had invaded Egypt and 
Palestine. Some twenty years later the refusal of 'Abdallah Pasha of Acre 
to accept his dismissal led to a massive mobilization. Troops from 
Aleppo, Adana and elsewhere were ordered to lay siege to the pasha's 
stronghold. The Hama area was occasionally the scene of frays which 
provoked the higher authorities to intervene militarily, and local troops 
were sometimes called upon by the wall. Apart from the contributions to 
the military efforts, the district of Hama was affected by wars and revolts 
because it was situated on the Sultanic Road along which many troops 
passed. 
The supply of food, fodder and transport to the passing troops or to 
the troops on the battlefield constituted the main contribution of the 
Hama district to the military efforts. The provisions were referred to as 
dhakhîra or, more often, its plural dhakhâyir. The mutasallim regularly 
received orders from the wâlî of Damascus or Aleppo, or directly from 
Istanbul, to prepare provisions for troops which were to pass through the 
district. Generally a list of the demanded items and quantities was en-
closed, but occasionally the mutasallim was simply ordered to prepare 
"plentiful" provisions. A whole range of items could be requested, includ-
ing coffee, tobacco and wax, but flour, biscuits, barley, sheep, and mules 
and camels for transport constituted the main components of the provi-
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sions. 
The engagement and movement of troops involved high expenses, 
which were only partly covered by the treasury. The deficit had to be 
made up by the districts. For that purpose an extraordinary levy was im-
posed, simply called dhakhîra or dhakhâyir. The supplies were largely 
bought locally and these purchases were referred to as mubâya'a. The of-
ficer in charge of the purchase of provisions, the mubâya'ajî, carried 
some money with him, but most of the expenses which he incurred were 
recovered from the villages, the town and the tribes. The distribution of 
this burden followed, at least partly, the method of assessment of the reg-
ular taxes. The villages, for example, contributed in relation to the num-
ber oifaddân.57 
The magnitude of the dhakhâyir levies, of course, varied from one year 
to the other, but it seems that the Hama district was earmarked for a 
fixed yearly contribution to the upkeep of the armies, which had to be 
supplemented in the case of actual warfare. In 1818 provisions of barley 
and wheat of a value of 51,250 q. were transported to Tripoli to be 
shipped, an amount which matched that of 1802. In 1831 the amount of, 
what appear to have been mostly regular dhakhâyir levies, added up to 
86,266 q. The rates had been established by the newly appointed wait, 
'Abd al-Ra'ûf Pasha, when he passed through Hama on his way to 
Damascus. 
In the event of war and insurrection the levies could skyrocket. The 
largest contributions to war efforts were made at the time of the French 
occupation of Egypt and coastal Palestine. Imperial and provincial 
troops, heading south to expel the French invasion army, camped for two 
days near Hama. They were not only provided with food and fodder 
during their short stay, but also with supplies which would last the troops 
until they had arrived in Damascus. 
The main order of the mubâya'ajî of the imperial troops included 
biscuits, flour and sackcloth for package. The quantities of wheat for the 
production of flour and biscuits were specified and the mutasallim was 
warned not to have the flour mixed with straw and earth. With the acqui-
sition of thousands of sheep the troops did not only enjoy nutritious 
biscuits but fresh meat as well. 
The effort was tremendous by all standards and not to be surpassed in 
the coming years. Some months later a second order for the imperial 
troops was sent to Hama, demanding the delivery and transport of identi-
cal amounts of biscuits and fodder to Damascus. No sheep were ordered 
this time. The delivery was delayed, because the mutasallim complained 
to his superiors that the district was unable to carry the burden. The wait 
acknowledged that the demands pressed hard upon the district and re-
duced the demands of wheat and barley. The district was also relieved 
from the cost of transport; camels would be sent from Damascus. The 
mutasallim was told that no further favours were to be bestowed upon the 
district.64 
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Table 4: Provisions for the imperial troops in 1799 
wheat 
barley 
sheep 
cloth 
milling/baking/ 
packing/administration 
TOTAL EXPENSES 
from the mubâya'ajî 
dhakhîra61 
treasury 
quantities 
ca. 705 таккйк 
946 таккйк 
5533 head 
TOTAL AMOUNT COVERED 
DEFICIT (to be made up by the district)62 
source: SMH 46, p. 358-9,1 Rabí* II1214 
value (q.) 
90,241 
77,054 
35,632 
7,500 
52,967 
253,394 
61,062 
41,551 
1,987 
104,601 
148,793 
In times of war the authorities required a large contribution from the 
ayân and other well-to-do members of the local community, especially 
merchants. They were not only forced to contribute financially, but they, 
or rather a number of them, also took heavy losses on their merchandize. 
The mubâya'ajî purchased the provisions from them at prices well below 
the official fiscal price and far below the market prices. In 1799 a price 
of 128 q. and 80 q. per таккйк of respectively wheat and barley was 
offered, less than 60 % of the official price. The reduction of the amounts 
of wheat and barley almost a year later was accompanied with a reduction 
of the prices. Now the mubâya'ajî offered only 84 q. and 56 q. respec-
tively. 
In the early 1820's the refusal of 'Abdallah Pasha of Acre to resign, in-
furiated the sultan and he condemned the pasha to death. In 1821 troops 
which had been ordered to bring his head to Istanbul passed through 
Hama on their quest and they had to be supplied with provisions. 
Hamawî cavalry joined the effort. Seven months later the mubâya'ajî 
placed a second order for these troops which were still besieging Acre. 
Complaints about the magnitude of the demands had been dismissed by 
the wâlî, although he realized that the population of Hama had im-
poverished due to the earlier movement of troops, but these were days of 
hardship for all, he argued. The demands of wheat were moderate com-
pared to those during the French assault on Acre and even though the 
amounts of barley and sheep stayed behind as well, they were again 
enormous. 
In the late 1820's the expenditure for the military increased sharply as 
a result of the reorganization of the army and the Balkan wars. The elimi-
nation of the janissary corps had left many officials and officers in the em-
pire with a strong sense of insecurity about their future position. The 
building of the new regular armies, notably the mansure, required high in-
vestments and time. Both fell short. The desperate attempts of Sultan 
Mahmud II to acquire additional income to finance his ambitious military 
reforms included the imposition of new charges, the most substantial of 
which was badal masârifai-'askar. In 1829 the town of Hama alone was 
earmarked for no less than 252,631 q. Earlier the tobacco duties had been 
increased to help cover the military expenses. These were temporary 
impositions meant to satisfy the urgent needs. Another new imposition 
was the badal anfâr 'askar, the conscription tax, apparently only payable 
by the villages in the Hama district at its introduction in 1829. The con-
scription constituted one of the most important military reforms. The 
actual conscription was delayed and in lieu an amount of 4000 q. was pay-
able for each technical conscript. The Hama villages had been earmarked 
for 50 conscripts and hence 20,000 q. of badal was demanded. Eventu-
ally the badal anfâr 'askar was to survive as a tax payable by non-Muslim 
subjects only, because they were exempted from serving in the sultan's 
army. 
5.11 Tlie limits of taxation 
The authorities encountered a number of obstacles in the pursuit of their 
financial and provisionary goals. The yields of agriculture were low and 
unstable. The crops on the rain-fed land, predominantly wheat and bar-
ley, were highly vulnerable to weather conditions and hazards like locusts 
and mice, and subsequently the yields varied considerably from year to 
year and crop failures occurred with some regularity. In the second half 
of the 18th century agricultural production had decreased and 
notwithstanding the slight recovery during the first decades of the 19th 
century, the rural economy remained fragile. Scarcity meant that the ad-
ministration was almost permanently confronted with inadequate re-
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sources and found difficulty in organizing the taxation because of the high 
costs involved for collection, storage and transport. Evidently the authori-
ties realized that the demands made upon the districts in times of war, re-
volt and military reform harmed the local economy, but the integrity of 
the state could not be compromised. In the late 18th and early 19th cen-
turies the empire was under severe threat, both from without and within. 
The initial response to the problem of inadequate resources was to lay 
the blame on local and provincial officials. These officials could easily be-
come the target of the higher authorities of the state. The rights of the of-
ficials in the provinces to a share of the revenue were only acknowledged 
to a certain degree, but they were usually able to appropriate a consider-
able share. In the next chapter it will be demonstrated that it was not 
mere greed which motivated the servants of the sultan in the province to 
apply the methods oizulm in order to enlarge their income. 
CHAPTER SIX 
THE LOGIC OF INJUSTICE 
FISCAL AND FINANCIAL POLICIES 
It had never escaped the central authorities that much of the wealth—in 
more modern words, the economic surplus—of the Ottoman domains 
was appropriated by those who served them in the provinces. Taxation is 
one of the methods of surplus extraction. Owen argues that the amounts 
taken in tax "...represented all, or almost all, of what peasants produced 
over and above what they needed to feed and clothe themselves and to 
maintain production". Undoubtedly, taxation constituted the major 
method of surplus extraction, but is was not the only method. Neither was 
taxation merely a method of surplus extraction; it constituted an instru-
ment to regulate the relations between the resources and the population, 
as well as the relations of power. In these functions taxation was supple-
mented by various other financial instruments. 
The provincial and local officials applied both legal and illegal 
methods in their efforts to secure an income which would enable them to 
administer their areas adequately and to further their careers. The cen-
tral state often took a lenient position with regard to the illegality of cer-
tain actions of its servants, because it was through them that it retained its 
claims on the subject classes. However, the dispensation of justice, the 
corner-stone of sultanic rule, required the timely imposition of sanctions 
against those servants who had overtly transgressed the boundaries of 
proper behaviour however fluid these boundaries were. This principle 
served the central state as an important instrument to contain provincial 
and local authorities and to press its material claims on them. 
6.1 The income and expenses of the senior provincial officials 
The tax income of a province often fell short of the actual expenses of the 
wâlî and other senior officials. Russell estimated in the mid-18th century 
that the regular revenue of the governor of the province of Aleppo was 
barely sufficient to cover two thirds of his annual expenses. The governor 
of the province of Damascus, with its particular fiscal regime related to 
the hajj, was also confronted with budget deficits. Given the great impor-
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tance attached to the pilgrimage extra-provincial sources were drawn 
upon, but the governor had to utilize other means of income derivation as 
well. Although the central authorities showed some degree of flexibility 
with respect to the financing of the pilgrimage, they played down the 
magnitude of the expenses. The formal allocation of funds to the pilgri-
mage remained unchanged over long periods, notwithstanding rampant 
inflation. By denying the provincial officials adequate regular funding to 
perform their duties, the central state relieved itself from the difficult task 
to make ends meet. In his treatment of the organization of the hajj Barbir 
approaches this phenomenon from a different angle. He puts much 
weight on "...the central government's flexibility in handling revenue 
problems". However, in practice this flexibility often came down to leav-
ing the handling of these problems to others. The consequence of this 
policy was that the central accountancy only had a limited control over 
the provincial finances. On the one hand this deficiency in the central ad-
ministration allowed senior provincial officials room for manoeuvering 
and manipulation, but on the other hand they lacked a secure financial 
base. Given its limited hold of the provincial finances, the central admin-
istration had every reason to keep the financial base of the senior provin-
cial officials insecure. The maintenance of this insecurity constituted a 
major instrument in containing these officials and in pressing the material 
claims of the central administration on them. The governors and other 
high ranking officials had no alternative other than to increase their in-
come from the province in order to make up the budget deficits. They 
could do so by various means. As we shall see, the function of the state in 
the economy was such that office-holders had the opportunity to turn 
economic resources to their own use. However, they also used the more 
manifest political resources which were at their disposal and these 
methods were often of a coercive nature. The most common sources of 
additional income were the imposition of illegal charges, the forcing of 
loans, the monopolization of the marketing of certain commodities, and 
investments in the spheres of the urban and rural production and com-
merce by establishing partnerships or by acquiring landed or commercial 
properties. Apart from the partnerships and some other commercial 
transactions, these methods were either of an illegal or, in the case of the 
forced loans and monopolies, of a controversial nature. The central 
authorities, then, had ample pretexts to intervene in provincial adminis-
tration. 
The logic of injustice 
6.2 The state and the economy 
In the Ottoman Empire the state carried a great responsibility for the dis-
tribution of goods from agricultural and pastoralist producers, as well as 
for the preservation of the conditions required for the continuation of 
production, in particular in the case of agriculture. The doctrine of the 
Circle of Equity clearly defined this responsibility. The state provided 
the incentives for the production of an agricultural surplus by granting 
peasants the permanent use of land on the condition that they cultivated 
the land. The usufructuary rights to the min, state-owned, land were 
generally well protected and, subsequently, the peasants' right to sub-
sistence. The provision of loans, ploughing animals and seeds figured 
among the instruments to stimulate peasants to continue producing. 
Peasants who left their land and village could be returned by force, a 
policy which was not undisputed. Given that the taxes were imposed col-
lectively on the village community, the community had an interest in the 
return of fugitive peasants. It is of interest that in the district of Hama 
the taxes resting upon the villages were assessed in relation to the land 
and not to the number of adults or households, thus binding the peasants 
to the land. 
The economic policies of the state aimed largely at the conservation of 
the existing productive units, also in the case of urban industries. The 
craftsmen, for example, were protected from competition by the state's 
custody of their corporations which had the obligation to maintain the 
quality of the products. The ideal was that everyone, peasant and crafts-
man alike, held on to his occupation and remained within his particular 
productive units, the village community or the craft organization. Only 
the attitude towards nomadic producers was different. They were often 
encouraged to take up a sedentary mode of production. This policy was 
not motivated by economic considerations as such, but reflected the 
state's ambition to control nomadic groups and to safeguard public secu-
rity in the rural areas and along the lines of communication. 
The exchange of goods, the market, was also regulated by the state to a 
considerable extent. Again competition was restrained by the fixing of 
prices and restrictions on the flow of goods. The provisioning of the 
urban population, and of the army, figured prominently among the re-
sponsibilities of the state. 
The central role of the state in the economy enabled the office-holders 
in the province to engage in economic activities in order to secure addi-
tional income. The relative weight of the additional financial resources 
which were at the disposal of provincial office-holders varied. The estab-
lishment of viable partnerships or other commercial relations with 
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peasants, pastoralists, craftsmen and traders could only be pursued to a 
larger degree when a governor or other senior official had a knowledge of 
the local and provincial economic fabric. When he was a total stranger to 
the province he would be reluctant to invest in its agriculture, animal 
husbandry or urban industry. From the early 18th century until 1812 
hardly any governor had been appointed to the province of Damascus 
who lacked a reasonable degree of familiarity with the area. The career 
expectation of a governor also influenced his commercial activities. When 
he would have reason to believe that he would serve for at least a few 
terms, investment into the local economy became more attractive. The 
'Azm governors were a case in point. They made a fortune out of various 
commercial enterprises ranging from cereal production, animal husban-
dry to overland trade. 
6.3 Market manipulation and monopolies 
The establishment of a monopoly of the marketing of cereals, meat, cot-
ton and other commodities often served to strengthen the economic in-
terests of a governor. It is unclear whether the establishment of a 
monopoly by a provincial governor constituted a legal act. Traditionally, 
the state granted the monopoly of the trade of certain commodities, like 
salt, tobacco, timber, candles, soap and wine, in given areas to individual 
merchants, including foreigners, but office-holders also competed for 
these monopolies. Commodities like wheat, meat and cotton did not 
normally belong to the category of state monopolies, but especially these 
commodities attracted the attention of the governors of Damascus, Acre 
and Aleppo. In the case of wheat, and to a lesser extent meat, the duty of 
the governor to guarantee the provisioning of the urban population with 
food may have offered him a pretext to enlarge his control over the 
market. 
Also the tax system advanced his commercial interests. The major 
share of the amounts of grain collected as qism in the Hama area was at 
the disposal of the wait and it is likely that the same was true for the grain 
collected in Horns and other districts. The wheat was marketed by the 
wait in order to convert it into cash. Through their hold on major cereal 
producing areas like Hama the 'Azms controlled a considerable part of 
the cereal market. In concert with some Damascene cereal traders they 
were able to manipulate the market by withholding supplies in times of 
plenty and by selling off their stock and pile in times of dearth. As'ad 
Pasha al-'Azm, the governor of the mid-18th century, was very successful 
in manipulating the price of grain and bread to his own profit. However, 
he did not actually monopolize the trade. In the case of the craft organi-
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zations, like the millers, bakers and butchers, a governor and other inter-
ested parties cooperated with the heads of these corporations in manipu-
lating the prices of the commodities. 
The establishment of a monopoly could easily provoke opposition 
from influential segments of local society. All families of some standing 
had interests in tribes, villages, crafts and their respective produce. But of 
special importance were the Damascene cereal traders, who were often 
aghawât and tax farmers of the hinterland of Damascus, the Marj and the 
Hawrân. The cereal production in the Hawrân was second in importance 
only to that of Hama. Any governor had to take the interests of the 
Damascene cereal traders into account. Also the entanglement of the 
craft organizations and the local military in Damascus put a restraint on 
the economic policies of a governor. In the pursuit of his commercial 
goals a governor had to be careful not to arouse popular discontent. For 
example, Damascenes complained about the manipulation of the market 
by As'ad Pasha al-'Azm, but he was careful enough not to provoke bread 
riots. It was essential for a governor not to disregard totally the interests 
of the common people and to temper popular feelings against him by oc-
casional acts of fairness and generosity. As'ad Pasha used the surplus of 
grain in Hama area on several occasions to relieve the population of 
Damascus, and later Aleppo, by selling his wheat at a modest price. 
The one governor who neglected the interests of the public at large 
was Jazzâr Pasha. He established a wide range of monopolies in the pro-
vince of Sidon and suppressed any opposition against his policy. He 
pursued a similar monopolistic policy when he was in office in Damascus 
and met with a strong local opposition when he initiated this policy. 
Contrary to the province of Sidon, his hold of the province of Damascus 
was never secure and the policy was not fully implemented. In his 
economic policies Jazzâr Pasha is likely to have followed the example of 
his former master, 'Ali Bey of Egypt, and, to a certain extent, that of 
Dâhir al-'Umar, who operated in the Acre region under much more 
favourable economic conditions. Jazzâr Pasha's economic policies in-
fluenced later governors, like Kunj Yûsuf Pasha of Damascus, who, how-
ever, was unsuccessful. The renowned governor of Egypt, Muhammad 
'Alî Pasha, resorted to this system of exploitation as well and carried it to 
its limits. 
An authorized method of raising capital was the enforcement of loans. 
When a governor or other functionary failed to repay a loan, however, he 
committed a breach of contract. It was not uncommon for him to refuse 
or to be unable to settle a contracted debt and it was often doubtful 
whether the claimant was able to recover the debt without the support of 
higher authority. The central state applied this method of fund raising as 
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well, particularly in times of war. At the time of the campaigns against 
the French occupation army in Palestine and Egypt, the commander of 
the imperial troops imposed large sums on several members of the 'Azm 
family, some of their associates and others. These loans were later re-
covered by the wall of Baghdad. The promissory notes issued by the 
treasury in return for a loan, however, were often difficult to redeem for 
cash and, consequently, local opposition to the enforcement of loans was 
generally strong. 
The illegality of some other ways to enlarge one's income was more 
obvious. They included outright extortion of money and kind, soliciting 
bribes on top of legal fees, the imposition of new taxes without the sanc-
tion of the central authorities, upgrading existing tax rates, as well as 
manipulating interest rates, prices and weights. The refusal of a proper 
compensation, or any compensation at all, for services of various types 
occurred frequently as well. While governor of Damascus Jazzâr Pasha 
frequently had well-to-do Damascenes arrested and then bailed out. 
These means of exploitation were collectively referred to as zulm or 
mazâlim, acts of injustice or abuse of power. Likewise outright profiteer-
ing by market manipulations and the exclusion of the local trading com-
munity were considered acts of zulm. 
The use of force by provincial officials was only unlawful when it con-
cerned the extortion of amounts on top of the legal rates. People who 
were reluctant or unable to pay their share of taxes could be subjected to 
various methods of persuasion. The governor of Damascus toured in 
most parts of his province with his private army in order to compel local 
officials and tax farmers to meet their liabilities. This custom was referred 
to as dawra and probably dated from the early decades of 18th century 
when the offices of wait and amir al-hajj had been combined. The dis-
trict of Hama, being attached as the governor's malikane to the province, 
was normally not visited by dawra. The taking of hostages from the rela-
tives of officials and tax farmers constituted another widely practiced 
method of compulsion. Beating constituted the main physical argument 
to compel people to pay. 
6.4 Tixe policies of the central authorities 
The withholding of adequate regular financial resources served as a valu-
able instrument to restrain the power of senior provincial officials, al-
though it may not have been intended as such at first. Their endeavours to 
augment their income in order to administer the province properly and to 
further their interests and careers were accompanied with transgressions 
of written and unwritten laws. Legal action could be taken against them at 
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any time and this constant threat served to intimidate the provincial ad-
ministration into a loyal attitude. The intimidation also restrained many 
an official from the more excessive methods of exploitation, although 
some, like Jazzâr Pasha, proved difficult to intimidate. When the policies 
of provincial authorities produced social unrest, the central authorities 
regularly intervened. For instance, a governor could be called to account 
for the sums exacted on top of the amounts established by law. The risk 
that an official had to account for even more than he had collected in re-
ality by illegal ways was far from hypothetical. The tradition of petition-
ing the imperial dîwân against acts of injustice perpetrated by senior 
officials was an important element of the tradition of exerting a constant 
pressure on provincial office-holders. 
In actual practice the central authorities often took a lenient position 
towards the unauthorized actions of those who served them in the pro-
vinces. These practices had become an organic part of the administration 
and no viable alternatives were at hand. They often turned a blind eye to 
market manipulations, exactions and other unsanctioned measures and 
much remained unpunished. From the point of view of the central 
authorities the main disadvantage of the system was that the actual in-
come of provincial officials and thus the magnitude of the provincial re-
venue remained obscure. The means to manipulate the provincial budget 
were manifold, in particular because the central state had little control 
over the expense side. Numerous officials were able to enlarge their in-
come and divert a considerable part of it to their own private use. The 
central authorities were always suspicious of the financial dealings of 
their inferiors in the provinces. The suspicion was mutual, because the 
sultan could act at will and many governors and others were obsessed by 
possible actions or intrigues against them. 
Although functionaries of the treasury department were regularly sent 
to provinces to audit the accounts, it often proved difficult to conduct a 
proper investigation into the finances of the senior provincial officials as 
long as they remained in office. It had become routine to conduct an in-
quiry into the provincial finances after a governor had been removed or 
had died, but even then it often took a long time before an inquiry was 
concluded. Local authorities were regularly involved in the inquiries. In 
1798 Jazzâr Pasha's mutasallim in Hama, 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd, 
was ordered by the Porte to instruct the qâdî of Hama to prepare a tabu-
lation of taxes collected during the reign of Ibrahim Deli Pasha, who had 
been dismissed nearly a decade earlier. In the same year the properties in 
the district of Hama of yet another former wâlî, Muhammad Darwîsh 
Pasha, who served in 1782-3, were subjected to an inquiry. Of course, 
most officials would eventually be found guilty of manipulations of some 
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sort. Many officials and their heirs were indebted to either the treasury or 
their proclaimed victims including individuals, often traders, quarters, 
craft organizations, villages or tribes. Confiscation of part of their proper-
ties or inheritance normally followed. 
In order to evade prosecution and confiscation many officials left their 
office in a hurry when news about their dismissal arrived and some even 
earlier. In principle a deposed governor was obliged to reside in the pro-
vincial capital until his accounts had been audited. Usually, governors 
and others had converted part of their wealth in cash, gold and precious 
stones, which were easily hidden or transported. Another method to pro-
tect one's possessions against confiscation was to convert property in, in 
principle, inalienable waqf holdings or to invest in existing waqf holdings. 
The low tax demands resting upon waqf estates constituted an additional 
advantage. Although in the legal, shar'î establishment opposition was 
voiced against some of these transactions, especially the 'Azm governors 
had applied this method widely. Notwithstanding the opposition against 
abuses of the waqf system, waqf holdings or the administration of these 
properties constituted the principal source of wealth of the religious 
ayân.30 
Part of the inheritance of most, if not all, of the 'Azm governors was 
subjected to confiscation by the state. The most famed governor of the 
family, As'ad Pasha, was even killed in preparation for the confiscation of 
a large part of his wealth. The officials in charge of the confiscations 
had the houses of the 'Azrns, as well as those of their associates, 
thoroughly searched, breaking down walls and digging up gardens. They 
forced relatives and aides of the pasha to cooperate by imprisoning and 
flogging them. Apparently, the central authorities were, at least at the 
time, more reluctant to infringe upon waqf holdings. The waqf holdings in 
the districts of Hama and Horns belonging to As'ad Pasha al-'Azm ap-
pear to have been left largely untouched.3 His slaves and mamlhks did 
not escape confiscation, however, and were carried off to Istanbul. 
6.5 Presents and patronage 
The artificial nature of provincial budgets, the manipulations of senior 
provincial officials and the incessant claims of the central authorities had 
created an ill-defined system of empire-wide exploitation which allowed 
many informal practices. In order to further his career a senior provincial 
official depended strongly on networks which included people from the 
entourage of the sultan and high officials of the state. In order to be re-
confirmed in office or to be promoted to a more prestigious position 
these officials needed intelligence on the political mood at the centre. 
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Above all the good offices of a grandee of the state were required. The 
removal or death of any member of the imperial elite could easily affect 
the careers of officials connected to him. Their chances depended on the 
degree of loyalty shown to their patron, and, naturally, to the sultan, his 
trustees and other prominent functionaries, who were all keen to protect 
their respective privileges. Loyalty, or in Ottoman terms servitude, was 
best expressed in cash payments referred to as gifts. Often a relation ex-
isted between the magnitude of the gifts forwarded to Istanbul and the 
potential revenue of a province. 
It would be wrong to assume that all payments in the context of pa-
tronage were bribes and therefore illegal. The payments to the sultan and 
the members of the imperial dîwân had been legalized in the mid-17th 
century. The presents were financed by what had become regular taxes by 
the second half of the 18th century and possibly earlier. The annual ex-
penses of the governor of Aleppo, referred to above, included these pay-
ments. In Egypt the levies related to the presents were included into the 
barraní taxes. A similar levy in the province of Damascus has not yet 
been identified with absolute certainty, but the tax referred to as 
'ubûdiyya may well have been collected for that purpose. 
The presents, which were payable annually, were substantial. Unfor-
tunately, there are no figures available for the province of Damascus for 
the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of the large 
and relatively prosperous province of Egypt transferred 740,000 q. as pre-
sents to the imperial household, the grand vizier and other high officials 
in 1827. The distribution of the presents is likely to have reflected the ac-
tual balance of power—and the relative strength of the sultan of the time, 
Mahmud II — rather than the ideological order of the state. Nearly 70 % 
of the amount was forwarded to the court. The swordkeeper of the sultan 
and the grand vizier received 50,000 q. each, but the shaykh al-islâm, in 
the ideological order their superior, was presented with only 25,000 q. A 
number of other high-ranking officials were paid 15,000 q. or less. Con-
sidering the fact that the total amount of Muhammad 'Alt Pasha's "pre-
sents" exceeded the annual income of the treasury from the district of 
Hama, the importance of these servile payments is evident. Apart from 
the regular presents, which also included gifts on the occasions of re-
ligious festivals, other more informal payments were made. 
It is of interest that a self-reliant governor-general like Muhammad 
'Alî Pasha continued to send such large sums as "presents" to Istanbul, 
despite his disputes with the sultan over a compensation for his military 
services. It appears to have been highly unusual for provincial governors 
in the period under regard not to honour the financial claims which were 
put forward by the central authorities. Jazzâr Pasha of Acre, who cer-
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tainly did not pay heed to each and every order emanating from Istanbul, 
never refused to honour the financial demands made upon him. Their 
willingness to pay demonstrates their dependence on support in the capi-
tal, but also their acquiescence in the system which allowed them to ex-
ploit their provinces in their own right. 
However, notwithstanding timely payments or the display of other 
good qualities, the position of any senior official remained insecure. In his 
relation with the Porte suspicion of the intentions of his imperial masters 
played a significant role. The sultan could depose anyone at will. An oc-
casional display of his absolute power was required in order to remind his 
servants that their prerogatives were limited, if not futile, when compared 
to his. The decapitation in 1758 of the capable and loyal As'ad Pasha al-
'Azm, whose principal offence seems to have been his prosperity, had left 
its mark on the Syrian provinces. The execution was generally regarded as 
an arbitrary act, but the fairness of sultanic law was beyond open dispute. 
Its arbitrariness bestowed upon it a supernatural dimension typical for 
traditional absolutist rule. The basic idea remained that no official had a 
right to professionally generated wealth. The paradox enclosed in the sys-
tem is striking; a wâlî, being the most senior provincial official, wielded 
very extensive powers within his province but enjoyed hardly any rights. 
6.6 The wâlî and the provincial administration 
The relation between the wâlî and the body of officials, officers and tax 
farmers in the province differed from his relation vis-à-vis the central ad-
ministration. The powers of the wâlî were extensive, but not exclusive. 
The central authorities had been careful to separate some authority from 
the governorship, most notably the jurisdiction of the sitar', religious law, 
and the administration of the treasury, the office of the defterdar. In prin-
ciple each and every subject in the province could address the imperial 
dîwân and by doing so evade the wâWs authority in non-shar'î affairs as 
well. In particular the religious ayân petitioned the imperial dîwân, be-
cause they were considered to be the guardians of the religious and moral 
tradition and by extension of local tradition. They often voiced the pro-
tests of the local commercial class. The effects of their petitions de-
pended very much on circumstance, but they were generally immune 
from arbitrary punishment. The authorities certainly paid heed to the 
common values of society. Exceptions to this rule occurred. Jazzâr Pasha, 
once the victim of a petition by the muftì of Damascus, showed less re-
spect for the religious establishment and had several muftis executed. 
The office of defterdar, treasurer, belonged to the more secure offices in 
the province, normally held for extensive periods. Little controversy ex-
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isted between the wâlî and the defterdar during the late 18th and early 
19th century, which suggests that the office of the treasurer did not figure 
as a major check on the activities of the governor. 
As has been noted before, the policy of the central authorities toward 
the province of Damascus was focussed on the yearly pilgrimage to the 
holy shrines of Mecca and Medina. Considerable power had been vested 
in the governorship of Damascus by combining the office with that of the 
amir al-hajj. By attaching parts of adjacent province of Tripoli as 
malikane to the combined office the central authorities had created the 
preconditions of the proper organization of the hajj. The balancing of the 
budget was left to the wâlî. In silent recognition of the strenuous nature of 
this effort the Porte had abandoned the principle of swift rotation of the 
walls during most of the 18th century. When a wall had given proof of his 
ability to organize the hajj, he would normally be maintained as wall and 
amir al-fiajj for longer periods. This allowed the wall to extend his control 
over the officials and tax farmers in the province and to initiate commer-
cial activities which would enlarge his income. 
The wall of Damascus spent most of his time in raising funds for the 
hajj. In this he depended upon a body of officials and tax farmers. Many 
people, in different capacities, were involved in the levying of taxes, all of 
whom had a right to a certain share or fee. The distinction between offi-
cials and officers on the one hand and tax farmers on the other was 
blurred, because many officials and officers acted as tax farmers. Basi-
cally, the province comprised a number of large muqâta'as, tax farms, 
most of which were in the leasehold of the wall. The wall farmed out the 
collection of taxes in most muqâta'as to other individuals or, occasionally, 
communities. Among the more important tax farmers were the senior 
provincial officials, like the kethiida, the wall's chief lieutenant and the 
second in command, his kâtib, secretary, and the defterdar. Like the 
governorship, the kethiidalik and defterdarlik constituted in fact tax 
farms. The kâtib of the wall often occupied an important position within 
the system of exploitation of the province. 'Abbûd Bahn of Homs, for ex-
ample, when serving as kâtib to 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm had been 
granted the tax farm of numerous villages. 
6.7 Tax collection in the district ofHama 
The tax farmers in outlying districts like Hama were often local officials, 
officers and members of prominent local families. The district of Hama 
was normally granted as a malikane to the governor of Damascus in his 
capacity of amir al-hajj. The mutasallim was his representative and en-
joyed extensive powers locally. It may be that he was granted the lease-
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hold of some villages or other tax farms, but there is no evidence for this 
in the Hama records. The group of multazims, tax farmers, was limited. 
The urban based tax farmers included members of the two most promi-
nent local families, the 'Azm and Kaylânî, from which local functionaries 
were recruited as well. Also aghawât families, like the Jijaklîs, Turkumân 
and Barâzîs families were involved in the farming of taxes. Members of 
these families served in the local military as well. Evidently, the combina-
tion of office-holding and tax farming was the dominant feature in the ex-
ploitation of the district. Rural aghawât, mainly Turcoman, also regularly 
acted as tax farmers of the villages in which they resided. 
Not all villages of the Hama plain were farmed by the more powerful 
well-to-do Hamawîs. The village community or the village sheikh regu-
larly acted as ntultazim. In 1802 the taxes of over half of the Turcoman 
villages to the south of Hama were farmed by the villagers. In most cases 
this probably implied that no one had committed himself to collect the 
amount of taxes imposed on the village and that this task now rested upon 
the communities themselves. 
In the rural muqâta'as of the western periphery of the district the local 
Nusayrî, Ismâ'îlî or Turcoman headmen usually acted as tax farmers. The 
position of these headmen was not always secure. Apart from local com-
petition, the aghawât of Hama occasionally competed for these 
muqâta'as. The leasehold of some villages in the Hama district were 
granted to a senior provincial official or a close associate of the wait. 
As the deputy of the wâlî, the mutasallim bore the overall responsi-
bility for the timely and full collection of the taxes which were remitted to 
the treasury, as well as of most extraordinary levies. The 'awâyid were col-
lected separately by those who were entitled to these fees and the mu-
tasallim had to see to the proper collection of these fees. The same was 
true for the collection by the qassâmiyya of the proportional agricultural 
tax, the qism. The qism, then, was not collected by the tax farmer of the 
village. 
The tax tabulations did, of course, not include the gains, or losses, of 
the tax farmers. In normal practice a tax farmer pledged a certain amount 
of taxes to the treasury when these were put at auction. The amount 
pledged was recorded in a contract, called sartname, and usually an ad-
vance payment was demanded. The wâlî or his dîwân granted the tax 
farm, but this power could be delegated to the mutasallim. The tax 
farmer ran a considerable risk. It was not unusual that he was unable to 
raise the required sum. In the late 18th and early 19th centuries many tax 
farms proved to be unprofitable and the authorities had difficulty in inter-
esting people to bid for the right to collect taxes, especially those resting 
upon the villages which suffered from depopulation. It appears from 
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the attempts to interest people in the farming of the taxes of villages 
which were in a poor shape, or even depopulated, by offering favourable 
conditions, that a tax farmer was not merely expected to collect taxes, but 
also to invest in the village or, at least, to create the preconditions for the 
return of peasants by taking such a village into his care. A multazim 
then, seems to have shared the—state's—responsibility of keeping a vil-
lage productive or increasing its output. 
6.8 The demands of local officials 
In many edicts local authorities received warnings from the wait or his 
dîwân not to exceed the proper rates of taxes and fees and to refrain from 
levying new, illegal charges, usually referred to as bida'. The high 
frequency of these edicts indicates that illegal demands were habitual and 
that the admonitions had little effect. It is of interest to note that the 
edicts were hardly ever directed against tax farmers as such. This seems 
somewhat surprising, since any tax farmer would be after a return on the 
capital invested—under conditions which were often not very favourable. 
The multitude of impositions and the variation in their assessment had 
produced an intricate fiscal system which was vulnerable to malversation. 
Ample opportunities existed to manipulate the outcome of the hisâb, the 
tax computation of a village. The court records do not provide sufficient 
information on the methods tax farmers applied in order to compensate 
their financial efforts. No indication was found that a tax farmer was per-
mitted to levy fees on top of the amount of taxes fixed by the authorities. 
Apart from farming the taxes he would often act as a banker to the vil-
lagers or as their partner in agriculture by supplying ploughing animals 
and seed. Instead of actually farming the taxes of a village people ad-
vanced the payment of the taxes resting on a village as a loan and some-
times made the payment to the treasury. 
Given the scarcity of warnings against the possible abuse of tax farm-
ing, it seems safe to assume that tax farming did not figure among the 
main instruments of exaction. Fiscal laws appear to have been applied to 
tax farmers rather strictly. Nearly all admonitions of abuse of power 
were directed against local officials and the same goes for petitions pre-
sented to the wâlî by the population. It is true that officials often acted as 
tax farmers, but the main offenses comprised the imposition of excessive 
rates of 'awâyid, the levying of illegal charges and the refusal to give 
proper compensation for lodging, food and fodder. In other words, offi-
cials and officers were susceptible to taking advantage of their powers 
and of the fact that they commanded or had access to armed units. Tax 
farmers who did not hold any formal office, and certainly the petty village 
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sheikhs among them, could easily become victims of the rapacity of the 
aghawât. Not only the common people suffered from exactions. The more 
well-to-do were regularly forced to make payments referred to as rashwa, 
normally translated as bribe. 
The information contained in the Hama records conforms largely to 
the more general picture presented in the contemporary literary sources. 
Acts of zulm were nearly always ascribed to the hukkâm, the military of-
fice-holders and their troops, who imposed all sorts of additional charges 
in both cash and kind at will. Other functionaries, like the local qâdh, 
muftis, or the non-military tax farmers belonged to the class of people 
whose malversation paled in comparison with those committed by the 
men of the sword. 
Like their superiors the local aghawât did not act out of mere greed. 
The collection of taxes which had to be remitted to the treasury was given 
precedence over the collection of other impositions, notably those which 
were meant to cover the expenses of local officials. The provincial 
authorities paid little heed to the actual expenses of local administration 
and in this they followed the example of their imperial counterparts. The 
magnitude of the expenses of their inferiors was disregarded and high 
payments were demanded from them in order receive appointments. 
Consequently, it was left to them to make ends meet. The way the local 
officeholders sought a compensation for their expenses and attempted to 
enlarge their personal income, varied. Like their superiors they combined 
legal with illegal methods. Even Jazzâr Pasha warned his mutasallim in 
Hama to refrain from burdening the local trading community with forced 
loans (without his consent) and exactions in kind. Most legal methods 
had in common that they carried an, at times considerable risk, because 
they required capital investments. This was true for farming of taxes and 
for commercial activities such as the establishment of partnerships and 
the making of loans. Nonetheless, investments in local agriculture and an-
imal husbandry, as partners of villagers and tribes or otherwise, occurred 
frequently. Investing in real estate, mainly shops in or gardens around 
Hama, required high initial investments. Although the lease of shops and 
irrigated gardens was lucrative, only longtime resident officials and their 
families, like the 'Azm, the Kaylânî, 'Alwânî and the merchant families 
Kûjân and al-Hajj Zayn, acquired extensive properties. The 'Azm and 
Kaylânî families owned or controlled, either as freehold or waqf, numer-
ous shops, houses, and agricultural land along the 'Âsî river, as well as 
stretches of rain-fed agricultural land in the vicinity of the town and some 
mills and waterwheels. Both families but especially the 'Azms possessed 
real estate in other parts of Syria as well. 
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The central authorities regarded the wealth of the ayân in the pro-
vinces as a source of additional revenue. In times of urgent financial need 
the locally prominent, in particular former high officials and their heirs 
and those who enjoyed privileges like the life leasehold of land, were 
forced to remit considerable sums to the treasury or to the purse of the 
mubâya'ajî of the imperial army. In 1799, for example, 12% of the ex-
penses incurred by the mubâya'ajî was covered by extraordinary levies re-
sting upon the amlâk and awqâf of Hama, the habitual reference to the 
properties and estates of the wealthy. As has been noted before, the 
ayân also incurred losses by the forced acquisition of provisions for the 
armies.70 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm, when wâlî of Damascus, even ordered 
his mutasallim in Hama not to exclude the properties of his relatives in 
the district, when he demanded supplies for his troops in 1805. The 
forcing of loans constituted another method to draw upon the resources 
of the ayân. 
Both the 'Azm and Kaylânî families had a long tradition of office-hold-
ing. Although their wealth, at times, constituted a target of the central 
authorities, they were also in the position to mobilize support and to ob-
tain preferential treatment. The heirs of As'ad Pasha al-'Azm, for ex-
ample, procured an imperial decree in 1799 ordering the cessation of any 
further demands on their properties concerning the war efforts against 
the French. In 1818, when several tax rates were reduced following the 
'arab incursions, the aibâb al-amlâk, the property holders, were granted 
additional tax exemptions. 
Other officials and officers in the district lacked the relative security of 
tradition and wealth. A number of families of aghawât were in the process 
of acquiring a foothold in the area during the first decades of the 19th 
century, like the Jijaklî, Barâzî, Tayfûr and Turkumânî. In the early de-
cades the Jijaklî family had the most extensive commercial interests of 
these aghawât families. It was only later in the century that some of 
these families, in particular the Barâzî and Tayfûr, could be counted 
among the small group of the very wealthy local families. For those who 
were not blessed with tradition and wealth, the unlawful methods of in-
come derivation looked more promising, certainly as a start. This is not to 
say, of course, that members of the 'Azm and Kaylânî families always 
obeyed the laws and that no non-local official established legal commer-
cial relations. 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd, who served as mutasallim 
under Jazzâr Pasha, was quick to enter into partnerships with several vil-
lages. This aghâ, however, was not totally unfamiliar with the area, 
being a native of the adjacent district of Horns. 
Exacting amounts of cash and kind from the population on top of the 
legal charges constituted the easiest method to secure supplementary in-
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come. The high frequency of official warnings against this practice served 
as a constant reminder to the local officials that they acted against the law 
and that legal action could be taken against them. The careful tabulation 
of the legal impositions resting upon the district defined the formal claims 
of the state and served as an instrument to discipline the local body of of-
ficials, officers and troops and to moderate their demands. That the rela-
tion between the tabulations and the actual amounts collected was at best 
hypothetical, appears to have been of secondary concern. 
6.9 The 'awâyid andmisriyyat al-fard 
It will be remembered that the 'awâyid, one of the main extraordinary im-
positions, were meant to furnish an income to a number of local officials 
and officers and to compensate them for their expenses. Most, if not all of 
these aghawât commanded a military unit. Their troops had to be paid 
out of the 'awâyid. The rates of 'awâyid were fixed by the provincial dîwân 
at a low rate. The 'awâyid were occasionally reduced, some by no less 
than 50 %. These reductions often coincided with the reduction of other 
impositions like the qism and the mâlfaddân and were meant to revitalize 
the ailing rural economy. In 1822 the hâsil villages even were exempted 
from the 'awâyid payable to the qassâmiyya. Another method to tone 
down the claims of the aghawât was to ignore the devaluation of the Ot-
toman currency. The amounts of 'awâyid payable to the qassâmiyya in 
1818, for example, were identical to those of 1824. The qassâm aghâ, how-
ever, had demanded higher amounts. The rates of the 'awâyid remained 
unchanged until the early 1830's, when they were abolished. Although the 
rates of 'awâyid were frozen, the rate of some regular taxes were in-
creased, albeit that major charges like the mal faddân remained un-
changed as well. 
In order to gain a proper compensation, or more, the local offials re-
sorted to a traditional method; the collection of the misriyyat al-fard. It 
may be that the 'awâyid had been recently introduced to replace the prac-
tice of collecting the misriyyat al-fard, which roughly translates as "a 
penny from each", and had constituted basically a poll-tax. When taken 
in kind it was referred to as ijabbat al-fard, a measure (of grain) from 
each. The high frequency of directives in which the local officials were in-
structed to refrain from taking the misriyyat al-fard from the population 
indicates that its collection remained customary, at least well into the 
1820's in the Hama district. In Damascus the levying of the charge ap-
pears to have been suppressed earlier. In particular the aghawât who 
were entitled to 'awâyid had difficulty in conceding that they were not or 
no longer authorized to demand these contributions. The provincial 
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authorities also called upon the population not to give in to the demands 
for the misriyyat al-fard. 
No figures exist about the actual expenses of aghawât who were en-
titled to levy 'awâyid, like the garib yigit agasi, the tiifenkçi basi and the 
qassâmiyya. According to Burckhardt 300 to 400 cavalrymen were nor-
mally stationed in Hama, but unfortunately he does not tell us whether 
these concerned garib yigit forces, delis or other mounted troops. Not 
only the number of troops in the service of the various local commanders 
is unknown, but their pay as well. Both the expenses and the income of 
other officials, most notably the mutasallim, are obscure as well. Only 
some figures about the magnitude of exactions are available and those 
will be dealt with shortly. Apart from regular para-military forces, com-
manded by officers who collected 'awâyid, at least one auxiliary force was 
normally stationed in the district, the delis, who were neither paid out of 
the treasury, nor had the right to collect fees. The presence of these 
troops was a common source of anxiety in the provinces, because they 
often failed to receive their pay from their patrons, mainly governors. As 
has been discussed before, the Hama district constituted for about 15 
years the base of the most renowned deli bast at the time, Mullû Ismâ'îl 
and his men. The status of the delis was often informal and their income 
insecure. Consequently, they were strongly inclined to extort food and 
fodder from the villages. 
6.10 FarajAghâ's exactions 
The mutasallim, being the most senior local official, controlled more re-
sources than any other official. The early career of Faraj Aghâ may serve 
as an example of the politics of financing the administration of a mutasal-
lim. As has been noted before, the origins of Faraj Aghâ are obscure, but 
it seems unlikely that he was a local. He was first appointed mutasallim 
in Hama in 1826. At the time of his appointment he was reminded by the 
dîwân of Damascus that the qassâmiyya in his service should not exceed 
the fixed amounts of 'awâyid payable by the population. A little later he 
received the warning not to charge interest on the delivery of seeds from 
the granary to the peasantry. The peasants were followed by a more in-
fluential segment of Hamawî society, the merchants. They petitioned the 
wait, accusing Faraj Aghâ of obstructing trade in general, levying illegal 
charges on silk and failing to repay forced loans. They also accused the 
tiifenkçi basi and some other aghawât of imposing illegal impositions. The 
merchants were backed by the naqîb, 'Abdallah Efendi al-Kaylânî who 
was also campaigning, with success, for the reappointment of 'Abd al-
Wahhâb al-Kaylânî to the office of qâdî. After the wall had attempted to 
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mediate between the parties, he conceded to the demands of the 
Hamawîs. In 1829 Faraj Aghâ was dismissed and a provincial functionary, 
Sulaymân Aghâ, the supervisor of the awqâf of the Haramayn in the pro-
vince, was dispatched to Hama in order to hold an inquiry into the finan-
cial dealings of the Faraj Aghâ and some of his aides. 
Table 5: The exactions and malversation of Ροή Aghâ and his men 
A. The income of Faraj Aghâ and some of his officers derived by illegal 
means 
B. The legal regular taxes payable to the treasury in the same year 
A. B. 
I. Urban 
craft organizations 155,770 79,685 
quarters 16,557 3,950 
market inspection 11,701 33,917 
subtotal 184,028 117,552 
II. Rural 
hâsil villages 
Turcoman villages 
maqtû' villages 
qutuniyyât villages 
Jabal Gharbî villages 
muqâta'as 
'arab tribes 
subtotal 
Other 
matrûkât of aghawât 
granary 
sundry taxes 
(incVnbûdiyya) 
miscellaneous 
subtotal 
189,450 
14,368 
3,863 
2,649 
72,818 
58,185 
82,728 
424,061 
75,797 
55,570 
31,832 
21,848 
185,047 
174,205 
45,232 
20,250 
10,463 
64,283 
150,240 
51,400 
516,073 
10,426 
TOTAL 793,136 644,051 
source: SMH 49, p. 250-2, dated [Safar] 1245 and p. 326-9,23 
Rabr 11245 
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The inquiry of Sulaymân Aghâ showed that Faraj Aghâ and a number of 
senior officers, namely the odabast, the tiifenkçi bap, the wakîl al-khaq, as 
well as his principal aide, 'Uthmân Aghâ, had collected 793,136 q. "...by 
way of injustice, violation and tyranny". Of that amount nearly 700,000 q. 
had been pocketed by Faraj Aghâ himself. Sulaymân Aghâ had based 
himself largely on the accounts of their victims, which included almost 
any single quarter, craft, village and tribe. Apart from that he had used 
the books of the local treasury and granary. Whether the inquiry had 
been conducted properly remains unclear, but the fairness of the exercise 
is of little interest here. Faraj Aghâ alleged rapacity finds some support in 
other sources. Later in the century villagers occasionally refer to the 
greed of Faraj Aghâ in their lawsuits. 
The income derived from illegal sources by Faraj Aghâ and his men 
exceeded the annual amount of the taxes which had to be remitted to the 
treasury by over 20 %. The lion's share of the total amount consisted of 
exactions taken from craftsmen, villagers and tribesmen. The high con-
tribution of the craft organizations to the pockets of the officials helps ex-
plain the strong urban opposition to Faraj Aghâ. 
In the case of the rural categories it is of interest to note that the 
maqtû' villages were treated with leniency, both by the treasury and by 
Faraj Aghâ. The opposite is true for the dozen of small villages of the 
Jabal Gharbî, which not only constituted a rich source of income for the 
treasury, but for Faraj Aghâ personally as well. The magnitude of the ex-
actions may indicate the degree of control over the various segments of 
the population. The high contribution of the 'arab, for example, may have 
reflected the strong influence Faraj Aghâ exercised over the tribes. A re-
markable feature of the distribution of the exactions from the villages is 
that those in the near vicinity of Hama either had been forced to pay 
moderate sums relative to the legal charges or even nothing at all. The, 
partly Nusayrî, village of al-Rabfa, for example, had not been visited by 
the mutasallim or one of his officers. Several members of the Kaylânî 
family maintained close relations with this village whose fields bordered 
on the land belonging to the town. Prominent Hamawî families had 
considerable interests in these villages and it is likely that their relations 
with the villages near Hama safeguarded their inhabitants from excessive 
demands, at least by Faraj Aghâ and his men. 
In the case of other villages the economic condition undoubtedly 
played a role. The highest demands had been made upon some villages in 
the fertile and well-watered Wa'r and on two large and relatively prosper-
ous Christian villages. The Muslim village of Talldû in the Wa'r had been 
forced to make the largest contribution both in absolute and relative 
terms: 35,350 q. compared to 9130 q. of taxes remitted to the treasury. It 
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is evident that religious bias did not influence the size of the amounts 
taken. Even the village of Tayyibat al-Gharbiyya, which was part of the 
awqâf of the principal mosque of Horns, had been forced to pay 6800 q. 
compared to the amount of 3190 q. remitted to the treasury. 
The inquiry not only involved exactions, but also malversations at the 
expense of the treasury. The single largest amount concerned a part of 
the inheritance of Husayn Bey al-'Azm, who acted as the qâyimmaqâm of 
Sulaymân Pasha al-'Azm, the late governor of Tripoli (1823-4). The fi-
nances of Sulaymân Pasha had been subject to an inquiry earlier and his 
debt to the treasury had apparently been settled, but Husayn Bey owed a 
debt to the treasury as well and so did his brother Muhammad Bey, who 
served as mutasallim of Hama at that time. Muhammad Bey died in 1824 
and in 1826 Faraj Aghâ was ordered to confiscate part of the inheritance. 
Husayn Bey had been charged with the supervision of the inheritance of 
his brother Muhammad. Husayn Bey had died by 1829. The inquiry 
showed that Faraj Aghâ had indeed confiscated coins, cereals, sheep, 
cows and horses from the inheritance, but had failed to remit 48,134 q. of 
their value to the treasury. He had also withheld from the treasury 23,163 
q. out of the debt of the haznadar (treasurer) of Sulaymân Pasha al-'Azm, 
the Hamawî Muhammad Aghâ Qaddûr. 
Faraj Aghâ had obviously taken full advantage of the central position 
he occupied as mutasallim. He had left few opportunities unused. He had 
failed to remit part of the 'ubûdiyya, the dhakhîra, the safariyya, and the 
recently introduced badal al-anfâr al-'askar. The wheat and barley stored 
in the granary had not escaped him either. Even the tüfenkci basi and 
odabasi were among his victims. Compared to their superior these two of-
ficers and the waktl al-Ιώαή had satisfied themselves with moderate 
amounts, which were probably more in line with the misriyyat al-fard, a 
few pennies from each villager, craftsman or tribesman. The other aghâ 
who was found guilty of exactions was 'Uthman Aghâ, a trustee of Faraj 
Aghâ. He had collected nearly 57,000 q., considerably more than his col-
leagues. 
Earlier incidents of this type of abuse in the Hama district did not 
compare with the rapacity of Faraj Aghâ. 'Abd al-Qâdir Bey al-'Azm, 
mutasallim in 1822 and 1823, for instance, had collected the modest 
amount of 18,000 q. on top of the legal impositions. Other mutasallims 
had been accused of imposing illegal charges on trade or other acts of 
zulm. The petitions addressed to the wait appear to have been directed 
more often against mutasallims who were either non-locals or who did 
not belong to the 'Azm faction. However, in the final years of 'Azm 
domination in the district the mutasallims recruited from the family were 
increasingly the object of complaints. There may well have been a corre-
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lation between the growing opposition at home and the demise of their 
power on the provincial level. 
6.11 Increased demands and the benefits ofzulm 
It is obvious that accusations ofzulm could influence the career of a mu-
tasallim or other officials; Faraj Aghâ had been dismissed. Nevertheless, 
he was reappointed to Hama within a year's time. Apparently his supe-
riors had recognized that he possessed a number of good qualities. His 
two main errors had been that his policies had provoked social unrest and 
that he had withheld money from the treasury and from his superiors. 
Some disciplinary action was certainly in place. However, he had proved 
to be an able tax collector, a quality which could not be easily ignored at a 
time in which the financial needs of the empire were exceptionally high. 
The reorganization of the imperial armies by Sultan Mahmud II had led 
to a sudden and sharp increase of military expenditure in the late 1820's. 
In order to finance the military reforms the sultan had enacted the im-
position of high additional charges. 
Two months after Faraj Aghâ had been reinstalled as mutasallim in 
Hama in 1829, he received an order to levy no less than 252,631 q. from 
the town of Hama as badal masârif al-'askar, a substitute tax to cover mili-
tary expenses. It was the largest single charge ever imposed on the dis-
trict. In the province of Damascus the increased tax demands provoked 
serious opposition. The imposition of large additional sums on top of the 
regular taxes required the service of capable officials in the provinces. 
One of the more cynical findings of the inquiry into the financial dealings 
of Faraj Aghâ may have been that he had the capacity to enlarge the re-
venue. The initiation of the inquiry may even have been partly motivated 
by the urgent financial needs of the empire. Whatever the precise motiva-
tions were which led to the swift reinstatement of Faraj Aghâ, his return 
to office and further career demonstrate that the higher authorities of the 
state could not afford to ignore him and his like. The material claims of 
the state were generally better served by governors who were inclined to 
use zulm. It is true that they appropriated a considerable part of the 
wealth of the provinces, but by doing so they were able to perform their 
administrative duties more properly than others, and, what is more, they 
were able to honour the material claims of the central state. In 1831 the 
population of Damascus revolted against the increased tax demands. 
Hama remained quiet. 
Faraj Aghâ functioned on the local level, and although at times he fol-
lowed his own interests rather than those of the state, he did not pose a 
danger to the central authority. Nonetheless, his policies were part of a 
126 Chapter Six 
system which allowed office-holders to accumulate wealth and generated 
power to the extent that they were able to create an autonomous base 
which enabled them on occasion to defy sultanic authority. Jazzâr Pasha, 
as well as his heir 'Abdallah Pasha, belonged to this category of self-reli-
ant provincial rulers who were contained with difficulty. Open challenges 
to the prerogatives of the sultan were rare, but could be engendered by 
the mechanisms of traditional Ottoman rule. The next chapter deals with 
the attempts to change the pattern by the one governor who actually com-
peted for power with the sultan, namely Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
THE EGYPTIAN EXPERIENCE 
The decade of Egyptian rule in Syria serves as the concluding chapter of 
this study. The discussion of the episode has been included primarily be-
cause under the regime of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha a number of new poli-
cies were formulated aiming at resolving some of the dilemmas facing the 
traditional state, most notably the inadequacy of the resources and the 
abuse of delegated power. These policies had been implemented in Egypt 
with considerable success, at least for the time being. Although 
Muhammad 'Alt Pasha's regime in the Syrian provinces differed from that 
in Egypt, the attempts to reform the administration and to revitalize the 
economy in the Syrian provinces and, perhaps, even more so the difficul-
ties encountered in the process of reform, sheds light on the mechanisms 
of traditional Ottoman rule. 
7. / The old ambition 
The annexation of the Syrian provinces by Muhammad 'Ali Pasha in 
1831-32 had been the realization of an old ambition of the governor of 
Egypt. The Syrian coastal areas had already been under his influence for 
about a decade. The province of Sidon had remained in the hands of one 
of Jazzâr Pasha's former mamlûks, 'Abdallah Pasha (1814-1832). In the 
province of Damascus the containment of provincial factions may have 
been reasonably successful, but when the Porte attempted to extend this 
policy to Acre and moved against 'Abdallah Pasha in 1821, the limitations 
on the abilities of the central authority were revealed. 'Abdallah Pasha re-
fused to accept his dismissal. He was condemned to death, but through 
the good offices of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha he was pardoned and reap-
pointed governor of Acre. However, the relation between 'Abdallah 
Pasha and Muhammad 'Ali Pasha was not friendly. From 1822 'Abdallah 
Pasha resisted encroachments upon his authority in the coastal areas of 
Syria by Muhammad 'Ali Pasha who increasingly acted as the patron of 
some local strongmen like the amîr of Mount Lebanon, Bashîr al-Shihâb, 
and Mustafa Aghâ Barbar of Tripoli. In the late 1820s Muhammad 'Alî 
Pasha increased the pressure on 'Abdallah Pasha to adopt a more 
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cooperative attitude until finally the governor of Egypt was openly pick-
ing quarrels with his colleague in Acre. These quarrels served as the pre-
text to send in his army in november 1831. However, the decision to 
invade and occupy Syria constituted, of course, above all a challenge to 
the authority of the sultan. 
The troops of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha of Egypt, commanded by his son 
Ibrahim Pasha, met with little resistance. Only 'Abdallah Pasha of Acre 
offered resistance to the advance of the Egyptian troops, but then he had 
good reason to do so. It took the Egyptian army six months of siege 
before 'Abdallah Pasha surrendered and opened the gates of Acre. 
'Abdallah Pasha was sent to Egypt. The siege of Acre was the only seri-
ous delay in the Egyptian advance caused by resistance. Most other local 
functionaries and officers in the Syrian provinces had less reason for seri-
ous concern at the time Muhammad 'All Pasha ordered his troops into 
Syria. In June 1832 the rebellious aghawât of Damascus surrendered their 
town to Ibrahim Pasha shortly after the fall of Acre. The reaction of local 
offials in most parts of Syria varied from open support to the Egyptian 
troops to quiescence, but a number of local aghawât retreated with non-
local officials to areas which were under loyalist control. 
By the summer of 1832 the army of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, under the 
command of his son Ibrahim Pasha, had occupied the area to the south of 
the line Tripoli-Homs. Egyptian units had already reached the outskirts 
of Horns in spring, that is before the capture of Damascus, but failing 
supplies of provisions precluded a swift advance. Profiting from this 
delay, imperial troops built up their forces near Horns and Hama, sup-
ported by local units. In late July raids by vanguard units composed of the 
Egyptian Hinâdi beduin embarked on the final advance to the north. In a 
short battle the imperial troops were defeated suffering great losses in 
both men and equipment. Within a week's time the remainder of Syria 
was annexed to the realm of the governor of Egypt. 
7.2 The end of an era ? 
In the literature there is a tendency to depict Egyptian rule in Syria as a 
clear, if not radical departure from the preceding Ottoman administrative 
tradition. This approach is best illustrated by the following quotation 
from Ma'oz: "The Egyptian occupation ... put an end to a long period of 
confusion and backwardness, and opened a new era in Syrian history. 
Bold measures which were carried out by Ibrahim Pasha brought about a 
profound change in almost every aspect of the old life...". Others are 
more careful and pay attention to the difficulties the Egyptians en-
countered in the process of establishing their methods of administration. 
The Egyptian experience 
Although the decade of Egyptian rule in Syria is generally considered to 
have been one of the more important episodes of 19th century Syrian his-
tory, relatively little research has been specifically directed to that period. 
The only monograph dealing with Egyptian administration in Syria pub-
lished since 1929, Latifa Muhammad Sâlim's al-Hukm al-Misrift Bilâd al-
Shâm {Egyptian Rule in Bilâd al-Shâm) (1983), has been ignored by 
students of Syrian history so far. Like others she admires the efforts of 
the Egyptian authorities to transform the Syrian provinces, but concedes 
that these efforts were by and large ineffective. In this view Syrian society 
proved unable to absorb the new, and well intended and beneficial Egyp-
tian reforms. Subsequently the region returned to "... a way of life per-
meated by rancor, fanaticism, contention, fighting and trouble..." after the 
withdrawal of the Egyptian troops. 
There are several reasons why the annexation of the Syrian provinces 
to the realm of Muhammad 'AU Pasha can be regarded as a turning point 
in the history of Syria. Firstly, after having acted as such for about half a 
century Acre ceased to be the main political centre. After a siege of six 
months the fortifications of the town were dismantled and the Egyptians 
reestablished Damascus as the principle centre of administration. Acre 
was not to resume any position of political or economic strength. Sec-
ondly, with the occupation the Syrian provinces came on the agenda of 
the European powers. In particular the British, who had previously 
largely ignored these provinces, demonstrated a strong interest in the 
area after they had decided to support the Ottomans in their efforts to re-
establish their control. It was to a considerable extent due to British 
policy that Muhammad 'All Pasha's hold over the Syrian provinces re-
mained insecure and, eventually, became untenable. After the British had 
forced Muhammad 'Ali Pasha to renounce his claim on the Syrian pro-
vinces in 1841, British, as well as French, interference with the affairs of 
Syrian provinces, most notably in Lebanon, only increased. 
With regard to the administration of the Syrian provinces, Egyptian 
policies in general differed less markedly from the previous decades than 
is often suggested. The main difference between the Egyptian and the Ot-
toman regimes was that the capabilities of the Egyptian, provincial, state 
exceeded those of the Ottoman, central, state. It should be realized that 
Egyptian rule in Syria did not equal Egyptian rule in Egypt. Reforms in-
troduced in the Syrian provinces were mostly based upon those imple-
mented in Egypt earlier, but the Egyptian authorities did not put the 
Syrian provinces on an equal footing with the province of Egypt and from 
the outset they were well aware of, at least, a number of differences be-
tween Syrian and Egyptian society and the economy of the two areas. The 
Egyptian authorities regarded the newly acquired provinces as secondary 
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to Egypt. The exploitation of the area was to serve the interests of the 
dawla Misriyya, the Egyptian state. This notion was not a nationalist 
concept, but the combination of a geographical orientation with the inter-
ests of the military household of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, which was of a 
mixed, but predominantly Albanian origin. The insecure position of 
Egyptian rule in Syria also influenced Egyptian attitudes, as did the op-
position of large segments of Syrian society to the strong coercive traits of 
the new administration. 
Egyptian rule did differ from traditional Ottoman rule in some re-
spects. Firstly, the various military and para-military organizations lost 
their autonomy, or near-autonomy. Some were disbanded, like the garib 
yigit and deli forces, others, like the tiifenkçis, were integrated in the new 
military and police forces. The more informal and occasional local para-
military formations, like the bands headed by rural chieftains, suffered 
greatly from the general disarmament of the population. However, some 
were allowed to keep their arms, or even furnished with better fighting 
equipment, like some Druze and Christian forces in the Lebanon. Sec-
ondly, a much higher degree of control over local finances was estab-
lished in the course of the first two years. Most vital in this operation was 
the abolishment of the system of the collection of fees for the support of 
office-holders. Instead they received a salary. Thirdly, the demands 
made upon the population at large increased sharply. Apart from in-
creased tax demands, the Egyptians implemented the conscription for the 
army and made extensive use of forced labour. Fourthly, the Egyptian 
authorities took drastic action to stimulate the rural economy. A fifth 
difference may be added, although it will not be treated in any detail in 
this study, namely that in some, but not all fields of the administration the 
Christian and Jewish subjects were treated on an equal footing with the 
traditionally privileged Muslim subjects. 
It will be argued here that although the Egyptian regime differed from 
the traditional Ottoman regime in several, sometimes important aspects, 
the basic principle remained unchanged. Like the Ottoman state, the 
Egyptian provincial state represented the rule of a particular household, 
which claimed in principle the entire revenue of its domain. The exploita-
tion of the domain by Muhammad 'Ali Pasha and his son Ibrahim Pasha 
followed by and large the traditional concept of the Circle of Equity, in 
which coercion, or force, and justice complement each other. The keep-
ing of a balance between coercion and justice had proved to be most 
problematic in the past, with the result that injustice and oppression, 
zulm, had often gained the upper hand. During the 1830s, especially from 
1834 onward, an increasing number of inhabitants of the Syrian provinces 
perceived the Egyptian regime as oppressive and unjust. Instead of the 
The Egyptian experience 131 
traditional zulm, which was an attribute of the agents of the state rather 
than the state itself, zulm appeared, in their eyes, to have become the offi-
cial policy. 
7.3 Disciplining Syrian society 
During the first months of Egyptian rule many of the local officials were 
retained in office. The vacancies which had been created by the depar-
ture of officeholders with the defeated Ottoman troops, were largely 
filled by members of the traditional local elite. A number of officials had 
been dismissed immediately, some of them because they had opposed the 
Egyptian advance. Others had to make room for locals who were re-
warded for their support to the Egyptians. Of all local officials and 
strongmen who had welcomed the Egyptians some old factions in the 
area formerly controlled by the governors of Acre, had acted most openly 
and actively. The veteran hakim Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, who was mutasal-
lim of Tripoli at the time of the invasion, was quick to embrace Egyptian 
rule. He had been under the protection of Muhammad 'Alî Pasha for 
some time. His close neighbour, Amîr Bashîr al-Shihâb of Mount Le-
banon, also maintained close relations with the Egyptian administration 
since the early 1820s and from the outset rendered military services to 
Ibrahim Pasha. Bashîr al-Shihâb was also associated with Ahmad Aghâ 
who had acted as the agent of Ibrahim Pasha in Damascus and was ap-
pointed qâyimmaqâm of the city. Ahmad Aghâ was the adopted son of 
Kunj Yûsuf Pasha, who had replaced 'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm in 1806 as 
wâlî of Damascus, and who had sought refuge with Muhammad 'Alî 
Pasha in 1810 after his failure to check the Wahhâbî movement. Hannâ 
Bahn, a son of Kunj Yûsuf Pasha's secretary 'Abbûd Bahrî who had 
escaped with him to Cairo, became the head of the financial depart-
ment. The 'Azms, although related by marriage to the new civil gover-
nor, the Albanian Sharif Bey, later Pasha, did not belong to the small 
group of Syrians who had a special relationship with Muhammad 'Alî 
Pasha's household. They were unable to obtain any position of signifi-
cance, except for a seat in the majlis al-shûrâ of Damascus, the consult-
ative council which replaced the dîwân. 
The Egyptian authorities were skeptical about the qualities of their 
local counterparts in Syria. The early experiences with local and provin-
cial officials were on the whole not satisfactory, because they failed to 
comply with the Egyptian standards of proficiency. Few of them had re-
ceived a proper education or training, at least in the eyes of the Egypti-
ans. Hannâ Bahrî, for example, complained on several occasions to 
Muhammad 'Alî Pasha about the shortage of skilled functionaries. 
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Egyptian functionaries, some of them of Syrian background, were sent for 
assistance and instruction, but only the central provincial institutions 
could be served in this fashion. Functionaries for local administration 
continued to be recruited from the traditional local elite. 
The Egyptian authorities were suspicious about the intentions of the 
traditional Syrian officials. This suspicion was undoubtedly mutual. One 
of the first acts of the new government had been the prohibition of impos-
ing levies on top of the regular taxes. Impositions, like the 'awâyid and 
'ubûdiyya, levied to cover the expenses of office-holders were abolished. 
In a letter to Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, Ibrahim Pasha explained this deci-
sion by pointing out to him that the multitude of taxes in the recent past 
had burdened the population to the extreme. From now on all officials 
were to receive a salary from the state. It proved difficult to eradicate the 
old habits overnight, certainly during the transitional period in which the 
Egyptian authorities, both civil and military, faced serious shortages in 
cash and kind. 
The popular reaction to the Egyptian occupation was generally 
favourable. During the first two years of Egyptian rule Syria witnessed an 
unprecedented degree of public security, which stimulated the economy. 
The inflationary effects of the large spending of the army and the sudden 
increase in the demand for local, both agricultural and industrial, pro-
ducts did not yet affect the population at large because job opportunities 
were ample and wages and prices for agricultural products high. During 
the first year no drastic reforms were implemented. Some were initiated, 
but these were largely ignored by the local office-holders and others. The 
traditional system of exploitation still functioned in much the same way as 
it had done for decades. The relative prosperity of the early 1830s may 
have blunted the sharp edges of the system and many an official may have 
shown some moderation in their demands on the population, because of 
the reputation of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha's rigid regime in Egypt. The 
Egyptian authorities, while facing huge cash deficits, had great difficulty 
in organizing the revenue collection, with the result that the amounts of 
revenue which reached the treasury were very small. In the beginning of 
1833 the Egyptian treasury was virtually empty. 
After the signing of the Kiitahya treaty (8 April 1833), which legalized, 
at least for the time being, Muhammad 'Ali Pasha's hold on Syria, the 
Egyptian authorities, assisted by troops which had returned from Ana-
tolia, pressed their claims upon the local administration and on the popu-
lation at large. They established a strict control over the finances of the 
provinces and were quick to react upon complaints brought by the popu-
lation against local officials who continued to levy 'awâyid and other 
abolished charges. A considerable number of them were dismissed after 
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the charge oizulm against them had been verified. The most famous vic-
tim of this policy was Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, whose remarkably long 
career ended with his dismissal in October of 1833. 
While the actions taken against the corrupt officials met with popular 
approval, some other policies led to widespread opposition to Egyptian 
rule. Apart from the imposition of higher tax rates (see below), the ban 
on the possession of arms and the implementation of conscription for the 
army were received with anxiety. In many areas the traditional, mainly 
military, local leadership was able to mobilize popular support for their 
defence against the imposition of a stricter centralized control. In the 
spring of 1834 the Nusayrî clans of the Mountain revolted when Egyptian 
officials and troops attempted to disarm them. They even raided the town 
of Latakia. With great difficulty and the help of troops of Bashîr al-Shi-
hâb from the Lebanon the revolt was suppressed. Southern Syria, too, 
revolted when the disarmament and conscription were introduced. Ayân 
who had been recently dismissed, played an important role in the rebel-
lion against Egyptian rule in Palestine. The rebellion, or rather the multi-
tude of smaller revolts following the lack of co-ordination between the 
rebel chiefs, was brutally crushed. 
After the revolts of 1834 the Egyptians maintained a large standing 
army in Syria and coercion became the dominant feature of Egyptian 
rule. Instances of violent and arbitrary actions increased, in particular 
when it came to the conscription of young men for the army. The con-
scription constituted by far the most unpopular innovation and people re-
sorted to almost every means to escape from conscription, ranging from 
the offering of bribes to self-mutilation. Many went into hiding or 
escaped to the 'arab tribes in the bâdiya or to areas under Ottoman con-
trol. Soon fathers were forced to follow their sons in hiding or exile, be-
cause Egyptian troops increasingly resorted to torture in order to 
discover the whereabouts of the conscripts. In particular the last two 
years of Egyptian rule were most oppressive when Muhammad 'Ali Pasha 
was preparing for another battle with the sultan. Apart from the young 
men, the army carried off huge numbers of pack animals from the vil-
lages, as well as food and fodder. Villagers were hardly ever compen-
sated. By the late 1830s bribing had become one of the few relatively 
secure options to protect one's family, animals and crops. 
7.4 Tite administration ofHama 
According to a popular Hamawî tradition Ibrahim Pasha spent the night 
in the sarâyâ of Hama after the town had been captured by his troops in 
late July of 1832. The loud moaning noise of the huge watcrwheels in the 
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'Âsî river near the building kept him from sleeping and he ordered his 
men to silence the wheel, which they did. Normally, these famous wheels, 
and symbol of the town of Hama, were only stopped when they needed 
repair. The lamentations of the waterwheels had inspired many a poet, 
but apparently Ibrahim Pasha paid little heed to established reputations. 
Faraj Aghâ was maintained as mutasallim of the district of Hama until 
November 1832, when he was succeeded by Rashîd Aghâ al-Shâmlî. The 
Egyptian authorities were suspicious about the strength of Faraj Aghâ's 
position following his control over the 'arab tribes in the area. The other 
reason for his dismissal sounds more familiar: "...he was indebted to the 
population which was most fearful of his infringements upon their rights 
and of his severity". His successor, Rashîd Aghâ, was a cousin of 'Abd 
al-Ghanî Aghâ al-Shâmlî, who had served briefly as mutasallim of Hama 
in 1829.2 The Shâmlî family belonged to the most influential aghawât of 
the Maydân. Rashîd Aghâ had figured prominently during the revolt of 
1831 in Damascus against the Ottoman governor, Salîm Pasha. The 
governorship of Hama had probably been granted to him in reward for 
his role in the revolt. Rashîd Aghâ did not remain in office for long. In 
June of 1833 he was replaced by a local Kurdish aghâ, 'Abdallah Aghâ 
Tayfûr. Rashîd Aghâ had been accused and found guilty of exacting 
money from sixteen village sheikhs, four local tax farmers in the western 
muqâta'as of the district as well as from one tribal sheikh. Rashîd Aghâ 
died shortly afterwards, and his victims received a compensation from his 
inheritance. The compensations amounted to 27,281 q. The scribe of the 
local treasury had audited Rashîd Aghâ's books and had established that 
he owed 44,366 q. to the treasury; this amount was taken from his inheri-
tance as well. Clearly, Rashîd Aghâ al-Shâmlî had not been the model 
mutasallim the Egyptian authorities envisaged. 
Despite his reputation of being rapacious Faraj Aghâ returned to the 
office of mutasallim of Hama in 1834. His reappointment may well have 
been motivated by the strong opposition to Egyptian reform policies. 
During the revolts in the Nusayrî Mountains and southern Syria, the 
'Anaza tribes had taken the opportunity to resist attempts by the Egypti-
ans to limit their migratory range and to deny them access to pastures 
close to the cultivated areas. The incidence of robberies committed by 
'Anaza tribesmen in the Hama area worried Ibrahim Pasha who favoured 
the forced settlement of the tribes. In 1835, after the pacification of 
most of Syria, including the bâdiya, Faraj Aghâ was replaced by, again, 
'Abdallah Aghâ Tayfûr. In 1837 a new functionary was appointed who 
ranked above the mutasallim, namely the qâyimmaqâm, who acted as the 
new governor of the district, having both civilian and military duties. The 
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mutasallim was relieved from military duties and his function restricted to 
the civil affairs of the town. For most districts in Syria the qâyimmaqâm 
was recruited from the Egyptian military, but in the district of Hama 
'Ârif Efendi Jâbirîzade, a member of an influential sharif family of 
Aleppo served in this quality.33 He was the first governor of the district of 
Hama who was not an aghâ or bey. In 1840 Faraj Aghâ once again re-
turned to office as mutasallim. Given the absence of a qâyimmaqâm 
during the final months of Egyptian rule, he acted in fact as governor of 
the district. He witnessed the transfer of Syria from the control of 
Muhammad 'Ali Pasha to that of the new Ottoman sultan, Abdiilmecid. 
Obviously, Faraj Aghâ remained a dominant factor in Hamawî politics, 
because he was again called upon in a time of insecurity, this time the in-
security which accompanied the transition of power and the evacuation of 
the Egyptian troops. 
During the Egyptian rule few changes occurred in the composition of 
the Hamawî ay an. The muftì, qâdî and the naqtb continued to be re-
cruited from the Kaylânî family. Contrary to the years preceding the 
Egyptian occupation no attempts appear to have been made to replace 
candidates from this family by others. However, the jurisdiction of the 
qâdî was restricted, which is clearly reflected by the contents of the regis-
ters dating from the 1830s. The formal interference of the qâdî with non-
shar'î affairs became minimal. The creation of the majlis al-shûrâ in all 
towns of Syria which numbered 2,000 inhabitants or more, served as an 
additional platform of ay an activity. The majlis al-shûrâ was modelled on 
the traditional dîwân which operated in the provincial capitals. Although 
the formal rights of the majlis were more extensive than those of its pred-
ecessor, it acted in a similar, servile way. The recruitment of the ap-
pointees for the majlis largely followed the traditional make-up of the 
Hamawî elite. The Kaylânî family was represented in this council by the 
mufti, Muhammad 'Ali Efendi. The leading member of the 'Azm family, 
Husayn Bey, figured among its members, as well as Sheikh Mustafa 
Efendi al-'Alwânî and, possibly, Khalîl Aghâ al-Jijaklî. Through the 
combination of offices the Kaylânî family preserved the political domi-
nance which the family had acquired during the 1820s. Muhammad 'Ali 
Efendi al-Kaylânî figured most prominently among the Hamawî ayân 
until 1845, when he was dismissed following charges of corruption. 
7.5 Fiscal policies 
Although a number of impositions were abolished by the Egyptians, no-
tably those charges which compensated for the expenses of the local of-
fice-holders, the total tax burden increased. In the late summer of 1833 
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the farda was introduced, a progressive poll-tax on male adults. The rates 
of the farda in Syria exceeded those in Egypt. The imposition of the 
farda led to grievances among the Muslim establishment because the tax 
resembled the jbya, the discriminatory tax payable by non-Muslim sub-
jects. Many considered it to be an illegal, anti-Islamic charge and thus 
the farda became the most infamous imposition, but the magnitude of the 
amounts of farda collected was relatively small, at least compared to some 
other impositions. In 1839 the amount oí farda collected in the Hama dis-
trict constituted about 6% of the total revenue. The rates of some ex-
isting taxes were increased or their name was used to cover what were in 
fact new impositions. The latter was true for the i'âna. In the Hama dis-
trict the i'âna had figured previously as a relatively moderate charge to fi-
nance the postal resting house and rested upon the quarters of the town. 
Under the Egyptians the i'âna was transformed into a tax on property 
both in the town and the villages and also covered rights payable at the 
transaction of real estate. By the time of the Egyptian evacuation the 
i'âna figured as the largest single imposition resting upon the district and 
may have totalled about 900,000 q.4 The rates of the i'âna resting upon 
urban properties exceeded the i'âna liabilities in the villages, because the 
rates payable by the villages had been lowered in 1836 at the expense of 
the urban tax payer. 
Table 6 shows that a remarkable increase of the revenue occurred 
during the 1830s. Even when amounts of revenue which had been col-
lected by illegal means in the years prior to the Egyptian occupation are 
taken into consideration, the increase remains very substantial. Due to 
some deficiencies in the available data the total amount for 1839/40 is un-
certain, but does not seem to be inflated. On the contrary, the revenue of 
the district in the preceding year, 1838/9, exceeded 5 million qirsh. The 
increase of the taxes payable by the villages corresponds partly to the sub-
stantial expansion of land under cultivation. It is of interest that the 
Egyptian authorities abandoned the tradition of treating the maqtû' vil-
lages with leniency. The tax demands made upon these villages were 
more than tripled. In the case of the cash revenue inflation should, of 
course, be taken into account. Unfortunately there are no figures on the 
rate of inflation during the 1830s. Given the shortage of coins it seems un-
likely that all revenue entered in the books in cash had actually been col-
lected in cash. It was also the policy to demand payment in kind when the 
market prices of cereals were high. Thus the government profited from 
the difference between official and market prices. 
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Table 6: Tax increase during Egyptian rule 
1832/3 1840/41 increase 
I. Rural 
Itâsil villages 
qism 
qutuniyyat villages 
maqtû' villages 
Turcoman villages 
Jabal Gharbî 
muqâta'as 
'arab tribes 
II. Urban 
Hamawî аула/ 
urban muqâta 'os 
III. Other 
farda 
Vana (estimate) 
other 
372,283 
108,728 
27,167 
51,905 
103,395 
140,423 
510,665 
111,848 
71,683 
157,503 
662,736 
98,838 
33,300 
166,225 
195,087 
327,508 
1,131,086 
144,787 
71,735 
326,844 
84,861 
900,000 
510,074 
79% 
-9% 
22% 
223% 
89% 
133% 
121% 
30% 
-
107% 
TOTAL 1,655,600 4,653,604 181% 
sources: SMH 51, p. 316-7, [1257] and p. 425-6, 3 Jumâdâ I 1257; F.O. 
195/196, n. 73, Damascus, 5 October 1842. 
The synopsis from which most of the figures presented in table 6 are 
derived, was prepared in order to facilitate the assessment of the taxes by 
the Ottomans after the Egyptians had evacuated the Syrian provinces. 
The Ottomans were deeply impressed by the fiscal efforts of the Egypti-
ans, not only because the revenue had increased, but also because a much 
larger share was remitted to the treasury. Only about half of the amount 
for 1832/3 consisted of taxes which were directly remitted to the treas-
ury, whereas the sum for 1840 was remitted to the treasury in its en-
tirety. The system of tax farming had not been replaced by direct 
collection in the case of most taxes, but the control over the tax farmers 
had been tightened and Egyptian troops regularly accompanied them. 
Abuses on the part of the tax farmer occurred, but these abuses went 
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largely at the expense of villagers, tribesmen and others, and not at the 
expense of the treasury. Jealous of the income derived from the Syrian 
provinces and the discipline imposed on tax farmers during the 1830s, the 
Ottomans attempted to achieve similar results. They paid little attention 
to the large governmental expenditure to which the Egyptians had com-
mitted themselves. The part of the revenue of the provinces of Damascus, 
Sidon and Tripoli that reached the treasury had dropped by 42 % in 1842. 
The income of the treasury from the district of Hama showed a decrease 
of 38 %. It is uncertain whether the net proceeds dropped correspond-
ingly, since governmental spending is most likely to have decreased. 
7.6 Agricultural and tribal policies 
High tax rates and strict control over the collection and farming of taxes 
were not the only instruments used by the Egyptian authorities to in-
crease the revenue. In their economic policies they aimed to augment, in 
particular, the agricultural production, basically in order to feed the 
Egyptian armies and industries. The attempts by the Egyptian govern-
ment to create an industrial base, independent of the capitalist European 
industries, may have distinguished the regime from the central Ottoman 
government, but the Egyptian economic policies did not differ radically 
from the traditional Ottoman economic concepts in which the state oc-
cupied a central position, both as regulator and beneficiary of the 
economic activities. Industrial and agricultural production served the in-
stitutions of the state, rather than the other way around which was in-
creasingly the case in Western Europe. By combining incentive and 
coercion the Egyptian government succeeded in expanding agriculture in 
the Syrian provinces, both in the interior and the coastal areas. Few of the 
policy instruments were new to these areas. The most commonly applied 
measures to stimulate agricultural production included tax exemptions, 
the provision of capital to village communities and forced settlement or 
resettlement. All of these were traditional means, but contrary to the pre-
ceding period they were now being used extensively. Although some at-
tempts were made to introduce new crops and cropping techniques, most 
peasants, and definitely those producing cereals, continued to work their 
fields and process their crops in the same fashion as the previous genera-
tions. Not only did the methods and means of production remain un-
changed, the control over these means showed no marked changes either. 
The land remained largely state-owned, the peasants continued to enjoy 
usufructuary rights and to depend on capital provided by either the state 
or more well-to-do individuals. The main difference with the preceding 
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decades was that fewer infringments on the rights of the state and, to a 
certain extent, of the peasantry occurred. 
A precondition for the expansion of agriculture was the enforcement 
of public security. Contrary to the preceding decades the military was 
generally well disciplined. Moreover, in most areas police forces 
guaranteed an unprecedented degree of public security. The decade of 
Egyptian rule was certainly a sad time for highwaymen. The tribal policies 
of the Egyptian government were aimed at establishing favourable condi-
tions for agriculture in the areas adjacent to the bâdiya, as well as in the 
more fertile parts of the bâdiya itself. A second goal was to deny the 
larger 'arab tribes the, often self-acclaimed, right to levy khuwwa, protec-
tion money, from subordinate tribes and villages. The Egyptian authori-
ties were by and large successful in containing the 'Anaza and other 
militant tribes. The privileges enjoyed by the tribes who controlled 
tracks of the Sultanic Road between Damascus to the Hijâz were 
abolished. In the Aleppo and Hama areas the 'Anaza continued to 
dominate the local tribes and villages in the transitional zone during the 
first two years of Egyptian rule. When in 1834 numerous revolts erupted 
in the Syrian provinces, the 'Anaza were quick to join. Several military 
campaigns were directed against the tribes. Additional 'arab forces were 
sent from Egypt and also the amir of the Mawâlî, and head of the 
Hamawî tribes, participated in the campaigns. The employment of 'arab 
forces was, of course, not unique and it is of interest that the forces of the 
Mawâlî amir, Muhammad Khurfân, rendered vital police services in the 
bâdiya. The Mawâlî chief was one of the principal provincial officers 
during the 1830s. He may not have had as autonomous a position as his 
predecessors once occupied, but his prominence in the military affairs of 
the Syrian interior reflects the revival of the Mawâlî at the expense of 
those who had pushed them to the margins of the bâdiya, the 'Anaza 
tribes. 6 By late 1834 the migratory movements of the 'Anaza tribes were 
restricted and the tribes were prevented from collecting khuwwa. Violent 
tribal incidents became rare, although 'Anaza tribesmen raided an en-
campment of the Banî Khâlid and the Juhma near Hama in 1837. But 
normally the 'Anaza kept aloof, also because Hama served as one of the 
major garrison towns and occupied a strategic position in the almost per-
petual movements of troops. 
The Egyptians induced, and sometimes forced, tribesmen to take up 
farming, but this policy was only successful in the case of the smaller, pre-
dominantly sheep rearing, tribes. Villagers were also induced or forced 
to settle in long-abandoned places. Forced settlement, or rather the com-
pulsory return to one's deserted village of origin, was neither a new, nor 
an undisputed measure. As in the past these settlers were provided with 
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seeds, ploughs and ploughing animals and granted tax exempts. Some 
people took the opportunity to take possession of villages which were 
neither deserted, nor assigned to them, among them the Danâdisha of the 
adjacent district of Homs. 
Although well-to-do Syrians were at times forced to invest in agricul-
ture, the main drive to the agricultural expansion came from the state. In 
the Hama area the families which used to have the strongest interests in 
the villages, in particular the 'Azms, Kaylânîs and Jijaklîs, continued to be 
involved with the old villages, but hardly invested in the repopulated vil-
lages in the transitional zone. Their apparent reluctance to invest in these 
villages may well have been motivated by the insecure position of Egyp-
tian rule. Surprisingly, the person who seems to have invested most in the 
recurvation of parts of the bâdiya of Hama was Muhammad Khurfân 
Bey, the Mawâlî amir. Both Faraj Aghâ and his trustee 'Uthmân Aghâ 
were financially involved in the recultivation of these villages as well, 
sometimes as partners of Muhammad Khurfân Bey. In most of these vil-
lages the new settlers were 'arab, among them people from the Mawâlî, 
Nu'aym and 'Uqaydât tribes. The aghâ who acted as mutasallim for 
much of the 1830s, 'Abdallah Aghâ Tayfûr, had opted for the more se-
cure investments in some large and well established villages. 
The efforts to extend the area under cultivation were successful. 
Towards the end of Egyptian rule the area under cultivation in the Hama 
district showed an increase of 60% compared to 1831, with the highest in-
crease occurring in the area to the south of the town of Hama. When 
both the human and animal labour shortages, as well as the high tax pres-
sure are taken into consideration, this extension was indeed a great 
achievement. The conscription and the extensive use of forced labour 
constituted a heavy drain on the agricultural population. The construc-
tion of large army barracks in Hama required the labour of so many vil-
lagers that the mutasallim Faraj Aghâ felt obliged to alarm the authorities 
in Damascus, because the work in the villages was being neglected. The 
shortage of pack animals often caused the loss of the harvest which was 
left on the threshing floor. During the last years of Egyptian rule, when 
many pack animals were confiscated by the army, the transport of the 
crops undoubtedly became even more problematic. The shortage of 
human labour was partly solved by coercive measures. Villagers from 
areas which did not, or to a lesser extent, suffer from labour shortages 
were transferred to the transitional zone, when necessary at gun point. 
The contribution to the increase of the acreage and the revenue by the re-
populated villages should not be exaggerated. In the Hama district about 
twenty deserted villages were reoccupied, but, like elsewhere in the Syr-
ian interior, most of them were small. Much of the increase occurred in 
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those parts of the district where relatively large village communities ex-
isted. In these parts more distant Fields were brought under cultivation. 
The newly established village communities proved to be fragile. The 
inhabitants, certainly those who had been forced to settle, were not 
devoted to farming near or in the bâdiya. They were to abandon the land 
and to return home as soon as the Egyptians started leaving Syria. As to 
another group of farmers on the newly cultivated land, the 'arab tribes-
men, apart from having been forced to settle in some cases, they normally 
combined farming with their old occupation of tending sheep. The 'arab, 
then, were able to alternate rather smoothly and most of them indeed va-
cated the villages in the bâdiya in the early 1840s. Very few of the repopu-
lated villages survived during the 1840s. 
Towards the close of the decade of Egyptian rule, particularly in its 
final year, the movements of the Fad'ân, Sibâ' and other large tribes in 
the bâdiya disquieted the Egyptian authorities and a new campaign was 
initiated. Obviously the 'Anaza tribesmen were preparing to recover 
lost pastures and liberties. As soon as the Egyptian troops were 
evacuated, the tribes returned to the fringes of the cultivated land. In dis-
regard of pledges by their sheikhs to the contrary, the Fad'ân, Sibâ' and 
Hasana started to collect khuwwa again. Instances of robbery increased 
swiftly. The bâdiya soon recovered lost territory. In the late spring of 
1842 'Anaza and Hadîdîn tribesmen warred over the control of pastures 
near Hama and in the process carried off the crops of numerous villages. 
It was believed that over 200 women and children drowned in the 'Así 
river when they tried to escape the 'arab. Clearly, the Egyptian episode 
had not been a watershed in the history of the bâdiya. For some years 
tribal pressure in the transitional zone had decreased, largely due to mili-
tary efforts. However, the impact of the tribal shifts, which had started 
somewhere in the 17th century, continued to be felt throughout the 1840s 
and 1850s.72 

CONCLUSIONS 
Ottoman rule in the Syrian interior, in particular in the district of Hama, 
has been discussed against the background of the two fundamental dilem-
mas of the traditional state: the recurrent inadequacy of the resources 
and the centrifugal effects of the delegation of power. In Ottoman ide-
ology these two problems were not insoluble, but the dangers they posed 
were clearly understood. The Ottoman solution held that the sultan and 
his servants, the askeri, created the conditions in which the subject popu-
lation could prosper and in return the subjects produced the wealth 
which enabled the sultan and askeri to continue protecting the subjects. 
The sultan, who wielded absolute power, guaranteed the reign of justice, 
in other words prevented the abuse of power by the askeri. The Circle of 
Equity, as this ideal was called, defined the relations of power and exploi-
tation. Evidently, the ideal proved difficult to uphold. In Ottoman politi-
cal thinking the inadequacy of the resources, i.e. revenue problems, did 
not constitute an economic problem, but an administrative and political 
one. The solution was to be found in restoration of justice; in the reestab-
lishment and maintenance of the proper relations of power. This means 
that the dilemma of the delegation of power and the abuse of that power 
occupied a central position. 
The delegation of power 
The central authority applied a variety of policies aimed at the main-
tenance or strengthening of the dependency of the office-holders on the 
imperial centre. These policies included the rotation of the senior offices, 
the separation of power and, at times, arbitrary intervention. Nonetheless, 
extensive powers continued to be delegated to the office-holders, in par-
ticular to the wait, the governor-general of the province, who in his turn 
delegated power to his representatives on the local level, like the mutasal-
lim, the deputy governor in the districts. The delegation of considerable 
powers facilitated the exploitation of the province and enabled the office-
holders to provide vital services, the most important being the collection 
of revenue, the protection of production and, in the case of Damascus, 
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the organization of the hajj, the annual pilgrimage to Mecca. These exten-
sive powers enabled the office-holders to tap sources in addition to the 
regular revenue. The responsibility of the state for the protection of the 
productive units and the distribution of the products provided the office-
holders with the opportunity to engage in commercial enterprise and to 
enlarge their own income. However, they also applied various un-
authorized methods of income derivation, for instance the imposition of 
illegal charges, like the misriyyat al-fard, or blatantly oppressive methods, 
like outright extortion. 
The extraction of additional income was a necessity, because the for-
mal allocation of revenue was well below the actual expenses incurred by 
the office-holders. The central authority was most reluctant to concede 
that the allocation of revenue failed to cover the expenses of the provin-
cial office-holders. From the point of view of the central authority the 
policy of withholding from its servants in the province adequate regular 
funds had two major practical advantages. Firstly, the handling of provin-
cial and local budget deficits was left to the office-holders in the province. 
The second advantage was that the additional income derivation was not 
formally accepted as being part of the system of administration and, con-
sequently, could serve as a pretext for the central authority to intervene, 
as well as to claim its share of the surplus. This proved to be a fairly ade-
quate method for pressing the material claims of the central state on the 
office-holders in the province. The method derived its relative efficiency 
from the strong dependency of office-holders on the powers which were 
delegated to them. The delegation could be terminated at will and the of-
fice-holders were well-aware of that danger. 
The disadvantages of the system, again from the point of view of the 
central authority, were also obvious. Firstly, the actual or potential re-
venue of the province remained obscure. The deficiency of the mecha-
nism of control offered office-holders the opportunity for manipulation. 
Consequently, the central authority showed a high degree of suspicion. 
Secondly, the system favoured the inclusion of local elements, the ay an, 
in the ruling class. Non-local nominees also exploited the system and 
were at times able to create a strong local power base. This was true for 
both the local and provincial levels. Some local power groups even ac-
quired a dynastic quality, like the military households of the 'Azm family 
and that of Jazzâr Pasha and his mamlûks. On the one hand these house-
holds had the better resources and were better able to honour the mate-
rial claims of the state and to perform vital services. Hence they were 
difficult to ignore. On the other hand they had the capacity to act inde-
pendently. The formation of independent power bases posed, of course, a 
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danger to the absolute power of the sultan, although open challenges to 
the position of the sultan were rare. 
The dilemma of the delegation of power was not solved. The limita-
tions imposed on the function of office-holders did not prevent the crea-
tion of self-reliant power groups. The rotation of the senior offices, for 
instance, helped to strengthen the dependency of the candidates on the 
imperial centre, but the use of this instrument of containment proved to 
be hazardous during the period 1785-1812. It stimulated the competition 
between rival provincial factions to the extent that provincial rule became 
highly oppressive and violent. As a result provincial and local power frag-
mented and became even more difficult to control. Eventually, the partic-
ipants exhausted their resources and their ability to act independently 
diminished. This was one of the reasons why a change in the recruitment 
pattern of the governors of Damascus could be implemented from 1812 
onward. 
The other reason was that the province of Damascus had lost its prom-
inent position in the wider region by 1812. With the emergence of the 
mamlûk household of Jazzâr Pasha of Acre the political centre of gravity 
had already shifted from the Syrian interior to the coastal area in the clos-
ing decades of the 18th century. Nonetheless, for three reasons the gover-
norship of Damascus continued to play an important role in the regional 
politics until 1812. Firstly, Jazzâr Pasha desperately attempted to annex 
Damascus to his realm. Secondly, the central authority used the gover-
norship of Damascus in its efforts to establish a higher degree of control 
over the strongman of Acre and his heir Sulaymân Pasha. Thirdly, the or-
ganization of the pilgrimage was the responsibility of the governor of 
Damascus. Access to the holy places became highly problematic in the 
early 19th century when the Wahhâbî movement occupied the Hijâz. 
Until Muhammad 'Alî Pasha, the governor of Egypt, reestablished Ot-
toman rule over the holy cities of Islam in 1812, Damascus remained of 
great strategic importance. After 1812 this was no longer the case. The 
way the central authority utilized the governor of Egypt's abilities would 
prove to be highly precarious. However, for the time being the formation 
of this competing centre of power in the empire allowed the central state 
to appoint its nominees to the province of Damascus. 
Coercion and abuse of power 
It was not without reason that the Ottoman ruling class was called askeri, 
military; coercion played a central role on all levels of administration. 
When and where other policy measures failed, the use of force consti-
tuted the familiar remedy. The military constituted the dominant group in 
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the provincial and local administration. The other main group of office-
holders, those who derived their position from religious learning, clearly 
wielded less power. Nonetheless, on the whole the position of the military 
proved to be more vulnerable, because their reliance on delegated power 
was much stronger. The career of a military office-holder could end 
abruptly with his execution or death on the battlefield. On the other hand, 
some aghawât were able to make a quick career and establish themselves 
firmly in the administration, like, for instance, Faraj Aghâ in Hama. 
There are more illustrious examples; soldiers who made it to pasha. No 
less than five of the six governors of Damascus who served during the pe-
riod 1785-1812 had started their career as soldiers. However, it was also 
the period in which the trade of a soldier, violence, proved to be a high-
risk occupation. 
The religious office-holders occupied a more secure position, because 
they derived their authority, or at least a considerable part of it, from a 
different source. They were the custodians of the Islamic tradition and by 
extension of the local values. Moreover, the claim of sultanic authority 
that it was God-given gave the religious establishment legitimizing power. 
The Ottomans did not rule without a degree of consent. Consequently, 
the religious a'yân were less exposed to arbitrary action than any other 
group in the empire. The vicissitudes of members of the two most promi-
nent families in Hama, the 'Azm and Kaylânî, clearly demonstrate that, 
compared to the Kaylânî 'ulama', the 'Azm aghawât were more exposed 
to changes in the relations of power in the province or the empire at 
large. The brutal treatment of several Damascene 'ulama' by Jazzâr 
Pasha was exceptional. However, it did demonstrate that in the end the 
sword wielded more power than the book. 
Coercion may have been a reasonably effective policy, but in tradi-
tional Ottoman rule it had a strongly arbitrary aspect. This was partly due 
to lack of co-ordination and the failing mechanisms of control. Arbitrari-
ness may be an efficient instrument of coercion, it is, however, difficult to 
combine with legitimation. During the period 1785-1812 this deficiency in 
the system became painfully manifest, when the services of specialists of 
violence, like Mullû Ismâ'îl, were in high demand, but proved to be diffi-
cult to contain. After 1812 justice did not exactly reign, but the use and 
abuse of power became far less violent. 
Nonetheless, coercion appeared to be the solution for the dilemma of 
the delegation of power, as long as it was applied in a concerted and con-
sistent manner. During the decade of Egyptian rule over Syria coercion 
was applied with consistency. It was only during these years that coercion 
acquired a high degree of predictability. In this sense Egyptian rule may 
be called modern. However, in the perception of the great majority of the 
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Syrian population this feature of Egyptian rule constituted the ultimate 
manifestation oizulm, injustice. 
Resources 
Coercion was not an inexpensive policy instrument. Governors like Jazzâr 
Pasha, Kunj Yûsuf Pasha and others invested heavily in the military and 
by doing so exhausted their means. During the period 1785-1812, and 
especially at the turn of the century, the fragmentation of power and the 
extremely violent application of coercive measures resulted in massive 
land desertion. The village economy of the Syrian interior had been under 
strong tribal pressure for some time, due to the displacement of Mawâlî 
and other 'arab tribes, but the rural night was caused primarily by the ex-
cessive exploitation of the peasants, to the extent that their subsistence 
was endangered. In the process they were treated brutally by aghawât and 
their troops, and, occasionally, by 'arab. Significantly, village desertion oc-
curred, too, in areas which were less, or not at all, exposed to tribal pres-
sure. Moreover, even a number of provincial towns suffered from 
depopulation caused by extreme zulm, amongst them H ama and Acre. 
With the subsidence of violent provincial factionalism the village 
economy recovered and showed a remarkable endurance, at least in the 
district of Hama, during the second decade of the 19th century, 
notwithstanding the arrival of the large 'Anaza tribes. However, this is not 
to say that the resources became adequate; on the contrary, in the course 
of the 1820s the financial needs of the empire increased sharply in the 
wake of wars and military reform. 
The military spending by Jazzâr Pasha and others was dwarfed by that 
of Muhammad 'Ali Pasha. The governor of Egypt may have solved the 
problem of the delegation of power, but he was unable to find a solution 
for the inadequacy of the resources. The occupation of the Syrian pro-
vinces in 1831-2, although intended as such, did not resolve his materia] 
predicament. Of course, a number of complications frustrated his efforts, 
in particular the unwillingness of the major European power, Great Bri-
tain, to allow the formation of a new Muslim empire and certainly one 
which attempted to create its own industrial base. However, apart from 
the ill-fated encounter with the major capitalist power, the Egyptian reg-
ime's policies of exploitation were in line with the traditional Ottoman 
economic concepts in which the state was both the regulator and benefi-
ciary of the economic activities. Coercion played a prominent role in the 
economic policies of the Egyptian regime. In addition to forced settle-
ment and labour services, the coercive traits of the Egyptian regime 
manifested themselves in the conscription for the army, which constituted 
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a further drain on the resources of Syrian society. In the end the Egypti-
ans resorted to force in order to solve revenue problems. This traditional 
mechanism further contributed to the perception of the regime as highly 
unjust. 
Nevertheless, in the light of the Ottoman ideal of the Circle of Equity 
the efforts of the Egyptian regime in Syria were quite remarkable. This 
achievement was acknowledged in the imperial centre. Not only proper 
relations of power were established, but the subjects prospered as well, in 
the sense that they produced considerable wealth compared to the pre-
vious periods. In the late 18th century the Circle had been broken. The 
conduct of the military had caused massive village desertion. Tribal pres-
sure had aggravated the predicament of a sedentary, agricultural society. 
With the cessation of violent factionalism during the second and third de-
cades of the 19th century the condition of the villages of the Syrian inte-
rior improved, but the rural economy remained fragile. In contrast, 
during the decade of Egyptian rule the area under cultivation increased 
significantly and even some 'arab committed themselves to settled farm-
ing. However, from the point of view of the central authority the Circle 
was not complete. It lacked the legitimacy of that vital chain of God-given 
sultanic authority, and hence Egyptian rule could, indeed, only be re-
garded as unjust. 
NOTES 
Notes to the Introduction 
1. Chaudhuri,y4s;'fl, p. 71-2. 
2. Ibn Khaldûn's (Muqaddima) concept of the ages of the state which holds that 
the once high standards of rule are bound to be abandoned in the fourth 
stage, strongly influenced Ottoman court historians. Mustafa Naima, for in-
stance, believed that the Ottoman empire had entered this stage at the time of 
the second failure to capture Vienna (1683), see Thomas, Naima, p. 77-80. 
3. Much has been written on the pre-industrial or pre-modern state. I have 
drawn in particular on Chaudhuri, Asia; Gellner, Nations and Plough; Tilly 
Coercion; as well as, albeit to a lesser extent, on Crone, Pre-industrial; Eisen-
stadt Systems; Wittfogel, Despotism. 
4. Charles Tilly (Coercion) includes Ottoman rule, in my view correctly, in the 
category of the coercive-intensive mode. Tilly does not relate coercion to the 
question of legitimacy. Ernest Gellner {Plough, p. 146-7) equates coercion 
with power. He argues that coercion and legitimacy (and conviction) are com-
plementary elements of the mechanism which imposes structure on society (p. 
18). Tilly defines coercion as "...all concerted application, threatened or ac-
tual, of action that commonly causes loss and damage" {Coercion, p. 19). His 
definition roughly equals Gellner's concept of primary coercion; the physical 
threat {Plough, p. 146). Obviously, neither Tilly, nor Gellner follow Max 
Weber's definition of coercion, i.e. the antithesis of authority; power which is 
regarded illegitimate by those over whom it is exerted (Tischler, et al. Intro-
duction, p. 455). 
5. Thomas, Naima, p. 88. 
6. Occasionally, the inhabitants of Damascus referred to the two main military 
formations of Damascus, the imperial and local janissaries, as dawlat al-qal'a 
(The State of the Citadel) and dawlat Dimashq (The State of Damascus) re-
spectively, see Barbir, Rule, p. 90. 
7. See on the Ottoman concept of the state, Inalcik, Empire, p. 65-75; Findley, 
Bureaucratic, p. 5-19; Shaw, Empire, vol. I, p. 164-5; Itzkowilz, Men; Keyder, 
State, p. 7-23. 
8. Gellner, Plough, p. 156. The full circle was as follows: There can be no sul-
tanic authority without the askeri, there can be no askeri without wealth, the 
reaya produce wealth, the sultan keeps the reaya prosperous by making justice 
reign, justices requires harmony in the world, the world is a garden, its walls 
are the state, the foundation of the state is the religious law, there is no sup-
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port for the religious law without sultanic authority. See Itzkowitz, Men, ρ 23-
4 and Thomas, Naima, p. 78. 
9. This is the principle of the hudud (Arabic hudûd) which was not restricted to 
the functioning of the state, but considered valid for society at large. 
10. Inalcik, Empire, p. 66; Findley, Bureaucratic, p. 18. 
11. Wittfogel, Despotism, p. 72. 
12. Gellner, Plough, p. 239. The quotation is Gellner's interpretation of Ibn Khal-
dûn's definition of government. 
13. With the possible exception of those of Jerusalem, see Manna', Sijill. Docu-
ments of the third and fourth categories were included only sporadically in the 
series of court registers of Damascus and Aleppo. For Aleppo, however, a 
series of awumir (orders) is preserved. 
14. An early pioneer was As'ad Rustum who reproduced a large number of docu-
ments from various registers in his Usui (1930). Only in the 1960s interest in 
the Syrian court records revived (Mandaville, Records). Abdul-Karim Rafeq 
started using the registers extensively during the 1970s and is undoubtedly the 
main authority on the Syrian registers. However, his articles on the registers 
{Law court and Registers) as well as those by Layish (Jaffa), Doumani 
{Palestinian) and Manna' (Sijill) lack a critical assesment. Only Reilly 
(Shari'a) presents some problems in the use of the court records, particularly 
those concerning the interpretation of the legal terminology. In his introduc-
tion to Middle East (p. 6-11) Marcus surpasses all others in his praise of the 
registers. 
15. The series Mahkama Shar'iyya Hims in the Centre for Historical Documenta-
tion in Damascus comprises no single shar'î register, but late 19th and earlier 
20th century registers of the new civil courts, whereas one volume belongs, 
oddly enough, to Gaza. A few hundred shar'î documents are in private hands 
in Horns, but this number compares bleakly to the tens of thousands of docu-
ments preserved in the Hama registers from the last years of Mamluk rule to 
the close of the 19th century. 
16. The Maronite community in particular is well served by various religious insti-
tutional archives. Apart from Hama, only four towns are well covered by the 
court records: Aleppo, Damascus, Jerusalem and Tripoli. Of Sidon, the capi-
tal of an Ottoman province, nothing has survived, and the same is true for 
many smaller towns like Acre, Ma'arra, Tartus, Idlib and Latakia, whereas the 
series of places like Nablus, Yafa, Haifa and Beirut are anything but 
complete. 
17. See for the function of the mahkama, §3.5 and 3.6. 
18. See for the use of the registers for the study of the tax system §5.1. 
19. Reilly (Shari'a, p. 165) states: "This exclusion [of sales, rentals and disputes] is 
significant, however, only if the transactions done without the courts' sanction 
were unlike those which the court registered. Such does not seem to have 
been the case, at least in urban areas." However, Reilly fails to demonstrate 
his point. 
20. A nice example of such a ritual is given by Reilly (Shari'a, p. 161-3) concern-
ing the lease of waqf property. 
21. See Rafeq, Province, p. 325-7. 
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Notes to Chapter One 
1. The best contemporary description of the Hama area is by Burckhardt 
(Travels, p. 133-61), who visited the area in 1812. Later detailed descriptions 
of the area include Hardtmann, Beiträge; Weurlesse, Pays and Fleuve; 
Zakariyâ, Jawla; Kaylânî, Muhâfaza. 
2. Until the second half of the 19th century the name Syria was only common in 
Europeans writings. The inhabitants of the region referred to it as Bilâd al-
Shâm or Barr al-Shâm, the Land of al-Shâm, which is an alternative name of 
the town of Damascus. In official, Ottoman, usage the designation Arabistân 
was habitual, Shâm being reserved for the province of Damascus. 
3. Uncultivated land belonging to villages was also referred to as bâdiya. 
4. See on the transitional zone, N. Lewis, Nomads, p. 15-6. 
5. Lapidus, Cities, p. 28-9 and note 44 (p. 251-2). 
6. Yûsuf, Rtf. 
7. Burckhardt (Travels, p. 147) even states that this area constituted the granary 
of northern Syria and that the seed return was 10 to 1 in a good year. Accord-
ing to sheikh 'Abd al-Ghanî al-Nâbulsî (Milâha, p. 110) the best possible re-
turn was 8 to 1. The average return was much lower, in the 1930s estimated 4 
to 1 by Weulersse (Pays, vol. 1, p. 366). The average return of barley was 
higher: 6 to 1. 
8. See for a description of a mazra'a, Burckhardt, Travels, p. 129. 
9. About half of the villages, and most of the larger ones, were situated on the 
plain. The village estimate is based upon tax registers (SMH 46, p. 77,3 Rabf 
I 1203; SMH 43, p. 89, 5 Rabf II 1215; SMH 43, p. 174-187, 7, 15, and 19 
Rabr I 1233; SMH 49, p. 326-329, 23 Rabf 11245) and on a list prepared by 
Smith in the early 1830s in Robinson, Biblical, vol. 3, p. 176-82. Burckhardt 
(Travels, p. 147) excluded the western hilly parts of the district in his village 
estimate. He writes that Hama numbered 120 inhabited and 70 to 80 
deserted villages, but undoubtedly a considerable number of these deserted 
villages had fallen into ruin prior to the Ottoman occupation of Syria. 
10. The Matâwira are named after a small village in the Jabal Kalbiyya, Matwâr. 
See for the Nusayrî communities during the Ottoman period Tawil, 'Alawiy-
yin, p. 405-62 and Douwes, Knowledge. In the early 1920s the Nusayns 
adopted the name 'Alawiyya. 
11. The other main faction was called the Hajjâwiyya and was centered in the 
Khawâbî area, to the north of Tartûs. The division was of local importance 
only. In 1848 or 1849 Hajjâwîs settled in the ruined town of Salamiyya, to the 
southeast of Hama. See for the Ismâ'îlîs Douwes and Lewis, Trials. 
12. See Douwes, Knowledge. 
13. In the 16th century a small number of Jews lived in the town of Hama, as well 
as in some predominantly Christian villages, see Yûsuf, Rtf, p. 41-2. The last 
Jewish conversion to Islam was recorded in 1831 (SMH 49, p. 455,20 Jumâdâ 
II1247). After the early 1830s no references to local Jews were found in the 
records of the mahkama, nor to the small mahallat al-yahûd, the Jewish quar-
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ter. Part of the Hamawî Jews migrated to Aleppo, like the Tawtah family. At 
least until 1835 some Jewish inhabitants of Aleppo had commercial interests 
in Kafr Buhum, one of the villages which once comprised a small Jewish com-
munity (SMH 50, p. 14, [Jumâdâ 11251]). 
14. Burckhardt, Travels, p. 155. 
15. See on the relation between nomadic and sedentary populations, Spooner, 
Desert; Nelson, Desert; Chaudhuri,/táa, p. 263-5,288-91; N. Lewis, Nomads, 
p. 3-12. 
16. Seetzen (Reisen, vol. 1, p. 14), who passed through Hama in 1806, remarks: 
"Ueberhaupt ist Hama ein Gemisch von Dorf und Stadt". He estimated that 
the town had 12,000 inhabitants at most. Burckhardt (TraveL·, p. 146) 
believed that the town of Hama had at least 30,000 inhabitants in 1812. 
17. In the court records as well as in literary sources the word 'arab covered both 
categories. The word badw (hence beduin) is rarely used in this period. Oc-
casionally "urban or a'râb is used, again covering both categories. In later and 
modern writings 'arab often denotes ahi al-ghanam, the sheep rearers, 
whereas the ahi al-ibl, camel (and horse) breeders, are usually referred to as 
badw. The 'arab themselves often distinguish between shawâyâ and ra'iyya on 
the one hand and the sharqiyya on the other, respectively sheep rearers or 
herdsmen and tribes who migrated over long distances to the east. 
18. Masters, Orzgi'm, p. 116-7. 
19. See for the Mawâlî and the history of the Syrian provinces in the 16th and 
17th centuries; Abu Husayn, Leaderships; and Bakhit, Damascus; Zakariyâ, 
'Ashâ 'ir, p. 86-108; Lewis, Nomads, p. 7-8; Masters, Origins, p. 116-7. 
20. The arnîr al-bâdiya was entitled to make private arrangements with European 
factories for the protection of their goods, see Masters, Origins, p. 117. 
21. Abu Husayn, Leaderships, p. 52,55,121-2; Masters, Origins, p. 117. 
22. See for changing patterns of the overland trade Masters, Origins, p. 8-36. 
Masters argues that prior to 1750 the opening of alternative trade routes, 
both over land and sea, and the disclosure of alternative markets did not seri-
ously affect the Aleppine trading community, which depended on the caravan 
trade along the old Silk Road. His argument is not totally convincing because 
he seems to undervalue the effects of the decline of the volume which was re-
exported and the declining profits well before 1750, by only referring to these 
two developments in a rather casual way. 
23. See for a general discussion on tribal migrations the works cited in note 14. 
24. In 1877, for example, the Ruwâla claimed pastures to the east of Hama for 
their flourishing herds at the expense of the Sibâ', see Oppenheim, Beduinen, 
vol. 1, p. 79-80. See on the Ruwâla and Sibâ' §1.5 below. 
25. See Lewis, Nomads, p. 8; Masters, Origins, p. 118. 
26. See for example Seykali, Land, p. 406. Spooner (Desert, p. 247) argues that 
every peasant knows how to tend animals and that every pastoralist knows 
how to cultivate. This may be an exaggeration, but it is true that individuals or 
groups can move back and forth between pastoralism and agriculture. The 
heterogeneous Mawâlî included groups which were largely stationary and oc-
cupied themselves with extensive agriculture as well as rearing sheep. 
27. Lewis, Nomads, p. 24. 
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28. See for a discussion of the crisis and the measures taken to overcome it §2.1. 
29. Badly protected as they were against severe cold, many casualties fell among 
the 'arab. Their flocks and herds were also badly affected, see Rafeq, Pro-
vince, p. 215. According to the chronicler Budayrî (Dimashq, p. 193), to 
whom Rafeq refers, even the waterwheels of Hama came to a standstill due 
to the frost. 
30. See also §2.3. 
31. The 'Anaza Sibâ' appear to have left for Syria in order to avoid the paying of 
excessive tribute to the Wahhâbîs, see Burckhardt, Notes, vol. 2, p. 5-6. 
32. Zakariyâ 'Ashâ'ir, p. 108. He believes that they first arrived in 1757. If so, this 
would have been after the severe winter of 1756/57. 
33. Kurd 'A1Î, Khitat, vol. 3, p. 5-6. 
34. A later court case reflects the ambivalent attitude of the authorities towards 
the raising of khuwwa. A man from the Hasana had gone to the village of 
Tallsikkm in order to collect the khuwwa due to him and was killed by an of-
ficer while doing so. His uncle appealed to the court and being the sole heir 
received a compensation for the death of his cousin, see SMH 43, p. 53, 1 
Dhû al-Hijja 1238. 
35. The Hasana were sharqiyya and in winter they took their herds far into the 
Syrian desert, possibly as far as northern Arabia. 
36. Lewis, Nomads, p. 8-12. 
37. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 607-8. Shihâb estimated that the Fad'ân and Sibâ' who 
gathered in the area to the south-east of Hama, included 20,000 combatants, 
many of them on horseback. His estimates, however, are often highly inflated 
when describing dramatic events. 
38. ibid. See also §4.8. 
39. Shihâb (Lubnân, p. 637-7) writes that the combined 'Anaza forces carried off 
45,000 sheep. 
40. In a much later incident an odd combination of nine, mainly local tribes, in-
cluding rival Mawâlî factions, attacked a village at the entry of the Ghâb valley 
at harvest time, see SMH 57, p. 15,7 Ra№ 11277. 
41. Also when one compares the two main studies published on the tribes, mainly 
based on fieldwork, namely Oppenheim's Die Beduinen (1939-1943) and 
Zakariyâ's 'Ashâ'ir al-Shâm (1945-1947), contradictions about tribal alliances, 
as well as lineage, occur. Zakariyâ, for example, believes that the local 
Fawâ'ira tribe maintained hostile relations with the Banî Khâlid (p. 454), 
whereas Oppenheim holds that the two were on very friendly terms (vol. 1, p. 
334). (Zakariyâ did not use Oppenheim's study). 
42. See for a list of the tribes, annex 1. Although these tribes were considered 
local tribes, most of them were related to tribes which frequented other parts 
of Syria or much more remote areas, like Iraq, the Najd and even eastern 
Arabia. 
43. In the records of the Hama court no clear distinction in terminology is made 
between a tribe and a tribal subsection. Both arc usually referred to as 'ashîra 
or, simply, as 'arab. Sometimes the relation between the tribal units is given as 
follows: 'arab Abu Kamâl of the Hadfdìn or 'arab al-'Uqaydât al-Daghâmisha. 
Occasional reference is made to jamâ'as, the following of a tribal sheikh. The 
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more precise tribal designations like the 'arab al-Qamsa belonging to the 'ash-
îrat al-Sibâ' of the jamâ'at Ibn Murshid (SMH 53, p. 257,2 Sha'bân 1268), are 
rare. 
44. SMH 43, p. 183,7 Rabf 11233; SMH 49, p. 329,23 Rabf 11245. 
45. The governor of Aleppo also made payments to the amir of the Mawâlî, see 
Burckhardt, Notes, vol. 1, p. 10. Burckhardt remarks that the amir of the 
Mawâlî commanded a police force of 400 horsemen, but that they were 
"...reckoned treacherous and faithless.". 
46. Zakariyâ, 'Ashâ'ir, p. 444; Oppenheim, Beduinen, vol. 1, p. 324. This claim to 
a honourable descent was refuted by the medieval geographer al-Qalqash-
andî. However, the Banî Khâlid do consider themselves to be Quraysh, ibid. 
47. Burckhardt (Notes, vol. 1, p. 13) estimated that the Banî Khâlid proper had 
200 to 300 tents. Together with their subsections they paid almost a quarter 
of the total amount of the taxes resting upon the local tribes. See also §5.6. 
48. At least, they were assessed at more than 25 % of the fixed cash taxes payable 
by the 'arab tribes of Hama. It is unclear whether the Nu'aym of the adjacent 
Horns area, where they constituted the largest formation, were included in the 
assessment. 
49. Zakariyâ, 'Ashâ'ir, p. 503; Oppenheim, Beduinen, vol. 1,322-3. 
50. Yùsuf, Rtf. 
51. Zakariyâ ('Ashâ'ir, p. 501-3) connects the small tribe of the Turkîto the first 
'Anaza tribesmen who migrated to the Euphrates area. According to Shihâb 
(Lubnân, p. 636-7) the Turkî played an important role in forging the 'Anaza 
coalition which attacked a number of local tribes in 1817 (see §4.8). Burck-
hardt (Notes, vol. 1, p. 11) believes that the Turkî are of Mawâlî extraction. 
He estimated the number of Hadîdîn horsemen in the Hama area at 400, 
ibid. 
52. Several accounts of the origin of this tribe exist, but the Mawâlî and related 
tribes play a principal role in all of these, see Zakariyâ, 'Ashâ'ir, p. 449. 
53. A case in point is that of the Fawâ'ira, renowned for their militancy and hostil-
ity against the Hasana and their allies. During the 19th century they were en-
gaged in tribal wars against the Ruwâla, Hadîdîn and Banî Khâlid, but also 
against the Mawâlî, Fad'ân and Turkî, see Zakariyâ, 'Ashâ'ir, p. 449. 
54. During the 1830s some villages were repopulated by tribesmen, but they 
deserted these villages in the early 1840s. See §7.5. 
55. Compared to the period after 1830 the court registers contain relatively few 
data on loans and debts involving a rural party, and nearly all of these concern 
indebted peasants. Some large debts were recorded for villages in the Wa'r 
and Jabal Gharbî, areas which suffered far less from village desertion than 
others. After 1830 the magnitude of 'arab indebtedness remained small, 
whereas the peasants' indebtedness increased dramatically. 
56. The nicest example of such a law suit dates from the mid-19th century, when 
a donkey was claimed by no less than six people, see SMH 59, p. 346, 5 
Muharram 1285. 
57. SMH 57, p. 15,7 Rabí* 11277. 
58. In a sample of sixty diya (blood money) cases dating from the period 1815 to 
1890 only seven involved a village and 'arab party, two of them relating to a 
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feud between a family from the village of Ba'rm and the Turkî tribe. In all but 
one case it had been an 'arab who had killed a villager and all the convicted 
'arab belonged to one of the more militant tribes. 
59. Occasionally 'Anaza tribesmen purchased some wheat in the villages, see 
SMH 49, p. 267, [Rabf II] 1245. Later in the century a part of the market in 
the Hâdir quarter of Hama was called Bazar 'Anaza, see SMH 56, p. 514, 5 
Dhû'al-Qa'da 1277. 
60. A description of the trade of the 'Anaza tribes with the towns is given by al-
Sâyikh, Muqtarab, f. 9-10. He gives an example of a Hamawî trader who made 
a large profit by barter trade with the tribes. 
61. According to Sâyikh (Muqtarab f. 4 and f. 10) the tribesmen showed little fear 
nor respect for the authorities. When they robbed someone, they told their 
victim : "Go, complain to your governor". 
62. See for example the conflict of 1814 §4.8. In 1811 the governor of Aleppo at-
tempted to mobilize the support of the Fad'ân in his conflicts with the Alep-
pine Janissaries who had entered into an alliance with the Mawâlî, see 
Bodman, Factions, p. 11-2. 
63. Lewis, Nomads, p. 26. 
Notes to Chapter Two 
1. Prior to the annexation by the Ottomans, in particular in the 14th century, the 
Syrian interior had been the scene of tribal turmoil, see Lapidus, Cities, p. 28-
9 and 90-1. 
2. Barbir, Rule, p. 89-97; Rafeq, Province, p. 2442. 
3. Makkî, Târîkh, p. 296-7. 
4. Between 1691 and 1724 the hajj convoy was attacked, at least, twelve times, 
see Barbir, Rule, p. 200-1. 
5. The first time the Ottomans bought the 'arab off to safeguard the pilgrimage 
was in 1521, see Rafeq, Administration, p. 55. 
6. The history of this family has been dealt with in detail by Rafeq (Province). 
See also Shamir, 'Azm; Barbir, Rule; 'Azm, Usra; Schatkowski Schilcher, 
Families. 
7. This assumption has been advanced by Rafeq (Province, p. 90-2), who claims 
that Damascene janissaries had extended their influence to the province of 
Aleppo. Barbir (Rule p. 59) tends to agree with Rafeq, but suggests that it 
may have been primarily Anatolian military who migrated to Northern Syria 
in the wake of the suppression the Celali revolts, nearly a century earlier. 
8. In the local vernacular the consonant Ζ is usually pronounced as D. Both 
chroniclers and scribes often followed the local vernacular in their writing. 
9. Makkf, Târîkh, from p. 343 onwards. 
10. Pococke (Description, vol. 2, p. 139-40), passing through the area in the late 
1730s, described Hasya as "... a miserable place, there being only the gover-
nor's house, a mosque and two or three houses enclosed within a wall adjoi-
ning to the khan and a few other houses built on hollow ground." He found 
"...only some bad water in a pond.". 
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11. Makkî uses the word akâbir, dignitaries, and refers to the qâdt (judge), muß 
(Jurisconsult) and naqtb (head of the local descendants of the prophet), rather 
than to aghawât. 
12. The evidence is largely circumstantial: The victory of Ibrâhîm Aghâ, the dâbit 
(commander) of Horns over 'arab near Hama in 1717 appears to have paved 
the way for Ismâ'îl Aghâ al-'Azm to proceed to the south. Ibrâhîm Aghâ 
served under Sulaymân Aghâ of Hasya, then governor of Horns. Some time 
later a certain 'Abdallah Aghâ was sent from Horns to help protect Hama 
against the 'arab. He was returned by the hakim (ruler) of Hama after the lat-
ter "...had finished with the 'arab..." and had come to Horns to pay tribute to 
Ibrâhîm Aghâ. Unfortunately the chronicler does not mention the name of 
this hakim of Hama in early 1718. In the year prior to his appointment to the 
governorships of Ma'arra, Hama and Horns, Ismâ'îl Aghâ al-'Azm, possibly 
by way of one his allies, may have been already in control of Hama, see 
Makkî, Târtkh, p. 343-56. 
13. Makkî, Târtkh, p. 283. The account stops in 1722 at the time when Ismâ'îl, 
now Pasha, rode once more against Turcoman tribesmen. 
14. Makkî, Târtkh, p. 334. 
15. Occasionally Ibrâhîm Aghâ of Hasya was supported by the governor of 
Aleppo as well, see Makkî, Târtkh, p. 126. 
16. Ismâ'îl Aghâ al-'Azm was appointed for a term of seven years to the gover-
norship of Ma'arra, Hama and Horns under the condition that he would re-
populate villages and restore public order. Soon after his appointment to 
Ma'arra, Hama and Horns Ismâ'îl sent wheat and barley to Damascus which 
was running short of food. Late 1719 he was ordered to settle the Turcomans, 
Makkî, Târtkh, p. 371-7. He had only served about two years when he was 
promoted to Tripoli. 
17. See Rafeq, p. 70-1, 198 and 214-5; Oppenheim, Beduinen, vol. 1, 379-84; 
Zakariyâ, 'Ashâ'ir, p. 417; Barbir {Rule, p. 143) erroneously includes the Banî 
Sakhr and Sardiyya into the 'Anaza confederation. 
18. It is uncertain if the Hama district became formally attached to Damascus 
before 1832. 
19. The oldest reference to the 'Azms in the literary sources (Makkî, Târtkh) re-
fers to the provision of Horns with wheat. The supplies of wheat from Hama 
became vital in times of shortages for the Damascene population, see for ex-
ample Budayrî, Dimashq, p. 74 and 157. 
20. Barbir, Rule, p. 168-9. Already in the sixteenth century some these villages 
had been populated by Turcomans, see Yûsuf, Rtf. 
21. Pococke, Description, vol. 2, p. 143-4. 
22. See for an evaluation of the literature on the 'Azm family; Barbir, Rule, p. 56-
64. Barbir takes a "centralist" position. See for a critique on Barbir, Philipp, 
Syrians, p. 6-7, who argues that the 'Azms were strongly inclined to local au-
tonomy. 
23. See §3.2 and 3.7. 
24. Rafeq, Province, p. 221. 
25. That Tripoli had become a satellite province of Damascus is reflected by the 
function of its governor, who was of the rank of mirmiran and served as 
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baçbug al-jarda, the commander of the troops which brought provisions to the 
hajj convoy on their return from Mecca and Medina. The governor of Damas-
cus was of the higher rank of watt and in his capacity of amir al-hajj he was the 
superior of the basbu^ al-jarda. During the tenure of As'ad Pasha his younger 
brother Sa'd al-Dta usually served as mirmiran in Tripoli, see Budayrî, Di-
mashq, p. 108. Later, during the reign of Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm in 
Damascus (1771-2 and 1773-83) his sons Yûsuf Pasha and 'Abdallah Pasha 
acted in this capacity, see Rafeq, p. 317. 
26. See on Dâhir al-'Umar, Cohen, Palestine; Rafeq, Province. 
27. See for example, Philipp, Syrians, p. 9-10; Barbir, Rule, p. 180; Van Leeuwen, 
Mount Lebanon, p. 48-9. See on the theoretical approaches Wallerstein, 
World-system, Wallerstein et al., Incorporation and Kasaba, Ottoman Empire. 
Note that a difference exists between the concepts of the world economy and 
a world economy. The first usually refers to the modern universal capitalist 
economy which is conceived as constituting a single market. A world economy 
refers to an economically autonomous geographical region which forms an or-
ganic unity, for instance the Ottoman empire, see Braudel, Perspective, and 
Chaudhuri./tóa, p. 382-7. 
28. Masters, Origins, p. 30-3. 
29. Owen, Introduction, p. 151. 
30. In the early 17th century the more intensive trade relations had been estab-
lished with Tuscany, see Van Leeuwen, Mount Lebanon, p. 47. 
31. Rafeq, Province, p. 314-6. Oddly enough, Philipp (Syrians, p. 10-1, and note 
29) refers to the same passage to show that the Damascene trade was in de-
cline, arguing that the passage of the pilgrimage had become problematic. 
This is not sustained by faci. Apart from the attack on pilgrimage in 1757 no 
serious incidents occurred until the early 19th century. It is also contrary to 
the argumentation presented by Rafeq in this passage. He states that 
"Damascus was better off [than any other place in Syria] because it could still 
count on the commerce connected to the pilgrimage." See also Rafeq, Qâfi-
lat. 
32. Owen, World, p. 91; Schatkowski Schilcher, Families, p. 36-7. 
33. There are no reliable figures at hand for the regional trade conducted in 
Damascus prior to the 1830s, i.e. prior to the Egyptian occupation of Syria. 
The economic policies of the Egyptian government stimulated European, 
mainly French and British, economic activity in Syria, see Reilly, Merchants, p. 
4-7. 
34. War could create a sudden rise of demand. The French invasion of Egypt in 
1798 was an example in case. Napoleon was forced to purchase provisions for 
his troops locally because the British fleet blockaded his lines of communica-
tion with France. 
35. Typically, land desertion also occured in the Acre area during the late 18th 
century, see Rafeq, Province, p. 314 and Philipp, Social Structure, p. 101. 
36. From a citation in Bodman, Factions, p. 16. 
37. The Wahhâbîs controlled Mecca from 1803 until 1813, the year the armies of 
Muhammad 'Alî took the town. The hajj convoys from Syria and Egypt were 
refused entrance in 1807. 
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38. Shaw, Empire, vol. 1, p. 247-60. 
39. The term mamlûk refers to white male slave-soldiers of non-Arab extraction 
who were recruited by military commanders, as well as to their descendants 
(in the case of Egypt). 
40. See on the Egyptian interference with Palestine, Crecelius, Roots, p. 64-103 
and Egypt's Reawakening. 
41. See on Jazzâr Pasha in Acre: Cohen, Palestine. 
42. As has been pointed out before, trade with Europe was on the decline. The 
expulsion of the French followed complaints about Jazzâr Pasha's trade mo-
nopolies and caused further harm to this trade. 
43. See for an edict celebrating the event, SMH 46, p. 276, [Dhû al-Qa'da] 1213, 
see also Manna', Sijill. 
44. Cohen, Palestine, p. 64-6; Rafeq, Province, p. 310-3. Prior to Damascus 
Muhammad Pasha served in Aleppo and left a favourable impression there as 
well, see Bodman, Factions, p. 103-4. 
45. see Khûrî, Barbar. 
46. Chapter Four deals with the, at times disastrous, effects of this policy. 
47. Shaw, Old and new, Shaw, Ottoman, vol. 1, p. 260-77; Findley, Bureaucratic, 
p. 113-5; Zürcher, Turkey, p. 23-31. 
48. See Shaw, Empire, vol. 2, p. 1-3. 
49. See on Muhammad 'A1Î Pasha, al-Sayyid Marsot, Muhammad Ali; Hunter, 
Egypt, p. 9-32; Holt, Egypt, p. 176-92. 
50. See on the reign of Mahmud II, E.I.2, vol. 6, p. 58-61; Lewis, Emergence, p. 
74-103; Shaw, Empire, vol. 2, p. 8-34; Zürcher, Turkey, p. 32-51. 
Notes to Chapter Three 
1. E.I.2, vol. 1, p. 778. 
2. It concerns the position of ayanltk, which was formally abolished by imperial 
decree in 1786, but the degree was largely ignored in the provinces. Note that 
the term ayan is also used as a singular. See E.I.2, vol. 1, p. 778; Inalcik, 
Centralization. 
3. References found which related to this practice, or at least to a similar prac-
tice, in Damascus are in Hasan, p. 82: "As custom goes, the Pasha then in-
stalled the ayan and the arbâb al-manâsib (office-holders)". See also p. 36 
and 48. 
4. In the Hama records the word occurs frequently in the opening lines of edicts, 
but mostly in the term of address of the district governor (see below). The 
word occurs with some regularity in combination with its near equivalent 
wujûh. In most edicts the addressees were first the district governor, or the 
judge, followed by the religious dignitaries and the baqiyyat wujûh al-balda 
wa-ayânuhâ, the other dignitaries of the town and its ayhn, see for example 
SMH 49, p. 15,4 Rabr 11240. 
5. The confusion about the formation of local and provincial elites is apparent in 
the recent writing on the Syrian provinces. Barbir (Rule, p. 65-89), for ex-
ample, speaks of "notables" and implicitly includes petty local 'ulama' and re-
ligious students into this category, see also Marcus, Middle East, p. 351, note 
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2. Schatkowski Schilcher (Families, ch. 5) is unique in her use of the definition 
of estates (German Stande). Like Barbir she includes people who differed 
markedly in wealth, status and influence into one single category. However, 
she recognizes the limitations which she imposes upon our understanding of 
local society by dividing it into seven estates; she states that the political activi-
ties by leading members of the separate estates "...were only minimally based 
upon their position within their respective estates."(p. 131). 
6. Qabîqûl is a corruption of kapikuhi. See Rafeq, Forces. In Aleppo only locals 
were recruited into the janissary force, see Bodman, Factions, p. 72-7. See on 
the use of dawla, Introduction. 
7. See for example SMH 43, p. 55,13 Jumâdâ II1220. 
8. Inalcik, Centralization, p. 40-1. 
9. In the court records of Aleppo the use of the term a"yân was restricted, signif-
icantly, to tax farmers, see Marcus, Middle East, p. 349, note 78. 
10. Hourani, Reform, p. 49; Inalcik, Centralization, p. 37. 
11. Barbir, Rule, p. 71. 
12. The prominence of the aghawât during the early 19th century is demonstrated 
by Shihâb (Lubnân, p. 667), who, when referring to the akâbir, grandees, of 
Damascus, mentions three individuals, all of them aghawât, namely 'Anbar 
Aghâ al-Qazzâr, Darwîsh Aghâ ibn Ja'far Aghâ (see §4.7) and 'Abd al-Ghanî 
Aghâ al-Shâmlî (see §4.7 and 4.10). 
13. Schatkowski Schilcher (Families) defines the aghawât as the "first estate" (p. 
108-9), but remarks that the estate constituted no viable political entity, that it 
was not internally united, nor free from class conflict (p. 131). 
14. See for the Jundî family and their relation with the 'Azms and Hama; Jundî, 
Ma 'arra, vol. 2, p. 334-9 and §4.4 and 4.9. 
15. The lists of muhâfizs manning the fortresses are typical in this respect; only 
few aghawât, let alone soldiers, were recorded with what may be considered a 
family name, SMH 46, p. 193-7, [Rajab] 1208. 
16. SMH 46, p. 202,1 Rajab 1209. 
17. See §1.6. In the mid-19th century, but possibly earlier as well, the sheikh of 
one of the large villages acted as shaykh mashâyikh qarâyâ of the Hama dis-
trict, see SMH 55, p. 99,7 Jumâdâ II1272. 
18. See for a discussion of the origins of the 'Azm family Rafeq, Province, p. 85-
91 and Barbir, Rule, p. 56-64. 
19. The same was true for Kurds and Turcomans, see Masters, Origins, p. 46. It is 
of little surprise that, given the uncertain origin of the 'Azm family, some have 
opted for 'arab ancestry, see note 18. 
20. Namely 'Abd al-Ghanî Aghâ and Rashîd Aghâ al-Shâmlî (also spelled 
Shûmlî), see §4.7, 4.10 and 7.3. See also Schatkowski Schilcher, Families, p. 
146. 
21. It concerns 'Uthmân Khayr Bey who, by the late 1820s had extended his in-
fluence over much of the southern part of the Nusayrî Chain, including part 
of the muqâta'a of Hisn al-Akrâd, see SMH 49, p.'570, 5 Dhû al-Hijja 1249 
(In a rare exercise of Islamic discipline the scribe of the court spelled his name 
as 'Usmân, but he apparently had no objection to the use of the title bey by 
the Nusayrî chief). His son Ismâ'îl and grandson Hawâsh played an important 
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role in the politics of the area in the mid-19th century. The Nusayris referred 
to their clan leaders as mashôyikh al-zulm, as opposed to the mashâyikh al-
'ilm, the religious sheikhs, see Douwes, Knowledge. 
22. Nâbulsî, Haqîqa, p. 49-50; Pococke, Description, vol. 2, p. 144. 
23. Sâbûnî, Наша, p. 135-7. See for his fatâwâ (legal opinions) and his works on 
mysticism, Brockelmann, Geschichte, vol. 1, p. 196; see for a description of his 
shrine Gaulmier, Pèlerinages, 143-5. 
24. They even held an entire, but towards the end of the 18th century deserted, 
village (al-Bûzliyya) as waqf: SMH 46, p. 204,1 Rajab 1209. 
25. SMH 43, p. 141,9 Jumâdâ II1217. 
26. See for the shrines which survived into the 20th century, Gaulmier, Pèleri-
nages. 
27. See on the Bahrî family, Philipp, Syrians. 
28. Al-mu'allim Mûsâ Walad Hannâ, for instance, was appointed kâtib sancak for 
his lifetime, SMH 43, p. 125,27 Shawwâl 1216. 
29. SMH 49, p. 570,5 Dhû al-Hijja 1249. 
30. SMH 49, p. 114,11 Jumâdâ 11241. 
31. For the mahkama see §3.5. 
32. Nearly all letters of appointment mention these three duties in this order: 
tâhsîl amwâl, siyânat râhat ar-ra'âyâ and i'mâr al-qarâyâ. 
33. Garib yigit forces, or rather the gureba-i yeinin and the gureba-i yesar consti-
tuted two Janissary regiments in the central provinces. 
34. Winter, Egyptian Society, p. 56. Neither Rafeq (Forces) nor Hamûd ÇAskar) 
mentions these troops in their description of the local and provincial forces in 
the Syrian provinces. However, they did serve in Damascus during the rule of 
As'ad Pasha al-'Azm. On one occasion the latter expelled them after the local 
population, as well as the janissaries, had turned against a Kurdish garib yigit 
commander, see Budayrf, Dimashq, p. 201-3. The garib yigit, translated by 
RH as "young man fresh from the country", may have been similar to the 
Rum ovarii and Rum usak, known from Egyptian sources, both young immi-
grants from Anatolia who were enrolled in the lower ranks of the janissary 
units and who also served in the private armies of the Egyptian grandees, see 
Piterberg, Formation, p. 278-9. Another possible semantic relation is that with 
the maghâriba, a well-known military force in the province of Damascus, com-
posed, at least originally, from Maghribis. The maghâriba served in the private 
armies of governors. 
35. Respectively a number of çavus, qawwâs and the qahwajî (preparing coffee) 
and tütuncü (preparing waterpipes), see SMH 43, p. 187,7 Ra№ 11233. 
36. Also the qassâmiyya, see below, were entitled to collect these fees, see for 
details §5.4 and 6.9. 
37. Bodman, Facft'orts, p. 13. 
38. An amount, referred to as mal-i ocaqlik, the money for the corps, was re-
served for them, see SMH 49, p. 232,24 Rajab 1242. 
39. For a list of fortresses and the names of the dizdars and muhâfizs, see SMH 
46, p. 193-7, [Rajab] 1208. 
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40. Salamiyya was the easternmost fortress, situated well into the bâdiya. It ap-
pears that the fortress was reoccupied in the late 1820s, see SMH 49,9 Rabr 
11245. See for Qal'at al-Mudîq §4.7. 
41. See for example SMH 49, p. 289, [Rabr 11244]. 
42. Given his close relations with the 'arab tribes, he may have been of 'arab ex-
traction. See on Faraj Aghâ §4.10,6.10 and 7.3. 
43. See on the function of the mahkama, especially, Jennings, Kadi, and Limita-
tions; E.I. 2, vol. 6, p. 3-6; Marcus, Modernity, p. 101-20. 
44. See on the legal position of the Nusayrîs, Douwes, Knowledge, p. 163-5. 
45. SMH 56, p. 521,12 Dhû al-Qa'da І277. 
46. Marcus, Aleppo, p. 184-5. In the Damascus court the charging of interest was 
sometimes disguised by the inclusion of exceptionally large quantities of soap 
in a loan contract, see Rafeq, Economic Relations, p. 674-5 and City, p. 323-4. 
47. The qâdî justified such rulings with the phrase hasab al-'dda (as the custom 
cues') 
48. E.I.2, vol. 6, p. 6. 
49. see §6.10. 
50. SMH 49, p. 278,27 Muharram 1244. 
51. See on the function of iftâ' in the Ottoman Empire in general E.I.2, vol. 2, p. 
866-7. See on the Damascene muftis and the Murâdî family, Schatkowski 
Schilcher, Families, p. 117-22 and p. 160-165. Her list oí muftis is incomplete. 
See on the mufti As'ad Efendi al-Siddîqî (al-Bakrî) and his brother Khalîl 
Efendi, the naqîb, Hasan, p. 89 and p. 137-8. 
52. See on this Hamawîsheikh, Mardam Bey, Ayân, p. 169-70. 
53. He was dismissed and exiled after charges of corruption had been filed against 
him, but he returned to office for a short period afterwards. Apart from mufti 
he acted as naqib. See on some Kaylânîmuftis, Jundî, A'iâm, vol. 2, p. 35-8. 
Numerous references to the muftis are to be found in the court records, 
where they appear either in connection with a fatwâ, or as litigants. See on the 
death of Muhammad Sa'dî Efendi: SMH 49, p. 147, 9 Sha'bân 1241 and §3.7 
below. See on the charges of corruption against Muhammad 'A1Î Efendi: 
SMH 52, p. 261,21 Muharram 1264 and F.0.78/959, Damascus 25 February 
1853. 
54. The phrase: "... the parties argued and quarreled and then muslims interfered 
and mediated between them, and they agreed upon a compromise...", often 
occurs in court deeds. The word muslims refers to the public, which may in-
clude Christians. 
55. See SMH 48, p. 133,5 Jumâdâ II, 1235; SMH 49, p. 269,6 Rabr II1245. No 
case was found in which the qâdî overruled the mutasallim. Only later in the 
century this happened, albeit very rarely, 
56. The Mawâlî chiefs were, however, not tied to the district of Hama; they were 
not Hamawîs. Also in the province of Aleppo the exerted considerable in-
fluence and received payments from the governor general of that province. 
57. Zade denotes "son of', but in local usage it was frequently used in addition to 
the Arabic equivalent ibn or to the more prestigious najl. 
58. SMH 49, p. 131-141r29Rajab 1241.. 
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59. The form of address of the leading members of the families varied; in the case 
of the 'Azms, Iftikhâr al-umarâ' al-kirâm (The Pride of the Noble Com-
manders) was the most common, and in the case of the Kaylânîs and 'Ahvânîs, 
Zayd al-fadâ'il wa Omdat aWulamâ' (The Cream of the Illustrious and Pillar 
of the Learned). 
60. In Hama Burckhardt (Travels, p. 147) met the army commander, Nâsîf Pasha 
al-'Azm (who is also known as Nasuti Pasha) and remarks that he is well-
known for his travels in Europe and Barbary and for his brave defense of 
Cairo (against the French). 
61. The Hamawî muftì Muhammad Sa'dî Efendi al-Azharî al-Kaylânî, for ex-
ample, had studied in Cairo and died in Baghdad, SMH 49, p. 147,9 Sha'ban 
1241 (letter from the dîwân of Damascus informing the mutasaUim that the 
muftì had died). See also Jundí, A'lám vol. 2, p. 36-7. 
62. Schatkowski Schilcher, Families, p. 194-6. 
Notes to Chapter Four 
1. Kunt, Servants, p. 90-3; Inalcik, Centralization, p. 27-8; Rafeq, Changes, p. 59. 
2. These measures were also motivated by the shortage of cash for the payment 
of pensions and the increasing number of candidates for provincial offices, see 
Inalcik, Centralization, p. 29-30. 
3. Inalcik, Centralization, p. 49. 
4. See §2.3. Apart from the hajj disaster, the province suffered from famine in 
1758 and was struck by a heavy earthquake in 1759, followed by plague. 
5. After he had been in office for less than a year, he was replaced by a non-local 
governor, Mustafa Pasha, but Muhammad Pasha returned to office after 
some months. 
6. See §2.4. Only during his first term he did reside in Damascus for some 
months. 
7. It is uncertain whether Jazzâr Pasha was the third or the fourth governor to 
serve after Muhammad Pasha al-'Azm. In the list of governors produced in 
Munajjid's Wulât, which is based on a mid-19th century Ottoman almanac, he 
is the third. In the chronicle of Dimashqî (Hawâdith, p. 11) he acts as the 
fourth. 
8. The following is based on Hasan, p. 11-9; Dimashqî Hawâdith, p. 15-6; Kurd 
'Alf, Khitat, vol. 3, p. 5-6; Sh'attî, Rawd, p. 25-6. 
9. He had probably gone to Istanbul in connection with the petition which led to 
Jazzâr Pasha's dismissal, see below. 
10. See §1.4. 
11. In the 1730s the two wâlîs of Damascus, who served in between the first and 
second term in office of Sulaymân Pasha al-'Azm, had been ousted by the 
military. See Rafeq, Province, p. 11243. 
12. One of the wâlîs who tried to bring Damascus under control after the pillag-
ing of the hajj convoy in 1857 ravaged the Maydân quarter. As'ad Pasha al-
'Azm, too, had resorted to drastic action against the Maydânîs, see Burayk, 
Shâtn, p. 62-3 and Rafeq, Province, p. 166. 
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13. Jazzâr Pasha had expected to be appointed to Damascus after Muhammad 
Pasha al-'Azm had died in 1783 and again after the latter's successor, a son of 
'Uthmân Pasha al-Kurjf, had died within a month's time. However, another 
son of 'Uthmân Pasha was appointed, Darwîsh Pasha. On both occasions Jaz-
zâr Pasha had been confident about the promotion to Damascus, to the ex-
tent that he received congratulations and made preparation for his departure 
from Acre, see Rafeq, Province, p. 318-9; Cohen, Palestine, p. 66. 
14. Dimashqî, (Hawâdith, p. 14-5) writes that "the people of Damascus" directed 
a petition to the Porte. Schatkowski Schilcher deduced from this that Jazzâr 
Pasha faced massive opposition (Family, p. 37). Petitions, however, were usu-
ally signed by a number of the more notable citizens, who may or may not 
claim to represent the local population. It is true that Jazzâr Pasha was to be-
come most unpopular among the Damascenes during the 1790s, but at this 
early stage he may have had some support because he had the reputation of 
having "... restored justice and security" in the coastal areas prior to his first 
appointment to Damascus, see Burayk, Sham, p. 121. 
15. Apart from the muftì, Shattî (Rawd, p. 25) refers to wujûh, a term which usu-
ally denotes non-military notables. Apart from the muftì, Hasan (p. 14) refers 
to "a number of efendiyya", religious dignitaries. 
16. Schatkowski Schilcher (Families) distinguishes between two camps only, the 
'Azm faction and the Maydân faction, but also writes that the situation was 
confused (p. 40). However, it is highly doubtful whether the Damascene 
'Azms figured as the leading family of the inner city, in the sense that the 
other prominent families like the Mahâsinîs, Bakrîs and Murâdîs always—or 
often—looked for their support and guidance. The confusion arises from the 
multitude of, often unstable, factions and alliances in and between the inner 
city and the Maydân, as well as other quarters. 
17. See §3.6. Two of the mufite belonged to the Murâdî family and one to the 
Mahâsinî, see Shattî, Rawd, p. 40-1, Hasan, p. 81 and p. 88-9 and 
Schatkowski-Schilcher, Families, p. 38. 
18. Hasan, p. 26-7 ('Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm and 'Abd al-Rahmân Efendi al-
Murâdî, later executed by Jazzâr Pasha) and p. 137-8 (Kunj Yûsuf Pasha and 
As'ad Efendi al-Siddîqî (al-Bakrî)). When Jazzâr Pasha was appointed in 
1790, Muhammad Khali] Efendi al-Murâdî was exiled and replaced by As'ad 
Efendi al-Mahâsinî, who, however, was later imprisoned by Jazzâr, and died of 
neglect. 
19. The authors of the tarâjim (biographical dictionaries) hardly make mention of 
the 'Azms in connection with Jazzâr Pasha's policies in Damascus. They con-
centrated on the "ulama' who fell victim to the Pasha. Of course, the tarâjim 
mainly deal with the learned members of society, but some aghawût are men-
tioned in connection with Jazzâr's repression. See for example Shattî (Rawd, 
p. 38-43) who gives the tmjama of Jazzâr Pasha by Mahmûd al-Hamzawî and 
by 'Abd al-Razzâq al-Baytâr. 
20. Hasan, p. 20-1; Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 19. Schatkowski Schilcher (Families, 
p. 38) writes that Ahmad Aghâ belonged to the 'Azm faction, but there is no 
indication that this was this case. He was killed before 'Abdallah Pasha al-
'Azm was first appointed to Damascus. Muhammad Aghâ was one of the 
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principal aides of Jazzâr Pasha and extremely unpopular in Damascus. 
'Abdallah Pasha had him strangled in 1802, see Hasan, p. 74 (Dimashqî 
(Hawâdith, p. 21) writes that he had him killed during his first term in office 
(І795-8)). 
21. Hasan, p. 25-8; Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 21. 
22. Hasan, p. 82-4. 
23. According to Bodman (Factions, p. 117-22) 'Abdallah Pasha had already 
shown a lack of competence, while wâlî of Aleppo (1794), when he left the 
government to Ibrâhîm, then Aghâ. Ibrâhîm Aghâ had made his career in the 
household of a leading member of the Aleppine asfirâf. Among his qualities 
figured his ability to contain the 'arab tribes. When governor of Damascus, 
Ibrâhîm Pasha al-Halabî considered Jazzâr Pasha to be his main rival. 
24. The French dissolved the siege of Acre because their troops suffered from 
plague and because the British dispatched naval units to Acre. 
25. Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 18-9. 
26. Murâdî, Silk, vol. 3, p. 11-20; Jundî, Ma'arra, vol. 2, p. 336. 
27. The identity of the mutasallim of the time, Ya'qûb Aghâ, is unknown, but he 
was not an 'Azm. 
28. Note that the Jijaklî and some other aghawât families trace their arrival in the 
Hama area to this period, see §3.2 Their family names, however, only occur in 
the records during the second and third decade of the 19th century. 
29. SMH 46,211,1 Rajab 1209. 
30. SMH 46 p. 231, 7 Jumâdâ I 1210; p. 250, 25 Shawwâl 1211, and p. 230, 27 
Safar 1212. 
31. SMH 46, p. 352, 238 and 354, dated 15 Shawwâl and 15 Dhû al-Hijja 1213 
and p. 309, 23 Rabf II 1214; SMH 43, p. 99, 7 Ra№ I 1216 and p. 108, 27 
Rajab 1216. 'Abdallah Aghâ al-Mahmûd served in 1799 both as mutasallim of 
Hama and basbug' (commander) of the jarda under Jazzâr Pasha. A certain 
'Urâbî Aghâ served 'Abdallah Pasha in the early 19th century as well. 
32. SMH 46, p. 276, dated 1213. 
33. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 405; Hasan, p. 87-91. An undated edict (SMH 43, p. 118) 
from Damascus to an unnamed mutasallim of Hama may well be related to 
the incident; it refers to the suffering of the population of Hama at the hands 
of troops which had just returned to Damascus. 
34. SMH 46,361-2, 1 Jumâdâ 11214. 
35. Hasan, p. 88-116; Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 28-9; Shattì, Rawd, p. 41-3; Shihâb, 
Lubnân, p. 408-9. All of these sources contain verses on Jazzâr Pasha's death. 
36. Sulaymân Pasha even gained the epithet of al-'Âdil, the Just, see 'Awra's his-
tory entitled Tâtikh wilâyat Sulaymân Pasha al-'Âdil, ed. A. Qayqûnî, Beirut 
1979. 
37. See for the long career of Mustafa Aghâ Barbar: Khûrî, Barbar. 
38. See on the period 1804-1812, Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 408-583; Dimashqî, 
Hawâdith, p. 26-48; Hasan, p. 113-59; Mashâqa, Mashhad, p. 103-9. 
39. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 560. 
40. Muhammad 'Alî Pasha had first refused to fight the Wahhâbî movement. In 
1811, however, he conceded to the pressure from the Porle. Al-Sayyid Marsot 
{Muhammad Ali, p. 198-202) refers to this campaign, which lasted until June 
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1815, as the pasha's first war of expansion. One of his motives was to gain 
control over the trade conducted in the Red Sea region. It was also in this pe-
riod that Muhammad 'A1Î Pasha's contemplated the annexation of the pro-
vince of Damascus to his realm. The Wahhâbîs were forced to retreat into 
their heartland, the Najd. The pasha's attempts to establish control over the 
Najd had no lasting effect. In 1824 new campaigns were initiated to suppress 
the movement. 
41. This governor, Muhammad Râghib Pasha, was unable to bring the province 
of Aleppo under his control and faced several uprisings, among them a revolt 
of the Mawâlî after the pasha had their leading sheikh killed while entertain-
ing him as his guest. The 'arab avenged the death of Amîr Kunj, the son of 
Muhammad Khurfân, see Bodman, Factions, p. 128-30 and Shihâb, Lubnân, 
p. 584-5. 
42. Philipp, Social structure, p. 101-3. 
43. Sâbûnî, Târîkh Нота, p. 16. 
44. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 408. See also Hasan, p. 82. 
45. SMH 46, p. 74-5,15 Rabí* 11203.' 
46. See for details §5.10. 
47. SMH 43, p. 118, [Muharram 1217]. 
48. SMH 43, p. 89,5 Rabí* II1215. 
49. Even the once large village of Tayyibat al-A'lâ, situated near the Sultanic 
Road, was deserted, SMH 46, p. 355,5 Ramadan 1213. 
50. One third of the land of the Nusayrî village of Abu Qubays in the Jabal Kal-
biyya, for example, was taken out of production by the locals because they 
could not pay the taxes resting upon the land. They then sold the land to a 
Christian banker of Hama for an amount that equalled their debt to the treas-
ury, SMH 46, p. 120,15 Muharram 1200. 
51. SMH 46, p. 74-5,15 Ra№ 11203 and p. 384,13 Shawwâl 1214, in both cases 
it concerned the rates of the proportional agricultural tax, the qism, payable 
by most villages of the plain, see on the qism, see §5.5.2. 
52. The only important exception in this period was 'Uthmân Pasha al-Kurjî, who 
served in the 1760s. He was a former mamlûk of As'ad Pasha al-'Azm. He 
started his career as an aghâ in the Hama area, see Burayk, Sham, p. 81. Two 
of his sons served as governor of Damascus in 1783 and 1784. 
53. In all local Arabic chronicles there are clear signs of a strong ethnic conscious-
ness, especially in the case the aghawât and their troops. Phrases like, wa-
asluhu kurdt, of Kurdish origin, or min al-akrâd, from among the Kurds, 
abound. 
54. Jazzâr Pasha, himself a Bosnian, also made extensive use of Kurdish auxiliary 
forces. During his last year as governor of Damascus the city was ruled by his 
akrâd, see Shattì, Rawd, p. 40-3. 
55. This seems to have been the case in the province of Aleppo as well, see Bod-
man, Factions, p. 24-5. 
56. The two waits were Ibrahim Deli Pasha and Kunj Yûsuf Pasha, both Kurds. 
57. SMH and the chroniclers use Mullû, Munlâ and Mullâ interchangeably, which 
was not uncommon, but the spelling is occasionally far from common: jiL. 
His followers were referred to as Mulliyya, and those of his associate in Hama, 
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see below, Barâziyya. Both the Mulliyya and Baraziyya are Kurdish tribes, and 
families of these tribes settled in the towns of the Syrian interior, including 
Нагла, see Zakariyâ, 'Ashá'ir, p. 664. Mullû is Kurdish for Mulliyya. 
58. See §4.2. 
59. He is first mentioned in the Hama records in connection with supplies of food 
and fodder to the pasha's troops, SMH 43, p. 118, 17 Muharram 1217, see 
also p. 143,2 Sha'bân 1217. 
60. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 435-6. Shihâb refers to him as "kabîr aghawât al-
dalâtiyya", the senior aghâ of the delis (p. 415). 
61. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 501-2,529,534,538,541,554-5. 
62. Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 36. 
63. ibid, p. 45-6; Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 556-9. Prior to his appointment as mutasal-
lim Mullû Ismâ'îl was referred to as hakim (ruler) of Hama, while others 
served as mutasallim. This indicates that he had acted in an unofficial capac-
ity. 
64. Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 50. A Damascene Kurdish rebel aghâ who had 
escaped to the Hama area, was later executed {ibid, p. 58). 
65. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 572. Apparently the fortress had recently been evacuated 
by the janissary muhâfizs, see §3.4. One of the bravest among the European 
travellers, Richard Burckhardt, was so impressed by the stories told about 
Mullû Ismâ'îl—who was an old man when he passed through the Ghâb val-
ley—that he did not dare to enter Qal'at al-Mudîq, see Burckhardt, TraveL·, p. 
138. 
66. In 1811 the governor of Aleppo campaigned against the rulers of Jisr al-
Shughûr and Anna, but he was defeated, see Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 581. 
67. Sulaymân Pasha Silahdar, the successor of Sulaymân Pasha (who returned to 
Acre) was a Hamawî by birth, but had made his career in Istanbul. He died in 
1813 during the pilgrimage, see Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 49-50, and p. 58; 
Hasan, p. 153-9. 
68. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 603. Nasûh Pasha is referred to by Shihâb, as well as by 
Burckhardt, as Nâsîf Pasha.' He died in 1813 or 1814 and not in 1808/9 as 
Schatkowski Schilcher believes {Families, p. 136-7). Unlike Nasûh Pasha, 
'Abdallah Pasha belonged to the Damascene branch of the family. 
69. The chronicler Dimashqî {Hawâdith, p. 50-62) described the wâlîs of the time 
as 'adii (just) or sâhib harakât (energetic). Sâlih Pasha (see below), who had a 
leading aghâ of the Maydân executed, is characterized as just, gentle and in-
telligent. Hasan (p. 153-65) also judges them favourably. 
70. Shattî, Rawd, p. 89-90,129-30, and 199-203. See also Schatkowski Schilcher, 
Families, p. 119. 
71. See for the tribal incursions §1.5. 
72. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 607-8. 
73. Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 636-8; Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 62; SMH 43, p. 197-8, 27 
Rajab 1233, lists the personal belongings which Mullû Ismâ'îl left to his wife 
Zaynab; SMH 43, p. 213, early Sha'bân 1233, a copy oí a firman ordering the 
banishment of the Mulliyya and Barâziyya, as the two households were 
known, and p. 214 an order to that effect from the dîwân of Damascus, dated 
24 Sha'bân 1233. 
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74. The family name Mullí occurs in a number of hujjas of the 1840s, the people 
involved include aghawât. See for the edict concerning Bâkîr Aghâ SMH 49, 
p. 234, dated 1242. 
75. Shihâb, LM¿wd/t, p. 638. 
76. SMH 43, p. 242, 3 Ra№ II 1234 (Muhammad Aghâ al-Jundî replaces the 
deceased Salîm Bey); p. 254,11 Jumada I 1237 (reappointing 'Abd al-Qâdir 
Bey); p. 68,1 Rabr 11239 (appointing Sulaymân Bey); SMH 49, 12 Ra№ II 
1240 (appointing Muhammad Bey). 
77. In afirman 'Abdallah Pasha was accused of having made common cause with 
the Druzes, the Sltfis, Nusayrîs and with '"arab culprits", SMH 43, 314-5,30 
Ramadan 1237. In fact the governor of Acre had fallen out with the governor 
of Damascus over the control of Nablus district and the financing of the hajj, 
see for the rebellion of 'Abdallah Pasha, Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 710-39; Hasan, p. 
167-80; Mashâqa, Mashhad, p. 125. 
78. During the revolt the wall of Damascus, Muhammad Darwîsh Pasha, formally 
replaced 'Abdallah Pasha until he himself was dismissed and succeeded by 
Mustafa Pasha, who acted as wait of Damascus, Sidon and Tripoli. After a 
settlement had been negotiated 'Abdallah Pasha was reinstalled as wall of 
Sidon, but the districts of Yafa and Gaza were attached to Damascus. 
79. In 1814, for example, he acted as mutasallim of Tripoli and contributed to the 
campaign against the Fad'ân and Sibâ', see §4.8 above. 
80. In a later firman the, then late, Sulaymân Pasha is referred to as former wall 
of Tripoli; SMH 49, ρ 70,15 Rabf II1240. 
81. See §2.3, note 25. 
82. Shihâb, Lubnân, ρ 712,756-7. For the excerpts of the letters of appointment, 
see Khûrî, Barbar, p. 192-3. 
83. Yannî, Sûriyâ, p. 418-9; Khûrî, Barbar, 193-4; Shihâb, Lubnân, p. 756-7. 
Muhammad 'Alî Pasha of Egypt contacted 'Abdallah Pasha of Acre, express-
ing his conviction that Mustafa Aghâ Barbar had no hand in the events, see 
Mahßzat, vol. 1, p. 63. 
84. SMH 49, p.58,17 Ramadan 1240. 
85. Like Mullû Ismâ'îl, Faraj Aghâ is still remembered by some of the elderly in 
the Hama area. According to some he was 'arab extraction, but others believe 
that he was of Kurdish origin. 
86. SMH 49, p. 155,14 Shawwâl 1241. 
87. SMH 49, p. 275-6,17 Muharram 1244 (four orders from the wait Sâlih Pasha 
to Faraj Aghâ); p. 278,27 Muharram 1244. 
88. SMH 49, p. 278, 27 Muharram 1244 (reappointment of 'Abd al-Wahhâb 
Efendi following a petition). See for the non-local qâdîs, SMH 49, p. 109, 3 
Jumâdâ 11241; and p. 271,17 Muharram 1244. 
89. SMH 49, p. 239 and 242,30 Muharram 1245; p. 265,11 Rabf 11245. For the 
tabulation of the amounts levied on top of the legal taxes, see SMH 49, p. 
250-3, dated early Safar 1245. Refer for details to §6.10. 
90. SMH 49, p. 238, [Muharram] 1245. It concerned a certain 'Alfcâdeh al-Sharîf 
'Uthmân Efendi. 
91. SMH 49, p. 324, [Ra№ I] 1245 and p. 356, [Rajab] 1245. 
92. SMH 49, p. 265,11 Rabf I 1245. 
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93. SMH 49, p. 357,15 Rajab 1245. 
94. Shihâb (Lubnân, p. 787-90) claims that half of the population of Aleppo, 
Hama and Horns perished, most likely a highly inflated estimate. 
95. The figures in table 1 should be used with caution. The data used for В are in­
complete and only serve as an indication. For the figures concerning the num­
ber oîfaddân (see on this land measure §5.5) an error margin of at least 10% 
seems appropriate because the registration of the number oîfaddân was not 
always conducted with care. 
96. See SMH 48, p. 47, p. 63, p. 100, p. 225, p. 276, p. 306 (all cases in the period 
1818-1821). 
97. SMH 49, p. 199,1 Jumâdâ 11242. 
98. SMH 43, p. 354,20 Ra№ 11238. 
99. SMH 49, p. 468,20 Sha'bân 1247. 
100.Maybe with the exception of the occupation by the Nusayrî Rasâlina clan of 
the Ismâ'îlî fortress village of Misyâf in 1808 (see §4.7 above), but this conflict 
did not affect the core agricultural area. 
101 Apart from investigating the finances of Faraj Aghâ, Sulaymân Aghâ was to 
see to the return of peasants to their villages, SMH 49, p. 224, [Muharram] 
1245. 
102.See for the revolt in Horns in 1826, As'ad, Hims, vol. 2, p. 370, see on the 
Damascus revolt below. 
103.Schilcher Schatkowski {Families p. 40) believes it concerned "a personal levy 
on Muslims". Her sources, however, clearly say that it was a levy on shops and 
warehouses, see Mudhakkirât, p. 23 and Hawâdith, p. 77. According to Mu-
dhakJdrât the safyan was to be collected on a monthly basis. The original 
meaning oí safyan is a yearly payment, salary or allocation. 
Notes to Chapter Five 
1. F.O. 195/196, n. 73, Damascus, 5 October 1842. In this consular report the 
revenue of all the districts of the provinces of Damascus, Tripoli and Sidon in 
the years 1839 and 1842 is given. The Hama district yielded about 200 % 
more than the district of Horns and 30 % more than the district of Nablus, 
which was the second in importance of the districts of the province of Damas-
cus. For the earlier decades no such figures are at hand, but the figures given 
by Cohen (Palestine, table 5 and 7) for the province of Sidon for the late 18th 
century suggest that Hama was even in those days of crisis a comparably rich 
source of revenue. 
2. See on the function of the court §3.5. 
3. This chapter is primarily based upon the following tax tabulations and regula-
tions: SMH 46, p. 74-6,15 Ra№ 11203 (1788); SMH 43, p. 153, dated 1220 
[Jumâdâ I] (1805); SMH 43,174-187,7,15 and 19 Ra№ 11233 (1818); SMH 
49, p. 326-9,23 Rabr 11245 (1829). The evacuation of Syria by the troops of 
Muhammad 'All Pasha was followed by a comparison between the traditional 
fiscal regime and that of the Egyptians: SMH 51, p. 316-7, undated 
[Ramadan 1257], which includes the figures for 1248 (1832-3) and 1256 
(1840-1) and SMH 51, p. 425-8, dated Jumâdâ 11257 (1841). Numerous ref-
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erences to taxes are to be found in other documents as well. The identification 
of taxes was at times troublesome due to missing or illegible (mainly due to 
mildew) lines. 
In the literature on the Syrian provinces little attention has been paid to local 
taxation, except for the 16th century, mainly concerning Palestine (Mantran et 
Sauvaget, Règlements, Heyd, Documents, Lewis, Land tenure; Cohen and 
Lewis, Population, Abdulfattah and Hütteroth, Historical, Venzke, Tithe (on 
Aleppo), see also Murphy, Regional). Useful for the period under regard are 
Cohen, Palestine and Rafeq, Land tenure, albeit that the latter deals with the 
1840s when some changes in the fiscal system had occurred. Given regional 
variation in taxation studies on other parts of the empire (for example Egypt) 
are only helpful to some extent. 
4. Only the rates of some major impositions like the mal muqâta'a, the qism and 
the 'awâyid had changed. The rates and the methods of assessment of the ta-
kâlîfpnor to 1818 arc obscure. See for these impositions below. 
5. Especially in the case of the extraordinary taxes (see below) several general 
terms were used: bad-i hava, khcarj or khawârij, tarh anajawâyih. 
6. It is true that some taxes were abolished after the Ottomans had taken pos-
session of the Arab provinces, but others were adopted from their Mamlûk 
predecessors. The fiscal regime which prevailed in Syrian provinces during the 
16th century appears to have been less complicated than that in later periods, 
but our knowledge of the local fiscal regime in the 16th century is largely 
derived from the central archives. The central authorities were obviously less 
concerned about the local differentiation. It is unlikely that the highly differ-
entiated fiscal regime of the Hama district was unique. In the late 18th cen-
tury Egypt many dozens of different impositions existed, see 'Abd al-Rahîm, 
Rif. 
7. For example, in Lebanon the tarh constituted a tax resting on silk (see van 
Leeuwen, Notables, p. 268), but even though silk was taxed in the Hama area, 
the tarh is never used in that context. 
8. Excluding a number of officials who were engaged in the hajj and paid from 
the treasury. These officials were not part of the local of provincial adminis-
tration, but functioned within the central institutions of the state, see below. 
9. See for the organization and financing of the hajj, Barbir, Rule, Chapter 
Three. 
10. The 'tdiyya refers to the 'id al-adhâ, the feast of Immolation. The bashâyir, 
good tidings, and salâmiyya, the safe return (from the Hijâz to Damascus), 
may have been identical. 
11. Occasionally the murattabât and miri were referred to jointly as qist sultani, 
the sultan's share, see for example SMH 43, p. 357, Rabf 11238. 
12. See on categories of landholding, Rafeq, Problems. 
13. The real estate was referred to as musaqqafât and probably included commer-
cial and industrial properties only. 
14. Respectively the Orson, the ktslak (winter pasture fee) and qayziyya (summer 
pasture fee), the a'dâd mâ'iz, and the ghafr. 
15. The separate duties are referred to as bag. Unfortunately, the records contain 
no figures on the total amounts of the rusûmât collected. The relative impor-
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tance of these charges is likely to have been small, given the low rates, for in-
stance 1 q. for each camel or cow. 
16. See §1.6. 
17. These fees are often referred to as awârid in the literary sources. Although 
these fees are known to have pressed hard upon the population, few details 
are known for other parts of Syria. Cohen {Palestine, p. 224-6) found some 
references to the tax {'awâyidât), but failed to identify it. 
18. SMH 46, p. 75-7,21 RabP 11203. The secondary crops are called shakâyir. 
19. The muhassil was entrusted with the collection of the taxes payable to the 
treasury by local tax farmers. In the letters of appointment the wait directed 
the mutasallim of Hama to the tahsîl al-amwâl, the collection of the taxes. 
The term muhassil as such is not used in the Hama records. The only refer-
ence to the fâyid in the Hama records for the period within a specific context 
is SMH 49, p. 468, 20 Sha'bân 1247. It concerns an additional amount of 
wheat and barley charged on top of the amounts of seeds which had been dis-
tributed over the villages earlier and had been repaid by the villagers. 
20. See for numerous, but confusing, references to the fâyid Cohen, Palestine; 
Shaw, Old and New; 'Abd al-Rahîm, Rtf. The term fäyid was sometimes used 
interchangeably with damm, another very broad term, see §5.5.1 below. 
21. There is no direct evidence in the Hama records that such payments were 
made by the mutasallim to the wâlî. The only clear indication that the 
"ubûdiyya was indeed such a payment comes from Shihâb {Lubnân, p. 581) 
who writes that Amîr Sultan Harfûsh paid 200,000 q. as "ubûdiyya to Sulay-
mân Pasha in order to be appointed to Ba'albak, certainly a strong token of 
servitude. In 1829 the village sheikhs of the district declared before the court 
that they had paid the "ubûdiyya, along with some other impositions, to Faraj 
Aghâ. SMH 49, ρ 242, [Muharram 1245]. Cohen {Palestine, p. 226) did find 
references to the tax, but, for lack of a better alternative, defines the tax liter­
ally; namely, a slave tax, but he does suggest that it may have served to express 
loyalty to the sultan. See also §6.5. 
22. The high amount of 200,000 paid by Amîr Sultán (see the previous note) to 
obtain the much smaller Ba'albak district gives an indication of the magnitude 
of the "ubûdiyya. The amount of taxes resting upon the qassâbkhâna of Hama 
in 1795 amounted to 12,000 q. of which 8250 q. mm and 3750 q. "ubûdiyya, 
see SMH 46, p. 237-8, dated Ramadan 1210. A similar ratio occurs in some 
excerpts from tax farm contracts from the 'Akkâr region in Usui, p. 26. 
23. One misriyya out of every qirsh, there are 40 misriyya in a qirsh. 
24. The 'awna may have been a tax payable in lieu of forced labour services. In 
Egypt the tax was a component of the barraní charges, levied to cover the ex-
penses of local government, 'Abd al-Rahîm, Rif, p. 132. 
25. When the taxes resting upon a village, etc., were farmed out, the word 
muqâta'a was never used. The collection of the taxes of a village was given in 
iltizâm to an individual, see for example SMH 48, p. 276, [Rajab 1236]. 
26. In the tabulation of 1829 the Jewish quarter was simply referred to as [the 
rents of] the mahallat al-mtrt. Why this quarter was state-owned is open to 
speculation. Maybe the slate had taken possession of the houses after its 
Jewish occupants had migrated, see §1.2. 
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27. Given the broad application of the term it seems doubtful that the increase of 
amounts labelled damm correlated to an increase in productivity of certain 
muqâta'as, as Cohen (Palestine, p. 211-6) believes. He states that, contrary to 
the mîrî, the damm (zamm) figures reveal economic trends. However, the dis-
tinction between the two is blurred. The increase of damm payments by Jaz-
zâr Pasha to the central state is more likely to have been related to the 
financial demands of sultan Selim III who also initiated some fiscal reforms, 
see on these reforms Shaw, Old and new. 
28. The tabulation of 1818 distinguished between mîrî qadîm and damm al-mìrì. 
The tabulation of 1829 distinguished between asl al-matlûb and mtnmurat-
tab. In 1795 the mal muqâta'at qassâbkhânâ included damm for an amount of 
250 q., see SMH 46, p. 237-8, Ramadan 1210. 
29. The faddân, or span (Turkish gift), was not a fixed square measure. Its magni-
tude depended upon the quality of the soil, the availability of water for irriga-
tion and some other factors. According to Anderlind (Ackerbau, p.54) the 
Hama area was unique in that a double faddân was also used. He writes that 
the ploughing season in Hama comprised 28 days (in the early 19th century). 
In other areas of Syria the faddân often represented the amount of land 
which could be ploughed in one day. Scattered data in the Hama records con-
firm that such a double faddân existed. (SMH 48, p.46; 55, p. 330-3; 59, p. 27-
8; 60, p. 297; 63, p. 435) However, even more variation in the faddân 
occurred, not only "four cows" or two span faddân are mentioned, but also 
"six cows" and "eight cows" faddân. To make matters even more complicated 
there is even one reference to a plot of land of four faddâns of fourteen cows, 
or 3.5 cows per faddân. People also distinguished between the species of cows 
used, for example faddân baqar shâmî. The strong baqar shâmî, or Syrian 
cow, was not the most common cow in the Hama district. The smaller, but 
hardy baqar qalítí or anâdûlî was more common, see also Kurd 'A1Î, Khitat, 
vol. 4, p. 185-6. 
30. Mantran et Sauvaget, Règlements p. 5; Lewis, Studies, p. 484; Venzke, Tithe, 
p. 260-1. 
31. Prior to 1788 the rates had been higher. The expression used was: two (or 
one) out of every six (or seven or eight) habba, grain, see SMH 46, p. 74-75, 
15 Rabr 11203; SMII43, p. 384,13 Shawwâl 1214. 
32. In 1818 the winter camping (hslak) was 5 q. per tent. The summer camping 
fee (qayziyya) is listed in tax tabulations, but no rates are given. 
33. Raymond, Artisans, vol. 2, p. 505-82; Marcus, Middle East, p. 162-77; Rafeq, 
Mazâhir. 
34. In the literature no reference was found to the division into asnâf and hiraf. 
35. The hiraf mentioned are the tahhâna (millers), the kayyâla (corn measures), 
the saqqâya (water carriers), the nahhâla (bee-keepers), the makâriyya 
(muleteers), sabbâghîn (dyers) and the unidentified raddâda. The division of 
labour along confessional lines appears to have been manifest in Hama, be-
cause the khwâjkiyya (Christian gentlemen) and nasârâ (Christians in general) 
are entered in the list of Hraf instead of their occupational qualities. In the 
early Ottoman period Hamawî Christians worked, among others, as 
goldsmiths, blacksmiths, silk weavers, doctors and dyers, see Rafeq, Mazâhir, 
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p. 37. The basatine (market gardeners) were referred to as jatnâ'a or tâyifa, 
both broad designations. They paid takalifa& well. 
36. Three insignificant occupational groups were liable to mîrî only, the fisher-
men, stnngmakers and drummers, see above. 
37. Rafeq, Mazâhir, p. 28. 
38. SMH, 46, p. 237-8, dated Ramadan 1210. 
39. The qism collected in 1246 in Hamawf makkùk (= 16 shunbul and 1 shunbul 
equals 3.5 kayl Islâmbûlt). Cash value according to official prices. Source 
SMH 49, p. 449-50,15 Rajab and 15 Jumâdâ 11247. 
320 makkùk wheat = 76,800 q. 
163 „ barley = 20,864 q. 
47.5 „ dura = 6,840 q. (sorghum). 
24 „ kirsinna = 4,224 q. (related to lentils, fodder). 
30.5 „ chickpeas = ? 
8.5 „ lentils = ? 
40. The year 1248 (1832/3) has been selected because it is the only year for which 
total amounts of levies for support of office-holders are known. Note that 
years given in tax tabulations relate to mâlî or shamshî year, a solar year 
beginning in March. 
41. SMH 46, p. 376, 15 Ramadan 1214. In 1244 the official prices of wheat and 
barley were identical to those of 1247, see SMH 49, p. 322,29 Jumâdâ 11244 
and p. 450, 15 Jumâdâ 11247. The market value of a makkùk of wheat fluc-
tuated between 190 q. and 640 q. in the early 1820s and between 700 q. and 
1120 q. in the 1830s. 
42. In 1851 the French consular agent in Hama estimated that the rural popula-
tion in the Hama district numbered 60,000, which seems deflated. He put the 
urban population at 35,000 to 40,000 see ADN/CE, Beyrouth, с 44,8 March 
1851, Tripoli. 
43. SMH 43, p. 161,4 Ramadan 1221. 
44. Only two maqtû' villages were fairly sizable, the remainder were hamlets and 
farms. There is no reference to timar* in the Hama records for the relevant 
period. Research in the earlier records may reveal the reason for the lenient 
treatment of this category. 
45. For the year 1830 this meant that they paid qism to the value of about 60 q. 
per faddân, but when the market value of the crop collected as qism is fol-
lowed, this amount should be tripled or even quadrupled. 
46. Two years earlier the quantity of cereals stocked in the granary was less than 
half of the amounts collected in 1830, but it is uncertain if the stock repre-
sented the qism of the year 1828. In 1825 the granary contained considerably 
more. In that year an amount of cereals for the value of 95,040 q. was taken 
from the granary of Hama by the wall See SMH 49, p. 222, 29 Jumâdâ I 
1244; p. 107,25 Rabr II1241; p. 114,11 Jumâdâ 11241. 
47. Mantran et Sauvaget, Règlements, p. 76. 
48. See table 1: hâsil 42 %, qutuniyyât 46 %, Turcoman 48 % and maqtû', Jabal 
Gharbîand 'arab tribes all 55 %. 
49. E.I.2,voI.II,p.563-4. 
50. SMH 49, p. 83,5 Muharram 1241. 
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51. The last reassessment had taken place in 1824 when the rate was augmented 
by no less then 50 %; tartîb qadîm 9610 + dämm of the year 1240 4805 = 
14,415. This increase corresponds with the rates given in E.I. 2 vol. II, p. 364. 
In 1828 the jizya payable by the two large christian villages of Mharda and 
Kafr Buhum, amounted to 450 q. and 350 q. respectively, constituting about 2 
% of the total amount of taxes resting upon these villages. 
52. E.I.2, vol. II, p. 562. As a rule the jizya was remitted to the treasury in Istan-
bul and administrated by the qâdî on the local level. Whether this was the 
practice in early 19th century Hama is doubtful. The scarcity of references to 
the tax in the court records suggests that the qâdî was hardly involved in its 
collection. The edict of 1825 was addressed to the mutasallim and the inclu-
sion of the khidmat jizya, an administration fee, in the district's tax tabulations 
may indicate that the provincial authorities were in charge of its administra-
tion. The 1825 edict was signed by the qâyimmaqâm of Tripoli, the province 
of which Hama may formally still have been part. 
53. In 1818 three rural waqf estates in the near vicinity of Hama were exempted 
for one third of the mâlfaddân. The village Tayyibat al-Gharbiyya, belonging 
to the waqf of the Sayyidnâ Khâlid (ibn al-Walîd) mosque in Horns, was the 
only village in the relatively prosperous southern Wa'r which secured tax ex-
emptions. The dignitaries referred to are the muftì, the naqîb, and two 
sheikhs. Salîm Bey al-'Azm acted as mutasallim in this year; SMH 43, p. 187, 
15 Rabr 11233. 
54. The impositions jawâyih and sawâyib are referred to occasionally. Both terms 
translate to "calamities". See'for example SMH 43, 254, 11 Jumâdâ I 1237, 
and p. 357, late Rabf I 1238. However, jawâyih was also used in the broad 
meaning of "extraordinary tax", possibly because calamities were common. 
55. Sometimes the equivalent dhukhra was used. 
56. See for a list of twenty different items ordered by the newly appointed wait 
'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm who was preparing to leave for Damascus; SMH 43, 
p. 231,9 Jumâdâ 11210. 
57. SMH 43, p. 82,11 Safar 1215. 
58. SMH 43, p. 235, dated 1233 and p. 131,29 [?] 1217. 
59. SMH 49, p. 442-3, 29 Rabf I 1247 Occasionally reference is made to the sa-
fariyya, a well-known charge levied to finance war efforts, but no details are 
given about its magnitude. 
60. The following is based upon: SMH 46, p. 277,13 Dhû al-Qa'da 1213; p. 312, 
11 Rabr II 1214; p. 353,11 Dhû al-Qa'da 1213; p. 354, 10 Dhû al-Hijja 1213; 
p. 357-9, 1 Rabr II 1214; p. 360, 28 Ra№ II1214; p. 365, 24 Jumâdâ I 1214; 
p. 369, dated 1214; p. 376, 15 Ramadan 1214; SMH 43, p. 734, 19 
Muharram 1215; p. 82,11 Safar 1215; p. 84,15 and 19 Safar 1215; p. 85-6,27 
Safar 1215; p. 934,12 Rabí* II1215. 
61. This amount comprised a sum of 13,125 q. labelled dhukhra, 12,756 q. 
labelled darâhim dhakhira and 15,670 q., the value of sheep collected "in ad-
dition to the dhakhira". 
62. Apparently part of the deficit was financed from other sources, because even-
tually 118,628 q was imposed on the district. 
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63. The deficit nearly equalled the income of the treasury in the district in 1805, 
SMH 43, p. 153, dated 1220. 
64. The rent of 667 camels for the transport of the provisions had been imposed 
upon the district. The rent of one camel was assessed at 50 q. The total 
amount of rent imposed upon Hama was 33,350 q. Nearby Horns had to 
supply another 333 camels and Damascus 1,000. SMH 43, p. 73-4, 19 
Muharram 1215 and p. 82,11 Safar 1215. 
65. See Inalale, Centralization, p. 49. Not all names are given in the Hama re-
cords, and when individuals are named it is often only by their given name and 
title. In 1799 several people were lumped together as arbâb nuqûd, the 
wealthy. A document dealing with arrear payments states that the mubâya'ajî 
paid the "following a)rân", among them two members of the Kaylânî family 
and the merchant family al-Hâjj Zayn, see SMH 43, p. 119,11 Rabi* 1217. 
66. SMH 43, p. 345,7 Safar 1238. 
67. Demands during campaigns against 'Abdallah Pasha. 
wheat/flour ca. 160 таккйк camels 100 
barley ca. 590 таккйк mules 150 
sheep 3667 
source: SMH 43, p. 323, 27 Shawwâl 1237, p. 335, end of Dhû al-Hijja 1237, 
and p. 20,7 Safar 1238. 
68. SMH 49, p. 364,12 Ramadan 1245. No figures are given for the villages, the 
rural muqâta'as and the tribes. SMH 49, p. 230,19 and 27 Rajab 1242, on the 
extra charge on the gttmrilk dukhân. 
69. Conscription was a clear innovation, and first introduced by Muhammad 'All 
Pasha in Egypt. In the past villagers were occasionally mobilized. In 1746, for 
example, As'ad Pasha al-'Azm demanded 15 men from each village to sup-
port his efforts to establish his authority over Jabal Lubnân. In 1753 he re-
cruited 1,100 villagers to campaign against 'arab in the Balqâ (Jordan), see 
Budayrî, Dimashq, p. 97 and 176. 
70. SMH 49, p. 242, 25 Muharram 1245, and p. 261, 17 Safar 1245. In full 
badal{iyyat) anfâr 'oskar al-Muhammadiyya, referring to the new standing 
army, the Muallem-i Asakir-i Mansiire-i Muhammadiye, The Trained Vic-
torious Soldiers of Muhammad. 
71. Later in the 19th century the villagers reckoned with one crop failure in every 
five years; ADN/CE, Beyrouth, с 132, Hama, 25 August 1883. 
Notes to Chapter Six 
1. Owen, World, p. 11. 
2. See for a general discussion of taxation Eisenstadt, Systems, p. 123-6; Tilly, 
Coercion, 87-9. 
3. Russell, Aleppo, vol. 1, p. 315-6. Alexander Russell worked as a physician for 
the British factory in Aleppo until 1753. 
4. See for the financial base of the pilgrimage Barbir, Rule, p. 110-25. The 
amount of revenue allocated to the pilgrimage in 1796 was identical to that of 
1764. 
5. ibid, p. 118-9 and 125. 
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6. This was acknowledged by the central authority, Thomas, Naima, p. 88. 
7. See Introduction. The economy of the empire can be defined as a peasant 
economy, which means that most production takes place in agriculture and 
that the peasant household constitutes the dominant unit of production. The 
household in peasant economies produces first and foremost to satisfy its sub-
sistence needs and has an in-built reluctancy to produce a surplus. Structures 
of kinship, religion and/or political power provide the stimulus to surplus pro-
duction and its distribution, see Sunar, State, p. 65-8. See for the concept of 
the peasant economy, Thorner, Peasant. 
8. Islamoglu-Inan, Peasants, p. 58-64. 
9. According to the shar' (religious law) peasants were free to leave their land. 
Within the religious establishment opposition existed to the forced return of 
peasants and fining of fugitive peasants, see Seikaly, Land, p. 404-5 and Abdel 
Nour, Traits, p. 75; Aladdin, Fatwâ-s, p. 18-20. 
10. See Rafeq, Land tenure, p. 382. The remaining fief (timar) holders in the 
countryside of Damascus shared this interest, see Rafeq, Economic relations, 
p. 668. See also Hansen, Economic model. When peasants had left their land 
and ceased paying taxes (ta'attul al-miri), others could occupy the land and 
claim its usufruct, see SMH 48J p. 276, [Rajab 1236]. 
11. This was embedded in the ideal of the Bounds, see Introduction. 
12. See, for example, the appointment of a bas in the case of the butchers and 
bakers, §5.7. 
13. See Inalcik, Empire, p. 128,132,137 and Shaw, Empire, I, p. 60,120, and 159. 
14. Rafeq, Economic relations, p. 657-8. 
15. Rafeq, Province, p. 203. 
16. See Budayrf, Dimashq, p. 74 and 157. When As'ad Pasha was removed to 
Aleppo, he soon gained popularity, because he lowered the price of wheat and 
supplied the city from his own granaries. When after some months the news 
spread that he was appointed to Sivas, people demonstrated against his depar-
ture. See Russell, Aleppo, vol. 1, p. 341 and 404. 
17. Cohen, Palestine, p. 21-3; Gibb and Bowen, Islamic Society, vol.1, p. 67-8; 
Philipp, Social structure, p. 98, p. 102. 
18. In 1786 he was replaced after Damascenes had petitioned the Porte on the 
imposition of a monopoly on wheat, see §4.2. 
19. In Aleppo similar attempts were made, for example by the establishment of 
the monopoly of wheat by Khûrshîd Pasha in 1820, see Bodman, Factions, p. 
28. 
20. Owen, World, p. 64-76; al-Sayyid Marsot, Muhammad Ali, p. 145-60. 
21. In 1786, for example, the wait of Damascus, Ibrahim Deli Pasha, instructed 
the mutasallim of Hama to contract loans from the population following an 
order from the Porte, SMH 46, p. 123, [Rajab] 1201. 
22. Hasan, p. 68-70. The loans enforced on the 'Azms and their associates 
totalled 300,000 q. The then mutasallim of Hama, either 'Abd al-Rahmân 
Bey al-'Azm or 'Uthmân Aghâ al-Jundî, had also been forced to make a loan 
(of 40,000 q.). 
23. See for example Murâdî(S/№, I, p. 224) for the exile of three religious digni­
taries from Damascus after they had opposed the forcing of loans by the wait. 
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24. Hasan, p. 23-4. 
25. Rafeq, Province, p. 15; Cohen, Palestine, p. 166. It concerned a reintroduction 
of the custom, see Bakhit, Damascus, p. 162. 
26. Russell, Aleppo, vol. 2, p. 316. 
27. SMH 46, p. 330-1, 8 Sha'bân 1213 (Ibrâhîm Deli Pasha had acted as watt 
from 1786 to 1790); SMH 46, p. 352,13 Safar 1213 (on Muhammad Darwîsh 
Pasha). 
28. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic society, vol. 2, p. 47. 
29. Rafeq, Province, p. 180-1 una Economic relations, p. 669-72. 
30. The use and abuse of the waqf system in Cairo resembled that of Damascus, 
see al-Sayyid Marsot, Wealth, p. 206-9. 
31. See §2.2. 
32. Budayrî, Dimashq, p. 57-9 (Sulaymân Pasha), p. 219 (As'ad Pasha), p. 235 
(Sa'd al-Dín Pasha); Burayk, Shâm, p. 70-1 (As'ad Pasha). 
33. SMH 46, p. 360, 28 Ra№ II 1214. In this year, 1799, the awqâf of As'ad 
Pasha were exempted from further impositions levied in support of the war 
efforts. See also the (abstract of the) waqfiyya of 'Abd al-Qâdir Efendi al-Кау-
lânî §3.7 in which several references to the waqf of As'ad Pasha occur. 
34. Burayk, S/iôm, p. 71. 
35. The Ottoman word for networking, or patronage relations, is intisab. Al-
though the central authorities are presented as one body in this chapter, the 
ruling elite of Istanbul comprised—often unstable—conflicting factions, each 
with its own intisab. See Shaw, Empire, p. 166 and 170; Findley, Bureaucratic, 
p. 34,39 and 121; Barbir, Rule, p. 39. 
36. In their correspondence with the sultan governors normally opened with the 
confirmation of their servitude or devotion to him (ott. ubudiyyet, ar. 
iibudiyya). The payments were referred to a hediye (ar. hadiyya), see for ex-
ample Mahßzat, I, p. 95. 
37. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic society, vol. 2, p. 6 and 48-9. Impressed by the ap-
parent venality of the fiscal laws, the authors hesitate to acknowledge the le-
gality of the presents and the impositions imposed to finance them. 
38. See §6.1. 
39. 'Abd аг-Rahîm, Rîfi Gibb and Bowen, Islamic society, vol. 2, p. 60. 
40. See on the \ibudiyya §5.4. Cohen {Palestine, p. 212-4 and 238) believes that 
the presents paid by Jazzâr Pasha constituted voluntary payments and identi-
fies, in my view wrongly, the entire damm of the province with these transac-
tions. 
41. MahßzcU, vol. 1, p. 95, n. 231 (15 Muharram 1243). 
42. Cohen, Palestine, p. 237-8. 
43. Gibb and Bowen, Islamic society, vol. 2, p. 110-1. 
44. See §4.3. 
45. The defterdar served from 1736 until 1746, Fathî al-Falâqinsî, used the office 
in his struggle for power with the 'Azms. He was executed and not imitated by 
others in later years. See Rafeq, Province, p. 149-54 and 164-9; Barbir, Rule, 
p. 86-9. 
46. Non-resident high officials occasionally enjoyed the leasehold of a cluster of 
villages or even small districts in return for, mainly military, services to the sul-
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tan. The leasehold of expensive, but lucrative tax farms, like the gumruk (cus-
tomhouse), could also be granted to the grandees of the state. 
47. See Darbir, Rule, p. 118. 
48. 'Abbûd Bahrî is an older brother of the most famous scion of this family, 
Hannâ Bahrî the financial aide of Ibrâhîm Pasha, the son of Muhammad 'Ali 
Pasha of Egypt. Their father, Mikhâ'il Bahrî already had a career in the serv-
ice of Dâhir al-'Umar of the Galilee, and Jazzâr Pasha. 'Abbûd started his 
career in the province of Sidon. He moved to Damascus when Sulaymân 
Pasha was appointed to Sidon. He became one of the closest associates of 
'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm. 'Abbûd also served under Kunj Yûsuf Pasha, al-
though their relation was strained due to the efforts of Kunj Yûsuf to convert 
'Abbûd to Islam. In 1810 they fled to Egypt together. 'Abbûd continued his 
career as kâtib, now to the dîwân of Egypt, see Dimashqî, Hawâdith, p. 36; 
As'ad, Hints, vol. 2, p. 392-3; Philipp, Syrians, p. 25 and 65. 
49. It is unclear whether this was still the custom after 1826. In an edict of that 
year on the military reform of the provinces following the abolition of the 
janissary corps, it is stated that "... not the entire [revenue of the] province of 
Damascus is allocated to the organization of the hajj, but only that of the dis-
tricts of Jerusalem and Nablus". See Mahfûzât, vol. 1, p. 75. However, it may 
be that the llama and Horns districts were still considered to be parts of the 
province of Tripoli. 
50. For example, the villages of Nîsâf, Haydariyya, Kafr Kamra and Khirbat al-
'Awj in, and near, the Jabal Gharbî and 'Aqrab and Akrâd Ibrâhîm in the 
southern Wa'r, see SMH 48, p. 276 [Rajab 1236]; SMH 49, p. 345, 13 Ju-
mada II1245 and p. 483, p. 483,25 Dhû al-Qa'da 1248. 
51. SMH 43, p. 120,26 [?] 1217. The Turcoman villages in question are referred 
to as those of which the taxes were not guaranteed. The multazims of the re-
maining Turcoman villages are referred to as arbâb, the owners (of the tax 
farm). 
52. For instance, the Ismâ'flî headman of the muqâta'a of Misyâf, Mîr Mulhim, 
had lost his traditional rights, at least temporarily, to Khalil Àghâ Jijaklî in the 
early 1820s, SMH 43, p. 33,1 Sha'bân 1238. In the late 1820s the muqâta'a of 
Turcoman Hazûr was farmed by an aghâ of Maghribi origin, SMH 49, p. 333, 
22 Rabr 11245. 
53. The villages of Tayyibat al-A'lâ, Misîn, and Tall al-Râm had been in the lease-
hold for life of Muhammad Efendi al-Murâdî, the secretary of the dîwân of 
Damascus since 1786 until 1799 (SMH 46, 355, 5 Ramadan 1213). In 1805 
'Abdallah Pasha al-'Azm granted the malikane of al-Jannân to his relative 
Nasûh Pasha (SMH 43, p. 153-4,9 Jumâdâ I 1220). These malikanes had in 
common that they concerned villages which suffered from depopulation. 
54. See for example SMH 43, p. 254,11 Jumâdâ 11237, the dîwân granting of the 
iltizâm of the village of Dayr al-Salîb and its satellite farms (mazra'as) to 
Muhammad Râghib Bey (al-'Azm j . In 1805 the waff'Abdallâh Pasha al-'Azm 
ordered the mutasallim to grant the iltizâm of villages suffering from depopu-
lation to any interested party, see next note. 
55. SMH 43, p. 154, 9 Jumâdâ II 1220. 
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56. See also the granting of the malikane of the villages mentioned in note 49 
above. 
57. Singular bid'a, and, although hardly used in the documents, in full bid'a 
mudirra, the Islamic term for an innovation which runs contrary to the (spirit 
of the) law. See for example SMH 46, p. 215, 20 Ramadan 1209, one of the 
few documents in which bid'a mudarra is used. Also ihdâthât and hawâdith 
were used in this sense in several documents. 
58. The only instance in which they (i.e., the multazims) were specifically referred 
to is in an edict on the tax rates of the maqtû' villages, see SMH 43, p.179,19 
Rabr II1233. 
59. Cohen (Palestine, p. 211) remarks that not all impositions were included in 
the tax farm contracts. 
60. See for example SMH 49, p. 27,15 Rabf II1240 and p. 250, end Safar 1245. 
One of the pitfalls of the records of the sharl court concerns the formal taboo 
on charging interest. When someone addressed the court in order to recover 
a debt no reference is made to the interest accretion. 
61. When villagers, for example, had failed to meet their liabilities towards a tax 
farmer, the tax farmer had to bring the case either to the attention of the mu-
tasallim or to the court. In the court the qâdî applied the formal tax rates, see, 
for example, SMH 43, p. 357,29 Rabf 11238. 
62. See for example, SMH 49, p. 403, 22 Safar 1246, when the mutasallim, Faraj 
Aghâ, is forbidden to demand rashwa from a certain efendi, who farmed the 
taxes of one of the villages of Hisn al-Akrâd. 
63. The western travellers of the time repeated this common notion. In their ac-
counts the illegal demands are often referred to as avanias, an in origin Italian 
word, which is occasionally used in Arabic sources as well, but not in the court 
records. 
64. The qâdîs in chief in the provincial capitals regularly resorted to malversation, 
see for example Russell (Aleppo, I, p.317-20), who expresses a negative view 
on the administration of justice by this official in Aleppo. 
65. SMH 46, p. 259,13 Ramadan 1213. 
66. To give two examples: 1) the former mutasallim of Hama, and last pasha of 
the 'Azm family, Sulaymân Pasha ibn Salìm Bey, owed 78 oxen, 190 farming 
utensils (ploughs etc.) and 5 storage rooms in the village of Khân Shaykhûn 
and had another 20 oxen in partnership with a local aghâ, see SMH 49,1, 5 
Rabr I 1240. 2) Two aghâs, one of them of the Jijaklî family, entertained a 
partnership relation (sharika) with the village sheikh of 'Awj, and the capital 
sunk in the village amounted to 45,530 q., see SMH 49, p. 388, 16 Dhû al-
Hijja 1245. 
67. The landed waqf holdings were largely situated on, or near to, the banks of 
the 'Así, especially to the north of the town (Balhusayn area). However, the 
Kaylânî family also controlled waqf estates near Misyâf in the western fringe 
of the district, leasing it to locals, see SMH 43,33,1 Sha'bân 1238. 
68. In 1844 the heirs of Muhammad Bey al-'Azm (d. 1824) divided—or re-
divided—his real estate, which included 21 shops in Ma'arra, a bath, 3 shops 
and an olive orchard in Tripoli, 2 guesthouses in Horns and 2 shops in Damas-
cus, SMH 50, p. 225-6, Dhû al-Qa'da 1259. See also §3.7. 
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69. SMH 46, p. 376,15 Ramadan 1214. 
70. See §5.10. 
71. SMH 43, p. 148,28 Sha'bân 1221. 
72. SMH 46, p. 360,28 Ra№ II1214. 
73. SMH 43, p. 178,19 Rabí* II1233. 
74. See for some sharika (partnership) relations between the Jijaklîs and villagers, 
SMH, 48, p. 142,18 Jumâdâ II1235; SMH 49, p. 388,16 Dhû al-Hijja 1245. 
75. See SMH 43, p. 97, [Jumâdâ II] 1215. 
76. In 1788 the rates of the qism as well as the 'awäyid payable to the qassâmiyya 
were reduced, see SMH 46, p. 74-5, 15 Rabf I 1203. In 1818 the rates of a 
number of impositions were reduced, including the 'awäyid of the garib yigit 
agasi, tiifenkçi bast, the hamadar and the wakil al-khar], see SMH 43, p. 179-
80 and 187,19 Rabf II1233. 
77. SMH 43, p. 255 3 Jumâdâ 11237. It concerns an edict ordering the exemption 
of all impositions levied on top of the mâlfaddân and the qism. 
78. SMH 49, p. 16,3 Rabf 11240. 
79. One of the regular taxes which was increased by nearly 100 % was the i'âna, 
see SMH 49, p. 177-8, 17 Sha'bân 1241. The rates of the joya, the poll-tax 
payable by Christians and Jews, were usually adapted to the devaluation of 
the currency, as well as to the increasing financial need of the state. Compared 
to 1816 this charge had been increased by 50 % in 1824 and by 200% by 1829, 
see E.I.2, II, p. 564. 
80. The phrase "...do not charge anyone with the misriyyat al-fard other than (or 
on top of) the specified fixed amounts [of 'awäyid] mentioned previously..." 
seems to establish a relation between the misriyyat al-fard and the 'awäyid, see 
SMH 43, p. 177,19 Rabf II1233. 
81. According to Mudhakkirât (p. 67) the inhabitants of Damascus were dis-
turbed by the introduction of a poll-tax by the Egyptians in 1832, because "... 
it had been long since that the misriyyat al-fard had been taken from them." 
(The Egyptian tax was called farda). In this source misriyyat al-fard is used 
once in the meaning of an (illegal) increase of the prices on the markets in 
Damascus (p. 60). 
82. In the literature hardly any reference to the misriyyat al-fard occurs. The 
charge may have been similar to the hadriyya mentioned by Cohen {Palestine, 
p. 264-5) and defined as "a few akces from each" taken by the watt. The in-
come of Ibrahim Deli Pasha comprised misriyyat al-fard collected in the 
Hama area (SMH 46, 330-1, 8 Sha'bân 1213). This wait had prohibited the 
local qassâmiyya to levy the same charge (SMH 46, p. 74-5, 15 Rabr I 1203). 
'Abd al-Rahîm (Rîf, p. 136-8) lists a tax called fard(a) among the illegal 
charges in late 18th century Egypt. The charge is occasionally referred to as 
qirsh al-fard, see SMH 43, p. 179,19 Rabr II1233. 
83. Burckhardt, Travels, p. 147. 
84. In the late 18th century Aleppo the pay of a deli amounted to 10 q. monthly 
and that of a tiifenkçi 5 q., see Bodman, Factions, p. 23-4. In 1826 a yearly in-
come of 500 q. was considered the minimum for the upkeep of a cavalryman. 
Almost a decade later a soldier in the Egyptian army received a pay of 20 para 
(misriyya) a day (which would make 182,5 q. a year), which fell short of the 
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minimum of 1 q. needed daily to support a family, see Mahßzät, vol. 1, p. 80 
and vol. 3, 96. In the mid-19th century the ttifenkçis in Hama received a pay 
of 20 q. a month, see SMH, 53, p. 292,3 Dhû al-Hijja 1268. In 1818 the garib 
yifyt agasi was entitled to 1000 q. monthly, which would have allowed him, 
perhaps, to 40 to 60 mounted troops; the tiifenkqi bap to 750 q. monthly, per-
haps sufficient for the pay of up to 75 musketeers, see SMH 43, p. 187, [Ra№ 
I] 1233. 
85. See §4.7 and 4.8 That his presence was strongly felt and shaped local condi­
tions, is reflected by the use of the phrase "in the days of Mullû Ismâ'fl" in 
later documents, see for example SMH 48, p. 276, [Rajab] 1236. Only the 
Egyptians were later referred to in a similar way. 
86. See §4.10. 
87. SMH 49, p. 157,15 Shawwâl І241. 
88. SMH 49, p. 222,11 Rajab 1242. 
89. See for the petitions and the replies by the wâïï and qâyimmaqâm of the pro-
vince of Damascus SMH 49, p. 275-6, and p. 278, 17, [?], and 27 Muharram 
1244, and p. 239 and p. 242, late Muharram 1245. 
90. Namely in the records of the Egyptian administration of Syria, see Sâlim, 
Huhn, p. 67-8. 
91. SMH 55, 282-3, 23 Rabf I 1274 (1857); SMH 60, p. 284, 7 Rajab 1283 
(1866). 
92. Its taxes had been farmed by Muhammad 'Alî al-Kaylânî in the early 1820s, 
and possibly later, SMH 43, p. 357J 30 Ra№ 11238 and SMH 49, p. 37, 5 Ju­
mada I 1240. The relationship between the family and the village continued 
well into the 20th century. 
93. SMH 49, p. 1 and 33,15 Rabr II1240 (on Sulaymân Pasha and Muhammad 
Aghâ Qaddûr); p. 121, 13 Jumâdâ II 1241 (on Muhammad Bey (see also p. 
33 undated) and Husayn Bey); p. 251, dated 1245. The debt of Muhammad 
Bey amounted to 15,300 q. only. 
94. He was the wakîl, agent, of Faraj Aghâ in the Hama district after the latter 
had been called to higher office in the 1840s. 'Uthmân Aghâ was a member of 
the majlis of Hama in 1850, and possibly earlier, see SMH 52, p. 222,1 Rabf 
II1264; SMH 53, p. 158,30 Dhû al-Hijja 1267. 
95. SMH 43, p. 71, Rabr II, 1239. 
96. See for example SMH 46, p. 215,20 Ramadan 1209 ('Alî Aghâ, serving under 
Jazzâr Pasha); SMH 46, p. 259, 13 Ramadan 1213 ('Abdallah Aghâ al-
Mahmûd serving under Jazzâr Pasha) and, of course, Mullû Ismâ'fl. 
97. Villagers of Qumhâna complaining against Salím Bey and his successor Sulay-
mân Bey, SMH 43, p. 262,13 Jumâdâ 11237. Market gardeners complaining 
against 'Abd al-Qâdir Bey, see SMH 43, p. 32, 7 Sha'bân 1237 and p. 24, 10 
Sha'bân 1238; Silk traders complaining against 'Abd al-Qâdir Bey, see SMH 
43, p. 5, 2 Jumâdâ 11238. Note that Husayn Bey, qâyimmaqâm of Tripoli in 
1821, was also accused oîzubn, and that 'Abdallah Pasha had a reputation of 
being rapacious in Damascus. 
98. SMH 49, p. 364,12 Ramadan 1245. See on this tax §5.10. 
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1. al-Sayyid Marsot, Muhammad Ali, p. 199. 
2. See on 'Abdallah Pasha of Acre, §4.9. 
3. See §4.12. 
4. In the early 1820s Muhammad 'All Pasha had settled a debt of 'Abdallah 
Pasha to the treasury. 'Abdallah Pasha had failed to repay Muhammad 'A1Î 
Pasha. The governor of Egypt also accused his colleague in Acre of encourag-
ing smuggling between Palestine and Egypt, and of welcoming Egyptian 
peasants who had escaped conscription. A final insult had been the refusal of 
'Abdallah Pasha to supply Lebanese silkworms to him, see Sâlim, Huhn, p. 
25-42; Shihâb, Lubnân 819-72; al-Sayyid Marsot, Muhammad Ah, p. 222; 
Mahßzat, vol. 1, p. 94, p. 115, p. 119. 
5. See§¿5. 
6. According to an Egyptian report 1500 Ottomans troops were either killed or 
wounded, see Usui, vol. 2, p. 15-6. In a document reproduced in MudhakJarât 
p. 54-5 this number is repeated. 2500 troops were taken captive. Shihâb writes 
(Lubnân, p. 867) that the Ottoman troops left 4,000 tents, 4,000 pieces of ar-
tillery and abundant provisions to the Egyptians. 
7. Ma'oz, Reform, p. 12. 
8. Hofman, Administration; Abir, Local. 
9. In 1929 Sulaymân Abu 'Izz al-Dfti published his Ibrâhîm Bâshâ fi Sûriyâ in 
Beirut. However, the pioneering work on the Egyptian administration in Syria 
was conducted by As'ad Rustum, notably in his Usui (1930-34), a collection 
of, predominantly, court documents and his Mahfuzât (1940-43), a calendar 
of state papers relating to Egyptian rule in Syria. 
10. In this study the second edition of Sâlim's monograph (1990) has been used. 
11. Sâlim, Huían, p. 322. Hofman (Administration, p. 333) comes to a similar con-
clusion. 
12. The term dawla Misriyya was used in edicts emanating from the Egyptian 
government, see for example SMH 49, p. 543, [Rabí* I) 1248. 
13. Muhammad 'All Pasha recruited the key-officials from his family and his 
hometown Kavalla, see Hunter, Egypt, p. 22-5. It is of interest that low-rank-
ing and middle-ranking officers of the Egyptian army in the Syrian provinces 
were allowed to marry local girls, whereas the high-ranking officers were pro-
hibited from entering into a marriage relation with locals. Soldiers were also 
prohibited from marrying locals, because their pay was insufficient to support 
a family, see Mahfuzât, vol. 3, p. 97. 
14. See on these extraordinary taxes §5.4. 
15. The number of registered converts to Islam in Hama during the years of 
Egyptian rule does not reflect this policy; the number is congruent with that of 
the preceding and following periods: 5 Christians and one Jew (who may have 
been the last Hamawî Jew, Asian ibn Ya'qûb, see SMH 49, p. 445,20 Jumâdâ 
II1247) during 1824-1832; 6 Christians during 1833-1841; 5 Christians during 
1842-1850. 
16. MudhakJarât, p. 54. 
17. See §6.6, note 48. 
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18. The majlis of Damascus had 20 members. The majlis was also introduced in 
the smaller cities, like Hama, see §7.3 below. 
19. Sâlim,/Mm, p. 74-5. 
20. The order from Ibrahim Pasha to Mustafa Aghâ Barbar, dated 22 Rabf II 
1248, is reproduced in Khûrî, Barbar, p.' 258. See also SMH 49, p. 543, [Rabf 
I] 1248. See also Sâlim, Hukm, p. 111. 
21. See for the Syrian economy under Egyptian rule Owen, World, p. 76-80; Abir, 
Local, p. 306. 
22. In some areas nothing appears to have been remitted to the treasury in 1832, 
see Abir, Local, p. 305. 
23. Khûrî, Barbar, p. 360-70; Mahfûzât, vol. 2, p. 345. Mustafa Aghâ Barbar died 
in 1835. 
24. Mahfûzât, vol. 2, ρ 432 onward; Sâyikh, Muqtarab, f. 61-3 and 78; Âthâr, vol. 
2, f. 35-8. 
25. Abir, Local, p. 309-10. 
26. See for a description of the coercive traits of Egyptian rule, Sâyikh, Muqtarab, 
f. 78-84; Mudhakkirât, p. 76-9; Sâbûnî, Наша, p. 85. 
27. See for example the lines of sheikh 'Abd al-Ghanî al-Nâbulsî on the "weeping 
wheels", Haqîqa, p. 48. 
28. Cited from a document dated 2 Jumâdâ 11248, in Sâlim, Huhn, p. 67-8. The 
document referred to is probably a journal prepared by Hannâ al-Bahrî, see 
Mahfûzât, vol. 2, p. 154, n. 2106. 
29. See'§4'.10. 
30. SMH 49, p. 22 Rajab 1249 and p. 570,5 Dhû al-Hijja 1249. The letter of ap-
pointment of 'Abdallah Aghâ Tayfûr, dated 25 Safar 1249 is reproduced in 
Rustum, Usui, vol. 2, p. 71-2. 
31. Mahfûzât, vol. 2, p. 427. 
32. Hofman,Administration, p. 325. 
33. SMH 51, p. 206-7,17 Ra№ 11256. 
34. SMH 51, p. 277,24 Dhû al-Hijja 1256 and p. 297,7 Muharram 1257. 
35. Four members of the Kaylânî family acted as qâdî during the 1830s; Sharaf 
al-Dìn Efendi, 'Abd al-Qâdir Efendi, Ahmad Efendi and Muhammad Salîm 
Efendi. 'Abd al-Qâdir Efendi also acted for some time as naqtb, and was 
succeeded by Muhammad Tâhir Efendi after his death. The office of muftì 
was throughout the 1830s occupied by Muhammad 'Alt Efendi Kaylânfeade. 
36. For the period 1833-40 the registers contain almost nothing but hujjas, see 
Sources. Only few copies of edicts were included during these years, primarily 
letters of appointment. In the early 1840s the share of the non^Aar? docu-
ments shows a remarkable increase. 
37. Hofman, Administration, p. 330-3. 
38. Unfortunately, the Hama records contain no complete list of the membership 
of the majlis. Only occasionally reference is made to the membership of the 
majlis in hujjas, in which members or their representatives acted as shâhid al-
hâl. References to the members mentioned are; SMH 51, p. 99, 20 
Muharram 1253; p. 145, 15 Rabf 11253; p. 149, end Rabf II1253; p. 161,17 
Ramadan 1254;p. 156, 21 Dhû al-Hijja 1255. Normally, Christians were 
Notes to pages 127-141 
granted membership as well, but no reference was found to their member-
ship. 
39. See for a biography of Muhammad 'Ali Efendi, Jundî,^ 4 'lâm, vol. 2, p. 37-8. 
40. Mahfiizât, vol. 2, p. 344. 
41. According to Sâlim the farda had already been introduced by the Ottomans, 
but not in Syria, see Hukm, p. 114. Sâyikh writes that a kind of farda already 
existed, see Muqtarab, f. 77. He may be refering to the misriyyat al-fard, see 
§6.9. The farda, however, was abolished by the Ottomans in 1841, because it 
was considered bid'a, see SMH 51, ρ 425,3 Jumâdâ 11257. 
42. 84,861 q. of a total revenue of 5,269,824 q. see F.O.195/196, n. 73, Damascus, 
5 October 1842. 
43. The Ottoman authorities claimed that the amount of Vana they imposed on 
the district following the Egyptian evacuation, namely 452,048 q., constituted 
half of the amount levied in the previous year (by the Egyptians), see SMH 
51, p. 425,3 Jumâdâ 11257. See on the i'âna Sâlim, Hukm, p. 115-6. 
44. Mahfûzât, vol. 3, p. 165. The large village of Latmîn had been earmarked for 
the moderate amount of 720 q. of i'âna in 1840, see Rustum, Usui, vol. 4, p. 
203. 
45. No figures exist for the year 1832/3, therefore the figure for 1829 is used (see 
§5.8). 
1829 1840 
wheat 
barley 
dura 
kirsinna 
320 makkûk = 76,800 
163 „ = 20,864 
47.5 „ = 6,840 
24 „ = 4,224 
1076 
558.5 
35 
ardabb = 77,472 
= 20,106 
„ = 1,260 
total = 108,728 =98,838. 
The amounts of grains collected in 1840 are derived from a synopsis prepared 
by the local treasury (SMH 51, p. 316-7, [1257]). In this synopsis no official 
price is given. For lack of an alternative I have used the official prices given in 
F.O. 195/196, n. 56, Damascus, 20 July 1842. This consular report, however, 
concerns the districts of southern Palestine. It may be that the ardabb used in 
the synopsis of the Hamawî treasury for 1840 did not correspond to the use of 
this Egyptian measure in southern Palestine, but covered the local makkûk. It 
was not unusual for a "foreign" measure to be adopted, or forced upon a lo-
cality, while the actual measure remained unchanged, see for example for the 
introduction of the areal measure dunum in the late 19th century in the 
Ilawrân, Mundy, Shareholders, p. 224. When the amounts of grain collected 
in 1840 were in fact measured in local makkuks, the value of the qism for that 
year should be tripled, at the least. 
Other products collected in kind, like silk, soap, cheese, animal fat and sheep-
skins, have been excluded because of the absence of figures prior to 1840, as 
well as of official prices. The quantities were, at any rate, marginal. 
46. If the amount of nearly 800,000 q. which had been exacted by Faraj Aghâ and 
his men (see §6.10) were added to the (legal) revenue of 1830/1, the increase 
of the cash revenue by 1840 still constitutes nearly 100%. 
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47. According to a synopsis of the tax registers of Damascus, see F.0.195/196, n. 
73, Damascus, 5 October 1842. Contrary to the synopsis prepared by the local 
treasury of Hama (SMH 51, p. 316-7, [1257]) the synopsis derived from the 
provincial tax registers gives no information on the various components of the 
revenue, except for the farda. 
48. Surprisingly, the value of the amount of qism collected in 1840 shows a slight 
decrease compared to 1829. The acreage of the hâsil villages, on which the 
qism rested, showed an increase of 55% (see below). However, the magnitude 
of the qism collected in 1840, however, is uncertain, see note 45 above. 
49. Sâlim,HMkr»,p. 112. 
50. It is true that a substantial part of the remainder found its way to the imperial 
centre by way of "gifts", see §6.5. 
51. Tax farmers often failed to compensate villagers for food and fodder, and oc-
casionally imposed illegal charges, see Mahßzat, vol. 3, p. 121; Sâlim, Huhn, 
p. 118-9. 
52. See for the tax figures F.0.195/196, n. 73, Damascus, 5 October 1842. 
53. In 1842 in southern Palestine (districts of Jerusalem, Gaza, Yafa, Hebron, 
Ramla and Lidd) the net proceeds were expected to be no less than 75% of 
the total revenue of nearly 7 million q., see F.0.195/196, n. 56, Damascus, 20 
July 1842. However, the actual revenue from these district amounted to 
about 4 million q. only, see F.0.195/196, n. 73, Damascus, 5 October 1842. 
54. See for tribal policies in general Sâlim, Huhn, p. 216-9 and for the Aleppo 
area Lewis, Nomads, p. 38-9. 
55. The payment of surra to the Wuld 'Alî and the Banî Sakhr was stopped, see 
Mahfûzât, vol. 2, p. 383. 
56. SMH 49, p. 569, 2 Dhû al-Hijja 1249; Mahfûzât, vol. 2, p. 427, n. 3564 and 
3568, and vol. 3, p. 98, n. 4478. In the Mahfûzât the amîr Muhammad Aghâ, 
later Dey, Khurfân, is referred to as Muhammad "aghai khaftân (uncertain 
spelling) and head of the tribes of Hama", see vol. 4, p. 82, n. 5836/10. Aghai 
khaftân may have been a title (Officer of the Robe), or it simply may have 
been a misspelling of his name. See also SMH 51, p. 44,7 Sha'bân 1252. 
57. SMH 50, p. 68, [Safar 1253]. 
58. For instance in the villages of al-Jannân and 'Izz al-Dîn, both to the south of 
Hama, 'arab settled, SMH 51, p. 156,28 Sha'bân 1254. 
59. See §6.2. 
60. Sâlim, Huhn, p. 145-6. 
61. SMH 51, p. 33, 9 Rajab 1252 (Talldara); p. 156, 28 Shawwâl 1254 ('Izz al-
Dîn, Abu Imâma); p. 165, [Shawwâl 1254] (al-Khusaymiyya); p. 167,29 Shaw-
wâl 1254 (Talldara). Muhammad Khurfân also leased a large track of 
uncultivated u p l a n d of the village al-Jâjiyya, SMH 51,44,27 Sha'bân 1252. 
62. At least judging from his inheritance (he died at the time of the Egyptian 
evacuation), SMH 51, p. 365, [1257] and p. 439, 19 Jumâdâ II 1257. The vil-
lages involved are Kafr Buhum, Talldhahab, Talldû and Halfâyâ. 
63. SMH 51, p. 316-317, [Ra№ I] 1257. 
64. Usui, vol. 3, p. 3. 
65. Mahßzat,\o\.3,p. 121. 
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66. They included Salamiyya, Talldara, Taqsîs, 'Ayn al-Bâd, 'Izz al-Dîn, Abu 
Imâma, and al-'Ushr. 
67. One of the few exceptions was Taqsîs situated on bank of the 'Âsî river to the 
south of Hama. This village had been deserted in the closing years of the 18th 
century. 
68. Mahßzät, vol. 4, p. 50,75 and 177. 
69. SMH 5*1, p. 413,3 Jumâdâ 11257. 
70. For instance, Fad'ân and Sibâ' tribesmen carried off animals, as well as a boy, 
from the village of Murile 'to the north of Hama, SMH 51, p. 408 and 413,17 
Rabr II1257. 
71. F.0.195/196, n. 48, Damascus, 25 June 1842. 
72. In the winter of 1843/1844 'Anaza raids forced thousands of villagers to seek 
refuge in the province of Aleppo, see F.O. 195/207, n. 1, Damascus, 13 
January 1844. These attacks constituted the prelude of the last massive 
'Anaza incursions. During much of 1844 and 1845 the 'Anaza virtually con-
trolled the countryside of Hama and Horns. Only in the autumn of 1845 did 
Ottoman troops succeed in restoring order to a certain degree. 

GLOSSARY 
'âda 
a'dâd ghanam 
aghâ 
aghawât 
akâbir 
amîn al-fatâwâ 
amîr 
amîr al-bâdiya 
amîral-hajj 
amlâk 
amwâl 
anbâr 
anbâqî 
'arab 
arbâb al-fasâd 
ατά 
'ashâyir al-dâyira 
'ashîra 
askeri 
asnâf 
atbâ' 
'awâyid 
awlâd al-'arab 
'awna 
ayanhk 
ayân 
badal anfâr 'askar 
bâdiya 
barraní 
ba$ 
local custom, customary law 
sheep tax 
title: commander, chief, head, master 
plural of aghâ 
dignitaries 
record keeper of fatwâs 
title: emir, commander, prince, lord 
Lord of the Desert, 
tide held by the amîr of the Mawâlî tribes 
commander of the pilgrimage 
freehold properties 
see mal 
granary 
keeper of the granary 
Arabic speaking pastoralists, beduin 
corrupt officials, rebels 
arable field 
local 'arab tribes 
kinship group, tribe 
Ottoman ruling class 
plural oisanf 
following, clients 
levies for the support of provincial 
and local office-holders 
Arab 
forced labour services, tax 
granting of official status to ayân 
notables who participate in local government 
tax paid for exemption from conscription 
desert, wasteland 
extraordinary taxes (Egypt) 
head, commander 
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basbugal-jarda 
bashâyir 
bey 
bey-i büyük 
bid'a 
buyuruldu 
dalâtiyya 
damm 
dawlat Dimashq 
dawlat al-qal'a 
dawra 
dâyira 
defterdar 
deli 
delibasi 
devlet 
dhakhâyir 
dhakhîra 
dhimmt 
dîmûs 
dîwân 
dizdar 
efendi 
etmekçi basi 
faddân 
fâ'id 
farda 
fatwâ 
fâyid 
garibyigHt 
garib yigit a^asi 
ghafr dhimiyyîn 
ghunûmiyya 
habba 
hadar 
Щ 
commander oí the jarda 
good tidings, one of the takâlîf taxes 
title: superior to aghâ 
head of the Turcoman aghawât 
innovation, illegal imposition 
edict 
see deli 
taxes levied in addition to earlier tax assessments 
yerli, local janissaries (Damascus) 
kapikulu, imperial janissaries (Damascus) 
yearly tour made by the wâlî of Damascus 
to collect taxes 
migratory cycle of 'arab tribes 
"keeper of the registers", chief treasury official 
cavalryman, auxiliary troops 
commander of deli forces 
state, dynastic rule 
provisions to the armies, tax levied for that purpose 
see dhakhâyir 
protected person, Christian or Jew 
see hâsil 
council 
commander of a fortress, see muiiâfiz 
honourary title held by hilamâ' 
state appointed head of the bakers 
land measure 
interest on loans 
poll-tax imposed by the Egyptian government 
legal opinion (see muftì and if ta') 
impositions which were not subject to remittal 
to the treasury 
cavalry, janissaries 
commander of the garib yigit 
toll payable by dhimmts 
having one's livestock herded by tribesmen 
grain, dry measure 
sedentary society 
yearly pilgrimage to the holy places of Mecca 
hâkim 
hâkim al-shar' 
hâkim al-'urf 
hâsil 
haznadar 
hirfa 
hisâb 
hudud 
hujja 
i'âna 
'îdiyya 
iftâ' 
ihtisâb 
iltizâm 
jamâ'a 
jarda 
jawâyih 
jizya 
kapikulu 
kâtib 
kâtib khazîna 
kâtib sancak 
kayl 
kethüda 
khân 
khazîna 'âmira 
khidma 
khuwwa 
kislak 
mahkama 
tnajlis al-shûrâ 
majlis al-shar' 
mal 
mâlfaddân 
mal kanâyis 
mal muqâta'a 
ruler, judge 
qâdî 
governor 
(village) liable to the payment of qism 
treasurer 
craft organization, guild 
tax computation 
Bounds, defining rights and duties 
of individuals and groups 
judicial or notarized deed issued by the qâdî 
support, tax on real estate 
gift on the occasion of festivals, 
one of the takâlîf taxes 
jurisconsultancy 
market inspection, market dues 
(granting of a) tax farm 
following of tribal or military leader 
troops carrying provisions to the hajj convoy 
calamities, extraordinary taxes 
poll-tax payable by dhimmîs 
imperial janissaries 
scribe, secretary 
scribe of the treasury 
scribe of the district 
dry measure 
chief lieutenant of the wâlî 
hostel for travelling traders and their wares 
treasury 
administration fee 
protection money collected by 'arab 
pasture fee 
religious court 
council (Egyptian rule) 
mahkama 
wealth, tax, payment 
taxes resting on afaddân 
church tax 
taxes resting on a muqâta'a (tax farm) 
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mal muwassata 
mal qassâbkhâna 
malt 
makkûk 
malikane 
mamlûk 
manzilkhâna 
maqtu' 
mashâyikh 
mashâyikh al-hajj 
matrûkât 
mazra'a 
mîr 
mirahur 
mîrî 
mirmiran 
misriyya 
misriyyat al-fard 
mu'allim 
mubâya'a 
mubâya'ajî 
muftì 
muhâfi 
muhassil 
müjdeci bast 
muqaddam 
muqâta'a 
murattabât 
murattabât Hijâziyyc 
mutasallim 
mutawallî 
naqîb al-ashrâf 
nizâm 
odabast 
tax, payment to the Mawâlî chief 
taxes resting on the tax farm of the slaughterhouse 
fiscal year 
dry measure, 16 shunbul 
leasehold for life, tax farm 
white male slave-soldier 
postal resthouse 
fixed, (village) liable to a fixed amount only 
plural oishaykh 
religious dignitaries accompanying the hajj convoy 
inheritances 
farm, semi-permanent agricultural settlement 
see amtr, title held by Ismâ'îlî chiefs 
master of the horse, official in the retinue of a 
governor 
state-owned, tax on the usufruct of 
state-owned property, especially land 
governor-general 
para 
by the late 18th century illegal imposition 
title held by Christian office-holder 
forced purchases of provisions for the troops 
officer in charge oîmubâya'a 
jurisconsult 
watchman, janissaries manning fortresses 
tax collector 
chief emissary 
title held by Nusayri chiefs 
tax farm 
impositions 
( equivalent to takâlîf 
district governor 
administrator of waqf estates 
state appointed head of the descendants 
of the prophet 
new standing army 
commander of the barracks, janissary officer 
paha-i libsât appointment fee 
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qabîqûl 
qadâ' 
qâdî 
qassâb basi 
qassâbkhâna 
qassâm aghâ 
qassâmiyya 
qâyimmaqâm 
qirsh 
qism 
qui 
qutuniyyât 
rashwa 
reaya 
rusûmât 
safariyya 
sakabasi 
salâmiyya 
salyan 
samniyya 
sancak 
sanf 
sarâyâ 
san 
sarrâf 
sartname 
serkerder 
shâhid 
shakâyir 
shar' 
sharîf 
sharika 
shaykh 
shaykh al-islâm 
shaykh al-sajjâda 
shuhûd al-hâl 
shunbul 
sijill 
see kapikulu 
jurisdiction of the qâdî 
judge 
state appointed head of the butchers 
slaughterhouse 
head of the qassâmiyya 
collectors of the qism 
deputy governor 
piaster, 40 misriyya 
proportional agricultural tax 
see kapikulu 
cotton villages, fiscal category 
bribe, exaction 
flock, subject classes 
duties on imports 
war tax 
official in charge of water supply to hajj convoy 
safe arrival or return, one of the takâlîf taxes 
annual payment, tax 
tax on (the sale of) animal fat 
district 
craft organization, guild 
headquarters of the mutasallim 
payments to 'arab tribes in order to secure 
the safe passage of the hajj convoy 
cashier of the treasury 
tax farm contract 
title held by the Mawâlî chief as head of the local tribes 
witness, see also shuhûd al-hâl 
secondary crops 
Islamic law 
descendant of the prophet 
commercial partnership 
title: sheikh, head, religious dignitary 
supreme muftì 
head of a religious order 
witnesses assenting a hujja 
dry measure, 3.5 kayl 
register 
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sûq 
surra 
surre 
surre emini 
tâjir 
takâlîf 
tasarruf 
Untar 
tiifenkçi 
tiifenkçi basi 
tujjâr 
Hibûdiyya 
umarâ' 
w 
wakîl al-khw) 
wait 
waqf 
waqfìyya 
wâqif 
market 
seesarr 
payments to the dignitaries and the poor 
of Mecca and Medina 
official in charge of the surre 
merchant 
taxes to cover the expenses made for the 
organization and protection of the hajj 
right to usufruct 
cavalry fief 
musketeer 
commander of the musketeers 
plural of tâjir 
servitude, tax, payment to secure an appointment 
see amir 
sultanic law 
superintendent of expenditures 
governor-general 
religious or family endowment or foundation, 
dedication of property for public and religious 
facilities, or for the support of family 
of the founder of the waqf 
charter of a waqf 
founder of a waqf 
zulm injustice, oppression 
zur irrigated field 
ANNEX 1 
•ARAB TRIBES IN 1245 
1. 'ashâyir dâyirat Hanta: the tribes of the local cycle 
(following the order of entry in the tax tabulation). 
Source: SMH 49, p. 250-2, dated 1245 and p. 326-9,23 Rabf 11245 
A: tax payments to the treasury entered in cash (q.) 
B: exactions by Faraj Aghâ and his retinue (q.) 
tribe 
BanîKhâlid 
Nu'aym 
Bashâkim 
Tûqân 
'Uqaydât 
Banî 'Izz (incl. Mashârifa) 
Fawâ'ira 
Zurayq 
Ma'âqîr 
Abu Salîba 
Kharâshin 
Huwayziyya 
Shaqar 
Nabît 
Rutûb 
Abu Hayya 
Hazûmîn 
Shukr 
Sha'ar 
Hawârîn 
A 
5700 
6100 
4050 
2050 
2250 
2850 
3250 
2750 
2650 
1150 
2050 
1850 
1150 
2175 
1300 
1850 
1400 
1300 
1050 
600 
В 
7132 
7754 
9715 
3830 
9650 
6302 
4955 
3350 
1380 
2330 
4240 
2065 
-
60 
1720 
1715 
2475 
1410 
— 
145 
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475 
350 
300 
1400 
[ama area 
— 
— 
— 
235 
— 
3960 
655 
7150 
500 
Abu 'Así 
Shatîhât 
'Uwayshât 
Ίζζ al-Dîn 
2. Other tribes frequenting the Наша e  
Khutabâ 
Jumlân 
Abu Husayn 
Jamâjima — — 
Turkî - -
Hasana — — 
Siba' 
Fad'ân 
51,400 82,728 
The tribes were liable to the proportional a'dâd ghanam, as well as to 
several smaller impositions, like the samniyya (tax on animal fat), kiflak 
(winter camping fee) and qayziyya (summer camping fee). 
ANNEX2 
THE HÂSIL VILLAGES IN 1245 
(following the order of entry in the tax tabulation) 
Source: SMH 49, p. 250-2, dated 1245 and p. 326-9,23 Rabí* 11245 
A: village name 
B: village size in number of ¡addati 
number otfaddân mashâyikh* in between brackets 
C: cash payment to the treasury (mâlfaddân) 
D: exactions by Faraj Aghâ and his retinue 
A 
Ma'ardas 
Mûrik 
Kafr Zaytî 
Khatâb 
Tayyibat al-A'lâ 
Latmîn 
Kurnâz 
Sûrân 
Shayzar 
ТаШ 
Mharda 
Kafr Buhum 
Asîla 
Halfâyâ 
Akrâd Ibrâhîm 
Kâzû 
Albiyya 
Ma'rîn 
Umm Qantara 
Ighûr al-Gharbî 
Abu al-Rubays 
Harbinafsa 
В 
27(3) 
23(3) 
47(4) 
55(4) 
65(4) 
84(6) 
29(2) 
24(3) 
25(2) 
20(2) 
46(3) 
72(4) 
18 
44(4) 
50(2) 
25(2) 
58(2) 
25(2) 
8 
30(2) 
10(1) 
29(1) 
С 
1,320 
1,100 
4,730 
5,610 
6,380 
8,250 
2,970 
1,155 
2¿30 
1,980 
4,730 
7,480 
1,980 
4,400 
5,280 
2,530 
6,160 
2,530 
880 
3,080 
880 
2,970 
D 
4,720 
1,312 
4,634 
2,910 
4,850 
4,903 
450 
4,390 
6,897 
2,411 
13,250 
10,936 
— 
4,446 
2,127 
— 
-
350 
— 
5,160 
— 
1,160 
1% Annex Two 
Sîghâtâ 
Kafr Qadh 
Tallsikkîn 
al-Shîhâ 
Akrâd al-Dayâsina 
Kafr al-Tûn 
Qumhâna 
Tayyibat al-Gharbî 
Taqdîn 
Bsîrîn 
al-Julma 
Misîn 
Kafr 'Amîm 
Hayâlîn 
Dayr al-Firdîs 
Talldû 
Tîzîn 
Naqârina 
al-Rabfa 
al-Khâlidiyya 
Ma'arzâf 
Tarîmsa 
Sahriyya 
al-Raqîta 
al-Mughayyar 
'Amûrîn 
al-'Uwayna 
Kafr Lâhâ 
al-Majdal 
Talldhahab 
Dîmû 
Qîrâtâ 
Arza 
Kafr Nabûda 
Ard al-Hâmid 
Ard al-Bâd 
Ard Hasaniyyât 
Zalâqiyyât 
(Ard) Jabrîn 
Iyyû 
Burnâ 
Da'nân 
18(1) 
11 
10 
18 
20 
30(2) 
67(4) 
33(1) 
10 
12(1) 
8 
11(1) 
8(1) 
8 
25(1) 
86(3) 
46(2) 
19(1) 
41(3) 
8 
15(1) 
4 
18 
19(1) 
12(1) 
10(1) 
17(2) 
80(3) 
8 
65(2) 
17 
7 
5 
16(2) 
12(1) 
9(1) 
10(1) 
7(1) 
10(1) 
6 
16(2) 
10 
1,870 
1,210 
990 
1,980 
2,200 
3,080 
6,600 
3,190 
770 
1,210 
880 
1,100 
770 
880 
2,640 
9,130 
4,840 
1,980 
4,180 
880 
1,540 
440 
1,980 
1,980 
1,210 
990 
1,650 
8,470 
880 
6,930 
1,870 
770 
550 
1,540 
1,210 
880 
990 
660 
990 
660 
1,540 
1,100 
-
1,150 
245 
1,403 
2,080 
1,480 
4,400 
6,840 
313 
878 
330 
— 
— 
645 
718 
35,350 
4,725 
1,435 
-
-
1,480 
70 
— 
1,815 
300 
420 
— 
28,291 
— 
17,563 
1,210 
— 
— 
190 
80 
— 
60 
-
-
— 
— 
— 
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Sam'alîl 
al-Tuwaym 
al-Jarniyya 
al-'Arîd 
Kafr Yahûd 
Tall Milh 
Salbâ 
Basqilla 
al-'Ashârina 
14(1) 
8(2) 
6(1) 
6 
4 
10 
6 
7(1) 
18 
1,430 
660 
550 
330 
220 
450 
150 
300 
1,980 
— 
-
-
520 
405 
148 
— 
-
-
* No taxes rested upon the faddân mashâyikh. The yields of this land 
served as a compensation for the expenses of the village sheikh. 
ANNEX3 
MAQTÛ' VILLAGES AND FARMS 
(following the order of entry in the tax tabulation) 
source: SMH 49, p. 250-2, dated 1245 and p.326-9,23 Ra№ 11245 
A: village or farm 
B: number offaddân 
{faddân mashâyikh) 
С: mîrî 
D: mal faddân 
E: exactions by Faraj Aghâ and his retinue 
A В С D E 
Kafr Nân 
Kîsîn 
Ma'ar Jafna 
Qa'ya 
Jadrîn 
Kafr Lâm 
Dayr Sunbul 
Al-Mav/a 
Dayr al-Salîb 
Rab'û ' 
Jarrada 
Bîsîn 
Dayr Huwayt 
Umm al-Tuyûr 
Huwayr 
Bahra 
Balín 
Bajja 
Squlaybiyya 
al-Jafa 
20(1) 
16(1) 
7(1) 
10 
13 
3.5 
10(2) 
50(3) 
26(2) 
14(1) 
20(2) 
10(1) 
5 
12(1) 
5(1) 
115 
300 
103 
206 
412 
100 
500 
928 
257 
100 
154 
175 
175 
100 
? 
1900 
1500 
600 
700 
1300 
350 
800 
4700 
2400 
1300 
1800 
900 
500 
1100 
400 
— 
80 
260 
62 
1601 
1100 
150 
470 
-
140 
-
-
ANNEX4 
TURCOMAN VILLAGES 
(following the order of entry in the tax tabulation) 
source: SMH 49, p.250-2, dated 1245 and p. 326-9,23 Rabí411245 
A: village/tribe* 
B: number oifaddân 
(faddân mashâyikh) 
С: mal faddân 
D: exactions by Faraj Aghâ and his retinue 
A 
al-Bayâdiyya 
al-Bakmashliyya 
al-Tumkhurliyya* 
Tillif 
al-Madh 
Matar al-Khûla 
Qirra Khalüiyya* 
'Aqrab 
Ik'ûna 
Qirra Dûkar 
Aq Dûkar 
al-Qanqaliyya 
al-Sharqaliyya 
Jarjîsiyya 
al-'Albiyya* 
al-Jumqaliyya 
Barâq 
al-Jalîqaliyya* 
Murayj al-Durr 
Ighûr al-'Así 
В 
19(1) 
13(1) 
51(4) 
49(3) 
14(2) 
16(1) 
15(1) 
12(2) 
21(1) 
37(2) 
36(4) 
С 
4,050 
2,700 
10,575 
10,350 
2,250 
3,375 
3,150 
2,250 
4,500 
7,000 
7,200 
D 
1,350 
854 
1,609 
— 
— 
7,380 
— 
1,138 
— 
— 
— 
397 
-
— 
-
800 
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Bîrîn 11 2,200 840 
al-Suwayda 10 , _„__ 
Qartal 8 * А ' Ш 
45,232 14,368 
ANNEX 5 
JABAL AL-GHARBÎ IN 1245 
(following the order of entry in the tax tabulation) 
Source: SMH 49, p.250-2, dated 1245 and p. 326-9,23 Rabí* 11245 
A: village 
B: takâlîf (reduced rates) 
{takâlîfm 1233) 
C: exaction by Faraj Aghâ and his retinue 
A 
Nîsâf 
al-Haydariyya 
Fâhil 
Kafr Karnra 
Maryamîn 
(Qîrâtâ) 
Qurmus 
Bazza 
B'amra 
Bshînîn 
Khirbat al-Qabû 
Qasrâyâ 
Khanîzîr 
'Akâkîr 
al-Shanniyya 
Tansâ 
mîrt 
В 
7,250 (9,250) 
7,250 (9,250) 
7,250 (9,250) 
7,250 (8,865) 
3,625 (4,625) 
3,625 (4,625) 
3,625 (4,625) 
2,352 (3,468) 
906 (1,156) 
1,812 (2,312) 
1,273 (1,541) 
906 (1,156) 
47,125 
17,158 
С 
14,969 
11,200 
14,969 
6,110 
4,580 
3,080 
5,100 
5,100 
3,080 
3,080 
1,550 
72,818 
tot. 64,283 
ANNEX6 
QUTUNIYYÂT VILLAGES 
Source: SMH 49, p. 250-2, dated 1245 and p. 326-9,23 RabP 11245 
A: villages 
B: number offaddân 
(faddân mashâyikh) 
C: mal faddân 
D: exactions by Faraj Aghâ and his retinue 
A B C D 
al-Dâhiriyya 
al-Dajâjiyya 
Sarîhîn 
22(2) 
20(2) 
19(2) 
4950 
4500 
4275 
— 
510 
2139 
ANNEX7 
RURAL MUQÂTA V4S 
(following the order of entry in the tax tabulation) 
Source: SMH 49, p.250-2, dated 1245 and p. 326-9,23 Rabf 11245 
A: muqâta'a 
В: mîrî 
С: dämm 
D: exactions by Faraj Aghâ and his retinue 
A 
Kafrûn 
mazarí' Kafrûn 
Jabal al-Kalbiyya 
Jalmîdûn 
Hillat Hazûr 
mazarí' Hazûr 
Hisn al-Akrâd 
Misyâf 
Ba'rîn 
В 
2,352 
3,578 
22,893 
8,765 
902 
35,877 
16,000 
103 
90,470 
С 
648 
— 
12,500 
4,000 
-
29,122 
4,000 
1,500 
51,770 
D 
— 
— 
19,500 
3,000 
— 
19,800 
15,885 
— 
58,185 
tot. 150,240 

REFERENCE LIST 
7. Works of reference 
Brockelmann, С, Geschichte der arabischen Literatur, 2 vols, Leiden, 
1943; suppl., 3 vols., 1937-1942 
Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, Leiden 1954-
al-Jundî, A.,A'lâm al-adab wa-l-fann, 2 vols., Damascus 1954 
Mardam Bey, Kh.,Ayân al-qam al-thâlith 'ashar fi al-fikr wa-l-siyâsa 
wa-l-ijtimâ', Beirut 1971 
al-Murâdî, M.Kh., Silk al-durarfîayân al-qam al-thânî 'ashar, 4 vols., 
Bulaq 1301 A.H. 
Qahhâla, 'U.R., Mu 'jam qabâ'il al-'Arab al-qadîma wa-l-hadîtha, 3 vols., 
' Beirut 1968 
al-Qâsimî, M.S., Qâmûs al-sinâ'ât al-Shâmiyya, Damascus 1988 
Redhouse, J.W., Turkish-English lexicon, Istanbul 1890 
al-Shattî, MJ . , Rawd al-basharfi ayân Dimashq fi al-qam al-thâlith 
'ashar, Damascus 1972 
2. Archival material 
Sijillât al-mahkama al-shar'iyya, Hamâ, (SMH) vols. 43,46,48-53,57. 
Markaz al-Wathâ'iq al-Târîkhiyya, Centre for Historical 
Documentation), Damascus 
Correspondance avec les Echelles, Beyrouth (CE), carton 44,53,132 and 
142, Les Archives Diplomatiques de Nantes (ADN), Nantes 
Foreign Office (FO), series 195, Public Record Office, Kew 
3. Manuscripts 
Âthâr al-hiqab fiLâdhiqiyyat al-'Arab, 3 vols., private collection, Latakia 
(Syria), unfinished and undated manuscript [prob. 1882] 
al-Sâyikh, Fath Allah, Al-muqtarab fihawâdith al-hadar wa-l-'arab, 
Latakia 1843, Fonds arabe 1658, Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris 
206 Reference List 
4. Edited chronicles, histories and documents 
al-Budayrî, al-Hallâq, Α., Hawâdith Dimashq al-yawmiyya. éd. A.'I. 'Abd 
al-Karîm, Cairo 1959 
Burayk, al-Khûrî, M., Târîkh al-Shâm. éd. A.Gh. Sabânû, Damascus 1982 
al-Dimashqî, M., Târîkh Hawâdith al-Shâm wa-Lubnân. éd. A. Gh. 
Sabânû, Damascus 1982 
Ibn Khaldûn, The Muqaddimah, trans. F. Rosenthal, 3 vols., Princeton 
1958 
al-Khûrî, I.T., Mustafâ Aghâ Barbar, hâkim Tarâblus wa-l-Lâdhiqiyya, 
n.ed., Tripoli 1985 
al-Mahfûzât al-Malakiyya al-Misriyya. Bayân Ы-wathâ'iq al-Shâm, éd. A. 
Rustum, 4 vols., Beirut 1940-1943 
al-Makkî, M., Târîkh Hims, yawmiyyât, ed. 'U.N. 'Umar, Damascus 1987 
Mishâqa, M., Kitâb Mashhad al-'iyân bi-hawâdith Sûriyâ wa-Lubnân, éd. 
M.Kh. 'Abdû and A.H. Shakhâshîr,*Cairo 1908 
Mudhakkirât târîkhiyya 'an hamlat Ibrâhîm Bâshâ 'alâ Sûriyâ. éd. A.Gh. 
Sabânû, Damascus n.d. 
al-Nâbulsî, 'A. Gh., Kitâb 'alam al-milâhafî 'Um al-filâha, a, ed., 
Beyrouth 1979 
, al-Haqîqa wa-l-majâzfl al-rihla ilâ Bilâd al-Shâm wa-Misr 
wa4-Hijâz, éd. Α.Ά.Μ. Huraydî, n.p., 1987 
al-Sâbûnî, M., Târîkh Hamâ, n. ed., Hamâ, n.d. 
al-Shihâb, H.A., Lubnân fî 'ahd al-umarâ' al-Shihâbiyyîn, 3 vols., éd. A. 
Rustum and F.E. al-Bustânî, Beirut 1984 
Târîkh Hasan Aghâ al-'Abd, ed. Y.J. Nu'aysa, Damascus 1979 
Usui al-'Arabiyya li-târîkh Sûriyâ fî 'ahd Muhammad 'Ali Bâshâ, 5 vols., 
Beirut 1930-1933 
5. Travel accounts 
Burckhardt, J.L., Travels in Syria and the Holy Land, London 1822 
, Notes on the bedouins and Wahabys, 2 vols., London 1831 
Pococke, R., A Description of the East and some other countries, 3 vols., 
London 1745 
Robinson, E. and Smith, E., Biblical researches in Palestine. A journal of 
travels in the year 1838,3 vols., London 1841 
Russell, Α., The natural history of Aleppo, London 1794 
Seetzen, U.J., Reisen durch Syrien, Palästina, Phönicien, die 
Transjordan-Länder, Arabia Petraea und Unter-Aegypten, 3 vols., 
Berlin, 1854 
Reference List 207 
6. Monographs and articles 
'Abd al-Rahîm, Ά.'Α., al-Rîf al-Misrifial-qam al-thâmin 'ashar, Cairo 
1986 
Abdel Nour, Α., "Traits et conflits du monde rurale syrien au XVIIIe 
siècle d'après les fatwa de Hâmid al-'ImâdT', Mélanges de 
l'Université Saint-Joseph 50 (1984), p. 71-84 
Abu Husayn, A.R., Provincial leaderships in Syria, 1575-1650. Beirut 1985 
Abu-Manneh, В., "The Husaynis: the rise of a notable family in 18th 
century Palestine", in Kushner (ed.), p. 94-107 
Aladdin, В., "Deux Fatwâ-s du §ayh 'Abd al-Ganî al-Nâbulsî 
(1143/1731). Présentation et édition critique", Bulletin d'Études 
Orientales 39-40 (1987-88), p. 9-37 
Anderlind, L., "Ackerbau und Thierzucht in Syrien, insbesondere in 
Palästina", Zeitschrift des deutchen Palästina-Vereins 9 (1886), p. 
1-73 
As'ad, Μ.Ί., Târîkh Hirns, 2 vol., Homs 1984 
al-'Azm, 'A.-Q., al-Usra al-'Azmiyya, Damascus 1960 
Baer, G., "The administrative, economic and social functions of Turkish 
guilds", International Journal of Middle East Studies 1 (1970), p. 
28-50 
, "Jerusalem's families of notables and the wakf in the early 19th 
Century", in Kushner (ed.), p. 109-122 
Bakhit, M.A., The Ottoman province of Damascus in the 16th century. 
Beirut 1982 
Barbir, K.K., Ottoman rule in Damascus, 1708-1758, Princeton 1980 
, "Wealth, privilege and family structure: the 'askaris of 18th century 
Damascus according to the qassâm 'askaris inheritance records", in 
Philipp (ed.), p. 179-% 
Barnes, J.R.,An introduction to religious foundations in the Ottoman 
Empire, Leiden 1986 
Berque, J. et Chevallier, D. (eds.), Les Arabes par leurs archives, 
XVIe-XXe siècles, Paris 1976 
Bodman, H., Political f actions in Aleppo, 1760-1826, Chapel Hill 1963 
Braudel, F., Civilization and capitalism, 15th-18th century, vol. 3, The 
perspective of the world, London 1985 
Chaudhuri, K.N.,Asia before Europe. Economy and civilisation of the 
Indian Ocean from the rise of Islam to 1750, Cambridge 1990 
Chevallier, D. (ed.), L'espace social de la ville arabe, Paris 1979 
Cohen, Α., Palestine in the 18th century, Jerusalem 1973 
208 Reference List 
Cohen, A. and Lewis, В., Population and revenue in the towns of Palestine 
in the sixteenth century, Princeton 1978 
Crecelius, D.N., The roots of modem Egypt. A study of the regimes of 'Ali 
Bey al-Kabir and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760-1775, 
Minneapolis 1981 
, "Egypt's reawakening interest in Palestine during the regimes of 
'Ali Bey al-Kabîr and Muhammad Bey Abu al-Dhahab, 1760-1775", 
in Kushner (ed.), p. 247-262 
Crone, P., Pre-industrial societies, Oxford 1989 
Doumani, B.B., "Palestinian Islamic court records: a source for 
socioeconomic history", MESA bulletin 19 (1985), p. 155-72 
Douwes, D., "Knowledge and oppression; the Nusayriyya in the late 
Ottoman period", in Lo ShVa nell'impero ottomano, Roma 1993 
Douwes, D. and Lewis, N.N., "The trials of the Isma'ilis of Syria in the 
first decade of the 20th century", International Journal of Middle 
East Studies 21 (1989), p. 215-32 
, "Taxation and agriculture in the district of Hama, 1800-1831; new 
material from the records of the religious court", in Philipp (ed.), p. 
261-79 
Eisenstadt, S.N., The political systems of empires, New York 1963 
Findley, C , Bureaucratic reform in the Ottoman empire, Princeton 1980 
Gaulmier, J., "Pèlerinages populaires à Hama", Bulletin d'Études 
Orientales 1 (1931), p. 137-52 
, "Notes sur la propriété foncière dans la Syrie centrale", L'Asie 
Française 309 (1933), p. 130-37 
Gellner, E., Nations and nationalism, Oxford 1983 
, Plough, sword and book. The structure of human history, London 
1988 
Gibb, H.A.R. and Bowen, H., Islamic society and the West, vol. I: Islamic 
society in the eighteenth century. 2 parts, London 1950 
Hamûd, N.R., al-'AskarfîBilâd al-Shâm fîal-qam al-sâdis 'ashar 
wa-l-sâbi' 'ashar, Beirut n.d. 
Hansen, В., "An economic model for Ottoman Egypt: the economics of 
collective tax responsibility", in Udovitch (ed.), p. 473-520 
Hardtmann, M., "Beiträge zur Kenntnis der syrischen Steppe", 
Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästina-Vereins 22 (1899), p. 127-49, 
153-77 and 23 (1901), p. 1-77, 97-158 
Reference List 209 
Heyd, U., Ottoman documents on Palestine, 1552-1615. A study of the 
firman according to the Mühimme Oeften, Oxford 1960 
Hofman, Y., "The administration of Syria and Palestine under Egyptian 
rule", in Maoz (ed.), p. 311-333 
Holt, P.M. Egypt and the Fertile Crescent, 1516-1922, London 1966 
Hourani, A.H., "The Fertile Crescent in the eighteen century", in A.H. 
Hourani,>l vision of history, Beirut 1961, p. 35-70 
, "Ottoman reform and the politics of notables", in W.R. Polk and 
R.L. Chambers (eds.), Beginning of modernization in the Middle 
East, Chicago, p. 41-65 
Hunter, F.R., Egypt under the khédives, 1805-1879. From household 
government to modem bureaucracy, Pittsburgh 1984 
Hütteroth, W.-D., and Abdulfattah, K., Historical geography of Palestine, 
Transjordan and southern Syria in the late 16th century, Erlangen 
1977 
Inalcik, H., 77ie Ottoman empire in the classical age, 1300-1600, London 
1973 
, "Centralization and decentralization in Ottoman Administration", 
in Naff and Owen (eds.), p. 27-52 
Issawi, C , The Fertile Crescent, 1800-1914. A documentary economic 
history, New York 1988 
Islamoglu-Inan, H., (ed.), The Ottoman Empire and the world-economy, 
Cambridge 1987 
, "Peasants, commercialization and legitimation of state power in 
sixteenth-Century Anatolia", in Keyder and Tabak (eds.), p. 57-76 
Itzkowitz, N., "Men and ideas in the eighteenth century Ottoman 
Empire", in Naff and Owen (eds.), p. 15-26 
Jennings, R.C., "Kadi, court and legal procedure in 17th Century 
Ottoman Kayseri", Studia Islamica 48 (1978), p. 133-172 
, "Limitations of the judicial powers of the kadi in 17th century 
Ottoman Kayseri", Studia Islamica 50 (1979), p. 151-184 
al-Jundî, M.S., Târikh Ma'arrat al-Nu'mân, 2 vols., Damascus 1965 
Kasaba, R., The Ottoman Empire and the world economy; the 19th 
century, New York 1988 
al-Kaylânî, M., Muhâfazat Цата, Damascus 1964 
Keyder, С, State and class in Turkey. A study in capitalist development, 
London 1987 
Keyder, С and Tabak, F. (eds.), Landltolding and commercial agriculture 
in the Middle East, New York 1991 
210 Reference List 
Khalidi, T. (ed.), Land tenure and social transformation in the Middle 
East, Beirut 1984 
Kunt, I.M., The sultan's servants. The transformation of Ottoman 
provincial government, 1550-1650, New York 1983 
Kurd 'Alî, M., Khitat al-Shâm, 3 vols., Damascus 1983 
Kushner, D. (ed.), Palestine in the late Ottoman Period. Political, social 
and economic transformation, Jerusalem 1986 
Lapidus, I.M., Muslim cities in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge (Mass.) 
1984 
Lavish, Α., "The Sijill of the Jaffa and Nazareth shari'a courts as a source 
for the political and social history of Ottoman Palestine", in Ma'oz 
(ed.), p. 525-32 
van Leeuwen, R., Notables and clergy in Mount Lebanon: the Khâzin 
sheiks and the Maronite church (1736-1840), dissertation, University 
of Amsterdam 1992 
Lewis, В., The emergence of Modem Turkey, London 1961 
, 'Ottoman land tenure and taxation in Syria", Studia Islamica 50 
(1979), p. 109-124 
Lewis, N.N., Nomads and settlers in Syria and Jordan, 1800-1980, 
Cambridge 1987 
Mandaville, J.E., "The Ottoman court records of Syria and Jordan", 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 86 (1966), p. 311-9 
Manna', Ά., "The sijill as source for the study of Palestine during the 
Ottoman period, with special reference to the French invasion", in 
Kushner (ed.), p. 351-62 
, "Continuity and change in the socio-political elite in Palestine 
during the late Ottoman period", in Philipp (ed.), p. 69-89 
Mantran, R. et Sauvaget, J., Règlements fiscaux ottomans. Les provinces 
syriennes, Paris 1951 
Ma'oz, M., Ottoman reform in Syria and Palestine, 1840-1861. Oxford 1968 
, (ed.), Studies on Palestine during the Ottoman period, Jerusalem 
1975 
Marcus, Α., The Middle East on the eve of modernity. Aleppo in the 
eighteenth century, New York 1989 
Masters, В., The origins of Western economic dominance in the Middle 
East. Mercantilism and the Islamic economy in Aleppo, 1600-1750, 
New York 1988 
, "Ottoman policies toward Syria in the 17th and 18th centuries", in 
Philipp (ed.), p. 11-26 
Munajjid, S-D., Wulât Dimashqfial-'ahd al-'Uthmânî, Damascus 1949 
Reference List 211 
Mundy, M., "Shareholders and the state. Representing the village in the 
late 19th century land registers of the southern Hawrân", in Philipp 
(ed.), p. 217-38 
Naff, T. and Owen, R. (eds.), Studies in eighteenth century Islamic 
history, London 1977 
Nelson, C. (ed.), The desert and the sown. Nomads in the wider society, 
Berkeley 1973 
Oppenheim, M. von, Die Beduinen, 3 vols., Leipzig, 1939-43 
Owen, R., "Introduction [to part II: Resources, population and wealth]", 
in Naff and Owen (eds.), p. 133-51 
Owen, R., 77ie Middle East in the world economy, 1800-1914, London 
1981. 
Parry, VJ. and Yapp, M.E. (eds.), War, technology and society in the 
Middle East, London 1975 
Philipp, T., The Syrians in Egypt 1725-1975, Stuttgart 1985 
, (ed.), The Syrian Land in the 18th and 19th century. The common 
and the specific in the historical experience, Stuttgart 1992 
, "Social structure and political power in Acre in the 18th century", 
in Philipp (ed.), p. 91-108 
Piterberg, G., "The formation of an Ottoman Egyptian elite in the 18th 
century", International Journal of Middle East Studies 22 (1990), p. 
275-89 
Rafeq, A.-K, The province of Damascus, 1723-1783, Beirut 1966 
, "Local forces in Syria in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries", 
in Parry and Yapp (eds.), p. 277-307 
,'The law-court registers of Damascus, with special reference to 
craft corporations during the first half of the eighteenth century", in 
Berque et Chevallier (eds.), p. 141-6 
, "The law-court registers and their importance for a 
socio-economic and urban study of Ottoman Syria", in Chevalier 
(ed.), p. 51-8 
, "Changes in the relationship between the Ottoman central 
administration and the Syrian provinces from the sixteenth to the 
eighteenth century", in Naff and Owen (eds.), p. 53-73 
, "Economic relations between Damascus and the dependent 
countryside, 1743-71", in Udovitch (ed.), p. 653-86 
, "Mazâhir min al-tanzîm al-hirafî fî Bilâd al-Shâm fi" al-'ahd 
al-'Uthmânî", Dirâsât Târikhiyya 4 (1981), p. 30-62 
212 Reference List 
, "Qâfdat al-hau al-Shâmî wa-ahammiyyatuhâ fi al-'ahd 
al-'Uthmânf', Dirâsât Tâiîkhiyya 6 (1981), p. 5-28 
, "Land tenure problems and their social impact in Syria around the 
middle of the nineteenth century", in Khalidi (ed.), p. 371-96 
, "Mazâhir iqtisâdiyya wa-ijtimâ'iyya min liwâ' Hamâ, 
942/1035-943/1536", £>/>áídí Târîkhiyya 31-2 (1989), p. 17-66 
, "City and countryside in a traditional setting. The case of 
Damascus in the first quarter of the eighteenth century", in: Philipp 
(ed.), p. 295-332 
Raymond, Α., Artisans et commerçants au Caire au XVIIIe siècle, 2 vols., 
Damascus 1973-4 
, "Les sources de la richesse urbaine au Caire au dix-huitième 
siècle", in Naff and Owen (eds.), p. 184-204 
, "The economic crisis of Egypt in the eighteenth century", in 
Udovitch (ed.), p. 687-708 
Reilly, J.A., "Sharf a court registers and land tenure around nineteenth 
century Damascus", MESA bulletin 21 (1987), p. 155-69 
, "Properties around Damascus in the nineteenth century", Arabica 
37 (1990), p. 91-114 
, "Damascus merchants and trade in the transition to capitalism", 
Canadian Journal of History 27 (1992), p. 1-27 
Sâlim, L.M., al-Hukm al-Misrîft al-Shâm, 1831-1841, Cairo 1990 
Samad, Q., Târîkh al-Daniyya al-siyâsî wa-1-ijtimâ'îft al-'ahdal-'Uthmânî, 
n.p., n.d. 
al-Sayyid Marsot, A.L., "The wealth of the ulama in late eighteenth 
century Cairo", in Naff and Owen (eds.), p. 205-216 
, Egypt in the reign of Muhammad AH, Cambridge 1984 
Schatkowski Schilcher, L., Families in politics. Damascene factions and 
estates of the 18th and 19th centuries, Stuttgart 1985 
Seikaly, S.M., "Land tenure in 17th century Palestine: the evidence from 
the al-Fatâwâ al-Khayriyya", in Khalidi (ed.), p. 397-408 
Shanin, T. (ed.), Peasants and peasant societies, London 1988 
Shaw, S.J., Between old and new. The Ottoman empire under Sultan Selim 
III, Cambridge (Mass.) 1971 
, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modem Turkey, vol. 1, 
Cambridge 1976 
Shaw, S J . and Shaw, E.K., History of the Ottoman Empire and Modem 
Turkey, vol. 2, Cambridge 1977 
Spooner, В., "Desert and sown: a new look at an old relationship", in 
Naff and Owen (eds.), p. 236-49 
Reference List 213 
Sugar, P.F., Southeastern Europe under Ottoman rule, 1354-1804, Seattle 
1977 
Sunar, I., "State and Economy in the Ottoman Empire", in 
Islamoglu-Inan (ed.), p. 63-87 
Tabak, F., "Agrarian fluctuations and modes of labor control in the 
western Arc of the Fertile Crescent, с 1700-1850", in Keyder and 
Tabak (eds.), p. 135-54 
al-Tawîl, M.A.Gh., Târîkh al-'Alawiyyîn, Beirut n.d. 
Thomas, L.W.,A study ofNaima, New York 1972 
Thorner, D., "Peasant economy as a category in history", in Shanin (ed.), 
p. 62-8 
Tilly, Ch., Coercion, capital and European states, AD 990-1990, 
Cambridge (Mass.) 1990 
Tischler, H.L., Whitten, Ph. and Hunter, D.E.K., Introduction to 
sociology, New York 1986 
Udovitch, A.L. (ed.), The Islamic Middle East, 700-1900. Studies in 
economic and social history, Princeton 1981 
Venzke, M.L. "Special use of the tithe as a revenue-raising measure in 
the sixteenth-century sanjaq of Aleppo", Journal of the Economic 
and Social History of the Orient 29 (1986), p. 239-334 
Wallcrstcin, I., Decdeli, H. and Kasaba, R., "The incorporation of the 
Ottoman Empire into the world-economy", in Islamoglu-Inan (ed.), 
p. 88-97 
Weurlesse, E., Le Pays des Alaouites, 2 vols., Tours 1940 
,L'Oronte. Étude de fleuve, Paris 1941 
Winter, M., Egyptian society under Ottoman mie, 1517-1798, London 1992 
Witlfogcl, K.A., Oriental despotism. A comparative study of total power, 
New Haven 1957 
Yannî, J., Târîkh Sûriyâ, Beirut 1881 
Yûsuf, 'A.W., "al-Rîf al-Hamawî fî al-qarn al-sâdis 'ashar", Dirâsât 
Târîkhiyya 2 (1979),'p. 42-61 
Zakariyâ, A.W., Ashâ'ir al-Shâm, Damascus 1983 
,JawlaÂthâriyya, Damascus 1984 
Ziyâda, Kh., al-Sûra al-taqlîdiyya li-l-mujtama' al-madanî, Tripoli 1983 
Zürcher, E.J., Turkey. A modem history, London 1993 

SAMENVATTING 
In deze studie is het Osmaanse bestuur in de provincie van Damascus en 
het district van Наша bestudeerd tegen de achtergrond van de twee grote 
dilemma's waarmee de traditionele staat worstelde, namelijk de on­
toereikendheid van de bronnen van inkomsten en de centrifugale effecten 
van het delegeren van macht. De Osmaanse ideologie onderkende de 
problematiek terdege, maar zag de problemen niet als onoplosbaar. De 
oplossing lag daarin dat sultan en de askeri, de bestuurüjke eüte, de 
voorwaarden schiepen voor de welvaart van de onderdanen, terwijl deze 
welvaart de sultan en askeri in staat stelde om de onderdanen te bhjven 
beschermen. De sultan, wiens macht als door god geven en absoluut gold, 
stond garant voor rechtvaardig bestuur, wat in deze context betekende 
dat hij misbruik van de door hem gedelegeerde macht tegenging. In deze 
opvatting vormde de ontoereikendheid van de bronnen van inkomsten 
niet zo zeer een economisch probleem, maar een bestuurlijk probleem. 
De oplossing lag immers in het bewaren de juiste machtsrelaties. Veel 
aandacht ging dan ook uit naar het behoud of de versterking van af-
hankelijkheid van bestuurders in de provincies ten opzichte van de cen-
trale autoriteiten. 
Niettemin was de macht die werd gedelegeerd aan de bestuurders in 
de provincie groot, met name in het geval van de wâlî, de gouverneur-
generaal. Op zijn beurt delegeerde de wâlî macht aan zijn ondergeschik-
ten, zoals de mutasallim, zijn vertegenwoordiger op het districtsniveau. 
De toekenning van uitgebreide machtsmiddelen vergemakkelijkte het be-
stuur op provinciaal en lokaal niveau. Het stelde de bestuurders in staat 
om de belangrijke taken te vervullen. Deze taken behelsden voornamelijk 
het innen van belastingen, bescherming van de dorpen en bevoorrading 
van de steden en de legers. In het geval van de provincie Damascus 
speelde de organisatie en bescherming van de hajj, de jaarlijkse pelgri-
mage naar de heiligdommen van Mekka, eveneens een zeer belangrijke 
rol, gezien het religieuze belang van de pelgrimage. 
De macht van bestuurders in de provincie was dermate groot dat zíj ia 
staat waren om andere bronnen dan de reguliere belastinginning aan te 
boren. Dit was mogelijk omdat de staat een grote verantwoordelijkheid 
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kende op het gebied van de instandhouding van de produktie en de distri-
butie van de, voornamelijk agrarische, produkten. De bestuurders ont-
plooiden veelal commerciële activiteiten om hun inkomsten te vergroten. 
Daartoe bestond ook zeker een noodzaak. De door de centrale auto-
riteiten toegewezen financiële middelen dekten namelijk niet de kosten 
die zij maakten. 
Dat de formele toewijzing van middelen tekort schoot, werd door de 
centrale autoriteiten misschien wel onderkend, maar niet formeel erkend. 
Vanuit hun oogpunt had dit beleid twee belangrijke voordelen. Ten 
eerste werden op deze manier budgétaire problemen opgelost in de pro-
vincie. Het tweede voordeel van het niet formeel erkennen van de nood-
zaak van extra inkomsten was dat deze inkomsten, en de manier waarop 
zij verkregen waren, een reden konden zijn voor de centrale autoriteiten 
om in te grijpen en hun deel van het surplus op te eisen. Met name dat 
laatste werd in het algemeen met succes nagestreefd. Niettemin waren er 
ook een aantal nadelen verbonden aan dit beleid. Zo verloren de centrale 
autoriteiten hun zicht op de werkelijke of potentiële opbrengsten van een 
provincie. Een belangrijk deel van het handelen van de lokale be-
stuurders onttrok zich aan directe controle. Een tweede nadeel was dat 
het systeem de opname van lokale elementen (ayân) in het bestuur 
bevorderde, terwijl centraal aangestelde bestuurders vaak een sterke lo-
kale machtsbasis wisten op te bouwen. Sommigen wisten zelfs een dynas-
tisch bestuur in delen van de Syrische provincies in te stellen, zoals de 
'Azm familie, die Hama als basis had. De centrale autoriteiten hadden 
hun bedenkingen over deze ontwikkeling, die vooral opgang deed in de 
achttiende eeuw, maar deze lokale groepen beschikten over relatief 
ruime middelen en waren daardoor beter in staat om de bestuurlijke 
taken te vervullen en om aan de financiële eisen van de centrale auto-
riteiten tegemoet te komen. 
De meest prominente rol in het bestuur werd vervuld door de aghawât; 
hetzij militaire ayân, dat wil zeggen het deel van de lokale bestuurselite 
met een militaire achtergrond, hetzij soldaten en officieren die van elders 
kwamen. Uit hun midden werden vrijwel alle uitvoerende functionarissen 
gerecruteerd. De andere belangrijke groep bestuurders waren de reli-
gieuze ayân, de \ilama', gerecruteerd uit lokale religieuze elite. Hoewel 
de militaire bestuurders over veel meer machtsmiddelen beschikten, was 
hun positie kwetsbaarder dan die van de religieuze ayân. De eersten 
toonden namelijk een sterke afhankelijkheid van de macht die de centrale 
autoriteiten aan hen delegeerden. Wisselingen in de wacht kwamen dan 
ook veelvuldiger voor bij hen dan bij de religieuze ayân, die hun auto-
riteit voor een belangrijk deel uit een andere bron verkregen. Zij waren 
de hoeders van de religieuze waarden en in het verlengde daarvan van lo-
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kale waarden. Daarnaast hadden zij een legitimerende functie gezien de 
claim van de sultan dat zijn macht door god gegeven was en dat hij, de 
sultan, borg stond voor de uitvoering van de Islamitische wet. De carrière 
van leden van de twee meest prominente families van Hama, Kaylânî (re-
ligieus) en 'Azm (militair), toont de stabiliteit van de groep van religieuze 
a'yân en de relatief onzekere positie van de militaire a'yân duidelijk aan. 
Gezien de machtsmiddelen die de aghawât hadden, alsook de vaak 
moeilijke omstandigheden waaronder zij opereerden, was misbruik van 
macht in belangrijke mate het domein van deze gewapende tak van het 
bestuur. In de periode 1785-1841 deden zich fluctuaties voor in de mate 
waarin en de manier waarop zij deze middelen aanwendden. Gedurende 
de hele periode waren het de aghawât die geassocieerd werden met 
onrechtmatig optreden. Gedurende de jaren 1785-1812, en met name 
rond het jaar 1800, kwam excessief gebruik van geweld vaak voor. Het 
beleid van de centrale autoriteiten in die tijd stimuleerde provinciaal en 
lokaal factionalisme, aangezien de leiders van concurrerende facties om 
beurten op leidende posities werden gezet. Dit beleid werd vooral in-
gegeven door de wens van de centrale autoriteiten om de macht van Jaz-
zâr Pasha van Akka te beteugelen. Deze gouverneur was erin geslaagd 
een sterke basis te creëren in het Syrische kustgebied door optimaal ge-
bruik te maken van de machtsmiddelen die hem ter beschikking stonden. 
Zijn repressieve bewind stuitte op veel onvrede. Verzet drukte hij 
gewelddadig de kop in. Dit waren jaren van zulm, onrecht, van groot-
schalig misbruik van macht, waaraan niet alleen Jazzâr Pasha en de aan 
hem gelieerde aghawât zich schuldig maakten, maar ook de 'Azms en 
andere facties. 
In het gebied van Hama leidde de concurrentieslag tussen de facties 
van Jazzâr Pasha en de 'Azm familie tot ontvolking; dorpelingen lieten 
hun akkers in de steek en zelfs stedelingen zochten een beter heenkomen 
in Libanon of de grotere steden in het binnenland. Een belangrijke laak, 
namelijk het beschermen van de produktie, was daarmee verwaarloosd. 
Uiteindelijk leidde dit er toe dat de provinciale facties hun bronnen van 
inkomsten uitputten. Mede daardoor wisten de centrale autoriteiten hun 
greep op de provincie Damascus na 1812 te versterken. 
De gewelddadige episode 1875-1812 deed het vertrouwen in de oude 
ideologie niet verzwakken. Deze ideologie verklaarde zelfs wat er ge-
beurde, namelijk dat de verstoring van de machtsrelaties had geleid tot 
de neergang van de welvaart. In de periode 1812-1832 toonden deze 
machtsrelaties en ook de rurale economie een zeker herstel, ondanks de 
sterke nomadische druk waaraan een groot deel van het Syrische binnen-
land in die periode bloot stond. Misbruik van macht, met name het opleg-
gen van illegale heffingen, bleef bestaan, maar in een mildere vorm dan 
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voorheen. Succesvolle bestuurders, dat wil zeggen zij die konden voldoen 
aan de eisen van de centrale overheid, waren juist diegenen die in staat 
waren om hun inkomsten op zowel legale als illegale wijze te verhogen. 
Faraj Aghâ, mutasallim van Hama, was daar een voorbeeld van. 
Wanneer in 1833 alle Syrische provincies bezet worden door de troe-
pen van de rebellerende gouverneur van Egypte, Muhammad 'Ali Pasha, 
krijgt de lokale bestuurselite voor het eerst te maken met een sterke ge-
centraliseerde controle. Niettemin opereerde Muhammad 'Ali Pasha in 
de context van de oude Osmaanse ideologie. Hij slaagde erin het 
dilemma van de delegatie van macht op te lossen. Het probleem van on-
toereikendheid van de bronnen van inkomsten wist hij echter niet op te 
lossen. Zijn bewind rustte in hoge mate op de inzet van veel troepen. On-
danks het relatief succesvolle economische beleid, kampte het Egyptische 
bewind met hoge, deels ongedekte uitgaven. Het overgrote deel van de 
bevolking ervoer het bewind als uitermate repressief en onrechtmatig. In 
tegenstelling tot het verleden maakte de staat niet alleen aanspraken op 
een groot deel van de produktie —de belastingdruk steeg sterk—, maar 
gedwongen arbeidsinzet en de invoering van dienstplicht betekende dat 
de bevolking uitzonderlijk zwaar werd aangeslagen. Verzet tegen deze 
maatregelen werd hard onderdrukt. Andermaal was er sprake van grote 
onrechtvaardigheid, maar nu waren het niet zozeer de lokale vertegen-
woordigers van de centrale staat die zich daaraan schuldig maakten, maar 
de centrale autoriteiten zelf, met als gevolg dat het Egyptische bewind in 
toenemende mate als illegitiem werd ervaren. 
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